ŚĀBARA-BHĀṢYA

Translated into English by
GANGANATHA JHA

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IN THREE VOLUMES

Vol. I



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PREFATORY NOTE.

Twenty-five years ago, when I started work on 'Indian Thought', in collaboration with the late Dr. George Thibaut, it was our ambition that we should between ourselves, complete the translation of the 'Bhasyas' of all the six Darshanas,—with the exception of course of the Bhasva on the Sankhya-Sutras which had already been done long before we came to the field. It is therefore a happy day for me,-my esteemed colleague is not here with me to share the happiness,—when I am able to see the fulfilment of that ambition. The Bhāsya on the Vedanta-Sūtras (Shānkara and Rāmānuja) has been translated by Dr. Thibaut (published in the Sacred Books of the East Series); the Bhāsya on the Vaishēsika-Sutras—along with the Kandali has been translated by me (published in the 'Pandit', Benares); the Bhasya on the Nyāya-Sūtras—along with the Vārtika,—was translated by me (published in the 'Indian Thought'); the Bhasya on the Yoga-Sutras was translated by me (published under the 'Theosophical Publication Fund, Bombay); and now the Bhasua on the Mimamsa-Sutras, translated by myself is being sent out to the world, in its First Volume. numbers of 'Indian Thought' contained a very small part of the translation of Shabara-Bhāsya from the pen of Dr. Thibaut, but the attempt did not proceed any farther, on account of his having been transferred to the Calcutta University, where he did not find time to continue his literary labours.

It is a matter of satisfaction to me that this work of mine (perhaps the last in my present life) has been able to secure a place in the 'Gaekwad's Orientan's Series'. It is a well-known fact that much important work has been, and is being, done at Baroda; and it is difficult nowadays to find a publisher for a work that has the misfortune of abpertaining to a field of scholarship which, never 'popular', is becoming increasingly 'umpopular' under the stress of the pressing conditions of modern times. The encouragement therefore that an Oriental Scholar receives at the hands of H.H. the Gaekwad becomes all the more appreciated. One hopes that the work offered here to the world of scholarship will be received with due indulgence, on account of the fact that Shabara-Bhāgya has been regarded as one of the most difficult 'Bhāgyas' by reason of its archaic language and cryptic style. The fact of its having been included in the 'Gaekwad's Series' lends encouragement to that hope.

The other two volumes are in Press; and from the efficient manner in which the Baptist Mission Press is doing the work, they may be expected to be ready in the course of the next two years.

The inevitable 'Introduction' dealing with 'Chronology' and other more or less speculative matters,—along with the full Index—will go with the last (third) Volume.

My thanks are due in the first place to my late lamented being a Covinda-dasa of Benares, who was 'the guiding spirit of my literary life', and next, to Dr. Benovtosh Bhattacharyva, the talented edition of the Garkwad's

Series for finding room for the work in the Series;—and lastly, but most of all, to H.H. the Maharaja Gaekwad himself for the encouragement that is extended to the world of scholarship through the work that is being done under the Oriental Institute.

I am specially beholden to my pupil and friend, Pandit Ksetresha Chandra Chattopadhyaya of the Allahabad University, who has carefully gone through the proofs and (what is more) supplied the references to the Vedic texts,—not an easy task, as all students of Mimāmsa know, to their cost.

'MITHILA', ALLAHABAD, 15th June, 1933. GANGANATHA JHA.

SHABARA-BHĀṢYA.

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
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ADHYĀYA I.

PADA I.

Adhikarana (1): Propounding of the Enquiry.

SŪTRA (1).

NEXT THEREFORE (COMES) THE ENQUIRY INTO DHARMA. $Bh\bar{a}sya$.

The words of the Sūtras are, so far as possible, to be understood in that same sense which they are known to convey in common parlance; it is not right to assume meanings for them on the basis of elliptical and other devices,—or to attribute to them any special technical signification. It is only in this way that all that would have to be done would be to explain the Vedic texts directly (with the help of the Sūtras); otherwise (if we did not take the words of the Sūtras in their ordinary sense), it would be necessary for us to explain the extraordinary (technical) meanings of the words of the Sūtras themselves, and then the texts of the Veda. This would involve a great exertion.

Objection:—"In common parlance, the term 'atha', 'next', is found to be expressive of sequence to an event; in the case of the present Sütra, however, we do not find any event; and yet there must be an event in sequence whereto the enquiry into Dharma would come in. It is only thus that the word 'atha', 'next', could be taken in its ordinary sense."

Answer:—Reading of the Veda would be the required event; as it is only after Reading the Veda has been accomplished that enquiry into Dharma follows.

Objection:—"It cannot be so; as it is possible to have an enquiry into Dharma after some other event also,—even before the Reading of the Veda."

Our answer to this is that the Teacher has used the term 'next' in reference to that particular kind of enquiry into Dharma which is not possible without the Reading of the Veda.—Why so?—Because in the course of this enquiry there will be various kinds of discussion over Vedic texts (and until we have studied the texts there can be no discussion of them). Further, we are not asserting that there is to be no enquiry into Dharma prior to the Reading of the Veda, and that the enquiry is to follow immediately after (Vedic Study). In fact, the single sentence (contained in the Stitus) could not deny the possibility of the enquiry into Dharma before the Reading of the Veda, and at the same time affirm the immediate sequence of the enquiry to the Reading; if this were to be done, then there would be two distinct sentences (involved in the Stitus): the form of the sentence denying the

possibility of the enquiry into Dharma before the Reading of the Veda would have to be different from that affirming its immediate sequence to that Reading. For instance, the affirmation in regard to the immediate sequence would be done by a sentence in the form '(the enquiry into Dharma is to be carried on! after one has read the Vedas', while the other (i.e., the denial of the possibility of the enquiry before the Reading of the Veda) would be done by a sentence in the contrary form [viz. 'enquiry into Dharma cannot be carried on before the Reading of the Veda']; and the author of the Sütra is going to declare later on that it is only when a group of words expresses a single idea that it can be taken as one sentence [while under the proposed construction, there are two distinct and contrary ideas].

Further, on the completion of the Reading of the Veda, there are two courses open (to the student): he may return home from the Teacher's House (after graduation), or he may (continue to remain there and) carry on an investigation into the meaning of Vedic texts; and the advice (contained in the $S\bar{u}tra$) is that one should not leave the Teacher's House; for if he did, how could he investigate the meaning of Vedic texts?

Objection:—"If that is the case, then, the difficulty is that the Reading of the Veda is not found to be mentioned as the necessary precursor (of enquiry into Dharma); as a matter of fact, the injunction is to the effect that 'Having read the Veda, one should take the Bath (which indicates the end of studentship)'; under the circumstances, after having studied the Veda, and thus having to perform the Final Bath,—if one were to (postpone the Bath, and) carry on the enquiry into Dharma, one would be transgressing the said injunction; and certainly it cannot be right to transgress an injunction."

The answer to this is as follows:-We shall certainly transgress the injunction, when we find that by not transgressing it we would be making the Veda, which is highly useful, entirely useless [by not studying the meaning of the texts]. The useful purpose served by the Veda has been found to be that it makes known to us our duties; persons learned in sacrificial lore do not speak of any useful result following from the mere reading (of the text). Even though there are passages which appear to speak of such result, they are mere hortatory exaggerations (Arthavāda); this is going to be made clear under Sūtra 4-3-1, where it is declared that—'in regard to the acts tending to the preparation of substances, the declaration of results should be taken as Arthavada, being meant, as they are, to be subservient to other purposes [i.e. purposes of the sacrifice]' .- Then again (in the injunction 'Having studied the Veda, one should take the Bath'), the immediate sequence of the Bath to the Reading of the Veda is not what is enjoined; in fact, there is no term in the sentence expressing immediate sequence; all that the past-participial affix 'ktva' (in the word 'adhītya', 'having read') has been laid down as signifying is the mere precedence (of the act denoted by the verbal root), and not the immediate sequence (of the next act). -Or. if immediate sequence were really meant, then it would preclude all notion of the Reading serving a perceptible purpose. [If the student were to take the Final Bath and go away immediately after reading the text of the Veds, then, he would have no time to acquire a knowledge of what is contained in the Veda, and it is the acquiring of this knowledge which is the perceptible purpose served by the reading of the Veda). Through the process of 'indirect indication' we get at the following meaning (of the injunction): As a matter of fact, it is not for any imperceptible (transcendental) purpose that the Bath has been enjoined; all therefore that the injunction can indirectly indicate is the cessation of all such restrictions as 'not-bathing' and the like (that are observed by the Religious Student),—such cessation being simultaneous with the completion of Vedic Study; what thus the entire meaning of the injunction is is that 'Having read the Veda, one should bathe,—but one shall not go away from the Teacher's House',—this further (implication) being necessary for the purpose of avoiding the contingency of the Bath being meant only for an imperceptible (transcendental) purpose.

For these reasons, the full meaning of the term 'atha', 'next', is that 'Having first accomplished the Reading of the Veda, one should next seek to know Dharma'. We do not mean that enquiry into Dharma should not be carried on after any other act (than the Reading of the Veda); all that we mean is that after having read the Veda, one should not hasten to take the Final Bath, he should immediately seek to know Dharma.—Such is the meaning of the term 'atha', 'next'.

The term 'atah', 'therefore', signifies reason, and refers to a definite fact; for example, in the sentence—'This country is one where food is easily obtainable, therefore I reside here'. Similarly, 'since the duly read Veda is known to be a reason for enquiry into Dharma, therefore after the reading of the Veda, Dharma should be enquired into',—such is the meaning of the term 'therefore'. One who has not read the Veda could never be able to study the Vedic texts for the purpose of knowing Dharma; 'therefore'—For this reason—one should seek to enquire into Dharma after having read the Veda. Such is the meaning of the term 'atah', 'therefore'.

The compound term 'dharmajijñāsā' ('enquiry into Dharma') is to be expounded as 'dharmāya jijnāsā' ('wish for the knowledge of Dharma'); and 'jijñāsā' ('enquiry') is the 'wish to know'.-" In what manner is the enquiry into Dharma to be carried on?"-The questions to be investigated are—(a) What is Dharma?, (b) By what is Dharma indicated?, (c) What are the right means of accomplishing Dharma?, (d) What are the wrong means of accomplishing Dharma?, and (e) What is the end or purpose of Dharma? The first two questions—'What is Dharma' and 'By what is Dharma indicated '-have been dealt with by the single Sūtra 'Chodanālaksano'rtho dharmah' (next Sūtra); the remaining three questions-'What are the right means of accomplishing Dharma', 'What are the wrong means of accomplishing Dharma', and 'What is the purpose of Dharma'—the meaning of the last question being 'in what cases does the Dharma subserve the purposes of man and in what cases is the human agent only a subordinate factor',-are dealt with by the third and subsequent adhyāyas.

Objection:— Dharma must be something which is either known or not known. If it is known, then there need be no enquiry into it; if on the other hand, it is something not known, then there is all the more reason why there can be no enquiry into it. Thus the whole section dealing with

'enquiry into Dharma' is absolutely futile. Or, is there any purpose in it?"

Answer:—As a matter of fact, learned men have held divergent views regarding Dharma: some people regard one thing as 'Dharma', some regard a totally different thing as 'Dharma'. Under the circumstances, if a man were to undertake an act without due consideration, he might take up any one act at random and would thereby ruin himself and also incur evil consequences. For this reason it is necessary to carry on enquiry into Dharma; specially as we declare that Dharma endows man with the highest good.

The next Sūtra describes what this Dharma is.

Adhikarana (2): Definition of Dharma. Sūtra (2).

DHARMA IS THAT WHICH IS INDICATED BY (KNOWN BY MEANS OF)
THE VEDA AS CONDUCIVE TO THE HIGHEST GOOD.

Bhāsya.

'The term 'Chodanā' they use in the sense of the injunctive text; men are found saying 'I am doing this act on being enjoined (choditah) by the Teacher.'—'Lakşana' is that by which something is indicated (pointed out); for instance, when fire is indicated by smoke, they say that smoke is the 'lakṣana' (indicator) of fire.—That which is indicated by the said Injunctive Text is 'artha', 'something conducive to the highest good; that is, it brings man into contact with his highest good;—this is what we assert.

As a matter of fact, it is the Vedic Injunction which is capable of making known (indicating) what is past, present or future, also what is subtle or hidden or remote and such like; this cannot be done by any organ of sense. [But what is indicated or made known by the Vedic text is only an act, something to be done, or things connected with that act, and not any accomplished thing;—says Rjuvimalā].

Objection:—"It is possible that the Veda may say what is wrong or false; just as it is possible for an ordinary assertion,—such as 'there are fruits on the banks of the river'—to be true or false. [So that the proposition that the 'Veda brings happiness to man' would be doubtful; because the Veda is in the form of words, and words are found to be true as also false; hence there can be no certainty or confidence in what the Veda may assert; that is, there can be nothing of which the Veda could be regarded as the 'laksana' or 'pramāṇa', the means of right cognition].'

Our answer to the above is as follows:—There is self-contradiction involved in the assertion that "the Veda asserts, and asserts what is false" When the Veda is said to 'assert', what is meant is that it makes known,—i.e. becomes the means of something being known; when something becomes known on the presence of some means, this latter is said to make the former known. Such being the case, if on the presence of the Veda, it actually becomes known that 'from the Agnihotra follows heaven',—how can it be said that such is not the case [i.e. heaven does not follow

from Agnihotra]? If such were not the case, how could it be spoken of as becoming known? To assert that a thing does not exist and yet becomes known, involves a contradiction in terms. Then again, the idea brought about by the assertion 'Desiring heaven, one should perform sacrifices' is not an uncertain one; i.e. it is not in the form 'heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices'; [in fact, the idea is a definitely certain one-that heaven does follow], and when this is cognised for certain, it cannot be false. That cognition (or idea) alone is false which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion 'such is not the actual case'; the idea in question (that heaven follows from the performance of sacrifices) is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong.

As regards the assertion of ordinary men, if it emanates from a trustworthy person,—or if it pertains to something that is directly perceived by the senses,-it must be true; if, on the other hand, it emanates from an untrustworthy person,-or if it pertains to something that cannot be perceived directly by the senses,-then it is unreliable, proceeding as it does merely from the mind of a human being. Because such a thing (which is not perceptible by the senses) cannot be known by men except by means of words [and the words of an untrustworthy person cannot be reliable]. Dharma being something not perceptible by the senses, it can be known only by means of words,-and these words, to be entirely reliable, should not be such as proceed from a human source, which is not absolutely reliable, by reason of the inherent incapability of the human mind to comprehend things beyond the senses. -It might be urgued that the man making the assertion had its source in the previous assertion of another man.—But this previous assertion also would be as unreliable as the other one; and in regard to such things (as are beyond the senses) the words of men cannot be a reliable source of knowledge; just as the words of persons born blind cannot be a reliable source of knowledge regarding shades of colour.

Objection:—"It is not possible for persons not knowing a thing to impart instruction about it; and Manu and others have actually imparted instruction (about Dharma); from this it follows that good men have possessed the knowledge (of Dharma) [Read 'purusāt' for 'purusāt'; with 'purusāt', the meaning would be that 'good men have learnt it from a human source'; this would not go with the next sentence]; just as the fact that colour is apprehended by the eye is deduced only from the fact that the man sees it."

The answer to the above is as follows:—As regards instructions, they might proceed from illusion or wrong knowledge also. [Hence the very fact of human beings having imparted instructions does not necessarily prove that these instructors possessed the right knowledge of Dharma]; such instructions, in the absence of illusions, proceed also from the Veda [and in the case of the Veda there is no room for illusion or wrong knowledge, as there is no human agency involved, while in the case of human instructors, there is always a chance of mistakes and illusions and ignorance.—But in

the case of teachings emanating from human sources, the notion derived is in the form, 'this man, the speaker, knows this thing to be so and so', and not in the form, 'the thing is so and so'; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the notion derived from human assertions is not always compatible with the truth; in the case of the Vedic assertion on the other hand, there is nothing to indicate its falsity.-" There is the inference from analogy: Having found the human assertion to be false, we infer, from its analogy, that the Vedic assertion also, being an assertion (like the human assertion) must be false."-It is not so; because the two cases are not analogous; the falsity of one assertion cannot prove the falsity of another; simply because it is another (not the same, assertion); for instance, because Devadatta is dark, it does not follow that Yajñadatta also is dark. Then again your idea that 'the Vedic assertion must be false because it is of the same kind as the human assertion (which is found to be false)' is of the nature of an indirect inference based upon a premiss, while the idea derived from the Vedic assertion is of the nature of direct cognition; and no indirect inferential cognition can have any validity when it is opposed to a direct cognition.-From all this we conclude that 'what is learnt from the Veda is conducive to the highest good.'

Objection:—"If such is the case, then what should be enquired into is something that is conducive to good [which must be a well-established entity]; what could be the use of enquiry into Dharma [which is not a well-established entity, but something that has itself got to be brought into existence]?"

The answer to this is that what is conducive to good is exactly what is expressed by the term 'Dharma'.

"How are we to know that this is so ?"

If a man performs sacrifices, he is called a 'performer of dharma' ('dhārmika'); when a man does an act, he is called after that act; e.g. the person who does the act of purifying [or cooking, if we accept the reading 'pāchakaḥ' for 'pāvakaḥ'] is called 'the performer of purification' ('pāvaka') and one who performs the act of cutting is called 'the performer of cutting' ('lāvaka'). Thus it is that what brings to the man the highest good is what is spoken of by means of the word 'dharma' ['sacrificing' brings the highest good to man,—and it is the act of sacrificing that is denoted by the term 'dharma']. This is found to be so not only in common parlance; in the Veda also we find the passage—'Yajnen yajnanayajanta devāḥ, tāni dharmāni prathamānyāsan'. ['By sacrifice did the detites offer sacrifices, and these were the first dharmas'], (Rgveda 10. 9. 16) where what is denoted by the term 'yaji' (i.e. the term 'yājña', 'sacrifice') is precisely what is spoken of as 'dharma'.

As a matter of fact, the Veda indicates both what is moral and what is immoral.—'" What is moral?'"—That which is conducive to good, such as the *Jyotisjama* and other acts.—" What is immoral?"—That which leads to evil (sin), such as the *Shyena*, the *Vajra*, the *Isu* and other (malevolent) acts.—Thus the *Stira* has used the term 'artha', 'what is conducive to good', in order to preclude the possibility of the *Immoral act* (which is not conducive to good) being included under the term 'dharma'.

Objection :- "Why should the immoral act be so called ?"

Reply:—Because it involves inflicting of injury, and the inflicting of injury has been forbidden.

Objection:—"How then is it that an immoral act (in the shape of the Shyena sacrifice, for instance) is enjoined as something that should be done?"

The answer to this is that the Shyena and other such (malevolent) sacrifices are nowhere found to be spoken of as what should be done; they are indicated only in the form that 'if a man desires to inflict injury upon another, the performance (of the Shyena) would be the means for that purpose '; what the Vedic text says is only that 'one desiring to inflict injury may perform the Shyena' (of Sahvinisha-Brāhmana 8. 1-2),—not that 'one should inflict injury'. [The man is urged to undertake the performance of the Shyena entirely by his desire to inflict injury, not by any Vedic text enjoining that act as what ought to be done.]

Objection:—"The Sūtra as it stands is not capable of expressing all this—
(a) that 'Dharma is that which is indicated by the Veda, and not what is indicated by the senses and other means of knowledge', (b) that 'Dharma is moral, not immoral'. Because the Sūtra contains a single sentence; and it would involve a syntactical split of the sentence, if it were taken as expressing the said two propositions."

The answer to this is that such syntactical split is objectionable only in cases where the idea is meant to be expressed by a regularly formed sentence; and this is so only in the case of Vedic texts, not in Sūtras; because a Sūtra is understood to be merely indicative of what is gathered from other sources; so that it is only parts of propositions that are indicated (sūtryatē) in the Sūtra; in fact that is why it is called a 'Sūtra' (Aphorism). Thus it is that the present Sūtra is to be taken as containing the parts of the two distinct propositions (mentioned above by the Objector).—Or, the Sūtra may be construed as containing the single proposition that 'Dharma is that particular act conducive to the highest good which is indicated by the Veda'; so that there is a single proposition and there is no syntactical split involved.

Adhikarana (3): Investigation of the Means of knowing Dharma.

SŪTRA (3).

THE EXAMINATION OF ITS MEANS [follows].

Bhāsya.

It has been declared by us that 'the knowledge of *Dharma* is brought about by means of the Veda'; but that was a mere assertion; we shall now proceed to examine the means of that knowledge: Is the Veda alone the means, or is there something else also? Until this examination has been made, it cannot be known for certain that 'Dharma is' that which is indicated by the Veda as conducive to the highest good' (Sū. 2).

Adhikarana (4): Dharma not amenable to such means of Cognition as Sense-perception and the like.

SŪTRA (4).

THAT COGNITION BY A PERSON WHICH APPEARS WHEN THERE IS CON-TACT OF THE SENSE-ORGANS IS 'SENSE-PERCEPTION', AND IT IS NOT A MEANS (OF KNOWING DHARMA), AS IT APPEHENDS

Bhāsya.

The examination promised in the preceding Sūtra) is as follows:—Sense-perception is not the means (of knowing Dharma),—why?—because the character of Sense-perception is that it is that cognition by a person, etc.' (sūtra); that is, it is that cognition which a man has when his sense-organs are in contact with the object cognised.—Dharma however is something that is yet to come, and it does not exist at the time that it is to be known;—while Sense-perception is the apprehending of an object that is actually present and not non-existent at the time (of cognition);—hence Sense-perception cannot be the means (of knowing Dharma).

In the Sūtra, no stress is meant to be laid upon either 'cognition', or the 'appearance', or upon mere 'contact'; the only factor meant to be emphasized is the fact of its being such as is possible only when there is contact between the sense-organ and the object, and not when there is no such contact between them. If stress were laid upon several factors, then there would be syntactical split.

As for (the other means of Cognition,) Inference, Analogy, and Apparent Inconsistency, these also presuppose (are based upon) Sense-perception; hence these also cannot be the means (of knowing Dharma).

Nor can *Dharma* be amenable to 'Negation' [i.e. it cannot be regarded as non-existent; because of the reason given in the next Sūtra which indicates the real means of knowing Dharma].

Adhikarana (5): Dharma cognisable by means of Verbal Injunctions.

SŪTRA (5).

THE RELATION OF THE WORD WITH ITS DENOTATION IS INBORN.—
INSTRUCTION IS THE MEANS OF KNOWING IT (Dharma),—
INFALLIBLE REGARDING ALL THAT IS IMPERCEPTIBLE; IT
IS A VALID MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, AS IT IS INDEPENDENT.—ACCORDING TO BĀDARĀYANA.

Bhāsya.

"Autpattika" ('inborn'),—what we mean by this is 'constant'. It is existence (presence) that is figuratively spoken of as 'origin'. What is meant is that the relation between word and its meaning is inseparable.—It becomes the means of knowing ['jñāyatē anena iti jñānam' says the Shlokavārtika 5. 91 Dharma in the shape of Agnihotra and such acts, which are not known by means of Sense-perception and such other means of knowledge.- "How so?"-Because there is 'Instruction'; 'instruction' stands for the speaking of a particular set of words. [Thus it is the Word, in the form of Instruction or Injunction, which is the means of knowing Dharma.]-Of this 'means of knowledge' there is 'infallibility'; i.e. the cognition brought about by that means never fails (is never wrong); when a cognition is not found to be wrong, it cannot be said with regard to it that 'this is not so', or 'the real thing is not as it is represented by this cognition', or 'the real thing is otherwise than what is represented in this cognition', or 'it may be that the idea in the mind of the speaker is different from what is expressed by his words', or 'the words used give rise to contradictory ideas, representing the same thing as existing and as nonexisting' .-- For these reasons (since cognition brought about by words is not fallible), it is 'a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent'. That is, when a cognition has been brought about by means of words, there is no need for any other cognition (to corroborate it), or of any other person as having the same cognition.-The mention of 'Bādarāyana' means that 'what is stated here is the opinion of Bādarāyana'; and the name is mentioned only for the purpose of showing reverence to Bādarāyana, and it does not mean that what is stated is not the author's (Jaimini's) own opinion.

There has been some confusion regarding the exact extent of the 'Vpttikāragrantha' introduced by Shabara on page 7, line 18. This confusion has been due to the Editor of the Bhāṣya (Bib. Ind. Ed.), who puts the words 'Vpttikāramatam samāptam' (at the end of Bhāṣya, page 18, line 6); and to the Editor of the Shlokavārtika who has put the words 'Vpttikāragranthah samāptah' at the end of 26 Kārikās.

As a matter of fact, the ' $Vrttik\bar{u}ragrantha$ ' starts with page 7, line 18, and ends with the end of the Bhāṣya on $S\bar{u}tra$ 5, page 24, line 11.

That all this represents ' $Vrtitk\bar{a}ragrantha$ ' is borne out by Mandana Mishra who says in his $Mim\bar{a}ms\bar{a}nukrananik\bar{a}$ —

बक्कणं वक्तुकासेन तसर्थं सीवसिच्छता। एक्तिकारसतेनेयं विस्त्रवी वर्ण्यतेऽन्यणा॥

The 'bahu-artha' spoken of here can only be all those philosophical topics that we find dealt with in the Bhāṣya (pages 7 to 24). If it had referred only to what is said regarding the Pratyakṣapramāna, Mandana Mishra could have had no justification in speaking of it as 'bahu-artha,' 'many topics.'—The so-called 'Vrtikāramatam' in the Shlokavārtika also deals with a part of Sūtra 4 only; and if this was all that was meant by the Vrtikāra, then the Bhāṣya would have introduced it after Sūtra 4 and not after Sūtra 5.

The interpretation of the Vrtikäragrantha, according to this view, is as follows: Sūtra 3 puts forward the view that it is not necessary to carry on a detailed enquiry into the question of Pramāṇa for Dharma. [In this case a na has to be added to the Sūtra which necessity has led Prabhākara to the view that the Bhāṣyakāra is quoting the 'Vrtikāramata,' not with approval, but only as a view held by 'others,' 'para-mata']; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the exact nature of all Pramāṇas, including Shabda or Chodanā is already well known. A gainst this the opponent urges (Bhāṣya, pages 7,1, 21) that examination is necessary

on account of the chances of error.—This objection is answered in the first half of Sūtra 4, where the right perceptional process is described (this is obtained by transposing $\overline{q}q$ and $\overline{q}q$), and it is shown that Perception by itself is never erroneous, and must be accepted as valid until we discover some defect in the process leading up to it. Similarly with Inference and the other forms of Cognition.—This goes on up to Bhāṣya, page 10, line 10.—The upshot of all this is that all cognition is inherently valid.—Next the opponent raises the objection against the prāmāŋya of Shabba specially (page 10, 1.22). This objection—according to the Vṛthkāra—is embodied in the second part of Sūtra 5; and after a series of objections and counter-objections, the final conclusion on the point is stated on page 18, 1.6.—The discussion regarding Ātman also arising out of what occurs in the Vṛthkāramata, this latter mata must be taken as extending up to the end of Sūtra 5 (page 24, line 11).

According to the Brhati and Rjuvimala, the Bhasya does not approve of the explanation propounded by the $V_I titk ara;$ but according to Mandana Mishra, the Bhasya has purposely introduced this explanation as it provides Shabara with the opportunity of dealing with many philosophical topics.

The author of the *Vrtti* has explained the text beginning with Sūtra (3) [i.e. Sūtras 3, 4, and 5) in the following entirely different manner]:—

[The Siddhānta view propounded in the Sūtra (3) is that] the means of knowing Dhanna's need not be examined (Sūtra 3) [The negativing 'na' has got to be added in this case]; because Sense-perception and the other Means of Cognition are all well known; and as for the Scripture (Shāstra, Veda), this also is included among those same Means of Cognition; hence this latter also need not be examined.

The argument against this is that the examination is necessary, because of mistakes; for instance, the shell is sometimes actually perceived as silver, which shows that Sense-perception is sometimes wrong; and if Sense-perception may be wrong, it follows that Inference and the other Means of Cognition, being based upon Sense-perception, may also be wrong. Such being the case, if one were to act entirely in accordance with the notions derived through the said Means of Cognition,—without an examination (regarding the validity or otherwise of the means concerned),—he would fail in his purpose, and might, at times, come by what is undesirable.

Siddhantin:—It is not so; as what is real Sense-perception is never wrong; what is wrong is not Sense-perception. What is real Sense-perception is explained in Sitra (4), which (being construed by transposing 'sat' and 'at') means that 'That Cognition is real Sense-perception (sat pratyaksam) which appears when there is contact of the sense-organs with the object perceived (tatsamprayoge)'; that is to say, when the sense-organs are in contact with the object actually perceived, the resultant cognition of the man is real Sense-perception,—and it is not real Perception when the object perceived is different from that with which the Sense-organ is in contact. [So that in a case where the shell has been perceived as silver, what is perceived is the silver while the eye is in contact with the shell, not with the silver; hence this is not a case of real Sense-perception at all!

Question:—"How is it to be understood that one perception appears on the actual contact (of the sense-organ) with the object perceived, and another does not appear on such contact?"

Answer:—When it is found that at the time of the perception in question, there is no contact (of the sense-organ concerned) with any object other than the one perceived, it follows that the perception has appeared on the contact with the object actually perceived; and when the contrary is the case, the perception is taken as following upon contact with something other than the object perceived.

Question:—"But, how can this be ascertained,—when, as a matter of fact, at the time that a person perceives the shell to be silver, he thinks that his eyes are actually in contact with real silver?"

Answer:—In cases where a perception is subsequently followed by a sublative cognition to the contrary—such as 'in reality it is not as I have perceived, my perception has been wrong',—it is understood that the perception in question had appeared on the contact of the sense-organ with something other than the object perceived; while in cases where no such sublative cognition appears, it is understood that the perception had appeared on actual contact with the object perceived.

Question:—"How can this distinction be made before the appearance of the sublative cognition? In fact, at the time that the perception actually appears, there is nothing to differentiate a right cognition from a wrong one (until the subsequent appearance or otherwise of the sublative cognition)."

Answer:—A cognition is wrong, (a) when the mind is affected by some sort of derangement [the reading 'chakşurādibhh': is apparently wrong; what is wanted is some word expressive of a mental derangement],—or (b) when the sense-organ concerned (i.e. the eye) is beset by darkness or other such disabilities,—or (c) when the object itself suffers from such disabilities as being too subtle (for perception) and so forth. While in cases where none of the three (mind, sense-organ, and object) suffers from these defects, the cognition is right. What brings about a right cognition is the contact of the sense-organ, the mind, and the object; when there is no such contact, the cognition is wrong; hence what leads to a wrong cognition is a defect in (one or the other of) the three factors (mind, sense-organ, and object). [In place of 'ubhaya', which means both, we should have 'tritaya' or some such word expressing three];—when these are defective, the cognition becomes urong.

Question :- "How do you know this?"

Answer:—It follows from the fact that on the disappearance of the defects, there appears the cognition which is recognised by all persons as right.

Question:—"How is one to know if any of the three is defective or free from defects?"

Answer:—Even on careful scrutiny, if we do not find any defect, we should conclude that there is no defect, simply because there is nothing to show that there is a defect.

From all this it follows that only that cognition is wrong the means whereof are defective, or with regard to which there is a substive cognition that 'it is wrong'—and no other cognition can be regarded as wrong. [And

as all cognitions are not wrong, as stated by the Opponent, there can be no need for any examination of the Means of Cognition in general.]

[The Opponent next attacks the validity of Sense-cognition in general on the basis of Idealism]—"All cognition is baseless (without a real substratum in the external world), like dream-cognition. In the case of Dreams, we have found that Cognition has no real substratum;—waking cognition, also in the form 'a pillar' or 'a wall' and so forth, is a Cognition;—hence waking cognition also must be without a real substratum." [This objection is introduced here with the view that if there is no real object in the external world, there can be no contact of the sense-organs with an object of perception; and hence no perception could fulfil the essential condition laid down in the definition of Sense-perception; which would mean that Cognitions are in their very nature wrong; and hence an examination of the Means of Cognition is necessary.]

The cognition of the 'pillar' that one has during the waking state is positively determinate; how then could it be wrong?

"In dream also the same cognition was equally positively determinate, before waking; there is no difference in the character (of the dream-cognition and the waking cognition of the pillar)."

It is not so; in the case of dream-cognition we find that it is sublated (set aside, rejected, on waking), which is not the case with the other cognition (i.e. waking cognition).

"But from the analogy of the dream-cognition, to which the waking cognition is similar, it may be presumed that *sublation* will follow in the case of the waking cognition also."

This presymption in the case of the waking cognition would be possible only if the falsity of the dream-cognition were due to its being a cognition. That is to say, if the falsity of the Dream-cognition were due to the fact that it cognises, i.e. apprehends,-then, inasmuch as waking cognition also is a comition in the same sense, it could not be said that this latter is otherwise (i.e. not false). As a matter of fact, however, the falsity of the Dreamcognition is inferred from other reasons, such for instance, as the fact of its being sublated by a cognition to the contrary—"How?"—When a man is sleepy, his mind is weak (inactive, not alert); and hence it is sleepiness which is the cause of falsity in the cognition appearing at the beginning and the end of sleep; and during deep sleep, there is no cognition at all; as it is only when a man is entirely unconscious that he is said to be 'in deep sleep'.-From all this we conclude that the cognition of the waking man is not false.-"But during the waking state also, there may be some defect in the instruments of perception (which would give rise to false cognitions)."-If there were such a defect it would be detected .- "Even at the time of dreaming, the defect in the cognitive instrument is not detected."—But in this latter case. on waking, the man realises that his mind had been beset with sleepiness [so that the defect is actually cognised in this casel.

The 'baselessness' or falsity of Cognitions as cognitions has been rejected on the general ground that no cognition can be regarded as baseless or false unless it is found to have been brought about by means of defective Instruments. This is

met by the Opponent with the assertion that cognitions have to be regarded as false or baseless, not only because they are brought about by means of defective instruments, but chiefly because they are devoid of a real external object,—hence there can be no real contact between the sense-organ and the object;—hence there can be no valid perception which has been defined as Cognition brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.]

[There has been some confusion of thought in regard to the exact position of the two sections which have been called by the editors from ancient times, 'Nirālambanavāda' and 'Shūnyavāda'; which has led to the idea (a) that the portion of the Bhāsua preceding the words 'shūnyastu' deals with the doctrine of Idealism that there is no real object in the external world, hence all cognition is baseless .-- and (b) that with the words 'Shūnuastu' the Bhasva introduces the doctrine of Nihilism. that nothing, not even Idea, exists.—But this interpretation of the Bhāsva is entirely wrong. From the last verse of the so-called 'Shunyavada' section of the Shlokavārtika it is clear that the whole of that section is meant to establish the reality of the external object, in confutation of the doctrine of Idealism, and the only argument in refutation of the doctrine of Nihilism is that 'when the reality of the external object cannot be denied, it is all the more unreasonable to deny the reality of the Idea or Cognition'; so that the Madhyamika doctrine of Shunyavada is not what is meant to be directly introduced or attacked in the Bhasya beginning with the words 'Shūnyastu', which, in reality, is only a continuation of the refutation of the doctrine that there is no real external object. This is made clear by the section of the Bhasua concluding with the words 'Ato na niralambanah pratuauah'. ' for this reason, cognition is not devoid of a real substratum', -The Brhati clearly says-"It should not be thought that the section of the Bhasya preceding the words 'Shūnyastu' has refuted the denial of the real external substratum of Cognitions, and the section beginning with 'Shūnyastu' proceeds to deal with the Mādhyamika doctrine of Nihilism. Because the shūnyatā, 'voidness', spoken of in the Bhāsya is meant to be the voidness of the Cognition itself-i.e. the cognition is devoid of a real object,-and it is not that the Idea or Cognition itself is denied."-According to Kumārila (Shlokavārtika, Shūnyavāda, verse 3), the question discussed in the Bhāsya beginning with 'Shūnyastu' is-" Is it a fact that Cognition is able to function only when such objects as the Pillar and the like have an existence in the external world-or is it that Cognition rests in itself as the object cognised, and not in any object extraneous to itself?" So according to this also, the Bhasya does not introduce here a separate discussion of the Mādhyamika doctrine of Nihilism.]

Opponent:—"But as a matter of fact, Cognition is an empty void—[i.e. devoid of substantial reality or foundation in the external world].—Why?—Because we do not perceive any difference between the form of the Object and (its) Cognition. What is perceived (by the senses) is the Cognition, hence we conclude that there is no form of any object apart from that Cognition itself."

Answer:—This would be so if the Cognition had the form of the Object; as a matter of fact, however, our Cognition is without form; it is the external object that has form, and is actually apprehended as existing in external space. Then again, the objective of the Sense-cognition is the object, not another Cognition; and this for the simple reason that Cognition, having only a momentary existence (specially according to the Opponent, Bauddha), could never continue till the appearance of the other cognition (of which it could form the objective).

The Opponent might argue as follows:-

"[Is it not a fact, according to the Siddhāntin himself that] it is while itself coming into existence that the Cognition becomes cognised, and at the same time makes the other object (the external objective) cognised,—as is found to be the case with the Lamp (which is itself seen and renders other things visible)? [This argument is put in the mouth of the opponent, not as setting forth his own view, but only as against the contention of the Siddhāntin that Cognition cannot form the objective of a Cognition; the idea of the opponent being that even the Siddhāntin cannot deny the fact that a Cognition, while making its own objective cognised, must itself be cognised]."

We deny this; no one ever cognises a Cognition until the object has been cognised; it is only after the object has become cognised that the person comes to know of the Cognition, and this is through Inference [that is, according to us, the existence of the Cognition is only inferred from the fact of the object being cognised, which would not be possible if there were no cognition]; and thus there can be no simultaneity between the cognition of the Object and the cognition of the Cognition itself.

Opponent:—" Even so (according to you), it is only after the Cognition has come into existence that you speak of the object as 'cognised', which cannot be done until the Cognition had come into existence; so that (even according to your own view that there can be no simultaneity) the fact would appear to be that it is the Cognition that comes into existence (and is cognised) first, and it is only after this that the object is known as 'cognised' [so that it cannot be true to assert that the Cognition becomes cognised by Inference after the object has been cognised]."

Answer:—It is true that the Cognition appears first; but it is not cognised first; it sometimes happens that even a cognised object is spoken of as 'not cognised' [when for instance, on referring to the past, a man says 'I do not remember that I ever knew this thing', even in cases where the thing might have actually been known to the man in the past,—says the Shlokavārtika].

Further, the form of the cognition is never apprehended except in terms of the object [which could not be the case if both Cognition and Object were englised by Sense-perception; we never, for example, perceive Colour in terms of Touch, says the Rjuvimala]. Hence the Cognition cannot be spoken of (as the object of perception); and what cannot be so spoken of cannot be the objective of Sense-perception. Thus it is that Cognition cannot be the objective of Sense-perception. [It can only be an objective of Inference].

Further, even if the Cognition and the Object were identical in form, it would be the Cognition that would have to be denied (a separate existence), and not the Object which is actually perceived. As a matter of fact, however, the two are not identical in form; when we infer a Cognition (from the fact of the object being cognised), we infer it without a form (simply as 'cognition', not as 'cognition of such and such a thing'),—whereas when we directly perceive an object, we perceive it with a form.

From all this it follows that Cognition has its substratum in the object. Further, whenever the cognition of 'cloth' appears, it does so invari-

ably only when the yarns (composing the cloth) are there [which establishes a permanent connection between the cognition and the object in the shape of the cloth, whose existence therefore cannot be denied]. If this were not so (if there were no such relationship between the cognition of cloth and the cloth), then even when the yarns would be there, it might be possible for a man with perfectly healthy organs to have the cognition of the 'Jar'. This however never happens. Hence we conclude that Cognition is not without a substratum (in the external world).

Thus the conclusion is that Sense-perception is never false or wrong. [And hence no examination of it is necessary].

When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship (of Invariable Concomitance) leads to the cognition of the other factor of that relationship,-which latter is not in contact with the person's sense-organs,this second Cognition is what is called 'Anumana', 'Inference' (Inferential Cognition). (We take the compound 'Jñātasambandha' in the sense of 'well-recognised relationship', according to the Shlokavārtika, 2: which appears to give the simplest meaning.]-This Inferential Cognition is of two kinds-(1) that based upon a directly perceived relationship, and (2) that based upon a generalised relationship; as an example of the former, we have the (inferential) Cognition of 'Fire' following from the Cognition of 'Smoke' (which is based upon the invariable concomitance of Smoke and Fire which has been directly perceived in the kitchen); and as an example of the second kind of Inference we have the case where finding that the sun changes its position we infer that 'the sun is moving', -on the ground of our experience that in the case of the person Devadatta we have found that it is only after he moves that he changes his position (which experience has led us to the generalised premiss that 'whenever an object changes its' position it moves', and it is on this generalised premiss that the inference of the movement of the sun is based).

'Shāstra' 'scripture', (Injunction), is that means of cognising the object not in contact with the senses, (i.e. Dharma and Adharma) which follows from verbal cognition. [The Bhāsya does not waste time in providing a definition of 'Word' or 'Verbal Cognition' in general,-it defines only the particular form of 'Word', 'Injunction',-because it is only in reference to the means of Cognising Dharma, which has been declared to be Injunction alone, that the Vrttikara is proving the unnecessary character of an examination of the Means of Cognition; hence the term 'shabda' stands for the Vedic or scriptural word, and 'artha' for 'Dharma and Adharma' which form the special subject-matter of Scripture.-Shlokavārtika, Shabda, 8-13.-According to the Rjuvimalä, 'Shabdavijñāna' stands for the 'cognition of things through Word'-i.e. the cognition of something to be done; and the 'asannikrsta artha' is Injunction, urging to action; hence 'Shāstra' is that means of cognising Injunction which is derived from that knowledge of something to be done which is obtained through words.]-[And these two means of cognition also being well known do not need to be examined.]

'Upamāna', 'Analogy'—i.e. similitude—also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses. For instance, the sight of the Gavaya (which is similar to the cow) brings about the remembrance of the

cow (as being similar to the Gavaya). [According to Rjuvimalā, the meaning of the sentence is 'the sight of the Gavaya brings about the analogical cognition that "the animal seen is called Gavaya", to the man who 'has remembered the cow'. This is the same as the Nyāya view, which has been controverted by the Shlokavārtika, whose rendering of the passage has been adopted in the translation.] [And as this Analogy is well-known, it does not need to be examined.]

'Arthāpatti', 'Presumption', also consists in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard would not be possible without that presumption; for instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house, and this non-existence in the house leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house [as without this, the aforesaid fact of his being alive and not in the house could not be explained.] [This also needs no examination.]

Abhāva, 'Negation', 'Non-apprehension', stands for the non-existence (non-operation) of the (five) means of Cognition (described above); and it is what brings about the cognition that 'it does not exist', in regard to things not in contact with the senses. [That is, in a case where Sense-perception and the other means of Cognition are not found to be operative towards bringing about the notion of the existence of a certain thing, we have the notion of the non-existence of that thing; and the means by which this notion is brought about is called 'Abhāva'—Shlokavārtika, Abhāva 1.] [This also being well-known, does not need to be examined.]

From all this it follows that (all) means of Cognition being well-known, they need not be examined.

The opponent raises a fresh objection :- "Sense-perception and the rest may be right means of Knowledge; but Word (Injunction) can never be so :-Why?—The word (Vedic Injunction) is not a means of true knowledge, because what exists is actually perceived (Sütra 4, latter part). The Injunction (of the Chitra sacrifice, for instance, for the purpose of acquiring cattle) is not a means of right knowledge; because if a thing which is perceptible is not perceived, it is taken as non-existent; as in the case of the Hare's Horn (which, not being perceived, is taken as non-existent); now (as regards the Chitra sacrifice which is enjoined as bringing about the acquisition of Cattle) Cattle and such other things are such as could be perceived by means of the sense-organs; and yet we find that no cattle are found to appear after the performance of the sacrifice (Chitra) enjoined for one desiring Cattle; and from this it follows that the sacrifice does not bring about Cattle [and hence that the Vedic Injunction is false, i.e. not a means of right cognition.] The effect of an act must appear at the time of the performance of the act itself; for instance, the pleasure derived from massage appears at the time of the massage itself.-It might be argued that the act may bring about its result at some future time.—But any result that may appear at some future time we cannot regard as being the result of that particular Act; -why ?-because at the time when the Act itself was there, it did not bring about its result; while at the time when the result does appear, the Act itself is not there; and being itself non-existent, how could it be the bringer about of the

result ?-Then again, of the particular effect (acquisition of cattle), we actually find other causes (in the shape of gift, purchase, and so forth); and so long as a perceptible cause is there, there can be no justification for assuming an imperceptible one. Thus having found the Veda to be fallible in this one case, we conclude that the other results also-such as Heaven and the like-do not really follow (from the Acts enjoined in the Veda) .-Further, we find the Veda actually speaking of things contrary to what is actually seen; for instance, having enjoined the collecting of the Sacrificial vessels (on the death of the sacrificer), the Veda goes on to say that 'the sacrificer thus equipped with the sacrificial implements goes straight to the heavenly regions'; this clearly refers to the body, and yet the body never goes to the heavenly regions, as it is actually burnt before our eyes. Nor can the word 'goes' be taken as an injunctive word (whereby the passage would mean that the body should go to heaven, and not that it actually does go; so that the sentence would not contain anything contrary to a perceptible fact).—Such apparently absurd assertions therefore cannot be the means of right Cognition; as they would be like such absurd assertions as 'dry gourds sink in water, while stones float.' Thus then we cannot have any confidence in the injunctions of the Agnihotra and such other Acts; as these Injunctions also belong to the same category as those that have been shown above to be absolutely false (and unreliable).-From all this it follows that Dharma is not 'that which is indicated by the Veda as conducive to the highest good '-[as declared in 'Sū. (2)]".'

The answer to the above is provided in the first part of Sütra (5), ending with the word 'Jnanam'-' But the relation of the word with its meaning is original, etc., etc.'-The particle 'tu', 'but', serves to reject the opponent's view. The meaning is that the relation between the word and meaningwhich relation does not originate from a human being [i.e. which is primordial, original, self-sufficient, not dependent upon any other means of Cognition]-is the 'Jñāna', means of knowing, - 'Tasya', 'of that', i.e. of such things as the Agnihotra and the like which are not cognisable by means of Senseperception and the rest. [If the connection of the word with its meaning were dependent upon other means of Cognition, then all those words and expressions which speak of things not amenable to the other means of Cognition, might be regarded as of doubtful validity; when however the said connection is self-sufficient, then there is nothing to shake the inherent validity of what is spoken of in the words of the Veda-Brhati and Riuvimala. Thus then the notion derived from the Vedic Injunction must be right. In the case of a notion derived from words emanating from human beings, there might be doubts regarding its validity; because in that case what is asserted would be dependent (for its validity) upon things extraneous to itself [such as the validity of those sources from which the human being may have derived his knowledge of what he is speaking of, and so forthl. On the other hand, when a (self-sufficient) word (not emanating from a human source) speaks of something, why should that be false? Certainly we do not require any corroboration of what we learn from the said word. When the word 'speaks' of something, what is meant is that it makes that thing known, i.e. it becomes the means of that thing becoming known; so

that as soon as the means in the shape of the Word is there, what is spoken of by it becomes known by itself (without any extraneous help); under the circumstances, how could one call it 'false', declaring that 'what the word says is not really so'?—As a matter of fact, the notion derived from the Injunction is not of a doubtful character,—in any such form as 'this may or may not be so'; nor at any other time or place, or in any other circumstances, or in any other person, does there appear any notion to the contrary, that 'it is false'.—As regards the idea that 'the notion derived from this Vedic Injunction must be false because we have found another statement made in the Veda to be false',—this is only an Inference, and as such becomes sublated by the aforesaid direct Cognition to the contrary.—From all this it follows that 'Dharma is what is indicated by the Vedic Injunction as conducive to the highest good'.

The Opponent raises a fresh objection:—'All this may be so; but in reality there is no relationship be either the word and its meaning; how then could any such relationship be either created by human beings or not created by human beings?—Why?—If the relation between the word and the thing denoted by it were held to be of the nature of Contact (Conjunction), then on the utterance of the word "razor", the mouth (of the speaker) would be ripped open, and similarly on the utterance of the word "sweets", his mouth would become filled with sweets. As for the other kinds of relation—(a) that subsisting between the material cause and its product, or (b) that between the efficient cause and its effect, or (c) that between the container and the contained, or (d) that of birth and so forth,—these are not possible at all in the case of Word.

The answer to the above is as follows:—The only relation that is possible to assert in the case, you do not assert; that is, the relation that subsists between the denoter and the denoted, which is the relation called 'that between the name and the named.'-'If the word is the denoter (of its meaning), then why does it not denote it when it is heard for the first time?'-The answer to this is that in every case experience is our guide (and authority); it is only when we find a word actually denoting a thing that we regard it as its 'denoter'; this is not possible in the case of a word heard for the first time, as in its case we have never found it denoting anything: in fact the meaning of a word is understood only when it has been heard (used) as many times as makes it definitely recognised that this word is the name and this thing is the named? [Nor does this need for repeated experience vitiate the denotativeness of the word; because] in the case of the Eye also it is found that it is unable to see if there is no external light, and yet this does not mean that the Eye has not the power to see. [Thus then, the conclusion is that there is a definite relation between the Word and what is denoted by it.]

[A fresh discussion is started:—Says the Opponent]:—'If (as has been just stated) the Word does not express anything when it is heard for the first time, then the relation between the Word and the thing denoted by it must be one that is created (artificial)'—why?—(a) because sui generis, the word and the thing denoted are not related, as is clear from the fact that the word is uttered in the mouth while the thing denoted is found on the ground;

(b) because people clearly make such a distinction as "this is the Word not the Thing", "this is the Thing, not the Word";—and (c) because there is a clear difference in the forms of the two also: for instance, the word that they pronounce is in the form 'Gauh' ('Cow'), while the object that they understand as denoted by it is an animal with the devlap and other features; and in actual experience we have seen that any relation (or connection) that appears between two distinct things is artificial (created); as for example, the relation between the jar and the rope (to which it is tied).

[The answer to this Pūrvapakṣā which is reiterated on page 15, lines 16 to 18, ones in the Text on page 15, line 18; in the interval in order to clear the ground, the Author discusses the three questions—(1) What is 'word'? on page 13, line 7 to page 14, line 15,—(2) what is 'meaning' (or denoted thing)? on page 14, line 16 to page 15, line 14,—and (3) what is the 'relation' between the two? on page 15, line 15.]

(1) In the case of 'gauh' ('Cow'), what is it that is called the 'word'? The letters 'ga', 'au', and 'h' (visarga) constitute the word—says the revered Upavarsa. Among people the term 'word' is applied to what is apprehended by the ear; and in the case of the word 'gauh', the said letters are what are apprehended by the ear.

The Spholavadin Grammarian:—"If that is so, then no cognition of the meaning (of the word) is possible;—why?—because as a matter of fact the cognition of the meaning does not appear on the hearing of the single component letters severally; and apart from the components there is no single entity in the form of a composite whole, from which the cognition of the meaning would follow. At the moment of hearing the letter 'ga', the letters 'au' and 'h' are not heard; and at the moment that these letters are heard, the letter 'ga' is not heard. From this it follows that the word 'gauh' (as a composite whole) is something different from the component letters 'ga' and the rest; and it is from this composite that the Cognition of the meaning follows.—It might be urged that after the word (i.e. the letters) have ceased, there is a remembrance (of them), and it is from this remembrance that the Cognition of the meaning follows.—But this also cannot be; as the Remembrance also has only a momentary existence and hence is as unable to bring about the Cognition of the meaning as the letters themselves."

There is no force in all this, we reply; because what happens is that each letter, as it is uttered, leaves an 'impression' behind, and what brings about the cognition of the meaning of the word is the last letter along with the impressions of each of the preceding letters.—'If that were so [i.e. if the cognition of the meaning were so derived from the last letter, etc.], then the assertion of the ordinary people that "we cognise the meaning from the word" would be unjustifiable,'—Our answer to this would be that if it cannot be justified, it must be unjustifiable; simply because a certain popular assertion is unjustifiable, it cannot be right to admit the existence of something which is not vouched for by any means of Cognition, Sense-perception and the rest. As a matter of fact, popular assertions are found to be of both kinds—some are justifiable (true) and some are unjustifiable (false); for instance, such assertions as 'Devadatta, please

drive the cow' are justifiable (reasonable, serving a definite purpose); while such other assertions as 'ten pomegranates, six cakes' and the like are unjustifiable (unreasonable, entirely purposeless, having no meaning).—
"[It is not the popular notion alone that is contrary to the Siddhānta view.] Scientific writers also have made such declarations as 'what is denoted by a verb, like goes or cooks, is a single entity (act), consisting of several acts beginning with the starting (of the act) and ending with its fulfilment, ranging in sequence over several points of time' —(Nirukta 1-1) [which also lends support to the view that the word also is a composite whole apart from the component letters.]"—The answer to this is that even the declaration of scientific writers cannot render possible (or reasonable) what cannot be established by any valid means of Cognition.

Then again, there is nothing unreasonable in the view (stated by us) that the letters (composing a word) produce impressions, and from these impressions follow the apprehension of the meaning; so that in the bringing about of the apprehension of the meaning, the letters would be the cause.-" But in that case, the word would be only a subordinate cause (of the apprehension of the meaning)."-Not so; the causal efficiency of the letters is by no means subordinate, -because as a matter of fact, the apprehension of the meaning comes only when the letters are there, and it does not come when they are absent [which shows that the letters are the principal, not the subordinate, cause.]-But even if they were only a subordinate cause,-it would not be right to assume something not vouched for by Sense-perception or any other means of Cognition, simply for the purpose of saving the Word from being a subordinate cause. For instance, when it is asserted that 'the boy is fire', it is not understood that the Boy is actually Fire, for fear of making the word 'Fire' figurative (taken in the indirect or subordinate sense of 'brilliant'); -- for the purpose of saving the word 'fire' from being understood in its subordinate (or figurative) sense of (brilliance), the 'Boy' is not taken to be Fire itself (in the literal

As a matter of fact also, such a word as 'go' (Cow) is never actually perceived apart from the letters 'ga' and the rest; and this for the simple reason that no difference is perceived between them (i.e. between the word and its component letters), and that they are actually found to be non-different. What again is actually perceived are only the letters 'ga' and the rest. From this it is clear that the word 'gauh', beginning with the letter 'ga' and ending with the 'h', is only these letters themselves; and hence there is no such thing as 'Word' apart from those letters.

Objection:—'The assumption of Impressions (left by the component letters) involves the assumption of something that is not perceived'.

The answer to this is that the theory of the 'word' (as distinct from the letters) involves the assumption of the Word and also that of the Impressions (the assumption of which is necessary in this case also, for explaining the process of denotation); [whereas in our view, it is necessary to assume the Impressions only: so that while the Opponent's theory involves two assumptions, our theory involves only one assumption].—From all this we conclude that the letters themselves are the word.

(2) [The next question is]—What is the denotation (meaning) of the word 'gauh' (Cow)?—What we assert is that the class (or genus) characterised by the devolap and other features is what is denoted by the Word.—[In the Nyāya-sitra, 'Ākṛti' has been taken as different from Jāti, Class; it has been taken there in the sense of the shape or form that characterises a particular Class of things. In Mimāmsā however, we find that 'Ākṛti' is taken to be the same as 'Jāti.' The Shlokavārtika-Ākṛti, Verse 3 clearly says that 'This class (jāti) itself has been called Ākṛti in the sense that the Individual is characterised (ākriyatā) by it'; and Mandana Mishra also declares in his Anukramanī that 'the word go denotes the Class.']

The Opponent asks—"Is this 'Class' something to be accomplished, or not?" [The real motive behind this question is that, if the class is something to be accomplished, then its relation to the word cannot be eternal.]

[The answer is that] Being actually perceived, it cannot be something yet to be accomplished; as what is actually perceived is only an accomplished entity, such as the necklace, the road-crossing, the dish, and so forth.

'But this (notion of Class) may be a mere illusion.'

That cannot be; unless we find a conception set aside or negatived by a subsequent conception, we cannot regard it as an illusion.

'As a matter of fact, we find such conceptions as series, group, forest (as single entities),—while in reality there are no such single entities apart from the component individuals [the series being nothing apart from the individual factors, the group being nothing apart from the individuals composing it, and the Forest being nothing apart from the trees. Similarly, the Class being nothing apart from the individuals composing it, the conception of the "Class" must be a misconception, a mere illusion]'.

Not so; you have put forward a most incoherent statement. By asserting that 'there is a conception of the Forest while in reality there is no such thing as forest', do you mean to deny the validity of Perception (which provides us with a clear notion of the Forest as a real entity)? If so, then you might as well say that 'the trees also do not exist'. In that case your view would be the same as that of the Bauddha Idealist (who denies the existence of all external objects); and this view we have already refuted. (So that what you have asserted does not lend support to your own theory that there is no such entity as Class] .- Your assertion may be a complaint against the upholder of the Class, to the effect that "(by positing a single entity) you vitiate another doctrine of yours,-inasmuch as (according to you) the notion of the 'Forest' (as a single entity) appears while in fact there is no such (single) entity as Forest [what really exists is only a large number of trees; so that you have the notion of a single entity in reference to a plurality of trees; and this vitiates your doctrine" [Read for 'pi sati', 'pyasati', as read in Brhati] that it is only a single thing that can be conceived of as a single entity.]-If such is your meaning, then, it comes to this that being unable to refute the theory under discussion, you proceed to find fault with a totally different doctrine, and thereby render yourself open to a 'ground of defeat' (in discussion, by shifting your ground); specially as what you put forward does not establish anything. Because

the Siddhantin will retort-If the other doctrine becomes vitiated. let it be vitiated; what does it matter if that doctrine is vitiated or not vitiated? [The rule regarding the use of the singular or the plural number is not meant to be absolute; if then, it becomes vitiated by a perceptible fact, it does not matter; merely on the strength of the said rule, we cannot deny a perceptible fact.] What does matter is whether you succeed in establishing your own doctrine or in refuting my doctrine (regarding the subject-matter under discussion, i.e. the existence of the Class). Merely because the Forest is not perceived apart from the trees, it does not follow that the Forest does not exist; if there is some other reason which gives rise to a notion against (i.e. sublative of the notion of) the existence of the Forest, then only can the notion of the Forest be regarded as false; and then alone could we conclude that the Forest does not exist. [Even though in regard to the Forest and other things mentioned by you, such a sublative notion may appear, yet] in regard to such things as the Cow and the like (which we are discussing), we do not find our notion of class being sublated. So that there is no analogy between the two cases (that of the Cow and that of the Forest). In regard to the Forest and other things also, if there is no sublative notion, we cannot say that they do not exist.-From all this it follows that the statement that you have made regarding the Series, the Forest (and the Group) is entirely incoherent (having no bearing on the discussion, in hand).

The conclusion thus is that the assertion (of Jaimini) to the effect that 'the Class forms the denotation of the word' (Sūtra 1. 3. 33) is fully established. How the Class is denoted by the word we shall explain in detail later on (under 1. 3. 33).

(3) [The third question is]—"What is the relation (between the word and its denotation)?" [This question is introduced with a view to discuss the eternality of words and of their relationship to their denotations—says Shibkanārtika 10].

The answer is that the relation between the word and its denotation is that on the word being cognised, what is denoted by it becomes cognised. [That is, the relation of Name and Named, as already stated above.]

The opponent:—"We have already proved above that this relation is artificial; hence we opine that a certain person created the relation of words with their denotations and then with a view to make use of the words, he composed the Vedas."

Our answer to this view is as follows:—What we have asserted (regarding the relation between word and its denotation) is established by the fact that the said relation could never have been created by a human being.

Question:—"But how do you know that the relation could not be created by a human being?"

Answer:—It follows from the fact that there could not have been any persons to create the relations.

Question :- "Why could there be no creator of the relation?"

Answer.—[No such creator can be admitted] because no such person can be cognised by means of Sense-perception, and the other means of cognition also are preceded by (based upon) Sense-perception.

"As the creator existed a long time back, it is only natural that he should be beyond the Sense-perception of men of the present day."

Even if he had existed a long time back, it would not be impossible to remember him. In the case of such (important) things as the Himlaya mountain and the like, it would be impossible to forget the creator, in the manner in which the builder of a wall, a garden and such things becomes forgotten. In the case of these latter things there are such causes (for the builder being forgotten) as the disappearance (of all idea) of the builder, due either to the disruption of his country or to the extinction of his family. In the case of words and their meanings on the other hand there is no total disappearance of persons making use of them.

It might be argued that—" what men have to deal with is only the relation of words and meanings, and the matter of the creator of the relation would have no interest to them, and hence paying no heed to it, they would forget him."

But this also is not possible. If there were a person who created the relation and started its use, he would surely be remembered at the time of using the word. A certain usage becomes possible only when there is an agreement between the creator and the adopter of the usage,-and not when there is disagreement between them. For instance, Pānini (Sūtra 1, 1, 1) is the creator or originator of the relation between the technical name 'Vrddhi' and the letters 'at-aich', and a person making use of words independently of Pāṇini, or one not accepting the work of Pāṇini as authoritative, could never apprehend the word 'Vrddhi' as standing for those letters. Similarly Pingala being the originator of the connection between the technical name 'ma' and three long syllables, to a person not acting according to Pingala, or to one not accepting the work of Pingala as authoritative, the letter 'ma' could never bring about the idea of a group of three long syllables. Thus it is that there is always an agreement between the originator and the adopter (of a usage). Consequently persons who would be making use of the Veda would surely remember the creator (or originator) of the relation of words and their usage. If one forgot the author of Pānini's Sūtra to the effect that 'the term Vrddhi stands for the letters At and Aich' (1. 1. 1), he could never make any sense out of the Sūtra 'Vrddhiryasyāchāmādistad vrddham' ['That group of letters is called 'Vrddha' among the vowels wherein the first one is a Vrddhi, i.e. ā or ai or au] (Pānini 1. 1. 73).

For these reasons we conclude that no person created the relations (of words) and then for the purpose of making use of them, composed the Vedas.

Even if the possibility of (the creator) being forgotten were there, we could not admit a creator of the relation unless there were proofs for it. For instance, even though it is possible for an existing thing to be not perceived, we do not merely on the ground of that possibility, admit the existence of the Hare's Horn, because there is no proof of it. For this reason the relation between words and their meanings cannot be regarded as created by a person.

[The opponent puts forward a proof of the creator of word-relations]—
"We would deduce the existence of the creator of word-relations from

Presumption: As a matter of fact we do not find people comprehending the meaning of those words whose relation (to the meaning) has not been fixed. If people were to comprehend the meaning of such a word, they could comprehend the meaning of such words also as they might hear for the first time; as a matter of fact however they are not found to do so; hence there must be a person who fixes (creates) the relations (of words and meanings)."

This is not right. Because words are taught as accomplished entities (having the inherent power of denoting their meanings,-[This is what is meant by the term 'upadēshah' in sūtra 5-says Brhatī].--If it were a fact that in the absence of a creator of word-relations, the meanings are never comprehended, then alone could we deduce a creator by presumption. In reality however, there is another way (in which the meanings of words are comprehended); for instance, we find that when older people are making use of words for their own purpose, the younger men who happen to hear those words are actually found to understand them; these old people also, when they were young, understood the words as used by the older people at the time; these latter also understood them from other older people; and so on the process has gone on without any beginning in time. This is one possible explanation of the phenomenon (of the use and comprehension of words):—and the other explanation (proposed by the opponent) is that "in the beginning there was no relation at all between a word and its meaning, subsequently some one set going the relations."-Now as between these two possible explanations, so long as the explanation based upon the usage of older people is available [and it is actually perceived in everyday life, it would not be right to presume a creator of relations. Further the upholders of the 'Usage Theory' point to a fact of direct perception (in proof of their theory), while the other party only presume a creator of relations; and certainly Presumption has no force as against a fact of direct Perception. From all this it follows that there can be no creator of word-relations.

'Avyatirēkashcha', 'it is infallible', says the next term in sūtra 5. It is found that just as the word 'go' denotes the animal with the dewlap in one place, so does it also in the most inaccessible places; how could it be possible for the many creators of the word-relation to come together? Certainly no single person could create a relation (that would receive such universal acceptance). For this reason also there can be no creator of word-relations.

Another writer explains the phrase 'avyatirikashcha' in the following different manner:—There can be no point of time when the word-relation has been totally absent and when no word has been related to any meaning.—Why so?—Because, if there were, then the act itself of creating the relation would not be possible; for when the creator of the relation would proceed to create a relation, he could do so only by means of words; and the question arises—who created the relations of the words that the said creator uses when creating the new relation? If those were created by some other creator, then who created the relations of the words used by the older creator? And so on and so forth, there would be no end to this

enquiry. Consequently, it has to be admitted that when a person would proceed to create new word-relations, he would make use of words whose relationships have come down through the usage of older people, and have not been created by any one. And when usage has to be admitted (at a certain point), why should it be at all necessary to presume any creator of word-relations at any point of time? Thus it is clear that there can be no valid Presumption either (in support of a creator of word-relations).

The opponent may ask—"How is it possible for the younger people, to whom the word-relations are not known, to learn the meanings of words from who older people?"

The answer to this is that the question of possibility cannot arise in regard to a directly perceived fact. Younger people are actually found to learn the meanings of words from older people; and on the other hand, they are not found to have any such comprehension of a creator of word-relations. Hence the cases (of words and creators) do not stand on the same footing.

The next phrase in sūtra (5) is—'arthē anupalabdhē ('regarding what is imperceptible').—In regard to such imperceptible things as the Deity and the like [Right reading 'devatādau' supplied by the Bṛhatī], the creating of a name (expressive word) would be useless and also impossible. When a thing is known in its general form, and its particular forms are not known, then alone are names propounded in regard to these particular forms; and in the case of such words as 'deity' and the like, no particular forms can be known; as both the conditions are absent. For this reason also the relation of the word with its meaning cannot be one created by any person.

For this same reason [of not having its relation created by a person), the Word is 'pramānam' ('a valid means of knowledge' (sūtra 5),—'ana-peksatvāt' ('as it is independent') (sūtra 5); that is to say, being such as described, the word does not need (for its validity) another person or another cognition.

For all these reasons we conclude that Dharma is what is indicated by the Vedic Injunction:—and not what is indicated by anything else.

The significance of the mention (in sutra 5) of the name 'Bādarāyaṇa' has already been explained above.

[The Author now proceeds to answer the objections that have been urged by the Opponent against the trustworthy character of the Veda.]

It has been argued above that "Word (Injunction) cannot be the means (of knowing Dharma), as the result of the act is not found to appear at the time of its performance, and at the time that the result does appear the act is not there; consequently the word cannot be a means of right knowledge".—Our answer to this is as follows:—It would be true that Word is not a means of right knowledge, if there were only five such valid means (in the shape of Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy, Presumption, and Nonapprehension); every means by which a right cognition is obtained is a means of right cognition;—as a matter of fact, right cognition is obtained by means of word also;—therefore Word must be a means of right

knowledge,—in the same manner as Sense-perception is. If a certain thing is cognised by one means of cognition, it does not cease to be cognised if it is not cognised by another means of cognition [so that if the result of the act is cognised by means of the Vedic Word, it cannot be regarded as not cognised simply because that result is not cognised by other means of cognition]. Then again it is nowhere declared in the Veda that "the reward of the act is obtained merely by the performance of the act"; all that is said is that "the reward of the act is obtained".—As for the argument that "at the time when the reward does appear, it is cognised by means of Sense-perception and not by means of the Word",—this does not vitiate our position; because at that time Sense-perception is one means of cognising the reward, and Word also is the other means.

The opponent has cited a passage from the Veda which asserts something contrary to a fact of direct perception.—the passage which says that "the sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements proceeds straight to the heavenly regions", where it is clearly the body that is spoken of (as proceeding to Heaven; while as a matter of fact the body is burnt).-Our answer to this is that in fact that entity also to whom the body belongs is spoken of as "equipped with the sacrificial implements", by reason of the connection of those implements with the body (to which the said entity is related).—The opponent asks—"What is this other entity? We do not know of any such entity (apart from the body)".-We infer the existence of such an entity through such acts as breathing and the like; so that the entity spoken of as "equipped with the sacrificial implements" is one who carried on such activities in the body as breathing in, breathing down, breathing out, winking, and so forth.-" But it is the body itself that breathes in and breathes down."-Not so: breathing and the rest cannot belong to the same category as the properties of the body, because they do not continue to exist as long as the body lasts; as a matter of fact we find that the properties of the body, colour and the rest, continue to exist as long as the body is there; on the other hand, breathing and the rest cease to exist even while the body is there. Then again, Pleasure, Pain, and such other feelings are cognised only by the person himself, while colour and other properties belonging to the body are perceived by other persons also. [This also shows that there are certain activities of the person which belong to an entity other than the body. 1 From this fact of there being certain properties which differ from the properties belonging to the body, the conclusion is that the entity spoken of as 'equipped with the sacrificial implements' is other than the body.

The opponent asks—"How is it known that there is an entity other than Pleasure and other Cognitions to whom these latter belong? As a matter of fact, we do not see any form of such an entity apart from Pleasure and other Cognitions. This leads to the conclusion that the said entity is as non-existent as the Hare's Horn.—If it be asked—'To whom then do Pleasure and the rest belong?'—our answer would be that they belong to no one. It is not necessary that whatever is perceived must be related to some one else; we recognise one thing as 'related 'to another only when we actually perceive the things related, as also the relation itself: When we see the moon or the

sun, we do not proceed to search the thing to which the moon or the sun belongs; in fact, we recognise that they belong to no one. From this we conclude that there is no entity apart from Pleasure and the rest to whom these latter belong.—Then again, if it be absolutely necessary to assume an entity to whom every perceived thing is related, then, in the same manner, on perceiving the Self (soul), we should search for another relative to whom that Self would belong;—and having found such another relative, we should search for yet another to whom this latter would belong; and so on and on there would be no end to such assumptions. If (in order to save yourself from this unending series of assumptions) you would not assume a further relative after having assumed a relative at a certain stage,—and you would stop short at that, and feel satisfied,—then you can rest content with positing the 'Vijāāna' (Idea, Cognition) pure and simple and desist from all further asumptions."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—If there is no entity apart from the Cognition, then who is it that is spoken of as 'he knows'? The entity spoken of by this phrase is the nominative agent of the act of cognising; for the purpose of making this phrase give some sense, we should assume the existence of the Self distinct from the Cognition.

Says the opponent:—"Let the Divinities (Read 'devāh') assume a meaning for the phrase if they regard it necessary to assume it! [It is beyond our power to do it]. As a matter of fact, there are many people upholding the existence of the Self who say 'the Self exists', who directly utter the word 'Self'; and yet even these people do not succeed in assuming the existence of the Self; how much less possible is it to assume its existence on the basis of the indirect expression 'he cognises'? Hence we conclude that the assumption of the Self is not right."

Our answer is as follows:—It is through Desire that we perceive the Self.—"How so?"—Desire appears only when the desired object is one that has been perceived before: for instance, we have no desire for those sweet fruits that grow to the North of the Meru mountains and which have never before been tasted by people like us. Nor does Desire appear in one person for an object that has been perceived by another person. And yet Desire does appear in a person for an object perceived by him on the previous day. From this we conclude that the person desiring and the person perceiving must be the same. If mere Cognition had been the perceived then, inasmuch as that Cognition would have disappeared on the preceding day (when the object was perceived), how could there be a Desire (for the same object) on the following day? If, on the other hand, there is a cogniser apart from the Cognition, who is everlasting, then the person perceiving the object on one day would be the same as the one desiring it on the other day. The phenomenon of Desire would be impossible otherwise.

Says the opponent:—"In regard to what do we have the idea that it cannot be possible? It is only in regard to what cannot be known by any means of right knowledge. Now, as a matter of fact, we do not know anything other than Cognition (Idea); and what we do not know we conclude to be non-existent, like the Hare's Horns. Nor is it impossible to have Cognition without that unknown something; because we actually have a direct

perception of the Cognition. That the Cognition has a momentary existence,—that too is a fact directly perceived. And yet, even though we have no Cogniser apart from the Cognition,—and even though the Cognition is not a lasting entity (as it has only a momentary existence),—it is not impossible for Desire to appear on the next day; because we actually perceive the Desire so appearing. Nor have we found it always to be the case that the Cognition today is the same as the Desirer on the next day; all that we have found is that in some cases what has been perceived by one man is desired by another, while in other cases it is not so. In fact [there being nothing except an influx of series of Cognitions] what happens is that within the same series one (Cognition) desires what has been perceived by another (Cognition); but in case the two belong to two different series, one does not desire what has been perceived by another. From all this we conclude that there is no Self apart from Cognitions like Pleasure and the rest."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is not possible that persons who do not remember (i.e. have an idea of) a thing should desire it; nor is remembrance possible of what has not been perceived before; hence it is impossible that there should be remembrance in what is a mere momentary Cognition (Idea).

Says the opponent:-"The case of Remembrance is like that of Desire; what is called 'remembrance' is either a Cognition similar to a previous Cognition, or a Cognition having a previous Cognition as its object [and the same is the case with Desire also]. Now (such being the nature of Remembrance and Desire) even if the seer (i.e. the Cognition of the previous day) has ceased to exist on the next day, it cannot be impossible (for the Remembrance or the Desire) to appear on that day [i.e. there is nothing incongruous in the appearance of a Cognition on the second day which is similar to, or has for its object, the preceding day's Cognition]; for the simple reason that we directly perceive that this does happen. What happens is that when a Cognition has been cognised by another Cognition, it is recalled by another Cognition occurring in the same series as the former apprehending Cognition,-and not by a Cognition appearing in the series of another Cognition .- From all this we conclude that Cognitions are entirely Void (i.e. without any extraneous substratum in the shape of the Self). In support of this view we have the following Brahmana text also:- 'This pure Cognition which rising out of the elemental substances (of the body, at death) enters those same substances, and there is no consciousness after death.' (Brhadāranyaka-Upanisad, 4.5.13)."

Our answer to the above is that it cannot be as set forth above; as a matter of fact, it is only when one has seen a thing on one day that he has the notion (Remembrance) on the next day in the form 'I have seen it'; and this notion (of Recognition) appears only in the Self, not in anything else; as in the case of anything else, the entity that would have seen the thing on the previous day could be some one totally different (from the one recognising it on the second day). Hence it follows that there is something apart from Cognitions, and it is to this something that the term 'I' is applied.

Says the opponent:—"In several cases the term 'I' is applied figuratively to entities other than the Self,—when, for instance, a man says 'I am the son', 'I am Devadatta', 'I am going' [where the term 'I' stands for the body—says the Shlokavārtika, Ālmavāda 108]."

Our answer to this is that we do not put forward the use of the term 'I' as a reason for our conclusion (that there is a Self apart from the Cognitions); what we are pointing out (as the reason) is something different from the word 'I'; what we are pointing out (as our reason) is the recognitive notion [The right reading is 'pratyabhijñāpratyayam' as found in Nyāyaratnākara. p. 7161 that we have to the effect that 'It was we that saw this thing on one day, and it is we that remember it today'; which shows that we recognise the fact that 'it is we that existed yesterday and it is the same we that exist today'; and the entities that existed vesterday and exist today also could not have ceased to exist. In support of this (view of an enduring Self) we have the Brāhmaṇa-text-Having declared that 'This same is the Self', (Brhadā-Upa., 4.5.13, where the reading is slightly different), it goes on to say-' Being imperishable, it perisheth not' (Brhadāranyaka-Upanisad. 4. 5. 15); and again, 'This Self is indestructible, not liable to disruption' (Ibid., 4. 5. 15).-Cognition on the other hand is evanescent.-Hence we conclude that the Self (which is imperishable) must be something distinct from the Cognition which is evanescent. No one can hold the view that "things are not as they are found to be, they are as they are not found to be." For if that were so, then it would come to this that "the Hare does not exist, what does exist is the Hare's Horn" !-- Nor again can the notion of 'I' be said to be an illusion; because we do not find any subsequent cognition sublative of that notion.

From all this we conclude that there is a Self apart from Pleasure and of the cognitions. And such being the case, it is this Self that has been spoken of in the Vedic text as 'equipped with the sacrificial implements'.

Says the opponent:—"If there is a Cogniser distinct from the Cognition, then, leaving aside the Cognition, please point out the Cogniser—"This and such is the Cogniser.' You cannot point out any such Cogniser. Hence we conclude that there is no Cogniser apart from the Cognition."

Our answer to this is as follows: -As a matter of fact, the Cogniser is self-cognised, he cannot be perceived by another; how then could he be pointed out to another? Just as for instance, when a man with eyes himself sees a colour, but he cannot point it out to another who is blind, -and yet, simply because the Colour cannot be pointed out to another, it is not concluded that it does not exist; -in the same manner, a person cognises his own Self, but cannot point it out to another person, for the simple reason that (like the blind man) this other person does not possess the capacity to perceive the said Self (of the former person); and yet this other person cognises his own Self, but not the Self of other persons. So that all individual Selves cognising themselves must exist, even though none of them cognises the other Selves. In support of this we have the following Brāhmana-text- 'When speech ceases, what light does the Person possess? He possesses the light of the Self, O king' (Shatapatha Brā-Mādhyandina, 14. 5. 4. 11, and Brhadāranyaka-Upanisad, Kānva, 4. 3. 9 where the reading is slightly different) .- In support also of the view that one Self is not apprehended by another, we have the (Brāhmana-text-'Being inapprehensible, it is not apprehended' Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad, 3. 9. 25); what this means is that it is not apprehended by another: - 'how so?' -because the Self has been spoken of as 'self-luminous' in the text 'Herein the Person is self-luminous' (Brhadāranyaka-Upanisad, 4. 3. 9) [which means that the Self is cognised by itself, not by another self :- "By what means then can one Self be explained to another?"-This means also has been indicated in the Brāhmana-text itself-"He said that this Self is not this, not that' Brhada-Una, 4, 23;—that is to say, it cannot be asserted that 'the Self has such and such a form'; the method by which it can be indicated to another is by denying (i.e. rejecting) what the other person regards as Self: that is, if the other person regards the Body as the Self, he is taught that 'the Body is not the Self, the Self is something different from the Body',-where the teaching of the Self is done by denying the Body. Similarly the Life-breath and such other things not being the Self, the Self is taught by means of the denial of these as being something different from the Self. Similarly the Pleasure and other Cognitions of one person are inferred by another through certain signs, and by declaring that 'these are not the Self'; the Self is taught as being something different from them. Lastly, that 'the Person (or Self) is not different from one who perceives himself' is also inferred from the activities of the person himself: for instance, we find that when on one day a man has left an action half-done, he tries to make up for it and complete it on the next day; and from this action it is inferred that the Person regards himself as enduring (lasting) in relation to things (like actions) that are Or, on the basis of the evanescent activities one comes evanescent. to cognise the enduring Self.1

Further, through Analogy also this same Self is pointed out, in the words—'Just as you perceive your own Self, so on the same analogy, please understand that I also perceive the Self in the same manner.' There are several such indications through Analogy; as for instance, a man indicating his suffering to another, says—'It is as if I were being burnt', 'It is as if I were being tortured', ''It is as if I were being hampered.'—Thus on the ground of this self-realisation, it is concluded that there is a Person (Self) distinct from Cognition.

It has been urged by the Opponent above—"Leaving aside Cognition please point out the Cogniser apart from the Cognition."—Our answer to this is that when you leave aside the means itself, how can the end be attained without the means? The only means of knowing things is to realise that 'everything is as it is cognised to be'. For instance, what is 'white'?—It is that in which there is whiteness; i.e. that to which the term 'white' is applied.—To what is the term 'white' applied?—It is applied to that which is cognised (understood) whenever the term 'white' is uttered.—From this it will be seen that if we'leave aside Cognition' (as suggested in your argument), we cannot indicate anything at all [as things can be indicated only as they are cognised]—Then again, there is no such hard and fast rule as that the object of cognition is cognised only when the Cognition is not cognised; for instance, Cognition is not amenable to Sense-perception, while

the object known is amenable to it. This we have already explained above (Text, p. 9, 1. 15, where it is shown that the form of the Cognition is not the same as that of the cognised object].—So that if anything has to be 'left aside' (denied), Cognition itself might as well be left aside,—not objects. This also we have already explained (Text, p. 10, 1. 4).

Thus we conclude that there is an everlasting Person apart from Pleasure and other cognitions.

The Opponent has quoted a text (from the $B_rhad\bar{a}ranyaka\cdot Upaniṣad$) speaking of the Cognition arising out of the elemental substances and entering the same, etc.—Our answer to this is as follows:—As a matter of fact, after this passage had been addressed by Yājāavalkya to Mairtēyī, the latter complained of the teaching, saying 'Hereby your Reverence has led me into delusion' (Shatapatha-Brā-Mādhya. 14. 7. 3. 14), and in meeting this complaint, Yājāavalkya, repudiating all desire to delude her, has concluded by saying—'I am not talking delusion; in reality this Self is indestructible, not liable to disruption; but It does come into contact with perishable things (like the Sense-organs, Merit, Demerit, and the like)' (Shatapatha-Brā-Mādhya. 14. 7. 3. 15); from the whole context it is clear that the view of the Upaniṣad is not that Cognition is the only entity. Thus there is a great difference [between your view that there is no Self apart from the fleeting cognitions, and the view adumbrated in the Upaniṣad text quoted by you and taken along with its whole context).

Lastly, the Opponent has argued that the verb 'goes' (in the text 'the Sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements goes straight to the heavenly region') is not injunctive.—The particular word may not be injunctive; but it could very well be reiterative of the injunction contained in such texts as 'Desiring heaven one should perform sacrifices'. So that there is nothing incongruous (in the non-injunctive character of the verb 'goes').

Adhikarana (6): Eternality of Words.

SŪTRA (6).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"WORD IS A PRODUCT (NON-ETERNAL), BECAUSE IT IS SEEN TO FOLLOW (AFTER EFFORT)",—SO SAY SOME PEOPLE.

Bhāsya.

Says the Opponent:—'It has been said above that the relation between the Word and its Meaning is eternal. But this is not possible,—because Word itself is not eternal. Word is often found to be destroyed, so that when it comes to be produced (uttered) again, its relation (to its meaning) cannot but be artificial (newly made). Then again, no one ever comprehends the meaning of a Word heard for theifirst time.—'But why should the Word itself be regarded as non-eternal?'—Because as a matter of fact, it is seen to follow after effort; finding that there is an invariable concomitance (between the appearance of the Word and human effort, the Word appearing only when there is human effort) we infer that the word 'is produced' by the effort.—'It may be that the effort only manifests the (already existing) Word'.—We say that it cannot be so; because there is nothing to prove that the Word existed before the said manifestation; and it is only what already exists—never what is non-existent—that is manifested.''

SUTRA (7).

[Purvaparsa continued]—"Because it does not persist." $Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"When the Word is uttered, we do not find it to persist even for a moment; from which we conclude that 'it has been destroyed'.—It might be urged that 'the Word though there, is not perceived (when you feel that it is destroyed)'.—This cannot be,—because as a matter of fact, the Word is not perceived even when there are no causes of its non-perception in the shape of obstruction and the like.—Nor can it be urged that [the Word is not perceived because] it has not reached the substratum (where it could be perceived);—because its substratum is the $Ak\bar{u}sha$ (which is all-pervading, hence it is never possible for the Word not to reach its substratum); and yet it is not perceived even in our ear-cavity (to say nothing of $Ak\bar{u}sha$ in general)."

SŪTRA (8).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA continued]—"ALSO, BECAUSE OF THE TERM 'TO MAKE' (karoti) [BEING USED IN CONNECTION WITH WORDS]."

Bhāsya.

"Further, in practice people make use of such expressions as 'make (kuru, utter) the word', 'do not make the word': and yet they do not feel that they are referring to the same word (that has been in existence)."

SŪTRA (9).

[Porvapaksa continued]—" Also because there is simultaneity (of the perception of the Word) in diverse places."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"As a matter of fact, we hear a Word (uttered) in several places; this could not be possible if the Word were only one and eternal. Unless there is something special there can be no plurality of what is eternal; it is only in the case of (non-eternal) products, which are many, that on their being produced in several places, they come to be connected with those several places. For this reason also Word must be non-eternal."

SŪTRA (10).

[Pūrvapakṣa continued]—" Also because there are original forms and modifications."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"In the case of such expressions as 'dadhyatra', we find that in the original form we had 'i' (at the end of the term 'dadhi'), and this 'i' becomes modified into 'ya' (by reason of its being onjoined with the following 'a' in 'atra');—such is the teaching (of grammarians). As a rule, whatever is liable to modification must be non-eternal. Further, there is some similarity (of sound) between 'i' and 'ya', which also shows that the one is the modification of the other."

SŪTRA (11). .

[Purvapaksa concluded]—"Further, there is an augmentation for the Word(-Sound), due to the multiplicity of its producers (speakers)."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"As a matter of fact, we find that when a Word is uttered by many persons, the sound heard is very loud. If the Word were only manifested (and not produced, by the utterance), then the sound heard would always be the same, whether it were uttered by many or fewer persons. From this we conclude that some portion of the Word is produced by each of the speakers, and it is by reason of the augmentation thus caused in the Word that a louder sound is heard."

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—[Answer to $S\bar{u}$. 6]—But the fact of being 'seen' is equal in both cases.

Bhāsya.

The particle ' $t\mu$ ', 'but', serves to reject the view set forth above. It has been urged (under Sū. 6) that, "inasmuch as Word is seen to

appear after human effort, it must be regarded as artificial, produced".—
But if, by means of clear reasons, we are able to establish the eternality of
the Word, then, on the strength of this notion of eternality, the right conclusion would be that 'the Word is manifested (not produced) by human
effort'; that is to say, if, before being pronounced, the Word was not manifest, it becomes manifested by the effort (of pronouncing). Thus it is found
that the fact of Word being 'seen after effort' is equally compatible with
both views.

SŪTRA (13).

[Answer to Sü. 7]—What happens (when the Word ceases to be heard) is that there is no perception of the extant (word) on account of the non-reaching of the object (by the manifesting agency).

Bhāsya.

The second reason, put forward in the Pūrvapaksa is that "Word is destroyed (ceases to exist) as soon as it is uttered ".-Here also, if we are able to clearly establish the eternality of Word, then,-if we find that the Word is perceived at one time and not perceived at another,-we shall, on the strength of the said well-established notion of eternality, assume that there must be some cause which brings about the perception of the Word [and the absence of which leads to the non-perception of the Word]. And since we find that there is perception of the Word only when there are certain conjunctions and disjunctions (in the shape of soundwaves), we shall conclude that these 'Conjunctions and Disjunctions' are what manifest (render perceptible) the Word.—It might be urged that—"In reality the Word is heard after the Conjunctions and Disjunctions have ceased [so that these could not be the cause of the manifestation]".-But it is not so; in fact, the 'Conjunctions and Disjunctions' do not cease, -as is clear from the fact that the Word is actually heard; all that happens is that the 'Conjunctions and Disjunctions' are not perceptible [that is all that you can say, you cannot say that they have ceased to exist].

Says the Opponent:—"If the Conjunctions and Disjunctions only manifest the Word, and do not produce it,—then the Word manifested by the Conjunctions and Disjunctions in Srughna would be heard by people in Pātaliputra; because the substratum of the Word (sound) is Ākāsha and Ākāsha is one only, so that the Auditory Ākāsha in one place would be the same as that in other places. On the other hand, according to those who regard the Word as being produced (and not manifested), the Conjunctions and Disjunctions, being aerial and subsisting in the air, would produce the word in the air itself; just as the yarns produce the cloth in the yarns themselves; and in this case it is only right that the Word is not heard in Pāṭaliputra, being produced, as it is, in the air-waves in Srughna.—The Siddhāntin might argue that—'also for one who holds that the Conjunctions and Disjunctions manifest (not produce) the Word, the said incongruity (of the Word uttered in Srughna being heard in Pāṭaliputra) does not arise, because the Conjunctions and Disjunctions operating in one place do not affect the ear-drum at a

distance, so that the auditory organ at a distance does not catch the wordsound that is manifested' .- But this is not so; [the Conjunctions and Disjunctions can affect the ear-drum either by actually reaching it or without actually reaching it; as a matter of fact however, as the Conjunctions and Disjunctions originate in the source of the Sound, it is not possible for them to actually reach the ear; the only alternative possible then, according to the Siddhantin, is that the Conjunctions and Disjunctions affect the ear without reaching it; now] if the Conjunctions and Disjunctions could affect the ear without reaching it, then the ear placed near the source of the Sound would apprehend the Sound at the same time as the ear placed at a distance; as a matter of fact however, they do not hear it at the same time; hence the conclusion is that the Conjunctions and Disjunctions do not affect the ear without reaching it. If (in order to escape from these difficulties) it be held that the Conjunctions and Disjunctions do not affect the ear at all, then the inevitable conclusion would be that the Conjunctions and Disjunctions have nothing to do with the apprehension of the Word (Sound)."

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—It is not so; what happens is that the air-particles disturbed by the (sound-provoking) stroke strike against the stagnant air-particles and produce Conjunctions and Disjunctions (i.e. ripples) on all sides, which go on spreading as long as the momentum lasts;—the Conjunctions and Disjunctions (ripples) are not perceived, because the Air (of which they are ripples) is imperceptible; and as for the Sound, it is heard only so long and so far as the ripples do not cease, and after they have ceased, the sound is not heard. Thus there is no incongruity at all. It is for this same reason that the Sound is heard at a greater distance when the wind is favourable.

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SŪTRA (14).

[Answer to Sū. 8]—The term refers to the using.

Bhāsya.

Another argument urged by the Opponent is that in practice, people make use of such expressions as 'shabdam kuru' (make the word-sound),—But if it is beyond doubt that Word is eternal, then the meaning of these expressions would be 'make use of the word'; just as in the expression 'gomayān kuru' (Make the Cowdung), the term 'kuru' (make) means collecting.

SŪTRA (15).

[Answer to $S\bar{u}$. 9]—The simultaneity is as in the case of the Sun. $Bh\bar{u}sya$.

It has been urged above (under Sū. 9) that "any single entity existing at one place cannot possibly be seen simultaneously at several places".

Look at the Sun, O'Loved of the Gods' (Fool)! Being only one he is seen as if occupying several places.—"But how is it known that there is only one Sun?"—Our answer is that Devadatta, facing the East in the morning,

sees the Sun at that time in front of himself; another man standing to the right of Devadatta does not see two suns, one straight in front of himself and another oblique to himself but straight in front of Devadatta. From this it follows that there is only one Sun.—"But in the case of the Sun, his exact location is not grasped and hence there is delusion."—In the same manner in the case of the Word also its exact location cannot be grasped.

If the Auditory Organ apprehended the Word (sound) on getting at the place where the Conjunctions and Disjunctions are,—then it might be possible for us to apprehend the Word (sound) as occupying several points in space; as a matter of fact however, the Auditory Organ does not get at the place of the Conjunctions (and Disjunctions); it is clearly perceived that the location of the Auditory Organ is in the Ear-drum. Then again, the Conjunctions and Disjunctions are in the Air which is imperceptible; hence when they appear in the Ear-drum, they are not perceived [and this gives rise to the illusion that the sound that is heard is at some other place, where the Conjunctions and Disjunctions started; though in reality the sound that is heard is at the Ear-drum itself]. Thus there is no incongruity in our theory, and the idea that the Word occupies several places is illusory. Further, in reality, the locus of the Sound is Ākāsha; and Ākāsha is one only; for this reason also Sound cannot exist in several places.

Lastly, when the form of the Word is one only, if there are various places (where the Word is heard), it is the places that would be diverse, not the Word itself. For this reason there is nothing incongruous even in the view [that Word-Sound is heard in several places].

SUTRA (16).

[Answer to $S\bar{u}$. 10]—It is a different letter, not a modification. $Bh\bar{u}sya.$

The expression 'dadhyatra' is not a case of modification of an original; in fact the (resultant) 'ya' (in 'dhya') is a letter totally different from the (original) 'i' (in 'dhi'). People going to make use of the letter 'ya' do not take up the letter 'i',—in the manner in which people desiring to make a mat take up the reeds [where the reeds are the material which become modified into the mat]. Merely because we perceive some similarity (between two things), one is not called either the material cause (original) or the product (modification) of the other. For instance, on seeing a lump of curd and a lump of kunda flowers (both of which are white), we do not regard one as the original cause and the other as its product (or modification).—Thus the objection urged by the Opponent is not applicable to our doctrine.

SÜTRA (17).

[Answer to Sū. 11]—The 'AUGMENTATION' SPOKEN OF IS THE AUGMENTATION OF THE NOISE (NOT OF THE WORD).

Bhāsya.

It has been argued by the Opponent that "when several people are beating a drum or pronouncing a word, the sound heard is very loud, which shows that with each person (beating the drum or pronouncing the word) there is an augmentation of the particles of the Sound".—But as a matter of fact, it is not so; Sound has no parts, as is shown by the fact that we cannot perceive any component parts of Sound; and as it is without parts, no augmentation of it is possible. Hence there can be no augmentation of the Word (sound). What happens is that when the Word is pronounced by one man, its sound is soft; but when it is pronounced by several persons, those same letters (which had sounded soft), on account of being taken up continuously by such Conjunctions and Disjunctions (ripples) as fill all the space in the Ear-cavity, come to be heard as 'augmented', and hence as having parts. As a matter of fact, however, when the Conjunctions and Disjunctions continuously set up render the (same) Word manifest, they come to be called by the name 'noise'. Hence the 'augmentation' (spoken of by the Opponent) is of the noise, not of the Word.

SŪTRA (18).

[Final Siddhānta]—In fact (the Word) must be Eternal; as (its)

Bhāsya.

The Word must be eternal; -why ?- because its utterance is for the purpose of another'. The term 'darshana' stands for utterance; this utterance is 'for the purpose of another', i.e. for the purpose of making known the meaning to 'another'. If the word ceased to exist as soon as uttered, then no one could speak of (make known) any thing to others; and in that case the word could not be uttered for the purpose of another. On the other hand, if the word does not cease to exist, then it is only right that on hearing the word many times, there is comprehension of its meaning.-It might be argued that-" the comprehension of the meaning (of one evanescent word) is due to its being similar to another word which had expressed a meaning (which has ceased to exist after utterance) [and the two words are not the same as presupposed by the Siddhantin]."-But (according to the opponent) no word could have expressed its meaning, each word being equally new (disappearing as soon as uttered, without expressing any meaning) .- "But there may be some previous individual word whose connection with the meaning might have been created [and the similarity to this word would enable the subsequent words to express that same meaning?."—This (creation of the connection of a new word with its meaning) has been already explained by us (to be impossible) [in the section on the Relation of words to Meanings under Sütra 5-says the Shlokavārtika-Chap. on Eternality of Words, 255]. Further, if a cognition (of the meaning of a-word) were based merely upon the similarity (of that word to a previous denotative word), then, there would always be a chance of its being mistaken and hence liable to sublation; for instance, the words 'mālā' (garland) and 'shālā' (house) being similar (in sound) one might derive the notion of the garland from the word 'shālā' [Read 'shālā' for 'mālā'], and such a notion would certainly be a mistaken one (and hence liable to sublation) .-- "But (this need not be so in all cases; for instance) the notion of the animal with the dewlap having been derived from the word 'aāvi' (through its similarity to the word 'gauh' which denotes the said animal), that notion is not sublated; the same may be true with the case in question [e.g. the notion of the jar may be derived from the word 'ahata' heard by a person today through its similarity to another word 'qhata' which he had heard on a previous day as denoting the jar: and certainly there would be nothing wrong in this notion and it would not be sublated]."-This is not right; in the case of the (corrupt) word 'gavi', the speaker really wishes to make use of the correct form ' gauh' [and it is through incapacity or ignorance that he uses the corrupt form 'quvi', so that if one understands this corrupt word as denoting the animal denoted by that correct form, that too must be due to incapacity and ignorance and hence liable to be mistaken, -- says the Shlokavārtika, Chap. on 'Eternality of Words', 276-277]; while in the case in question [where the same form 'gauh' is repeated], there is no desire to use any other form [and the comprehension of the object denoted therefore cannot be due to similarity.]-Further, it is not possible that the single act of utterance should bring about the use of the word itself and also create its relation to its denotation. [Each time that the word 'go' is used, if it were a new word, only similar to the word 'go' used before, then it would mean that whenever the word is uttered, it produces two things: (1) the use of the new word and (2) the connection of this new word with the thing denoted by it: and this is not right.]

For these reasons, we conclude that 'its utterance being for the purpose of another, the word must be eternal'.

SŪTRA (19).

THERE IS SIMULTANEITY THROUGHOUT.

Bhāsya.

Whenever the word 'go' ('cow') is uttered, there is a notion of all cows simultaneously. From this it follows that the word denotes the Class. And it is not possible to create the relation of the Word to a Class; because in creating the relation, the creator would have to lay down the relation by pointing to the Class; and without actually using the word 'go' (which he could not use before he has laid down its relation to its denotation), in what manner could he point to the distinct class denoted by the word 'go',—seeing that the body of the cow (which alone could be pointed to is the receptacle of many classes [such as 'Earth', 'Substance', 'Being', 'Tail', and so forth—says the Shlokwārtika, Chap. on 'Eternality of Words', 360]? If, however, the word 'go' is eternal, it is the same word that is uttered many times and has been previously heard also many times, as applied to other individual cows; and thus by a process of positive and negative concomitance the word comes to be recognised as denoting the particular class.—For this reason also, the Word must be eternal.

SŪTRA (20).

Because there is no number (in connection with a Word). $Bh\bar{a}sua,$

People speak of the word 'go' itself being eight im number.—"What, if that is o?"—The use of such an expression shows that people recognise (the same word); [they argue as follows—] 'we recognise the word as the same,—our perceptive organs are not defective,—others also recognise the Word as the same,—like ourselves, all persons recognising the Word as the same,—like ourselves, all persons recognising the Word as the same, would be prepared to assert that the Word is not different (but the same)'.—It might be held that "though the words are actually different, yet people are deluded by their similarity and hence declare them to be one and the same word".—This is not right, the notion that people have is not that 'this is similar', but that 'this is the same as that'; and further, the idea of sameness could be called a 'delusion' only if the difference among them were clearly perceived; as a matter of fact however, the idea that 'this word go is other than that word go' is not got at by direct perception, or by any other means of right cognition.

The opponent might urge—"Cognition and Action also (which are admitted by all to be ephemeral things) are recognised to be the same [(a) the cognition of the cow that one has today is recognised as the same cognition of the cow that he had yesterday; and (b) the action of walking done today is recognised as the same action of walking that was done yesterday]: and so by your reasoning these two also should be eternal."

This does not affect our position; because these two are not directly perceived: if they were directly perceived, they also would be eternal. This is an obscure passage. The Shlokavārtika, Chap, on Eternality of Words, provides the most satisfactory explanation in Verses 390-394 :- 'We do not accept mere Recognisability of the Word as proof of its Eternality; all that we mean by citing the fact of Recognition is to show that the theory of the non-eternality of words is opposed to a fact of Sense-perception (Recognition), and not that eternality is inferred from Recognition. So that the objection urged by the opponent,—that on the same ground of Recognition, Cognitions and Actions also should be inferred to be eternal-is not relevant.—But even to this irrelevant objection we have a suitable answer:— 'It is by Inference that people can get at the idea of the non-eternality of words, whereas their eternality is proved by the Perception of Recognition; and naturally Inference is set aside by Perception; in the case of Cognitions and Actions, on the other hand, their eternality is only inferred from their recognisability (their recognition not being a fact of perception); and their non-eternality is proved by Inference; hence between these two there is no difference in the strength of their validity'.--Another explanation suggested is that when Cognition and Action are said to be 'not perceptible', what is meant is that they are 'not perceived' by the Auditory Organ. Further, only those actions are spoken of here as 'not perceptible' as belong to supersensuous things; and as regards Cognitions, that these are imperceptible has been explained under 'Shunyavada.' Those actions that belong to

perceptible things are accepted by us to be eternal, like Letters and Words, on the ground of Recognition, etc., etc.]

Says the Opponent:—"The Word pronounced yesterday has ceased to exist; so that the Word pronounced today must be a different word".

Certainly the word pronounced vesterday has not ceased to exist; for the simple reason that we perceive it again; when people see an object, and failing to see it for a moment, see it again and recognise it to be the same as seen before, they never think that the object had ceased to exist. If they were to think so, then, on seeing their mother or wife or father a second time, they would not believe them (to be the same). Simply on not perceiving a thing people do not regard it as non-existent, and do not assume that it has ceased to exist. It is only when a thing is not found to be cognisable by any means of cognition that we regard it as non-existent. So that when there is Sense-perception available as the means of cognising a certain thing, that thing could not be regarded as not cognisable by any means of cognition. When again a certain thing has been unmistakably found to be existing, its existence cannot be denied; and so long as the thing is not actually found to be non-existent, the notion of its being existent cannot be regarded as wrong. Now in the case in question, the non-existence (of the word) has not been proved. Hence the notion (of the continued existence of the Word) not being wrong, there can be no non-existence (of the Word). All this is proved seriatim. From this it also follows that even in the case of a word not pronounced before, if people do not perceive it, they cannot assume that it has ceased to exist. For instance, when people, going out of the house, do not see all their family-members, but on returning see them again, they do not regard them as having ceased to exist before the said return. In the same manner people cannot regard the Word (heard today) to be other (than the same word heard yesterday).

Even those people who regard all things as undergoing destruction every moment, cannot say the same with regard to the Word; because in regard to other things they hold the said view because they find the things perishing in the end,—while in the case of the Word there is no end, nor is it found to perish.

Lastly, the notion that 'this (what I hear today) is the same as that (heard by me yesterday)' is got at by Perception, while the notion that 'it is similar to it' is got at by Inference; and no Inference can appear against Perception, nor can it establish its object.

From all this it follows that Word is eternal.

SŪTRA (21).

BECAUSE IT IS NOT DEPENDENT.

Bhāṣya.

Even in the case of things whose actual production has not been perceived, some of them are regarded as non-eternal, in whose case we find that there are causes tending to destroy them. For instance, when one sees a piece of new cloth which he has not seen being woven,—and yet on merely seeing its form, he understands that it is perishable,—seeing that it

has been produced by the conglomeration of the yarns, and as such, it must perish on the destruction of that conglomeration of the yarns, or on the destruction of the yarns themselves.—In the case of the Word, however, we do not perceive any material cause, on the destruction whereof the Word itself would be regarded as ceasing to exist.

SÜTRA (22).

Also because there is no idea of the connection (of the Word, with any material cause).

Bhāsua.

This Sūtra has to be construed as following upon a few words, such as the following (emanating from the Opponent)—"The Word may be the product of Air: in fact it is Air which, through certain conjunctions and disjunctions, becomes the Word. The author of the Shikṣū also has declared that 'Air takes the form of Word'."

[It is in answer to this that we have the Sütra.]—It cannot be so; if the Word were the product of Air, then it could only be Air in a particular shape. As a matter of fact, however, we do not recognise any particle of Air in the constitution of the Word, in the manner in which we recognise the particles of yarn in the constitution of the Cloth. Therefore the Word cannot be a product of Air. If the Word were a product of Air, then we could perceive it with our tactile organ (as we perceive Air); and yet we do not feel by touch any air-particles in the Word. Hence Word cannot be a product of Air. Therefore it must be eternal.

SŪTRA (23).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

We also actually find a Vedic text indicating the eternality of Word—e.g. 'By means of Word which is eternal, etc.' Though this text relates to a different topic, yet it reiterates the eternality of the Word.

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From all this we conclude that Word is eternal.

ADHIKARANA (7): Expressiveness of Sentences (in the Veda). SÜTBA (24).

[Pūrvapaksa]—" Even though they (word, its meaning, and the relation between the two) be eternal, they could not be expressive of the Vedic Subject-matter (of the Vedic Injunction, Dharma); because they are not efficient for that purpose."

Bhāsya.

It has been established that Words, their meanings, and the Relation between them are inborn, eternal; but so far nothing has been said regarding Sentences; and as the Vedic Injunction, which is the sole means of knowing Dharma, is always in the form of Sentence,—until the same fact is established regarding Sentences, the validity of the Injunction as a means of knowing Dharma remains doubtful. Hence the Author now proceeds to deal with the nature of the Sentence and its meaning].

Pūrvapaksa.

Says the Pūrvapaksin-" Even though the Word, its Meaning and the Relation between the two be inborn,-i.e. eternal.-vet it cannot be true that 'Dharma is that which is indicated by the Vedic Injunction as conducive to the highest good.' The Injunction must be a sentence (not a Word); and in the injunction 'one desiring heaven should perform the Agnihotra', there is not a single Word which expresses the idea that 'heaven results from the performance of the Agnihotra'; this idea is comprehended only from all the three words (a) 'Agnihotram'-(b) 'inhuyāt'-(c) 'svargakāmah', [(c) 'one desiring heaven—(b) should perform—(a) the Agnihotra']; and there is no fourth word apart from the group of the said three words ;no such group of words however is met with in common parlance, on the basis of which usage the meaning of the group could be deduced. Every single word of the group is used (in common parlance), and the meanings of these words are eternal; but the group as such is never used in common parlance: hence the meaning of this group (not being eternal) must be either artificial (created) or illusory.

"It cannot be that the meanings of the (component) words themselves form the meaning of the (composite) group (sentence). Because (according to the Siddhāntin himself) the Word denotes the Universal (Class), while the Sentence refers to the Particular (Individual); and the Universal is something quite different from the Particular.—Nor would it be right to assert that 'the meaning of the sentence is deduced from the meaning of the (component) words'; because there is no connection between the two; and when there is no connection between them.—if it were possible that the compre-

hension of the meaning of some one word would lead to the comprehension of some totally different meaning,—then it might be (as well) possible to comprehend everything from the comprehension of one thing. No such thing however ever takes place. Hence we conclude that the meaning of the Sentence must be distinct (from the meaning of the words).

"The following might be urged by the other party—'Even from a sentence that has not been used before, and (hence) with regard to which no connection with any meaning has been established,—the comprehension of a meaning might be obtained by virtue of the nature of the sentence itself.—The Pūrvapaksin might urge that in that case the Word would go against its own nature; as it is not in the nature of the Word that the meaning is comprehended even from an unused word; in fact people never comprehend any meaning from the word heard for the first time.—The answer to this would be that what is set forth here (that no meaning is comprehended from an unused word) is a characteristic of the Word, not of the Sentence; because people are actually found to comprehend the meaning of a sentence which they have heard for the first time.

"To this the answer (of the Pūrvapākṣin) is as follows:—This cannot be; if people were to comprehend the meaning of a sentence heard for the first time, then all men would comprehend it,—those knowing the meanings of the component words, as also those not knowing them. As a matter of fact, however, those not knowing the meanings of the component words never comprehend the meaning of the sentence. Hence what has been urged by the other party is not possible.

"The other party retorts—' Even when the meaning of the sentence is comprehended by those knowing the meaning of the component words, the relation between the Sentence and its meaning must be one that is not artificial (created); and like the meaning of the Word, the meaning of the sentence also could be comprehended only by those who would be conversant with that (inborn) relation; just as the meaning of a word heard a second time is comprehended only by those who had heard and comprehended it before.'

"To this our (Pūrvapakṣin's) answer is—No; in the case of the sentence, if the last letter, along with the impressions left by the preceding letters, serves to express a meaning other than that of the words (composing the sentence),—then this process could not be held to be helped in any way by the knowledge of the meaning of the component words. [Read 'tadā na' for 'tadānīm']—From all this it follows that the cognition of the meaning of the sentence must be either artificial or illusory,—and that the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence cannot be got at through the meaning of the component words.

"The other party argues—'The process would be as follows:—The meaning of the sentence [e.g. shuklo gauh, white cow, or kryno shvah, black horse] is comprehended when the word 'white' or 'black'—which denote the particular—happens to be near the word 'cow' or 'horse'—which denote the universal.'

"But this cannot be; when, as a matter of fact, the word 'cow' or 'horse', which denotes the *Universal*, brings about the notion of all come or all horses, by direct denotation,—that notion could not be withdrawn from

any one of those cows or horses, under the influence of the Sentence. Nor does any such word as 'white', which denotes the Particular, express any such idea as 'the exclusion of the Black and others'. Nor can we assume the meaning of a word simply for the purpose of avoiding the contingency of its becoming meaningless.—Thus also the meaning of the Sentence cannot be due to the meanings of the Words; it must be artificial. Specially as sentences are only groups of words, and groupings of words are found to be made by man, in the form of such sentences as—'The sweet-voiced swans moving about amidst clusters of blue lotuses, appear as if dancing [read 'prantiganti' for 'pranashyanti'] with their bodies covered with blue silk'. From this it also follows that the Vedic Sentences also are created (not eternal, and hence not valid means of knowing Dharma).'

SŪTRA (25).

[Answer to the Pūrvapakṣa arguments]...[In the sentence] there is only a predication (or mention) of words with definite denotations along with a word denoting an action; as the meaning (of the sentence) is based upon that (i.e. the meaning of the words).

Bhāsya.

In the sentence there is a predication—or mention—of such words as are tied to their denotations—along with a word denoting an action. Hence the Sentence can never be said to have any separate meaning independently of the meanings of the words composing it;—why?—because there is no proof for it; there is no valid means of knowledge whereby we could have any cognition (of the independent meaning of sentences). Even the last letter of the sentence along with the impressions left by the previous letters has no power, independently of the meanings of the component words, to express any meaning totally different from what is expressed by those words.

Says the Opponent:—"But there is Presumption (of the sentence having the power to express an independent meaning): for instance, as a matter of fact, we do comprehend a meaning of the Sentence which is different from the meaning of the words; and this comprehension could not be possible unless the sentence had the requisite power."

This is not right; as the meaning (of the sentence) is based upon that (i.e. the meaning of words). The Presumption (put forward by the Opponent) would be possible, if, in the absence of the said Power, there were no other basis available; as a matter of fact however, such other basis is available—what?—in the shape of the meanings of words. What happens is that each of the words (composing the sentence) ceases from activity after having expressed its meaning,—and the meanings of the words thus comprehended bring about the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence (as a whole).—"How ?!"—When such words as 'white', 'black' and the like bring about the notion of the quality (of whiteness, blackness and the rest), they are quite capable of bringing about the notion also of the thing possessing

that quality; it is for this reason that people desiring to bring about the notion of the thing possessing the quality make use of only the word denoting the quality, and thereby their desired object is attained, and the notion of the qualified thing is actually brought about; -and it is this notion of the qualified thing that constitutes the meaning of the sentence. shows that the meaning of a word brings about the notion of a qualified thing; and as what is expressed by the sentence is only a qualified thing,-viz. the meanings of words as qualified by one another, -it follows that the comprehension of the meaning of the Sentence is derived from that of the meanings of words]. Such being the case, the meaning of the sentence is got at from something quite different (from the Power of the Sentence, posited by the Pūrvapaksa). When too no actual 'Power' in the group of words (i.e. Sentence, apart from the component words) is perceived, who can dare to say that the presence of this Power is deducible from (presumed on the basis of) the Meaning (of the Sentence)? [As such an assumption would involve a vicious circle, Meaning depending upon Power, and Power depending upon Meaning].-Then again, whether one thing is separate or not from another is ascertained by positive and negative concomitance; and in the case in question it is found that sometimes, by reason of some mental derangement (loss of memory), the meanings of the words uttered are not comprehended; at such a time the meaning of the sentence. (composed of those words) would never be comprehended only if the meaning of the sentence were not entirely separate from the meaning of the Words:-as a matter of fact, it is found that under the said circumstances. the meaning of the sentence is never comprehended. [It follows therefore that the meaning of the sentence is not entirely separate from the meaning of the component words] .- Some people might argue that in the case cited, when the meaning of the words is not comprehended by reason of some mental derangement, the sentence also is not perceived; so that the noncomprehension of the meaning of the sentence is due to the non-perception of the Sentence itself, and not to the non-comprehension of the meanings of the words. The answer to this is that | even in a case where the word 'white' is not uttered, if one happens to have some idea of 'whiteness', he has also the idea of the thing possessed of the quality of whiteness [so that the idea of the qualified thing follows from the idea of the quality; in the same manner the conception of the meaning of the sentence, which consists of the conception of the meanings of the words qualifying one another, follows from the conception of the meanings of the words; for instance, when we see a white animal running at a distance and hear its neighing, and we have some notion of white horse and running,-there follows the notion 'the white horse is running', which is the meaning of the sentence 'the white horse is running', even though no such sentence has been uttered. If the non-perception of the sentence were the cause of the non-comprehension of the meaning of the sentence, then in the case cited, there could be no comprehension of the meaning of the sentence; as the sentence, not being uttered, has not been perceived] .-- From all this it follows that the meaning of the sentence is comprehended only on the comprehension of the meanings of the component words; and it has no connection with (and does not follow from) the group of words (Sentence, as something distinct from the Words).

It has been argued above (Text, p. 33, l. 17) that "the direct denotation of the word (including all individuals) could not be withdrawn from any particular individuals simply in consideration of the sentence: [e.g. when the word 'Cow' denotes all cows, there can be no justification for restricting its denotation to any particular cow only because the word happens to appear in the sentence 'the white cow goes'.]—True, this is so. But we admit the qualified (restricted) denotation of the words as forming the meaning of the sentence, only where we find that the meaning of the Word as used by itself serves no purpose and hence becomes useless,—and not in all cases;—our idea being that (if it can serve no useful purpose as the isolated meaning of the word) it may serve some purpose by being taken as the qualified meaning of the sentence.

This same reasoning also sets aside the other objection that "the Word ('white') does not denote the exclusion of other qualities" (see Text, p. 33, 1.8). [That is, we can take the word as denoting the exclusion of other qualities if we find that, if not so taken, it becomes useless.]

Further, the Accusative and other case-endings appearing at the end of a noun clearly indicate the rule that the denotation of the noun qualifies (and restricts) the signification of those endings; and this particular rule (that the Accusative ending appearing along with the word ' $g\bar{a}m$ ' signifies the objective character as restricted to the cov) would set aside the general rule (that the Accusative ending signifies the objective character in general).

Lastly, it has been urged (Text, p. 33, 1. 21) that "groups of words (sentences) are found to be composed by human beings".—This has been refuted by us by such arguments as that people have no remembrance [idea of any human beings as the composers of Vedic sentences] (see Text, p. 15, 1. 23). Further, we do not find among human beings any such capacity as would enable them to compose sentences on such (supersensuous) subjects (as Sacrifice, Heaven and the like).

SŪTRA (26).

In regard to the ordinary (worldly) things,—inasmuch as there is contact (of the thing with the organs of perception),—it is possible for sentences to be actually composed in usage.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[It has been shown that it is not possible for human beings to compose sentences dealing with supersensuous things.] In regard to the things of the world, it is possible (for men), after having actually perceived the things, to compose sentences speaking of these things,—such as 'the swans reaming among the clusters of blue lotuses, etc.' (quoted by the Pūrvapak-sin).

From all that has gone above we conclude that the connected idea that Heaven is attained by performing the Agnihotra is obtained out of just those

meanings (ideas) that are severally expressed by the words (a) 'Svarga-kāmah' (Desiring Heaven), (b) 'juhvyāt' (one should offer), and (c) 'Agni-hotram' (the Agnihotra sacrifice);—the comprehension of the meanings of words being derived from Words, and the meaning of the Sentence being derived from the meanings of the component words.

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ADHIKARANA (8): The Veda is not the work of any Person. SÜTRA (27).

[Pūrvapakṣā]—"Some people regard the Vedas to be modern, Because they are named after Persons."

Bhāsya.

Says the Pürvapaksin:-"It has been declared above that 'Dharma is that which is indicated by the Vedic Injunction as conducive to the highest good', because relation between Words and their meanings is not created by man. Our objections regarding Words and Sentences have been answered (by the Siddhantin). We are now going to attack the Siddhanta doctrine from another standpoint: What we say now is that the Vedic Injunctions themselves are the work of human beings; that is, the Vedas belong to recent times, being composed in modern days: and as the Injunctions are all contained in the Vedas,-if the Vedas are the work of human authors, the Injunctions also must doubtless be the work of human authors. -The Siddhantin may ask-'On what grounds do some people regard the Vedas as composed (by man)? '-The answer is-Because they are named after persons; as a matter of fact, we find that the Vedas are named after certain men,-being named as 'Kāthaka' (composed by Kathaka), 'Kālāpaka' (composed by Kalāpaka), 'Paippalāda' (composed by Pippalāda), 'Mauhula' (composed by Muhula), and so forth. Such naming would not be possible unless the texts had some connection (with the persons whose name they bear); and the man can have no connection with a text except that he is the author and the text is his work .- 'But the name might be due to the text having been expounded (not composed, by the person).'-That cannot be, we reply; the qualification of a thing is always such as is peculiar to that thing itself; and it is only the author that can be one only for a text, the expounders might be many [so that the distinguishing name could not be based upon those expounding it; as in that case there would be no reason for the text being named after any one of the expounders |.- From all this we conclude that there must have been an author of the Vedic Injunctions. even though we do not remember (have no idea of) him. And therefore 'the Dharma indicated by the Vedic Injunction' cannot be accepted as authoritative."

SŪTRA (28).

[Pürvapakṣa concluded]—"Also because we find Ephemeral things (mentioned in the Veda)"

Bhāṣya.

"In the Veda we find several such things spoken of as are prone to birth and death; for instance, we find such sentences as—'Babara, the son of Pravahana, desired,' (Taitti. San. 7.1.20), 'Kusuruvinda, the son of Uddā-

laka, desired '(Taitti. Sam. 7. 2. 2), and so forth. Now the 'son of Uddālaka' must be born of Uddālaka; and if so, the text speaking of him could not have existed before his birth. In this way also, the non-eternality (of the Veda) becomes established."

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THERE IS AN UNBROKEN CONTINUITY OF THE TEXT.

Bhāsya.

We have already explained that (under $S\bar{u}$. 5) there is an unbroken tradition of the text among the students of the Veda [which proves that the Veda is eternal]; all that we have to do here is to answer the objections (urged by the $P\bar{u}rvapaksin$); and this we are going to do in the following $S\bar{u}tras$.

SŪTRA (30).

THE NAME IS DUE TO EXPOUNDING.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

It has been urged by the Pūrvapaksin that such names of Vedic texts as 'Kāthaka' and the like must be indicative of the author.—Our answer to this is as follows:-No such presumption (of the author) is justifiable; as people might call a text by the name of one who is not the author at all: it is possible that all that Katha and other persons (whose names are applied to. certain Vedic texts) have done is such superior expounding of the text as has not been done by any one else; and there are people who call texts by the names of such exceptional expounders. Then again, we are told that, while Vaishanpāyana was a student of all the Vedic texts (of the Yajurvada), Katha taught only the one particular Recensional text (which is named after him), and among the many students of several Recensions, if any one man concentrates upon a single Recension and does not study any other Recension, he becomes an expert in that Recension, and as such it is only natural that he should be specially connected with that Recension which may be distinguished (from other texts) by its connection with him. [So that the name of the text does not necessarily indicate an author.]

SŪTRA (31).

In reality, there is only a similarity of sounds.

Bhāsya.

The Pūrvapakṣin has cited the term 'prāvāhaṇi' (as a proper name corring in the Veda, and hence proving that the Veda came after that person).—But this is not right. We do not know of any person of the name of 'Pravāhaṇa',—hence the term 'prāvāhaṇi' cannot mean 'the son of Pravāhaṇa'; in fact the prefix 'pra' is well-known as signifying excellence, and the root 'vaha' as signifying the act of carrying; and we do not know of the combination of these two (pra-vahaṇa) as forming any common well-known word;—as regards the 'i' (in the term 'prāvāhaṇi'), it is known as

signifying 'progeny' as well as 'agent of an action';—so that the term 'prāvāhaṇi' signifies 'one who carries things in an excellent manner' [and it cannot mean 'the son of Pravāhaṇa', as we do not know of any person of the name of 'Pravāhaṇa'].—As for the term 'babara', it is only a word imitative of sound (produced by the blowing wind).—Thus the two words ('prāvāhaṇi' and 'babara') only express the everlasting thing (the blowing wind).—It is this that is meant by the words of the Sūtra—'There is only a similarity of sounds.'

SŪTRA (32).

ON ACCOUNT OF PASSAGES BEING CORRELATED TO ACTIONS, THE PAS-SAGES IN QUESTION WOULD BE OF USE IN REGARD TO AN ACT.

Bhāsya.

Asks the Opponent—"How do you know that all this (Veda) is not like the utterance of lunatics and children? As a matter of fact, we find in it such sentences as 'Trees sat at the sacrificial session', 'Serpents sat at the sacrificial session', 'The old bull sings maddening songs'. Now, how could the 'old bull' sing? How too could 'trees' or 'serpents' sit at sacrifices?'

The answer to this is as follows:—As a rule we find the sentences occurring in the Veda laid down as mutually connected.—"How so?"—Having stated the word 'Jyotistomah', the term 'should be performed' is added;—then the question arising as to the means of the performance—'by what is it to be performed?'—the term 'by means of the Soma' is added;—then arises the question, for what purpose?';—and in answer there is the term 'for the purpose of attaining heaven';—then comes the question, 'in what manner?'—and the answer is 'thus, by this process'. Thus seeing that the entire passage affords an idea which is the sum total of what is expressed by each of the terms described above,—how could we say that it is like the utterance of a lunatic or a child?

"But the statement that we find to the effect that 'Trees sat at the sacrificial session' is clearly absurd."

It is not absurd. In the first place, even if this particular statement were absurd, that would not make all other statements—such as 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the Agnihotra'—absurd.—But in reality, even such statements as 'Trees sat at the sacrificial session' are not absurd. They serve to eulogise the sacrificial session; the sense being, 'even such inanimate things as trees performed this sacrifice, what to say of learned Brāhmaṇas?' Just as in common parlance we say 'At evening-time even animals do not graze, what to say of learned Brāhmaṇas?'—Further, the teaching in the Veda being found irreproachable, wholesome and definite, how could it ever be suspected to be like the utterance of lunatics and children?

For these reasons, it becomes established that 'Dharma is what is indicated by Vedic Injunctions as conducive to the highest good'.

Thus ends Pāda I of Adhyāya I, the Tarkapāda.

PĀDA II.

Authority of the Arthavada.

Adhikarana (1): Authority of Arthavāda Passages in general.

SŪTRA (1).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" THE PURPOSE OF THE VEDA LYING IN THE ENJOIN-ING OF ACTIONS, THOSE PARTS OF THE VEDA WHICH DO NOT SERVE THAT PURPOSE ARE USELESS; IN THESE THEREFORE THE VEDA IS DECLARED TO BE NON-ETERNAL (UNRELIABLE)."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[Having established the authoritative character of the Veda, the Author nover proceeds to explain the usefulness, with regard to Dharma, of the whole Veda, consisting of Vidhi (Injunction), Arthavāda (Valedictory Passages), Mantras and Names, each of these being considered separately with reference to its own specific use.—The use of Vidhi, Injunction, has been discussed fully in the preceding Pāda, where it has been shown that it is the only means of knowing Dharma. The present Sūtra starts the consideration of the Arthavāda or Valedictory Passages.]

The propounders of the scripture read (in the Veda) such passages as—
(a) 'He wept (arotit);—because he wept, Rudra came to be called Rudra'
(Taittiriya-Sanihitā 1-51), (b) 'Prajāpati cut out his own fat' (Taittiriya-Sanihitā 2. 1. 1), (c) 'The deities, on coming to the sacrificial ground, did not
know the directions' (Taittiriya-Sanihitā 6. 1. 5).—In connection with these,
the question arises—Do these bring about the knowledge of any Dharma
or not?

The Pūrvapaksa view is stated as follows:-

"The propounders of the scripture quote texts only for the purpose of explaining in what manner an act is to be performed. Such being the case, if there are passages which do not indicate an act to be done, or some detail connected with the act, and which speak of only past events,-such for instance as 'Rudra wept', 'Prajāpati cut out the fat', 'the deities did not know the directions' and so forth,—of what Dharma could these bring about a knowledge ?-It might be said that 'some suitable meaning (tending to indicate an act to be done) might be got out of even such passages, by the several methods of indirect interpretation,—such as (a) supplying of ellipsis, (b) changing the forms of words, (c) connecting what is disconnected. (d) disconnecting what is connected, and (e) imputing a figurative meaning. [Examples of these methods are given in the Shlokavārtika, Sūtra 1, verses 54-58]'.- Even if such a meaning could be assumed, what is the definite meaning that could be actually assumed? It could only be the following: -(a)'Rudra wept, therefore other people also should weep', (b) 'Prajapati cut out his fat, therefore other people also should cut out their fat', (c) 'At the time of the sacrifice, the deities did not know the directions, therefore other people also should not know the directions. '-But none of these acts could be done; for instance, (a) when a man sheds tears either on account of separation from a loved person or by reason of being hurt, that action is called 'weeping': and certainly no one does this act voluntarily :- (b) nor can any one cut out his own fat, offer it into the fire, and with the hornless animal rising out of it, perform a sacrifice:-(c) nor could people be voluntarily bewildered regarding the directions at the time of a sacrificial performance.-For these reasons we conclude that all these passages must be useless.-And because they are 'useless,' therefore they are described as 'non-eternal': which means that 'though (being contained in the Veda) they are eternal, yet they do not serve any eternal (lasting) purpose' .- This attack is aimed at a few of the sentences (in the Veda, i.e only Arthavadas), not against the entire body of Vedic texts.—'But if a portion of a number of mutually related words is rejected, they become defective and as such unable to serve their purpose; consequently the rejection of a part must mean the rejection of the whole' .--Not so: there are certain groups of words (sentences) which are capable of enjoining a certain act, even without any Arthavadas (Valedictory Passages); it is only such sentences as by reason of being connected with the Valedictory Passages, enjoin something quite different, that become rejected by the rejection of those Valedictory Passages".

SÜTRA (2).

[PÜRVAPAKŅA continued]—" ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS CONTRADICTION OF THE SCRIPTURES AND OF DIRECTLY PERCEIVED FACTS."

Bhāsya.

"There are such passages in the Veda as—(a) 'The Mind is a thief', 'Speech is a liar' and so forth. These passages, containing mere descriptions of accomplished things, cannot serve as the means of knowing Dharma.— Even if some indirect meaning could be assumed by the indirect methods of interpretation, the only injunction of actions that could be derived from these would be—(a) that 'one should commit theft', and that (b) 'one should tell lies'; and the acts thus enjoined cannot be performed without transpressing the prohibitions of stealing and of telling lies. Nor could the two (Stealing and Not-stealing, or Lying and Not-lying) be taken as optional alternatives; as the two do not stand on the same footing: in the case of one (i.e. Stealing) the injunction is assumed (on the basis of the Arthaväda 'the mind is a thief'), while in that of the other (Not-stealing), we have the direct injunction ('thou shalt not steal').

"Then again, there is contradiction of directly perceived facts also: For example—'During the day, it is only the smoke of the fire that is seen, not its flame, and during the hight only the flame of the fire is seen, not the smoke' (Taitti. Brā. 2. 1. 2); and in support of this statement we have the further assertion—'The Fire going forth from this World enters the Sun, and during the night the Sun enters the Fire'.—Both these statements (of fire antering the Sun and the Sun entering the Fire) are contrary to perceptible

facts; and hence cannot prove the aforesaid restrictive assertion (that 'it is the smoke alone' or 'the flame alone' that is seen).

"Another example of the contradiction of perceptible facts we have in the passage—'We know not whether we are Brāhmaṇas or Non-Brāhmaṇas' (Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa 5. 21). In the first place this sentence, not laying down anything in regard to any action, is useless. Secondly, if it actually means that 'we do not know whether we are Brāhmaṇas or Non-Brāhmaṇas', then it is contrary to a perceptible fact, and as such cannot be true.

"An example of the contradiction of what is stated in the scriptures we have in the passage—'Who knows whether one lives in the other world or not' (Taittiriya-Sanhitā 7. 2. 2; 6. 1. 1).—If it is a mere question, then, serving no purpose regarding any act, it is useless. If it expresses a real uncertainty, then it is contrary to what is declared in the Scriptures (regarding men going, after death, to regions other than the Earth). And thus being contrary to well-ascertained facts, the statement cannot be true."

SŪTRA (3).

[Pürvapaksa continued]—"Also because of the absence of results."

Bhāsya.

"With reference to the Gargatrirātra Brāhmana, it is said 'If one knows this, his face shines' (Tāṇāya Mahābrāhmana 20. 16. 6). If this is a mere statement of an accomplished fact, then it has no value. If it describes the result following from the reading of the particular text, then it is a description of what does not exist (is not true).—'But the result may come at some future time'.—There is no evidence for this.—'The statement may be taken as an Injunction (of the result)'.—But the sentence is not capable of being taken as an Injunction; and further, it is going to be considered later on, under the Sūtra 'Dravyasamhskārakarmasu, etc.' (4. 3. 1), whether such passages as the one under consideration are Injunctions of results or Arthavāda [and the conclusion arrived at there is going to be that they are Arthavāda]. In the present context all that we have to consider is whether the passage is a mere description of an established fact, or it lays down something helpful to an Action [and we have seen that as a description it is untrue, and it does not lay down anything in connection with any Action].

Another example of the same kind is the passage—'If a man knows this, an extremely wealthy child is born among his progeny'.

SŪTRA (4).

[Purvapaksa continued]—" Because of the uselessness of other (acts)."

Bhāsya,

"There are the following three texts—(1) 'By pouring the Final Oblation one fulfils all desires' (Taith. Brā. 3, 8, 10); (2) 'One who performs the Pashubandha sacrifice wins all regions'; (3) 'He passes beyond death, he passes beyond the sin of Brāhmaṇa-slaughter, who performs the Ashvamedha sacrifices, as also one who knows this' .-- Now if these are mere descriptions of established facts, then they are useless. If they lay down the actual results following from the acts mentioned, then there is no use for any other acts. For instance, (a) until the Final Oblation has been already poured into the Fire, the Agnihotra and other acts are not completed [so that if all desires were to be fulfilled by the pouring of the Final Oblation, then there would be no need for performing the Agnihotra or any other act];-(b) similarly, until the Agnisomiya (which is a kind of Pashubandha) has been performed, the Soma-sacrifice is not completed [so that if all regions including heaven were actually won by the performance of the Pashubandha, there would be no need for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, for the purpose of attaining heaven]: -(c) similarly, until they have read the section dealing with the Ashvamedha, people do not perform the Ashvamedha Sacrifice [so that if immortality and freedom from sins were already attained by the mere knowledge of the Ashvamedha, there would be no need for performing the sacrifice]. So that the case of all this should be like the case where men seeking for honey would never leave the honey found on the Arka-plant growing on the way and proceed further on to the mountain. To this end there is the popular saying-'If honey can be found on the Arka plant, wherefore should one go to the mountain? which wise man would go on working after the desired object has been attained?'

SŪTRA (5).

[Põbvapakṣa continued]—" Also because of the prohibiting of what cannot be prohibited."

Bhāsya.

"Such passages as 'The Fire shall not be kindled on the Earth, nor in the Sky, nor in Heaven' (Taitti. Sainhitä 5.2.7) prohibits things which are incapable of being prohibited. For instance, it is already known (without the help of the text) that fire cannot be kindled in the Sky or in Heaven; as for the kindling of fire on the Earth, if a sentence were to prohibit that, it would mean the prohibition of all kindling (of fire).—If we take the statement as not true, then these incongruities do not arise. In fact, how can that be true (a valid means of knowledge) which perturbs (goes against) another Injunction, (that of fire-kindling for instance), and is itself confounded (as prohibiting the Kindling in the Sky); in the case in question, the prohibition that 'fire shall not be kindled' would go directly against the injunction that 'fire shall be kindled after placing a piece of gold on the ground' (Ibid.).

SŪTRA (6).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA concluded]—" BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF NON-ETERNAL THINGS."

Bhāsya.

In connection with the authoritative character of the Veda, the objection that there is mention of non-eternal things in the Veda has been answered

by the declaration that 'it is merely a similarity of sounds' (Sū. 1. 1. 21).— The same objection is raised here again in support of the attack upon some parts of the Veda—on the basis of the mention in the Veda, of such apparently ephemeral things as 'Babara, the son of Pravāhaṇa, desired' (Taitti. Sam. 7. 1. 10).

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BEING CONSTRUED ALONG WITH INJUNCTION, THEY
WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF COMMENDING THOSE
THURSTIONS.

Bhāsya.

[The Bhāsya proceeds with the Siddhānia, in connection with a passage distinct from all those that have been cited by the opponent; the reason for this has been thus explained in the Tantravārikā: As regards the passages cited by the opponent, even in their literal significations they are open to doubt; consequently to begin with them would entail the additional initial effort of proving those to be true and then showing their bearing upon an Injunction; and inasmuch as this initial effort would be of no consequence regarding the connection of Arthavāda passages with Injunctions,—which is the real subject-matter of the present context,—the Bhāsya has cited a passage which, in its literal signification, is universally recognised to be true; whereby it becomes easier to explain that such passages are glorifications, to be taken along with Injunctive passages, and as such help in the knowledge of Dharma; and to facilitate the matter further, the Bhāsya cites a passage which is instantly recognised as one to be taken along with, and forming part of, a direct Injunction.]

The following text is found in the Veda-' One desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal Shveta dedicated to Vāyu;-Vāyu is the eftest deity;....he leads the man to prosperity' (Taitti, Sam. 2. 1, 1). Though the sentence 'Vayu is the eftest deity' does not indicate any action (to be done), or anything connected with an action, yet it becomes a valid means of knowledge by being construed with an injunctive sentence; in the entire passage quoted, the sentence ending with 'bhūtikāmah'-i.e. the sentence 'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal dedicated to Vāuu',-is injunctive; and it is with this injunctive sentence, that the sentence in question-'Vāyu is the eftest deity'-is construed.-"But how can there be any syntactical connection between the two sentences?"-There is syntactical connection between the Injunction and the eulogy, because the words (of the two sentences) are interdependent; the construction being-'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice,-why ?-because Vāyu is the eftest deity'. [With a view to avoid the need of the sentence eulogising Vāyu] the injunctive sentence may be sought to be construed in the following way-'The man desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal,-why should he sacrifice it ?-because prosperity results from the sacrifice'.-But this construction will not be acceptable if the two concepts ('sacrifice' and 'results') are totally distinct, and hence if both were predicated, there would be a syntactical split.

It may be asked—"Why should there be commendation (of the enjoined act)?"—There is commendation for the purpose of making the Act attractive and hence performed.—"Even without the commendatory sentence,

the performance of the Act would be secured by the force of the injunction itself, ending with the term 'bhūtikāmah', so that the commendatory sentence is absolutely useless" .- Not so; as a matter of fact, if there were no commendatory words, then the enjoining would be accomplished by the preceding sentence (ending with 'bhūtikāmah', i.e. only the sentence 'one desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal dedicated to Väyu'); but when the commendatory sentence is there, then the enjoining of the sacrifice for the man desiring prosperity would not be accomplished (without the help of the eulogy). For instance, when we have the simple sentence 'Paio bhavati', it expresses the sense that the cloth is produced, as the two words forming the sentence are complete by themselves and do not need any other factor; but when along with the same two words we find the third word 'raktam' (red), then we get the further sense that there is connection with colour; and in this case the first two words do stand in need of being construed with the word 'raktam' (which otherwise would be wholly unconnected and hence meaningless). In the same manner, if there were no commendatory words, then the necessary persuasion (needed by the Injunction) would be done by the Injunctive word itself. But when there is a commendatory word, the persuasion is done by the praising,-"But even so, why should we have the commendatory word at all? When (as you say) its presence makes the Injunction lose its injunctive force, it had better not be there; specially as if it were not there, the necessary persuasion would be done by the preceding Injunctive sentence itself".-True; even without the commendatory word, the persuasion could be accomplished; but the commendatory word is there; and when it is there, the sense that is expressed by it is the commending (of the Act); and this commending is the purpose served by both the sentences [the injunctive and the commendatory sentences. The object commended, i.e. the Act, is indicated by the Injunctive sentence,-no commending is possible without any indication of what is commended, -so the Injunctive sentence also, in this way, serves the purpose of commending.—Tantravārtika, Trans. p. 37]. It is only when the commendatory Word is not there that the persuasion may be regarded as being done by the Injunctive sentence (which involves a highly complicated process).-" Even when the commendatory words are there, inasmuch as the preceding sentence has the clearly injunctive form, the injunction would be naturally regarded as expressed by that sentence, and there would be no need felt for connecting that sentence with the commendatory words. It might be argued that-in this way, the commendatory words would be meaningless and incomplete':-our answer to this would be that, yes, they would be meaningless; let them be so."

So long as the Words afford good sense, they cannot be regarded as meaningless. As a matter of fact, the injunctive sentence is capable, independently by itself, of enjoining its object, and it is also capable of being construed along with the commendatory words. And in the case in question, the fact that it can be so construed is clearly manifest. For this reason we take the commendatory words as containing the commendation of what is enjoined by the Injunction ['asmāt', from the commendatory text in question; 'widhēh', of what is enjoined].

"We could deduce the injunction from the injunctive sentence independently by itself."

That may be so; if that is so, there is nothing incongruous in it. But when the connection of the commendatory words is there, the desired Injunction cannot be expressed (by the Injunctive sentence, independently by itself). Every Sentence indicates a relationship; if then, the Injunctive sentence were to indicate two relationships—such as,—(1) one desiring prosperity, should sacrifice, and (2) by sacrificing, such and such good things would be accomplished,—then there would be a syntactical split.

It has been argued above (Text, p. 39, 1. 9) that—"the sentence in question ('Vāyu is the eftest deity') does not express an act, nor anything connected with an act [and hence it is useless]."—The answer to this given by the Sūtra is that the eulogistic passages 'would serve the purpose of commending the Injunctions'; that is, the commendatory words, eulogising the Act (enjoined), persuade the performers and thus help the Act itself. In this same manner all such (commendatory) words eulogise something and thereby help its being enjoined.

From all this we conclude that such sentences as ' $V\ddot{a}yu$ is the eftest deity' (Taitti. Saii. 2. 1. 1. 1) are useful as means of right knowledge (of Dharma).

SŪTRA (8).

And the connection of long-established tradition also is equally present (in the Injunctive and the Commendatory Words).

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent might argue as follows:—"Even before the Commendatory Words appear, the Injunctive Words, having the injunctive form, accomplish, independently, by themselves, the enjoining (of the act to be enjoined); and the presence of the Commendatory Words must be regarded (and rejected) as a wrong reading of the text".

It is not so; because they give very good sense; and also because 'the connection of long-established tradition is equally present'; that is, all those characteristics that go to establish the 'tradition' are present equally in the Injunctive and the Commendatory Words;—such characteristics being—(a) 'the text should be read on certain days, and should not be read on certain days', (b) 'the text must be learnt from the mouth of the Teacher', (c) 'the rights and duties of the Teacher and the Pupil are such and such', and so forth; all which are equally observed for the unimpeded study of all Vedic texts.—And further, there is a firm remembrance (of the entire Vedic text consisting of the Injunctive and the Commendatory Words).—For these reasons, the presence of the Commendatory Words cannot be regarded as 'wrong (or mistaken) reading.'

SUTRA (9).

THE INCONGRUITY (URGED BY THE OPPONENT) IS NOT APPLICABLE
(TO THE SIDDHĀNTA); BECAUSE THE INCONGRUITY COULD BE
THERE ONLY IF AN ACTION WERE INDICATED (BY THE
COMMENDATOBY WORDS); AS A MATTER OF FACT,
HOWEVER, WHAT THESE WORDS INDICATE IS
NOT AN ACTION. HUNCE IT IS ALL RIGHT.

Bhāsya.

The incongruity has been urged (by the Pūrvapaksin under Sūtra 2) to the effect that "there is contradiction of the scriptures and of directly perceived facts" and so forth.—But as a matter of fact, this incongruity is not applicable to the sentences 'He wept, etc.,' and the rest (which have been cited by the Pūrvapakṣin,);—why?—because there would have been 'contradiction' (or incongruity) if the sentences had indicated (or enjoined) the action of 'stealing' and so forth; as a matter of fact, however, what the words indicate is not an action. Hence all these texts—'The mind is a thief', 'The speech is a liar'—are all right (not incongruous).

SŪTRA (10).

THEN THERE IS INDIRECT APPLICATION (FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION).

Bhāsya.

Says the Opponent:—"It has been asserted (by the Siddhāntin, Text, p. 43, I. 7) that the commendation serves the purpose of recommending the enjoined act. But how will this be possible in a case where what is commended is totally different from what is enjoined? For instance, we find the injunction laying down that 'Fire is to be removed by a branch of the Vetasa or by Moss; '(Taitti. San. 5. 4. 4) where the things enjoined are the Vetasa and the Moss; while what is commended in the connected commendatory sentence—"Water is calm' (Taitti. San. 5. 4. 4)—is Water. [Certainly the praise of Water does not recommend the use of the Vetasa or the Moss.]"

The answer to this is that 'there is indirect application'. It is an indirect or figurative way of saying things when, for the purpose of eulogising a certain thing, we praise another thing related to it. In the case in question, Water is the origin of the Vetasa and Moss; these grow out of Water; and by the praise of the origin, the thing growing out of that origin becomes praised; for instance, Devadatta born in the Ashmaka country regards himself as praised when the Ashmaka country is praised. The same should be understood to be the case with the sentence in question (dealing with Vetasa—Moss and Water).

The Opponent asks—"To what Injunction is the commendatory sentence 'He wept' auxiliary?"

It is auxiliary to (and to be taken along with) the Injunction that 'Silver shall not be given on the Barhis' (Taitti. Sam. 1. 5. 1. 2).—"How

so?"-Because of the mutual requirements of the words of the two texts: For instance, first of all we have the sentence 'He wept, and the fact that he wept makes Rudra rudra' (Taitti. Sam. 1. 5. 1),-and here the pronoun 'he' requires (refers to) some subject spoken of in the context, as such is the signification of the pronoun 'tat' (of which 'sah', 'he', is the nominative form); next follows the sentence 'his tears that flowed became silver', where also the pronoun 'tasya', 'his', refers to the same aforesaid subject :- I thus the idea expressed by the two sentences taken together is that 'The tears that flowed when Rudra wept became silver'l .- Now this idea supplies the justification for the Prohibitive Injunction that 'silver should not be given on the Barhis', -this justification being that, 'if one gave silver at the sacrifice, then before a year passes, there shall be weeping in his house', (Taitti. San. 1. 5. 1. 2)-and for this reason 'one shall not give silver on the Barhis'. Thus it is found that all the words of the two texts are mutually complementary.-" But in what manner do the words of the deprecatory text help the Injunction?"-They do it by 'indirect implication' (of excellence); the sense being that 'silver being produced from tears turns into tears for one who gives silver', and hence it constitutes the excellence of the Prohibitive Injunction that one who obeys it (and does not give silver) is saved from the weeping.

"(a) But when there was no real weeping, how can it be said that 'he wept'? (b) How too can the silver be spoken of as produced from tears, when, as a matter of fact, it is not produced from tears'? (c) Lastly, when we actually find that there is no weeping in the house 'before a year passes'. how can it be asserted that 'there is weeping'?"

The answer to this is that—'There is indirect application'; that is, all these words are used in the indirect (figurative) sense. (a) It is said that 'Rudra wept', because the name 'rudra' is derived from the root 'rud, to weep';—(b) even though silver is not produced from tears, the speaker, wishing to decry it, describes it as produced from tears, on the basis of its having the same colour (white) as tears;—(c) again, it is with a view to decrying silver that the speaker asserts that 'there is weeping in the house before the year passes', on the basis of the fact that the giving away of wealth (and silver is a form of wealth) causes pain.

Similarly, there is the Injunction—"If one desires offspring or cattle, he should sacrifice the hornless goat dedicated to Prajāpati' (Taiti. Sam. 2. 1. 1. 4, 5); and as this Injunction requires supplementing, we have the following passage as its auxiliary—'Prajāpati cut out his own fat' (Taiti. Sam. 2. 1. 1. 4)—"What is the indirect implication here"?—It is this: 'There were no cattle at the time when Prajāpati cut out his fat; but such was the force of the act (of cutting the fat and offering it) that as soon as the fat was thrown into the fire, a hornless goat rose out of it;—thus it is that by sacrificing the hornless goat one acquires many cattle."—"When in reality, Prajāpati never cut out his fat, how was it stated that he did it?"—The answer to this is that the mention of an event that never happened serves the purpose of eulogising (the act), because it is clear that some praising is meant. Whenever an event is mentioned, it produces two-effects—(1) a knowledge of the event itself and (2) attraction to, or regulsion

from, a certain thing. Of these, the knowledge of an event does not lead either to any activity or to any desisting from activity, so that serving no purpose in regard to actions, it would be useless; and hence the mention of the event in question cannot be taken as meant to serve the purpose of bringing about the knowledge of the event. On the other hand, through attraction, one undertakes the act, and through repulsion, one desists from the act: these therefore are meant to be brought about by such mention of events. If the mention of events were itself meant to be predicated by the Vedic text, then it would make the Veda open to the charge of having a beginning.—" But how is it that the Veda makes such a baseless statement as the one under consideration?"-The answer to this is as follows: [The statement, even in its literal sense, need not be entirely baseless: for instancel 'Praiapati' may be taken as standing for any eternal entity such as (a) Air, or (b) $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$, or (c) the Sun;—'the cutting of his own fat' may stand (respectively) for (a) rain, or (b) wind, or (c) rays :- as for 'the throwing into fire', 'fire' may stand for (a) lightning, or (b) light, or (c) the ordinary fire :- lastly, as regards the 'rising of the goat', the 'goat' may stand for (a) food, or (b) seed, or (c) creepers.—Having 'sacrificed',-i.e. made use of-this 'goat', one obtains offspring and cattle. -In this explanation, all the words are taken in their 'indirect' ('figurative') sense.

Lastly, there is the injunction that 'The Prayaniya charu is to be offered to Aditi,-the Udayaniya charu is to be offered to Aditi' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 1. 5. 1); and as an auxiliary to this Injunction, we have the passage- The gods on reaching the sacrificial ground, did not know the directions' (Ibid.); that this is so is clear from the fact that this eulogistic statement is wanted (by the Injunction); -- and the meaning of the eulogy is that 'The charu-offering to Aditi destroys all illusions, and so also the illusion in regard to the directions',-" How is it that the text speaks of illusion regarding directions, when there was never any such illusion in fact?"--The answer to this is as follows:--At the time of performing a sacrifice, when a host of details not pertaining to the sacrifice in hand present themselves, the mind of the performer becomes bewildered; and it is this bewilderment that is figuratively spoken of as 'illusion'; and that this is so is shown by the fact that the act of offering of 'the Charu to Aditi' provides the respite necessary for the performer to collect his mind and settle the actual details to be taken up.

[After having gone through the performance of the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa, when a man comes to take up the Soma-sacrifice, and finds that the details relating to the latter are different from those that he has been accustomed to in the former sacrifice, he becomes bewildered as to the exact procedure; it is this bewilderment that is spoken of as 'not knowing the directions'.—Now on this occasion if the Prāyanīya sacrifice to Aditi is performed, the details of which are similar to those of the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa which are thoroughly known to the performer,—it provides the necessary interim of respite to enable him to collect his wits about the details to be performed in connection with the Soma-sacrifice. Thus, inasmuch as this respite is provided by the Prāyanīya sacrifice, it has been sulogised as helping to

remove the bewilderment, figuratively spoken of as 'not knowing the directions'.—Tantravārtika.]

SÜTRA (11).

(a) On the similabity in form, and (b) on the character of the greater part [is the indirect signification based].

Bhāsya.

[This answers the first two objections urged under Sütra (2).]

There is an injunction to the effect that 'one should hold the gold-piece in one's hand and then he (the Priest) takes it' (see Maitrā. Sam. 4. 8. 2. 3); this injunction stands in need of aid, which is supplied by its auxiliary in the shape of the statement that 'the mind is a thief, and speech is a liar.' This deprecatory assertion serves the purpose of commending the Gold; just as we have the statement—'What is the need for a sage? Feed Devadata alone.'—"But even for decrying it, why should the mind, which is not a thief, be spoken of as thief? Why too the Speech, which is not a liar, be spoken of as liar?"—The answer is that this also is 'figurative expression', based (a) 'upon the similarity of form',—as thieves remain hidden, so Mind also remains unseen, the term 'thief' being taken in the figurative sense of 'one who remains hidden',—and 'upon the character of the greater part',—for the most part what people speak is untrue.

SŪTRA (12).

BECAUSE OF THE GREATNESS OF DISTANCE.

Bhāsya.

[This answers the third objection urged under Sūtra (2).]

As an example of a statement (in the Veda) contrary to directly perceived facts, the Opponent has cited the passage-' During the day only the smoke of fire was perceived, not the flame, and during the night only the flame of fire was perceived, not the smoke' (Taitti, Brā, 2, 1, 2, 10), This passage is auxiliary to the injunctive passage—'In the evening one makes the offering with the Mantra, Agnirjyotirjyoti-ragnih svaha, and in the morning, one makes the offering with the Mantra, Sūryo jyotirjyotih sūryah svāhā'. (Vājasa. Sam. 3.9); -which enjoins two mantras having inter-mixed implications, and hence requires justification, and the sense of the Eulogy is that 'the Homa should be offered when both the deities are there'.- It is the fact of their being at a 'great distance' that is figuratively spoken of as the 'not seeing' of the smoke and the flame. [The explanation of this statement lies in the fact that during the day, when we look at the Fire burning at a great distance, we see the Smoke only; while at night, we perceive the flame, not the Smoke. This statement of a well-known fact serves as the basis for the Praise.1

[The Tantravārtika, Trans., pp. 46-47, says that the mantras as cited in the Bhāsya are not found to have 'intermixed implications', as one mantra clearly speaks of Agni and the other of Sūrya, as the deity:—and

that the right mantras to be cited would have been '(a) Agnirjyotirjyotih, sūryah svāhā, (b) Sūryojyotirjyoti-ragnih svāha', where both mantras speak of both Agni and Sūrya.]

SÜTRA (13).

On account of the failings of women, (there can be no certainty regarding one's caste); specially as the son belongs to the progenitor.

Bhāsya.

[This answers the fourth objection urged under Sūtra (2).]

Another example of a Vedic text stating what is contrary to direct facts, cited by the Opponent is—'We know not if we are Brāhmaṇas or Non-Brāhmaṇas' (Maitrā. Sam. 1. 4. 11). This is auxiliary to the Injunction 'When the Pravaras are being recounted, one should say the deities are our fathers' (Ibid.), which stands in need of justification; and the meaning of the eulogistic passage is that 'Even a Non-Brāhmaṇa would become a Brāhmaṇa by the recounting of Pravaras, as one can never be sure of one's Brāhmaṇa also to recount his Pravaras, as one can never be sure of one's Brāhmaṇa hood!'. It is difficult to know if one is really a Brahmaṇa;—this is what is figuratively spoken of as 'we do not know; and the difficulty in knowing it for certain is due to 'the failings of women', and also to the fact that 'the son belongs to the progenitor'; this is also indicated by the advice 'May you guard this dynastic line with great care.' (See Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra 2.6. 13. 6.)

SÜTRA (14).

THERE IS DESIRE FOR IMMEDIATE GOOD.

 $Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[This is an answer to the fifth objection urged under Sütra (2).]

As an example of a Vedic text making a statement contrary to what is found in the Scriptures, the Opponent has cited the passage— 'Who knows that there is Heaven, etc. ?' (Taitti. Sań. 6. 1. 1. 1) This is an auxiliary to the Injunction that 'One should set up windows on all sides' (Ibid.), which stands in need of justification. The sense of the commendatory sentence is that the making of windows brings perceptible (and immediate) comfort (by allowing the smoke to escape). The assertion of uncertainty regarding Heaven is to be taken in the figurative sense of coming after a long time (and hence not being so desirable as the making of windows which brings immediate relief).

SÜTRA (15).

IT IS PRAISE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Bhāsya.

[This answers the objection urged under Sütra (3):]

Under Sū. (3), the Opponent has cited the passage,—'His face shines who knows this?' (Tāndya-Mahābrā. 20. 16. 6.) This is an auxiliary to the

Injunction of reading the Gargatrirātra-Brāhmaṇa, which stands in need of justification.

As for the second passage cited under the same Sūtra—'An extremely wealthy child is born among his progeny',—it is auxiliary to the injunction of the careful study of the Veda.

The shining of the face and the possession of wealth are expressive of 'guna', '(quality); and in this sense, the expressions are 'guna' '(in the sense of being expressive of quality, and not in the sense of being indirect or figurative). The face of the learned teacher really shines, when it is looked up to by the pupils;—and the child born in a family where the Veda is being constantly read becomes very intelligent, and on becoming learned, he obtains many gifts and becomes the possessor of much food (and wealth). [In the case of these two passages, the direct meaning also is not incongruous in any way: hence these statements cannot be called 'gunavida' in the sense of indirect or figurative assertion; hence the author has explained the term 'auma' in relation to these passages as standing for Quality.]

SÜTRA (16).

The mention of 'all' refers to the fact of the man being entitled (to perform all acts and obtain all their

REWARDS).

 $Bhar{a}$ sya,

[This answers the objections urged under Sutra (4).]

As an example of a passage that makes the performance of all acts useless, the Opponent has cited the text—'By means of the Final Oblation, one attains all desires'. This is an auxiliary to the injunction that 'one should offer the Final Oblation', which stands in need of support.—Another text cited by the Opponent is 'He who knows the Ashvamedha also passes beyond death, etc.' (Taitti. Sam. 5. 3. 12. 2); and here the statement 'passes beyond death' is auxiliary to the injunction that 'one should know the Ashvamedha (texts)' which stands in need of support. The mention of the results (in the injunctive text itself) is purely commendatory.

When the text speaks of the man 'attaining all desires', it is only a figurative way of stating that he performs the acts bringing about the reward in the shape of the attaining of all desires. And though 'all' is not meant, yet the word 'all' is used, in the sense of all that the man may be entitled to.

SÜTRA (17).

THE RESULT BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF ACTIONS, THE DIFFERENCE IN THE RESULTS COULD BE DUE TO THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ACTIONS.

Bhāsya,

This is a bold assertion (in answer to the same objection that has been answered in the preceding Sutra).—Even if one takes the statement in question

(to the effect that 'All desires are obtained by the Final Oblation') as laying down the results actually following from the oblation,—the statement would be quite reasonable even in its direct literal sense; and even though all results might really follow from the Oblation, yet there would be a difference in the quantity and quality (of the results as obtained by the simple act of the Final Oblation, and as obtained by means of the more elaborate Sacrifices; and hence the actual performance of the latter would not be superfluous.) [Similarly even though the results of the Ashvamedha might be really obtained by the mere knowledge of the texts bearing on that sacrifice, yet the same results as obtained by the performance of the sacrifice would be larger and better.]

SŪTRA (18).

THE ANSWER TO THE LAST TWO (ARGUMENTS OF THE PÜRVAPAKŞA)
WOULD BE AS ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāsya.

Under Sütra (5), the Opponent has cited the passage 'The Fire is not to be kindled on the earth, nor in the sky, nor in heaven' (Taith. Sain. 5, 2, 7, 1). This is auxiliary to the Injunction that 'The Fire is to be kindled after placing a piece of gold under it' (Ibid., 5, 2, 7, 3), which stands in need of justification. The deprecation of the earth, sky, and heaven serves the purpose of eulogising the gold. Though there is no possibility (of the fire being kindled in the sky or in heaven), yet the statement may be taken as referring to the well-known fact (that Fire cannot be kindled in the sky or in heaven). [The sense is that 'just as the kindling of the Fire in the sky or in heaven is not possible, so it is also on the bare ground, hence a gold-piece should be placed under the fire'—Tantrovartika.]

Under Sū. (6) the mention of ephemeral things in such passages as 'Babara prāvāhani desired' (Taitti. Sam. 7. 1. 10. 2) has been cited by the Opponent. This objection (though already refuted in the Tarkapāda) was raised again (under Sū. 6) with special reference to the Arthavāda section of the Veda; and on the present occasion we shall refute it by simply asserting the authoritative character of the Arthavāda.

ADHIKARANA (2): Treating of the authoritative character of such Arthavāda passages as resemble Injunctions.

SŪTRA (19).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"It should be an Injunction, because it lays down something not already known; specially as a mere narration would be useless."

Bhāsya.

[The Arthavādas containing mere descriptions of facts and events having been dealt with in the preceding Adhikaraṇa, we now proceed to consider those Arthavādas that appear in the form of Injunctions.]

The texts to be cited as examples in this connection are those passages which resemble Injunctions. For instance—'The sacrificial post is to be of Udumbara wood; the Udumbara wood is the essence of food; cattle are strong; through this strong Udumbara post one acquires strong cattle, for bringing about strength'. (See Taittiriya-Samhitā 2. 1. 1. 6.)—Here the question arises—Does the sentence ('Through this strong Udumbara post one acquires strong cattle') serve as an injunction (of the particular result, the obtaining of strong cattle and strength, as following from the act of having the post of Udumbara wood, which has been enjoined in the first sentence 'The sacrificial post is to be of Udumbara wood', the injunctive character of which is admitted by both parties)? Or does this also contain only the praise (of the act of making the post of Udumbara wood)?

On this question we have the following PÜRVAPAKŅA:-

"It should be an injunction, because it lays down something not already known; specially as a mere assertion would be useless. That is to say, all such passages as resemble Injunctions, like the one cited, should be taken as containing the injunction of results [the meaning of the full injunction being one who desires to obtain strong cattle, etc., should make the post of Udumbara wood'], because a result is definitely recognised as mentioned in the sentence ('through this Udumbara post one obtains strong cattle'), and because in this manner, the sentence in question would be laying down something not already known. Otherwise, if the sentence were taken as containing a mere 'narration' of praise, it would serve no useful purpose; because whether a certain thing (an act, for instance) is praised or not praised, it remains the same.—Further, the phrase 'urjovaruddhyai' ('for bringing about strength') speaks of a purpose, the motive, the result aimed at, while there is no word (in the text) expressing the idea that what has been enjoined 'is praiseworthy'; the praise therefore, if intended, could be got at only through indirect indication; and certainly Direct Assertion (of motive, or purpose) is more authoritative than Indirect Indication."

SŪTRA (20).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA continued]—"IF IT BE URGED THAT IT MAY BE AS IN COMMON PARLANCE:"—

Bhāsya.

[The Siddhāntin is supposed to urge the following argument against the Pārvapakṣa]—If you think that "mere praise would be useless,—and the praise is not expressed by any word in the text cited",—then our request to you is that—Please look at the sentences met with in common parlance; for instance, the sentence "This cow belonging to Devadatta should be purchased, she gives much milk, gives birth to she-calves and never loses a progeny';—here, even though the injunction that 'the cow should be purchased' is there (enough to make the intending buyer buy it), yet the addition of the praise supplies the additional incentive;—the words 'giving much milk, etc.', pointing out the excellences of the cow.—The same may be the case with the Vedic text also. [The injunction 'the post should be of Udumbara wood' is quite sufficient to urge the agent to make the post of Udumbara wood, and yet the Praise contained in the subsequent sentences supplies the additional incentive; and in this way the Praising would not be useless.]

[If this be urged by the Siddhantin, then the answer of the $P\bar{u}rvapaksin$ to this would be as set forth in the following $S\bar{u}tra$]—

SŪTRA (21).

[Pūrvāpakṣa concluded]—"That cannot be; because it is known beforehand."

Bhāsya.

"What has been urged by the Siddhantin (under Su. 20) is not possible; in common parlance, what is spoken of,-such, for instance, as the fact of the cow giving much milk and so forth, is already known beforehand; so that the bringing about of the mere cognition of it would be of no use; and so the words are taken as containing Praise. People would have no faith in a mere assertion of what is not already known,-to the same extent that they have in an assertion of what is already known; and it is only when the fact asserted is well known that its assertion serves to persuade people. As regards Vedic passages, on the other hand, if people would not be persuaded by the Injunctive Sentence itself, they would be much less so by the Reiterative Sentence (Arthavada), because if the man fails to be persuaded by the Injunctive sentence, it is only because doubts have arisen in his mind regarding (the authority of) that Injunctive sentence [and if that is so, then, no amount of Praising would persuade him]. If, on the other hand, he has been already persuaded by the Injunctive word, then what is the use of the Reiterative Word (Arthavada)?-Further, the conditions of the Vedic passage under consideration are totally different (from those of common parlance). Here, first of all, the expression 'for bringing about strength' states a fact not already known; -secondly, the reason propounded for this, that 'because the Udumbara is the essence of food, therefore the Post should be made of Udumbara' is also something not already known;—hence there being a suspicion that one statement 'Udumbara is the essence of food' is false,—the conclusion would be that the other statement (in the passage) also is false."

SÜTRA (22).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT THE FACT OF SUCH SENTENCES BEING TAKEN ALONG WITH OTHER SENTENCES HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāsya.

The fact that such sentences as those under consideration are taken along with other sentences has already been explained by us under Su. 7. where it has been shown that Arthavada passages are to be taken along with other Injunctive passages .- "But it has been shown that the passage we are discussing now contains the injunction of a Result, and not commendation [and what has been said under Su. 7 in the preceding Adhikarana is with regard to passages containing Commendation or Deprecation]."-The mention of the Result that we have in the sentence in question could pertain only to the Post made of Udumbara wood; but this Post made of Udumbara wood (having been already enjoined by the first sentence, 'the Post is of Udumbara') is not something not already enjoined and hence to be enjoined along with the result by the second sentence 'Udumbara is food', etc.]; and the mention of the mere Result, without an injunction, would be meaningless .- [In the entire passage we have three factors-(1) the Post made of Udumbara, (2) the Injunction of that Post, and (3) the Result following from the Post; now, if, as held by the Pūrvapaksa, we have injunction of the Post made of Udumbara, and also the Injunction of the Result, then the Post made of Udumbara will have to be connected with both (2) and (3), which would give rise to a syntactical split; hence the mention of the result cannot be connected with the Post of Udumbara. It could be so connected if the sentence that mentions the result had contained the injunction of that Post; but as a matter of fact, no such injunction is contained in that sentence, which speaks only of the Udumbara post leading to the acquiring of cattle and so forth. Thus then, the mention of the Result, having no connection with the enjoined Post, becomes meaningless. But this is so only if we admit of the mention of the Result being an Injunction. The necessary connection could be secured only if the mention of the Result were taken as containing a Praise of the Post that has been enjoined. - "But there is no word expressive of commendation."-The sentence which mentions the result signifies (a) that what has been enjoined brings a reward, and (b) what brings a reward is certainly commendable; now this latter factor of commendation is implied on the basis of the fact that, without this implication, the mention of the reward (or result) would be meaningless.—It might be urged against this that "such an implication would involve a process of indirect indication".-But there is no force in this; because even if something is got at through indirect indication, it becomes useful all the same; and then indirect indication also is among the ordinary processes of signification.

The Pūrvapakṣin recalls a former objection—"We have pointed out at variance with well-kinown facts; for instance, Udumbara is not the essence of food."—What we assert is that it is through indirect or figurative signification that the sentence serves the purpose of persuasion (through commendation); and this figurative interpretation would reconcile the Vedic declaration with ordinary facts—"But what is the similarity (on which the figurative signification would be based)?"—The similarity is this—Just as Food is the means of satisfaction, so this (Post of Udumbara wood) also has the power to bring about satisfaction; and it is on this basis that the Post is being commended and spoken of by means of a word ("ūrk", 'essence of food') denoting a means of satisfaction. Further, the Udumbara is capable of being spoken of as the 'essence of food' also on the ground of its ripe fruits (being edible).

SŪTRA (23).

In certain cases, Injunction is found to be actually meaningless; in which cases the sentence would be taken as indicating commendation: and when other sentences are found to be similar, these also should be treated

SIMILARLY. Bhāsya.

There is the passage—'The horse has its origin in water, from water is born the Vetasa' (Taittiriya-Sanihitā 5.3, 12). The only form of injunction that could be derived from this would be 'the horse should be made to be born out of water'; and as this would be absurd, such an Injunction would be meaningless; and in that case it would be necessary to assume that the passage contains a commendation in the sense that 'the connection of the horse and the Avaka with the calm-producing water allays the troubles of the sacrificer'.

When other sentences are found to be similar, they also should be treated similarly. 'Tathātva', 'similarity', means similar circumstances.—"What is the similarity?".—The similarity would consist in the (a) impossibility of being taken as an Injunction, and (b) the possibility of being taken as a commendation.

SŪTRA (24).

WHEN A CERTAIN TEXT IS CAPABLE OF BEING RIGHTLY TAKEN
ALONG WITH ITS OWN CONTEXT, IT IS NOT RIGHT TO TRANSFER
IT ELSEWHERE; SPECIALLY AS SUCH AN INJUNCTION
WOULD BE MEANINGLESS IN REGARD TO THAT
(PARTICULAR ACT).

Bhāsya.

For the following reason also we hold that texts like those we have been discussing are commendations,—"For what reason?"—For the following

reason:—There is the text (Taittivija-Sanihitā 6. 3. 4)—'That which is burnt belongs to the Nirṛtis; that which is uncooked belongs to Rudra; that which is cooked belongs to the deities; therefore one should cook things in such a way as not to burn them'.—If this is only a praise, then it means the praise of the substance cooked at the Darshapūrṇamāsa (in whose context the passage occurs). When this is possible, transference cannot be right—i.e. it will not be right to transfer the passage to another context (which would be necessary if the passage were treated as an Injunction). Then again, if the passage were taken as an Injunction, then the meaning would be that the substance is to be burnt at a sacrifice where Nirṛti would be the Deity (and not at the Darshapūrṇamāsa); and this would contravene the context; because Nirṛti not being a deity at the Darshapūrṇamāsa, any injunction of 'burning' the substance would be meaningless. From this it follows that the passage must be taken as a commendation.

SŪTRA (25).

In the event of its being taken as an Injunction, there would be syntactical split.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

If the text—'(a) The post is to be made of Udumbara..........(see Taitti.-Sain, 2. 1. 1. 6), (b) for bringing about strength',—if both (a) and (b) were taken as Injunctions, then there would be syntactical split: the sense being '(a) the Post of Udumbara wood is excellent, and (b) the strong brings about strength'. [Thus there being two predicates, there would be syntactical split.]

From all this we conclude that all those Arthavada passages also which resemble Injunctions serve the purpose of commending only.

Adhikarana (3): Treating of Passages which appear like the statement of reasons for a certain course of action.

SŪTRA (26).

Pürvapakṣa]—"It must be taken as the statement of reason, because of usefulness and plausibility."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

There are some assertions which have the appearance of statement of reasons; for instance—'(a) One should offer the libation with the winnowing basket, (b) because food is prepared by it' (See Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa 1. 6. 5).—In regard to such assertions as (b), there arises the question—Does their purpose lie in commending (what has been enjoined in the preceding sentence) or in stating a reason (for the Injunction)?

The Pūrvapaksa view is as follows:--"The fact of Food being prepared by the Winnowing Basket must be the reason why the libation should be offered into Fire with that basket .- But when the said causal relation (between the Basket and the Preparation of food) is not generally known, how could that be put forward as a reason?'-It may be true (that what is not generally known cannot be put forward as a reason) in common parlance: but in the Veda it could certainly be done by direct assertion: that is why the text in question puts forward the preparation of food as the reason for the offering being made with the Winnowing Basket .- What is the purpose served by this?'-The purpose served is that it opens up the possibility of the offering being made with the Ladle, the Pan, and other things, which also are used in the preparation of food .- ' How ?'-Because they also have their use in the preparing of food, as food can be prepared by means of these also. In fact, it is this possibility of food being prepared (that it can be prepared) by the Winnowing Basket that is expressed by the word 'Kriyatë', 'is prepared'. in the text [and not that it is actually prepared]; because the ordinary meaning of the Present tense form 'kriyatë', 'is prepared at the present moment', cannot fit in with the present context [as there is no 'preparing of food' going on at the time of the offering].-Further, if we take the sentence as a statement of reason, we accept what is directly asserted by the Veda; whereas if we take it as a commendatory declaration, we have recourse to indirect (or figurative) signification .- If it be urged that 'the Ladle, the Pan, and other things are not directly instrumental in the preparation of food, and these cannot be called the means of preparing food [so that there would be no possibility of the Homa being offered with these]',-then our answer would be that if the Ladle, etc., are useless in the preparing of food, then in that case, it would be meaningless to commend the Winnowing Basket as 'the means of preparing food', as the Winnowing Basket also is of no use in the preparing of food; and hence as what is asserted would not be applicable to the Basket, the commendation would be futile (not plausible)."

SŪTRA (27).

[Siddhānta]—But it is a commendation (of the Winnowing Basket), as this matter is one that is amenable to verbal authority alone, and there is no injunction of any other thing.

Bhāsua.

The view propounded by the Pūrvapakṣā is not correct. The matter under discussion is one that is determinable only on the basis of authoritative texts. What the Pūrvapakṣin says regarding the preparing of food being a reason (for the Homa to be offered with the Basket) is also based by him upon the text ('By it is food prepared'); and when the text speaks of 'preparing food' as a reason, it is only a reason for offering the Homa with the Winnowing Basket, not for offering the Homa with the Ladle or the Pan or any other thing. So that what is spoken of by the text is the Winnowing Basket only. Nor is there any injunction of offering the Homa with the Ladle, the Pan or any such thing [as there is of offering it with the Winnowing Basket in the first sentence].

SŪTRA (28).

IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—"THE ASSERTION NOT BEING APPLICABLE
(TO THE THING IN QUESTION), A COMMENDATION (OF THAT
THING, BY THAT ASSERTION) WOULD BE ILLOGICAL;"—

Bhāsya.

This argument has been urged [towards the end of the above statement of the Pūrvapakṣa, to the effect that "as the Winnowing Basket is of no use in the preparing of food, what is asserted would not be applicable to the Basket, and hence the commendation would not be plausible"]; and this has got to be refuted (which is done in the following Sūtra):—

SŪTRA (29).

(Then our answer is that) as a matter of fact, however, the assertion is applicable,—being taken as supplementary to the Injunction; as in common parlance.

Bhāṣya.

According to our view the assertion in question is quite applicable (to the Winnowing Basket); because according to our view, the assertion becomes auxiliary to the Injunction. And when taken as a commendatory assertion, the assertion becomes quite logical; the statement in the text 'food is prepared by the Winnowing Basket' being understood to mean 'as we know of food being prepared by the Winnowing Basket'; so that even though not actually present, the 'preparing' is spoken of as present, with a view to commending the Basket.—In your (Purvapaksin's) view on the other hand, the weak point is this, that the assertion in question is an injunction of the

reason, and it is not permissible for a word in an Injunctive text to indicate any meaning other than the direct one [while such indirect indication is quite common in commendatory sentences]; so that when the Vedic Injunction spoke of the present (act of preparing food), it could not be taken as enjoining that (preparing of food) which can be done. - In our view, it would be quite possible to take the word directly denoting one thing as indirectly indicating another (this sort of thing being permissible in commendatory assertions).-We find instances like this in common parlance: when it is asserted that 'Devadatta is strong enough to meet Yajñadatta and others', though the term 'strong' means 'possessing superior strength', the superiority meant is not in comparison with the lion or the tiger or other strong animals, but in comparison with those whose strength is inferior to Devadatta's ;-in the same manner, when it is said that 'food is prepared by it', it commends the Winnowing Basket as being a 'superior means of preparing food',-and the superiority is in comparison with those other 'means of food-preparation' which are inferior to the Winnowing Basket.

SŪTRA (30).

If it were a statement of reason, the assertion would be restricted (to the Basket only);—because it is that which is specially mentioned.—If, through similarity (the assertion were to apply to the other things also),—then there would be an indefiniteness in the Injunctions.

$Bh\bar{a}$ sya.

Even if 'the preparing of food' were a reason which might be applicable to the Ladle, the Pan and other things,-(in the present context) it would be restricted to the Winnowing Basket; -- because the fact that 'being the means of preparing food' is a reason (for the Homa) is learnt from the Vedic Word only, and the Vedic Word has asserted the said fact in reference to the Basket, not to the Ladle, the Pan and other things. -Because it is that which is specially mentioned,-the text declaring that because food is prepared by the Winnowing Basket, therefore the Homa should be offered with the Winnowing Basket'. For instance, when it is said that 'Because the Fire was blown strongly, therefore my house was burnt',-it does not mean that anything other than Fire also, when strongly blown, burns the house.-If it be held that 'what is meant is that by whatever thing-even other than the Winnowing Basket-food is prepared, even indirectly, -with that the Homa should be offered,'-then, in that case there would be an indefiniteness in the Injunctions; for there is nothing which, either directly or indirectly, does not help in the preparation of food. [The right reading is na kenachit pranādyā annanna kriyatē—as is clear from the closing words of the Tantavārtika on this Sūtra].—So that to assert that 'one offers Homa' would be tantamount to saying that 'one offers Homa with the means of preparing food'.

According to our view, on the other hand, it is the Winnowing Basket (alone) that is commended; and the statement of the fact 'food is prepared by its means' is not for the purpose of proclaiming that fact, but for the purpose of persuasion.—Thus the conclusion is that commendation is the purpose served by those Arthavāda passages also which appear like Statement of Reasons.

Adhikarana (4): Treating of the use of Mantras. SÜTRA (31).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" (a) BECAUSE THERE ARE SCRIPTURAL DIRECTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH MANTRAS;"

Bhāsya.

[It has been established that even such apparently absurd passages as some of the Arthavādas can have a bearing upon Dharma; now the question arises regarding the bearing upon Dharma of another kind of Vedic texts, which are known as 'Mantra';—what is the particular purpose served by the Mantras? That they are not injunctions of action is clear from the fact that they contain no injunctive word. Expressing no commendation or disparagement, they cannot serve the purpose that is served by the Arthavāda passages. Before the use of the Mantras is discussed, the preliminary question to be discussed is—are the Mantras intended to convey any meaning?—The idea underlying the discussion is that if the Mantras are not meant to convey any sense, then they cannot help in the knowledge of Dharma; and this would vitiate the Siddhānta doctrine that the purpose served by the entire Veda is to help us to know Dharma.]

The question that arises now is—Are Mantras intended to convey any meaning?—or are they not intended to be expressive of any meaning?—That is to say—Do they help the sacrifice by expressing some meaning, or by mere utterance?—If they help by mere utterance, then the Mantra 'Barhirdevasadanan dāmi' ('I am chopping the grass for seating the Gods') (Maitrāyanī-Sanhitā 1. 1. 2) would not necessarily always be used in the 'chopping of grass'. If, on the other hand, they help by expressing a meaning, then (inasmuch as the words express the chopping of grass, and) the context in which the Mantra is found indicates its auxiliary character, it could not be used anywhere else, so that even in the absence of any directions to that effect, it would always be used in the chopping of grass only.

Our view (the Pūrvapakṣa) is as follows:—"The Mantras help the sacrifice by their mere utterance;—why?—because there are scriptural directions in connection with them; that is to say, the scripture lays down the use of the Mantra in that same sense which is conveyed by the words of the Mantra. For instance, we have the scriptural direction 'Uruprathā uru prathava—iti prodāsham prathayati,' (Taitti. Brā. 3, 2, 8, 4) which means—'O Expanding one, may gou become large',—uttering this Mantra he should enlarge the cake' (Taitti. Sam. 1, 1, 8, 1); now, the direction 'one should enlarge the cake' would be superfluous if the Mantra came to help through the meaning expressed by it.—[If the words of the Mantra, 'O Expanding one, may you become large' were really meant to be expressive, then the Act of enlarging the cake would have been expressed by the Mantra itself, and therefore there would be no need for the direction that the Mantra is to be used in the enlarging of the cake].—On the

other hand, if the *Mantra* is intended to help by its mere utterance, then, it would be necessary to lay down its use; and this use has been laid down in the scriptural direction just quoted. For this same reason, the *Mantra* cannot help through the meaning expressed by it. For example, if a man with eyes is found to be led by another person, it is understood that he cannot see with his eyes.

[When a person who has his eyes intact but inefficient is found being led by another person, the irresistible conclusion is that he does not see with his eyes; exactly in the same manner, when a person comes across the text of a Mautra though his first impression is that it has a certain meaning, yet, as soon as he finds another sentence laying down its use, he naturally concludes that the Mantra itself has not the capacity to indicate its own use; and this distinctly shows that the meaning of the Mantra is to be disregarded altogether; for, if any significance were attached to the meaning, the use of the Mantra would be indicated by the Mantra itself, through that same meaning.—Tantravārtika-Trans., p. 81.]

"'The direction in question may be taken as serving the purposes of an Arthavāda [i.e. as commending the Injunction of the use of the Mantra, this Injunction being indicated by the indicative force of the words of the Mantra and by the context in which the Mantra occurs].'—But that cannot be; it has been explained above that that alone can be taken as Arthavaāda which is supplementary to the sentence by which the Act is enjoined; in a case where the act is enjoined by an independent Injunction (which needs no supplementing), no useful purpose is served by the Arthavāda. Hence in the case in question the Direction cannot serve the purposes of the Arthavāda.

"The Mantras connected with the Holding of the Spade [i.e. the mantras beginning with 'Devasua tva' and ending with 'Gauatrena chhandasa adade traistubhena jägatena pänktena'] (Taitti, Sam. 1, 1, 3, 4) may be taken as another illustrative example. Here also, though the fact of the mantras being used in connection with the act of 'holding' is indicated by the indicative force of a word ('adade) in the mantra itself, yet the mantras are enjoined for such use in a subsequent direction—'Tān chaturbhirādattē' - He holds the spade with the four mantras'. (Taittiriya-Samhitā 5, 1, 1). [This direction would be superfluous if the words of the Mantras were intended to help by expressing their meaning.]-It might be argued that the direction would serve the purpose of pointing out (emphasising) the number Four (which is not indicated by any words of the mantras). - But that would not be possible; as there is no word to indicate that all the mantras are to be used collectively. [On the contrary, the indication would appear to be that the four mantras are to be used optionally,-and there is nothing to preclude the possibility of this Option-says the Tantravārtika.]

"Similarly the case of the text—'Imāmagrbhnan rashanāmṛtasya—ityashvābhidhānimādattš' (Shatapatha Brālmana 13. 1. 2. 1; Taitt. Sam. 5. 1. 2. 1) provides another example. While the holding of the leading string is already expressed by the words of the mantra (Mādhya-Sam. 12. 2; Tai-Sa. 4. 1. 2. 1), we have the direction ('ityashvābhidhānimādattā') laying down the same holding of the leading string; and this would not be right if the words of the mantra were meant to be expressive.—It might be

urged that the said direction (laying down the holding of the leading string of the horse) would still have its use in precluding the holding of the string of the ass.—But, as a matter of fact, it could not do this precluding; because if it were to do the precluding, (i.e. if it meant that 'the string of the ass should not be held') then, firstly, it would renounce its own meaning (that 'the string of the horse should be held'),—secondly, it would have a different meaning (that 'the string of the ass should not be held'),—and thirdly, it would set aside the holding of the string of the ass which is indicated (by the Mantra which uses the general term 'holding of the string' without reference to any particular animal).

"From all this it follows that *Mantras* are not intended to be expressive; and as such, they cannot serve as the authority for the using of the mantra 'Barhirdēavasadanan dāmi' in connection with the chopping of grass.

SŪTRA (32).

[Pūrvapakṣa continued]—" (b) Because the order of the words (in mantras) is irrevocably fixed."

Bhāsya.

"The Mantras have the order of their words irrevocably fixed; for instance, the order of the mantra 'Agnīrmūrdhā divah, etc.' (Taittirīya-Samhitā 1. 5. 5. 1) must be 'Agnīh-mūrdhā-divah', and not the reverse ('Divahmūrdhā—agnih');—if the words were meant to express a meaning, they would express it when placed in this latter order as well; and in that case, there would be no sense in the fixing of the exact order of the words.-It might be argued that the fixing of the order serves the purpose of securing the particular form of utterance (of word-sounds), which becomes altered when the order is reversed,-and that the restriction of the order is accepted on that account.—But in that case, the right view would be that under which the said restriction (of the order) would serve a distinctly useful purpose; [and this view would be only that under which the words are not meant to be expressive; because the only useful purpose that would be served by the utterance of the words in a particular order would be a transcendental one; and on such transcendental results proceeding from the order of the wordsounds alone, the meaning of the words could have no bearing at all: so that the explanation proposed lends support to the view that the words are not meant to be expressive].-It might be argued that even in the case of words expressive of meanings, we find restrictions regarding their order; for instance, in the compound 'Indragni', (the term 'Indra' must come first, according to the rules governing the order of terms in a Copulative ·Compound).—The restriction is quite right in that case; because a reversal of the order of the terms would make the compound word entirely inexpressive as it would become grammatically wrong, and wrong or corrupt forms of words cannot be really expressive, according to the Mimainsaka.1

SŪTRA (33).

[PÜRVAPAKȘA continued]—"(c) BECAUSE THERE ARE DIRECTIONS ADDRESSED TO ONE WHO ALREADY KNOWS;"

$Bh\bar{a}sya$,

"We meet with such mantras as 'Agnīd agnīn vihara'; now this mantra can express the meaning ('O Agnidhra Priest, please attend on the Fires') only to a person who knows it (that it is the duty of the Agnidhra Priest to attend on the Fires) already from his study (of the Veda); -and if this is already known, what is there (left to be expressed) which the mantra would (be required to express) ?-If, on the other hand, the words are uttered (not for expressing any meaning, but) merely for the sake of a particular way of utterance, then the peculiar way in which the words are uttered may serve some useful (transcendental) purpose, even when addressed to one who already knows (his duty) .- If you urge that "the reiteration (of what the man already knows) may serve to bring about a peculiar sanctification",-then you come over to our view of the case; 'reiteration' is the same as 'utterance': and that may certainly be done (for some transcendental purpose); but what need not be done is the expressing of the meaning; because it is needless to do this latter when what is expressed is already known (to the person to whom the words are addressed). For instance, when a man has a shoe already on his foot, he does not, because he cannot, put another shoe on the same foot.

SÜTRA (34).

[Purvapaksa continued]—"(d) Because they speak of things that do not exist;"

Bhāsya.

"What has to be indicated (by Vedic texts) is something that helps in the performance of the sacrifice; but we find that certain Mantras speak of such things as do not exist at all; for instance, we have the Mantra beginning with 'Chatvāri shṛngāḥ, etc.' (Taittirīya Āranyaka 10. 10. 2; also Ryeeda-Sam. 4. 58. 3); but there is no such thing among those that help the sacrificial performance as has 'four horns, three feet, two heads, and seven hands', [and it is such a thing that is denoted by the words of the Mantra]. Under the circumstances, if the Mantra were recited for the purpose of expressing its meaning, what is it that it would express?—On the other hand, if it is merely for the purpose of utterance, then its reciting would be possible (as tending to some transcendental end).

"Similarly, there is the Mantra 'Mā mā himsih' ['Do not, oh, do not hurt'] (which is addressed to the altar); as no 'hurting' is there, if the Mantra were intended to convey a meaning, what is it that it would convey?

SŪTRA (35).

[Porvapakṣa continued]—"(e) Because they are addressed to insensate things;"

Bhāsya.

"There is the Mantra 'Oṣadhē trāyasvainam, etc.' (Taitirīya-Sanhitā 1.2.1.1), which contains a request addressed to an insensate object, the Herb (Oṣadhi); if such Mantras were to help by conveying some meaning, then they would be preferring a request to the Herb ('oṣadhē') for protecting ('trāyasva') the animal ('enam'); certainly the Herb, which is insensate, could never understand the request.—There is no such incongruity if the Mantra is required to help by its mere ultrance.—Hence Mantras must be only for the purpose of being uttered (recited).

"Another example of the same kind is the Mantra 'Shrnota grāvāṇaḥ' 'Listen, O ye stones!' (Taittirīya-Sanhitā 1. 3. 13. 1)."

SŪTRA (36).

[Pörvapakṣa continued]—''(f) Because there is self-contradiction in what is expressed;''

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"In what is expressed by the words, there is contradiction also: For instance, there is the Mantra 'Aditivityanth aditivantariksam' ('Aditi is heaven, Aditi is sky' (Egweda 1.89.10); where the same Aditi is spoken of as 'heaven' and as 'sky'; and who could comprehend any such idea? If he did not comprehend it, what help could the Mantra render by conveying such an idea?—There is no such incongruity if the Mantra is meant only for utterance.—Hence Mantras must be taken as helping only by being uttered.

"Another example of the same kind (involving self-contradiction) is the Mantra—(a) 'Eleo rudro na dvitīyo'vatasthē' (Taittirīya-Saihhitā, 1. 8. 6. 1), and then (b) Asaihhyātā sahasrāṇi yē rūdrā adhibhūmyām' (Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka 1. 12. 1; Vājasanēya-Saihitā 16. 54; Taitti. Sain. 4. 5. 11. 1) [where (a) asserts that 'There is but one Rudra, there never was a second'; whereas (b) speaks of 'the innumerable thousands of Rudras on the earth'].

SŪTRA (37).

[PGRVAPAKȘA continued]—"(g) Because there is no teaching of the meaning as there is of the text (of the Mantras);"

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"At the time that the Veda is being read, a certain woman named Pāmikā is threshing corn, while the young student is learning the Mantra that is recited at the threshing of corn during a sacrificial performance; now when the student is learning the text of the Mantra, he is not learning its meaning; in fact, his sole effort is centred on getting up the verbal text only;—and as a rule, one learns only that which is of some use; hence from the fact that the student learns and practises the reciting alone, we conclude

that it is the reciting alone of the Mantra which serves a useful purpose. [Just as at the time of the threshing being done, the threshing,-mantra is not recited for the purpose of conveying the idea of the threshing, so, in the same manner, at the time that the sacrifice is being performed, the Mantras, even though they may be expressive of things connected with the sacrifice, are recited, not for the purpose of conveying any idea of those things, but only for the purpose of the utterance.]

SŪTRA (38).

[PORVAPAKȘA continued]—" (h) BECAUSE (THE MEANING IS) UN-INTELLIGIBLE;"

Bhāsya.

"Further, there are some Mantras whose meaning it is impossible to understand; for instance—(a) 'Amyak sā ta indra ṛṣṭirusmā' (Rgveda 1. 169. 3); (b) 'Sṛṇyena jarbhari turpharitū' (Rgveda 10. 106. 6); (c) 'Indraḥ somasya kāṇukā' (Rgveda 8. 77. 4).—Now what meaning could these Mantras convey?—If they are taken as serving the purpose of mere recital, then there is nothing incongruous (in their being unintelligible).—From this also we conclude that Mantras are meant only to be recited.

SŪTRA (39).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA concluded]—" (i) BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE CONNEC-TION WITH EPHEMERAL THINGS;—THE MANTRAS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS CONVEYING ANY MEANING."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"If the Mantras were to convey some meaning, then they would become connected with ephemeral things. For instance, there are the Mantras—Kintē kṛṇwanti kikaṭēṣu gāvaḥ...ā no bhara pramangadasya vedo naichā-shākham maghavan randhayā naḥ' (Rṛweda 3.53.14); 'Kikaṭa' is the name of a country (which has had a beginning in time);—'Naichāshākha is the name of a city; 'Pramahġada' the name of king. If such Mantras were meant to convey a meaning, then it would follow that this Mantra did not exist before the king Pramanġada.

"From all these reasons detailed in the Sūtras beginning with 'Tadarthashāstrāt (Sūtra 31), it follows that Mantras are not meant to convey any meaning."

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHANTA]—BUT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE SIGNIFICATION OF SENTENCES (IN THE VEDA AND IN COMMON PARLANCE).

Bhāsya.

The meaning of words used in the Veda and in common parlance is the same; and just as that meaning is meant to be conveyed in common parilance, so it should be in the Veda also.

The Opponent argues as follows: "That is not possible; because in common parlance, business is actually found to be carried on by means of the things comprehended as expressed by the words; in the case of the Vedic sentence, on the other hand, no help can be accorded to the sacrifice by a conversation carried on by the invisible deities and the insensate sacrificial implements. If a transcendental effect were assumed, then, that might follow from the mere recital (of the Mantra, without its conveying any meaning). The reciting of the Mantra would be done in either case,whether it be for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result, or for the purpose of conveying the meaning;—but (there is this difference that) if no meaning is conveyed, the Mantra does not become useless; but if it is not recited or uttered, then its presence in the Vedic Text itself becomes useless (futile). Hence the right view is that there is to be recital of the Mantra, and that only for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result. This is what we have explained in the statement of the Pūrvapaksa, heginning with the Sūtra 'Tadarthashāstrāt' (Sū. 31)."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—At sacrifices, there is recital of Mantras only for the purpose of conveying a meaning. As for the argument that 'there is no useful purpose served by a conversation between deities and sacrificial implements',—our answer is that in connection with sacrifices, the purpose served is the indication of the sacrificial details. Why?—Because until the sacrifice and the sacrificial details have been indicated, no sacrifice can be performed. Hence for the accomplishment of the sacrificie, the conveying of the meaning renders a great help to the act (of sacrificing); and this help is understood to be accorded by the Mantra. Thus there is a useful purpose served; and when this purpose is actually found to be served, it is not right to deny it by simply saying that 'the conveying of the meaning cannot be the purpose served by the Mantra'.

"But", says the Opponent, "if the Mantras help the performance by conveying a meaning, then such scriptural directions as 'Hold the Abhri with the four mantras' become absolutely meaningless (as shown by us under Sū. 31)."

Let it be meaningless—we reply; but we can never deny the perceived fact that help is actually rendered to the act by conveying a meaning.

"Then, do you mean that some scriptural directions are entirely meaningless?"

By no means (we reply); [what happens is explained in the following $S\overline{u}tra~(41)$]—

SUTRA (41).

THE REITERATION (OF THE DIRECTION) IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF QUALIFICATION.

Bhāsya.

It has been urged above (Text; p. 55, l. 26) by the Pūrvapakṣin that—
"as there is no word in the direction 'Hold it with the four mantras' indicating that the mantras are to be used collectively, it cannot be explained as having been added for the purpose of indicating the collective use of the mantras." But what we understand the sentence ('Tām

chaturbhirādattē') to mean is the holding as qualified by the number 'four' If this were to be deduced from any single Mantra itself,—then this would mean that the Mantra is not comprehended in its direct meaning.

SŪTRA (42).

THERE IS PRECLUSION.

 $Bh\bar{a}sya$.

It has been further urged by the Opponent (Text, p. 56, ll. 4-6) that "in the case of the text 'Imāmagrbhnan rashanāmrtasya-ityashvābhidhānimādattē', (Taitti. Sam. 5. 1. 2), if the latter sentence (which contains the direction) were taken as serving the purpose of precluding the reins of the Ass. -then there would be three incongruities-[(a) the sentence would lose its own meaning, (b) it would be assumed to have a totally different meaning, and (c) it would set aside the holding of the reins of the ass, which is already understood as indicated by the Mantra itself, which speaks of the holding of reins in general, which includes the reins of the ass also, l'-But in construing the direction 'Ityashvābhidhānīmādattē', what is predicated (and stressed) is not the 'holding' (ādattē), but 'the reins of the horse' ('ashvābhidhānīm'; [so that in precluding the holding of the ass's reins, the sentence would not be relinquishing its own meaning]; -and thus the fact of the Mantra being used in all kinds of holding (that of the reins of the horse as well as of the ass and other animals) would be indicated by the indicative force of the words of the Mantra, while the fact of its being used in the particular holding of the horse's reins would be got at directly from the words of the direction ('ityashvābhidānīmādattē). Then again, Indicative Force can indicate the use of the Mantra efficiently only with the help of a subsequent direction declaring such use of the Mantra; [and such a direction may be either actually present in the Veda or inferred from the context]; -in the case in question, no such direction is (either present or) inferred from the context .-- "What sort of a direction do you mean?"-A direction in the form that 'By this mantra, the holding of the reins should be done', which alone could make the mantra applicable to every kind of holding of the reins (of the Horse as well as of the Ass and other animals). As regards the reins of the Horse, on the other hand, we have the direction actually present in the text itself ('Holds the reins of the Horse'); and so long as this direct declaration is present, there can be no Inference of the other direction (relating to the holding of all kinds of reins); so that there is no chance of the Mantra being used in connection of the reins of the Ass. [Thus the Preclusion of the ass's reins would not involve the incongruity of the setting aside of what is already indicated.]

SŪTRA (43).

AND IT MAY BE A COMMENDATORY DECLARATION (ARTHAVADA).

Bhasya.

As for the text— Uruprathā uru prathasva—iti purodāsham prathayati. (Taitti. Brā. 3. 2. 8. 4) (dealt with by the Pūrvapaksin under Sū. 31),—here

the reiteration is by way of a commendatory declaration,—the sense of the commendation being that 'by enlarging the Cake, one enlarges, renders prosperous, the Master of the Sacrifice himself'. [That this is the sense is made clear by a subsequent sentence in the same Mantra-text 'Uru tē yajñapatil prathatām', 'May the Master of the Sacrifice prosper'. (Taitti. Sam. 6.2.7.)

Objection:—"The sentence quoted (as indicating the commendation) is not syntactically supplementary to the mantra in question; nor is there any need for the commendation of what has been directly indicated."

Reply:-True; the sentence in question is not an injunction of the Mantra, nor a commendation of the Mantra; what is really commended is the act of enlarging (the cake). As for the Mantra, its use is indicated by its own words ('Urupratha uru prathasva', which words, addressed to the Cake, request it to become large); and when it is mentioned in the text under consideration, it is only by way of being reiterated with a view to commending the act of enlarging; -the sense of the commendation being that 'the act of enlarging is so commendable that it is done with such an excellent Mantra as Uruprathā uru prathasva.' (Taitti. Sam. 4. 1. 2. 1.)-"What is the advantage gained by this?"-The advantage is that 'the Master of the Sacrifice becomes enlarged, prosperous, in regard to progeny and cattle' .- "Is this the reward that actually accrues to the man?"-We say, No; we say so only because how, otherwise, could the passage be commendatory? [An act is regarded as 'commended' only when it is spoken of as bringing a desirable result; it is for this reason that the prosperity of the sacrificer has been mentioned; and it does not mean that this prosperity is the result that actually follows from the act of enlarging the cake with the particular Mantra.]

Objection:—"But when, in reality, there is no enlarging (of the cake), why do you speak of the Priest enlarging it?"

Reply:—We deduce this from the words of the Mantra: What the words of the Mantra mean is that 'with the Mantra, the Adhvaryu Priest tells the Cake to become large'; now when some one tells another to 'become large', he is said to 'enlarge' it; just as when a man asks someone to 'do' a thing, he is said to 'make him do' it.

SŪTRA (44).

THE ASSUMPTION WOULD NOT BE INCONSISTENT.

$Bhar{a}sya.$

It has been argued under Sūtra 32 that—"inasmuch as the exact order of words in the Mantras is insisted upon as essential, it follows that Mantras are not intended to convey any meaning."—But the said insistence on the exact order may be baseless (we do not mind that); but we cannot reject the validity of what is actually perceived, [that is, the patent fact that the words do actually convey a meaning].—It might be argued that the insistence on the exact order of the words may be conducive to a transcendental result.—But the 'assumption' of such transcendental result. would not be inconsistent,' with our view also, under which the meaning as conveyed by the words would bring about prosperity and success.

SŪTRA (45).

As regards the Directions, there should be no objection against the Act (or pointing out the duty); as it seeves to bring about an additional outlification.

Bhāsya.

It has been argued under Sütra 33 that—"In the case of such directions as 'Prokṣaṇirāsidaya' [Mādhya-Sam. 1-28; Tirti. Brā. 3. 2. 9, 'Aṇnidaṇin nihara', and the like], it cannot be right to point out (the duty) to one who already knows it; hence the uttering of such words can serve only a transcendental purpose."—But this is not right. Even though the Priest might be knowing that such and such an act has to be done, it is necessary to remind him of it at the time of the actual performance; as this reminding could be done by other means also, the Text lays down the exact words to be used in the reminding; it is this emphasising of the exact wording that is done by the Mantra; and this reminding serves the purpose of 'adding to the qualifications' (of the Priest; by making him more alert and efficient).

SŪTRA (46).

Being significant, the Mantra may be an Arthavāda.

Bhāsya.

The Mantra cited under Sūtra 34 is 'Chatvāri shringā, etc.' (Rgveda 4. 58. 3); it is true that the thing spoken of directly by the words here has no existence; but the words could be taken in an indirect (figurative) sense; and such figurative expressions are accepted as correct (justifiable, authoritative); while there is no authority (or justification) for the assumption that a transcendental result follows from the mere recital of the Mantra. figurative meaning of the words of the Mantra is as follows:—(a) The 'four horns' stand for the four Hotr priests who are like horns of the Sacrifice (personified);-(b) the 'three feet' stand for the three Savanas (Morning, Midday and Evening);—(c) the 'two heads' stand for the Sacrificer and his wife; -(d) the 'seven hands' stand for the metres; -(e) 'bound three-fold' means circumscribed by the three Vedas;-(f) the 'bull' (vrsabha) stands for the Sacrifice as bringing about (varsati) desirable results; -(g) 'cries' (roraviti) means makes a sound; -and (h) the phrase 'the Great Divinity entered the mortals' means that human beings are entitled to the performance of sacrifices.

This figurative description (of the Sacrifice) is like such figurative descriptions as the following—'The river has the Chakraväka birds for her breasts, the swans for her teeth, reeds for her clothes and mosses for her hair';—where the River is described.

[Under Sătra 35, the Opponent has cited the Mantra—(a) 'Oṣadhē trāyasva' (Taitti. Sam. 1. 2. 1), and (b) 'Shṛṇota grāvāṇah' (Taitti. Sam. 1. 3.-13)].—(a) The words 'Oṣadhē', etc. ('O Herb, please protect') addressed to the sacrificial accessories, which are insensate, are meant to indicate that

towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice, the accessories are as efficient as intelligent beings.—(b) Similarly the words 'Shryota grāvāṇaḥ' 'Listen, O, Ye, Stones') are meant to indicate that 'after this now will follow the reading of the Morning Hymn, which is so important that even the insensate stones will listen to it.—how much more, the learned Brāhmaṇas'; and it is for the conveying of this idea that even though they are insensate, the stones are thus addressed.

SŪTRA (47).

THE WORDS BEING FIGURATIVE, THERE WOULD BE NO INCONGRUITY.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

Under Sütra 36, the Opponent has cited the Mantra—'Aditirdyauh, etc.'—But these words are 'figurative', and hence there is 'no incongruity'; just as we find in the case of such words as—'Thou art my Mother and thou my 'Father.'—Similarly, in connection with a sacrifice at which there is a single deity, Rudra is spoken of as 'one', and in connection with that in which the deity consists of a hundred Rudras, Rudras are spoken of as 'a hundred'; so that there is 'no incongruity' or self-contradiction involved in any such texts.

SŪTRA (48).

That there is no mention of the learning (of the meaning of Mantras) is due to the fact that it has no bearing (upon the actual performance).

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

Under Sūtra (37) it has been urged that-"at the time that the act (of threshing) is going on, and the young student is learning the Mantra that is recited at the time of corn-threshing at a sacrifice, there is no desire on the part of the student to convey (by means of the words of the Mantra) an idea of the threshing that is being done by the woman, Pūrnīkā:--[in the same manner at the time that the sacrifice is being performed and a Mantra is being recited by a Priest, there can be no desire on the part of the Priest to convey an idea of the sacrificial details by means of the words of the Mantral."—The reason why the Priest does not wish to convey an idea of the meaning of the Mantra that he recites during the performance of the sacrifice lies in the fact that an indication of the meaning of the Mantra, having no bearing upon the performance, would be of no use.-"But the teaching and learning of the meaning has not been enjoined, while the teaching and learning of the verbal text has been enjoined."—The reason for this lies in the fact that the understanding and remembering of the meaning is easy, and hence there is no teaching or learning of it, -while the learning and remembering of the verbal text is difficult, and hence there are the teaching and learning of it.

SŪTRA (49).

The meaning is there; only there is ignorance of it. $Bh\bar{a}sua.$

[Under Sutra 38, the Opponent has urged that there are many Mantras whose words are entirely meaningless.]-The fact is that the Mantras have a meaning,-only it is not grasped, by reason of carelessness, idleness and some other causes; as a matter of fact, the meaning of every word can be deduced from its etymology, with the help of commentaries, lexicon and grammar. For instance, [one of the apparently meaningless Mantras cited by the Opponent is 'Jarbhari turpharitu'; and here the words 'jarbharī turpharītū', having the form of words with dual endings, are understood to be names of the twin-gods Ashvins; and through this significance, the Mantra indicates the hymn to the Ashvins, ending with the words 'Ashvinoh kāmamaprāh.' (Rgveda, 10, 116, 11)-Further, all these words-'Jarbhari' and the rest-can be taken as the names of deities; and their special significance is determined by their etymology and common usage.—For these explanations, see Tantravārtika—Translation, pp. 100-101].-Similarly in other cases also.

SUTRA (50).

THE MENTION OF EPHEMERAL THINGS HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāsya.

It has been already explained under the $S\bar{u}tra$, 'There is only a similarity of Sounds' ($S\bar{u}tra$ 1. 1. 31).

SŪTRA (51).

The injunction (of a Mantra) by an indicative name shows that it signifies the same thing.

Bhāsya.

We have the text 'One approaches the Agnīd's place with the Āgnēyi' (Taitti, Sain. 3. 1. 6), which enjoins the use of a Mantra named 'Āgnēyi'; it is only when Mantras are significant of some meaning that they are enjoined by such an indicative name: that is to say, the Mantras are called 'Āgnēyi' because they are capable of signifying the deity Agni, and not because they contain the word 'agni'.

SŪTRA (52).

THE MODIFICATION (OF MANTRAS SHOWS THAT THEY ARE EXPRESSIVE).

Bhāsya.

Modification is possible in Mantras only if they are meant to be expresive.—"Where do you find this modification?"—We have the text 'Napitā warthatē na mātā, 'The Father does not grow, nor the mother', [this is with reference to the Mantra—'Anvēnam mātā, etc., Taitti Brā. 3. 6. 6. 1]: this means that beings other than these do grow; but as a matter of fact, the Mother and such persons also do 'grow',—through the several stages of childhood, youth and old age; hence what the text means is that the word ('mother') does not 'grow'.—"What would be the growth of the Word?'"—It would consist in the taking of the Dual and Plural endings.—[It is this growth that is forbidden by the text; and such forbidding has some sense only if the Mantra is taken as conveying some meaning—says the Tantraārtika.—The Mantra text quoted precludes the possibility of nouns in the singular number being modified into those in the Dual or the Plural. The sense of the prohibition is that if a certain Mantra contains the word 'ānam' in the singular, as referring to the sacrificial animal, this singular pronoun should not be changed into the Plural form 'onān', in a case where there is a large number of animals.]

SŪTRA (53).

THERE ARE ALSO CERTAIN POSITIVE BRAHMANA-TEXTS (WHICH CLEARLY POINT TO THE EXPRESSIVE CHARACTER OF MANTRAS.)

Bhāsua.

There are certain 'Brāhmāṇā-Texts' [according to the Tantravārtika 'vidhi' here is used in the sense of Brāhmaṇa] which refer to Mantras in such a way as to indicate that they are intended to convey a meaning. For instance, we find the Brāhmaṇa-text 'Shatam himāh shatam varṣāṇi jīvyāsam ityetadevāha' (Shata-Brā. 2. 3. 4. 21) [which says that 'When the Mantra uses the phrase Shatam himāh in the Mantra 'Agnā grhapatē, etc.,' (Vājasa sainhitā 2. 27) what it means is 'Shatam varsāṇi, a hundred years'; and in this passage the words occurring in the Mantra are explained as having a definite meaning].

Thus ends Pāda II of Adhyāya I.

ADHYĀYA I.

PĀDA III.

Treating of the Authority of Smrti and Custom.

Adhikarana (1): The Authority of Smrtis in general.

SŪTRA (1).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"INASMUCH AS DHARMA IS BASED UPON THE VEDA, WHAT IS NOT VEDA SHOULD BE DISREGARDED."

[The authority of Injunctions, Arthovadas and Mantras having been dealt with, what calls for consideration next is the character of such words and expressions as are Names, Nāmadhēya, of sacrifices. But before taking up this latter, we take up the case of Smrti and Custom; and the propriety of introducing this discussion here has been explained in several ways: -(1) We can form no idea of the authority of the Veda until we have understood it in all its bearings; and as it is only with the help of Smrti and Custom that it can be so understood, it is necessary that the exact nature of these latter should be investigated .- (2) Finding that Smrti and Custom are treated as authorities for Dharma, we might take exception to the conclusion arrived at under Sūtra 1.1.2 to the effect that Veda is the only authority for Dharma; and in order to guard against this, and to ascertain how far Smrti and Custom may be allowed to interfere with Veda, in matters relating to Dharma, it has to be shown that these are based upon Veda, from which alone they derive their authority .-- (3) The subject-matter of Mimamsa has been declared to be 'Investigation of the nature of Dharma', and after the first authority on Dharma in the shape of the Veda has been dealt with, it is only right that the nature of its other authorities should be considered.-The consideration of Smrti and Custom comes before that of Nāmadhēya (Names), which is a part of the Veda, because while the Nāmadhēya does not affect the Smrti, the Smrti does at times help in the comprehension of the Nāmadhēya.— Before considering those cases where there is conflict between Veda and Smrti, we deal with the more general preliminary question—Is Smrti to be regarded as having any authority in matters relating to Dharma ?]

Bhāsya.

So far we have explained the authoritative character of the whole Veda. Now we are going to consider cases where we do not find any Vedic texts and yet there are *Smrtis* to the effect that 'this act should be performed in such and such a manner, and for such and such a purpose';—the question to determine in this connection being, whether or not similar authority attaches to these *Smrtis*. As examples of such *Smrtis* we have—(a) 'The *Asrakā* should be performed', (b) 'The Teacher is to be followed', (c) 'Tanks should be dug', (d) 'Drinking booths should be set up', (e) 'One should keep a tuft of hair on the head', and so forth.

[The grounds for doubt regarding the authoritative character of such rules have been thus set forth in the Tantravārtika, Translation, p. 105—In as much as these Smṛtis are the work of human authors and are dependent upon their memory, which cannot be infallible, their authority is not inborn or self-sufficient, like that of the Veda;—yet on the other hand, they are found to be accepted as authoritative by an unbroken line of Vedic Scholars from time immemorial; hence they cannot be altogether wrong or untrustworthy. Hence the doubt.]

The Pūrvapakṣa view on this question is as follows:—"Inasmuch as Dharma is based upon the Veda, what is not Veda should be disregarded. That Veda is the only right means of knowing Dharma has been made clear under Sūtra 1. 1. 2, where it has been declared that 'Dharma is that which is indicated by means of the Veda as conducive to the highest good'; hence all that has been cited (being not Veda and hence) having no sound basis, should not be heeded."

[The supporter of Smrti says]—Those persons (Smrti-writers) who knew that such and such an act should be done in this manner,—how could they say that the Act should not be done at all? [That is, there is no reason for suspecting the veracity or authority of the Smrti-writers. The Tantra-vārtika puts the reasoning in a better form—'If the Smrti-writers knew a certain action, for instance, the Aştakā, as one that should not be done, how could they declare it to be one that should be done, and thereby lead astray the people of the present day?']

[The Pūrvapaksin continues]-"The answer to this is that the false or wrong declarations might be made by the writers by reason of the impossibility of their having any remembrance (of the acts concerned). As a matter of fact, no one ever remembers any such thing as has not been apprehended or heard by him; and the subject in question (the Astakā offering) is not mentioned in the Veda and is something super-physical (and hence not cognisable by any other means of cognition); [so that it could not have been previously known to the Smrti-writers at all;], and no remembrance (of the Act) is possible for the Smrti-writers, for the simple reason that they have not had previous cognition, which is what brings about Remembrance. Remembrance under the circumstances would be just like the remembrance that a barren woman might have to the effect that 'such and such act was done by my daughter's son'; if she ever had such a remembrance, then, knowing as she does that she has had no daughter, she could never believe that remembrance of the son's act to be correct.

"The Opponent may say—'Even so, just as in the case of the Veda, we accept as authoritative the remembrance (or tradition) of these Smṛti-writers by reason of there being an unbroken tradition among them regarding what is Veda,—in the same manner we may accept as authoritative their remembrance regarding the matter under consideration (the Agtakā and the rest).'

"But this is not possible; because in the case of the Veda, the compilation being there, the previous Cognition (necessary for remembrance) is not impossible; in the case of the Aslakū and the rest, on the other hand, as these are imperceptible things, there could be no means of any previous Cognition of them, and hence it follows that any remembrance regarding these must be wrong. In fact, this case would resemble the case where a person born blind says 'I remember this particular colour',—and being asked, 'How could you have any Cognition of colour', he points to another person blind from birth,—it being asked from where this latter derived his Cognition, another person blind from birth is pointed out; so that even though there is an unbroken line of tradition of persons born blind, no sensible people can ever regard this remembrance as right Cognition.

"Thus we conclude that a Smrti like those we have been considering is not to be treated with respect, it is to be 'disregarded'."

SUTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT (SMŖTI) IS TRUSTWORTHY, AS THERE WOULD BE INFERENCE (ASSUMPTION, OF THE BASIS IN THE VEDA) FROM THE FACT OF THE AGENT BEING THE SAME.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

The phrase 'api vā' ('but') implies the rejection of the Pūrvapakṣa.

The Smrti, (Remembrance), is 'pramāna', 'trustworthy'; -because it is a kind of Cognition; and how can Cognition be wrong ?- It might be argued that-"as there could have been no means available for the previous Cognition (of such things as Astakā and the like), there could be no previous Cognition of them (on which the Remembrance would be based)."-Our answer is-'Anumanam', ('there would be inference');-i.e. we would infer the reason for the reliability of the Remembrance. Of course the ground of this reliability could not be any previous direct apprehension, as (in the very nature of the things concerned) no direct apprehension is possible; human beings do not, in their present life, have any direct apprehension of things like Astakā; and what may have been apprehended in a previous life is not remembered during the present life. But what we could infer (as the ground for reliability) is the Text (Vedic) itself [which would have provided the Smrti-writers with the previous Cognition necessary for the Remembrance, Smrti, which would thus have its basis in that inferred Vedic text];—this inference being drawn from the fact (premiss) that 'the agent is the same';i.e. the 'agent', author, of the Smrti is the same as the 'agent', performer, of the acts prescribed in the Veda .- Thus it becomes established that in the case of the Smrti, Remembrance, of men of the three higher castes, there is actual connection (support, basis) in the Veda.

Says the Opponent—"But people do not find any such Vedic Text as you would infer (as the basis for Smrti)."

Even if they do not actually find it, they would infer it. It is quite possible also that the text upon which the Smrti is based was actually known to the Smrti-writer, but has since been forgotten.

Thus in the case of the 'remembrance' of men of the three higher castes, the necessary 'previous cognition' being traceable,—and it being possible that the texts from which that Cognition proceeded have been forgotten,—the inference of the text becomes justifiable; consequently 'Smyti is trustworthy'.

Then again, we do find in the Veda, texts indicative of the Astakā;—e.g. 'Yānjanāh pratirandanti, etc.' [Pāraskara-Grhya-Sūtra 3. 2. 2; Āpastamba-Mantrapathā 2, 20, 27.]

[The whole passage reads thus—' Yānjanāh pratinandanti rātrindhāmnuminā, yatim samuatsarasja yā patni sā no astu sumanjali asṭakā yaistu rādhasē svāhā';— here Aṣṭakā is spoken of as the Divinity of the Night, eulogised as the 'Consort of the Year'; here we have a Vedic text speaking of Aṣṭakā as an object of adoration; and this is taken as indicative of the desirability of performing the rites of the Aṣṭakā.]

As regards the other instances of Smrti.—rules of conduct quoted above, (relating to the 'following of the Teacher', 'the digging of tanks', 'establishing of drinking booths', and so forth), their authority (reliability, trustworthiness) rests in the fact of the apparently useful purposes served by them; for instance, -(a) if one follows his Teacher, the Teacher becomes pleased and teaches him with care, and also being satisfied with the pupil, explains to him the reasonings that go to solve the various difficulties that present themselves in the course of the study of the texts. This rule of following the Teacher derives support also from the Vedic text-'Therefore the inferior always walks behind the superior walking ahead' (which speaks of the Ass following after the Horse, and hence indicates the propriety of the Superior Person being followed by the Inferior):—(b) Drinking Booths and Tanks are philanthropic works, conducive to the benefit of the people, and not conducive to Dharma (merit only, and hence directly cognisable only through the Veda); as indicatives of such acts, we have the text-' Dhanvanniva prapa asi' (Rgveda 10. 4. 1) [which indicates the establishing of Drinking Booths], -and 'Sthalayodakam parigrhnanti' [which indicates the digging of waterreservoirs, Tanks].—(c) As for the keeping of a tuft of hair on the head, this serves the purpose of indicating the gotra (Clan) to which one belongs; and as indicative of this we find the text 'Yatra bānāh sampatanti kumārā vishikhā iva' (Rgueda 6. 75. 117. 7) [which cites the case of 'young boys with various top-knots' as a simile, and this indicates the practice of keeping tufts of hair as indicative of gotra .- Thus then, those rules (Smrti) that serve apparently useful purposes are trustworthy on that account, and in the case of those that pertain to transcendental purposes, we shall infer Vedic texts as their basis (and on this basis will rest their trustworthy character).

[The Prābhākara presentation of the Adhikaraṇas in this Pāda is somewhat different. According to him, the question of the authority of Smṛti or Custom does not concern us; the subject-matter of the Adhyāya is the Means of knowing Dharma, and it having been established that the Veda is the only means of knowing Dharma, the whole Adhyāya should deal with the authority of the Veda only.—Thus then, the vieayavākya of the present Adhikaraṇa is the Vedic text that has been cited above as indicative of the Aṣṭakā: 'Yānṭaṇāh pratinandanis, etc.'; and not the Smṛti-rule relating to Aṣṭakā. This Vedic Text is found to speak of the Divinity of the Night, and thus becomes connected with the Aṣṭakā-Rite laid down in the Smṛti, in which the Night figures as a deity.—Now in regard to the trustworthy character of this rule regarding the Aṣṭakā, the Pṛruṇakṣw view is as follows:—"The Smṛti-rule that 'the Aṣṭakā should be performed' is found to accomplish its purpose of enjoining the Rite, only through the help of the Vedic text also, as indicating the Divinity of the Night, must

have had in view that same Aṣṭakā-Rite in which Night figures as a deity, and which has been enjoined only in the work of a human author;—and thus this Vedic text is found to be dependent upon the work of a human author, which therefore shakes its inborn self-sufficient authority; and thereby the authority of the entire Veda becomes shaken."—The Siddhānia view is as follows:—When we have found that the persons who wrote down the rule that 'the Aṣṭakā should be performed' must have found a basis for the rule in the Veda itself,—then the injunction of the Aṣṭakā must be regarded as emansting from (based upon) the Veda itself; so that the text 'Yāṇṭahā, etc.', also refers to a divinity that figures in an act enjoined originally in the Veda itself; and thus the mantra-text is not dependent upon the Smṛṭr-rule at all; it is based upon the Vedic text upon which primarily the Smṛṭr-lu eis inferred to rest.—Riwwindlā.]

Adhikarana (2): Shruti (Veda) more authoritative than Smrti.

SŪTRA (3).

When there is Conflict (between Veda and Smrti), the Smrti should be disregarded; because it is only when there is no such conflict that there is an assumption (of Vedic text in support of Smrti).

Bhāsya.

[The authority of Smrtis in general having been established, the author next proceeds to point out exceptions.]

The question that arises now is—How would it be in cases where there is a conflict between Smṛti and Shruti? For instance—(a) The Smṛti rule that the whole of the Udumbara-Post should be covered—is in conflict with the Shruti-rule that 'one should sing a Sāman, touching the Post' [no touching of the Post is possible when the whole of it is covered with cloth];—(b) The Smṛti-rule that 'one should remain a Vedic Student for forty-eight years' is in conflict with the rule that 'one should instal the Fire when a son is born to him and his hair is still black'. [If a man is to remain a student for 48 years, he would not marry before he is 55 or 56 years old, by which time his hair would cease to be black,—and he could not instal the Fire before marriage];—(c) the Smṛti-rule that 'one should not take food at the place of one who has purchased Soma (for the Soma-sacrifice)' is in conflict with the Shruti-rule that 'on the completion of the Agnistoma stage (of the Soma-sacrifice) one should dine at the house of the sacrificer' [at the time mentioned here, the sacrificer will have purchased the Soma].

[Now the question arises—are these Smrti-rules authoritative?]

The Pūrvapaksa view is that "all this Smrti is authoritative, because the agent is the same (as declared in the preceding Sūtra)."

In answer to this, our Siddhānta view is as follows:—Inasmuch as the Smṛti lays down something that cannot be done, it must be regarded as wrong.—"But why can it not be done?"—Because the touching of the Post has been enjoined, therefore it cannot be entirely covered up and yet touched by the singing priest. For when we understand that the Post is to be touched by the singing Priest, what is there that would obstruct this notion of ours? It would be obstructed by the Smṛti laying down the covering up of the whole Post. [Thus this is a clear case of conflict between the two].—"The only reason that would make the Smṛti wrong would be the fact of its having no basis in the Veda; but it could have a Vedic text for its basis."—It could have a Vedic text (assumed by us) for its basis only if the idea of touching the Post were wrong; if this idea of touching

is not wrong, then the idea of covering up, being impossible, must be wrong; and just as no direct Apprehension is assumed, merely because (without it) something is not possible, in the same manner no Vedic text can be assumed (simply because the 'covering up of the whole post') would be wrong without such a text.—"In that case, how about the Smyti laying down the covering up of the whole Rost?"—Well, it is wrong.—"But why should we assume it to be wrong?"—Because it conflicts with an idea founded on the Veda.

"But why cannot we regard the two rules (Smṛti and Shruti) as optional alternatives,—like Vrihi and Yava, or like the two Sāmans, Bṛhat and Rathartar?"

That cannot be; as option is admitted in only those cases where neither of the two courses is known to be wrong.-[There is some obscurity attaching to this passage, due mainly to the explanation provided in the Tantravārtika, where the Kārikā beginning with 'Pūrvoktēnaiva mārgēna, etc.,' clearly means that in every case of Option, one of the two alternatives must be regarded as wrong; and according to this the Bhasya should be translated as-'Until one of the two is definitely recognised as wrong there can be no option'; the negative particle 'na' in this case is construed along with what follows. As a matter of fact however, if either of the alternatives is definitely recognised to be wrong, then it is rejected altogether, and it is not taken as an acceptable alternative; it is only when neither of the alternatives is definitely recognised as wrong, that both are recognised as equally right. The only way in which the Bhasya could possibly be explained in accordance with the Vartika is to take the 'wrongness' of one of the alternatives to mean the partial wrongness which attaches to every alternative option, involved in the fact that when one accepts the first alternative, it means the rejection of the other, and this rejection implies that the alternative so rejected must be taken as wrong at least for that occasion .- But from what follows in the Bhāsya, it appears better to take the negative particle 'na' as separate, and to accept the translation as given above in the body of the text.]-As a matter of fact however, if 'the covering up of the whole post' is right, 'the touching of it' must be wrong,-and if the 'touching' is right, then the 'covering up of the whole' mentioned in the Smrti must be wrong. But when the other party talks of this being a case of 'Option' he admits that the 'touching' is partly right [i.e. it is right in the event of the performer adopting that alternative]; this 'Touching' however has its source in the Veda; -and if the authority of this Veda is admitted, it cannot be partial; -as regards the 'covering up of the whole'-which according to the other party, is the second alternative in the option-that also would (according to him) be only partly right [i.e. only in the event of the performer adopting that alternative]; and what is only partly right can never justify the assumption of a Vedic text in support of itself; as any such assumption would be obstructed by the idea of 'touching' [which, as derived directly from the Vedic text, would be absolutely right, and hence very much more powerful than the 'covering up of the whole' which is admitted to be only partly right].-Hence unless it is recognised as right, not wrong, no Vedic text in its support, can be assumed .-- Nor will it

be right to hold that the same alternative (of 'covering the whole') is wrong in one case and right in another; -- because its source (or basis of authority) would be the same in the one case as in the other; if then it is not wrong in one case, it cannot be wrong in the other, as the authority of the Vedic text (on which the Smrti is based) would be the same in all cases; the Vedic text cannot be operative in only one case, as a text is always found in the form of a composition of words; and this cannot be regarded as wrong reading in one case (and right in another). From all this it follows that the idea (of covering of the whole post, which is derived from Smrti). in one case, can have no status other than that of a mistake; and consequently on account of its being in conflict (with the direct Vedic text), the idea of 'covering up the whole post' is held to have its source in either wrong learning or dream or some such other source of wrong cognitions. For so long as the said conflict is there, there can be no reason to justify the view that the idea of 'covering up the whole' is right. Hence the conclusion is that, just as (according to the other party also) no Vedic text (in support of the 'covering up of the whole') can be assumed in one case (i.e. in the case of the other alternative of 'touching' being adopted by the performer), so it cannot be assumed in the other case also; as the reason [for not assuming the Vedic text, i.e. the conflict with a direct Vedic text] remains the same in both cases.

Then again, there being a mutual interdependence, (the Smrti regarding the 'covering up of the whole' cannot be right), because its significance would be dependent upon something extraneous to itself .- "What is this mutual interdependence?"-If the Smrti-rule (regarding covering up the whole) is right, then the touching (laid down in the Shruti) is wrong,-and if the Touching is right, then the Smrti is wrong; it is in this way that there is mutual interdependence.-Now as between these two (the Shruti laying down Touching and the Smrti laying down Covering up the whole), the source of the Touching is fully recognised (in the Vedic text), while the source of the Smrti has got to be found (assumed):-this is what is meant by the Smṛti-rule having 'its significance dependent upon something extraneous to itself'. Thus then, the source of the Smrti being vet to be found, its authority is far from being established; and if the Smṛti is not authoritative, then the Touching (laid down in the Shruti) cannot be wrong; and if the Touching is not wrong, then there can be no reason for assuming a Vedic text in support of the Smiti-rule, for the simple reason that no validity (authority, trustworthiness) attaches to this latter.

Says the Opponent—"By this same process of reasoning, in so far as the notion of Vrihi being the material for the sacrifice is right, there can be no room for the Vedic text laying down Yava (as the other optional alternative)".

Certainly there would be no room for such a Vedic text, if it did not exist there already; as a matter of fact however, the Vedic text prescribing Yava (as an optional alternative) is already there (and has not got to be assumed); and certainly when the text is there already, nothing can be said against it. In this case both the texts are there;—and the two are two distinct sentences; one of these speaks of the Yava only as the

substance for the sacrifice, and the other speaks of the Vrihi only as the substance for it; and when something is distinctly mentioned by a sentence, it cannot be put aside. For this reason, in the case of Yava and Vrihi, it is only right that Option should be admitted.—Similarly in the case of the two Sāmans, Brhat and Rathantara.

It is for the reason that it has been declared that Smrti conflicting with Shruti is not trustworthy; consequently what has been said in the Smrti regarding the 'Covering up of the whole Post' has to be disregarded.

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND MOTIVES.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

(a) Some greedy priests being desirous of having a large piece of cloth, covered up the whole of the Post at a certain performance; this was what gave rise to the Smṛti-rule (that the whole post should be covered up).—(b) Some greedy Priest took food at the house of the Sacrificer after he had purchased the Soma [and this gave rise to the Smṛti-rule permitting such esting].—(c) Some people, with a view to conceal their want of virility, remained Religious Students for forty-eight years; and this is what gave rise to the Smṛti-rule permitting such a course.—[For this reason also, no authority can attach to the Smṛti which is found to have its source in such motives.]

This Sūtra (4) may also be taken by itself as embodying a separate independent Adhikarana, as follows:—

Adhikarana (3): No authority attaches to \(\bar{Smrtis} \) prompted by worldly motives.

SŪTRA 4.

IF WORLDLY MOTIVES ARE DISCERNIBLE THE SMRTI-RULES CANNOT BE REGARDED AS TRUSTWORTHY.

[The foregoing Adhikarana dealt with those Smrti-rules that are in conflict with Vedic texts; the present Adhikarana deals with those Smrti-rules which are not in conflict with any Vedic texts, but which are found to be prompted by greed and other motives.]

Bhāsya.

There are such Smpti-rules as (a) 'The cloth used at the Vaisarjuna Homa is to be taken by the Adhvaryu priest',—and (b) 'They should give away the cloth covering the Post',—In regard to the authoritative character of these, the Pūrvapakṣa view is that "they are authoritative, because the agent is the sume (as declared in Sūtra 1. 3. 2)."—The Sidāhānta view however is that such Smpti-rules cannot be regarded as authoritative; because at the root of these there is something totally different (from motives of Dharma);—the fact being that some people did such an act through greed, and this gave rise to the Smpti. This view (rejecting the authority of such Smptis) is more reasonable than the assuming of Vedic texts in their support.

[Kumārila does not accept the view propounded in these two Adhikaraņas, whereby certain Smrti-rules are held to be absolutely devoid of authority. According to him the form of the Siddhanta as embodied in Sutra (2) should be as follows-'When there is a conflict between the ideas expressed by the Vedic text and the Smrti it is the Vedic text that should be regarded as authoritative',which means that in cases where the Smrti-texts have expressed in other words the sense of certain Vedic texts, without quoting the exact words of these latter,they make their own authority dependent upon the assumption of those texts whose sense they are meant to express; while the Vedic text, which declares what is not in agreement with what has been declared in the Smrti, is self-sufficient in its authority; and as such this latter inspires greater confidence, and leads people to adopt the course laid down in it, in preference to the other course laid down in the Smrti. But this does not mean that the Smrti has no authority at all. - For a full discussion, see Tantravartika-Translation, pp. 154-165.-On pp. 165-168 Kumārila suggests another interpretation of the Adhikaranas, whereby what are declared to be untrustworthy are, not the Smrtis admittedly based upon the Veda, but those so-called 'Smrtis' which have been propounded by Bauddhas, Jainas and other heretical sects.]

Adhikarana (4): What deals with the Act is more authoritative than what deals with its accessory.

SŪTRAS (5-6).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" IF IT BE HELD THAT WHEN THERE IS NO DISTURBANCE OF THE VEDIO TEXT, THE SMRTI-RULE IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE VEDA,—OUR ANSWER IS THAT THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT, BECAUSE THE LIMIT HAS BEEN FIXED BY THE SORPPURSS".

[The case of Smrti texts dealing with acts to be done for accomplishing certain results desired by man has been dealt with so far; it has been shown that they are accepted or disregarded according as they are found to be in agreement or in conflict with the Veda. We are now going to deal with those Smrti-texts which hear upon such small acts as are not performed for accomplishing any definite purpose, but only come to be performed on certain occasions during a sacrificial performance.]

Bhāsya.

The Smyti-rules dealt with here are such as—(a) 'An act should be done after rinsing the mouth',—(b) 'An act should be done by one wearing the Yajhopuvita',—(c) 'One should perform the acts with the right hand' and such others.

The question that arises in regard to these is—Are these Smrti-rules in conflict with the Veda and hence should not be followed? Or, are they not in conflict with the Veda and therefore should be followed?

Says the Pūrvapaksin :--

"In this connection if it be held that-'Inasmuch as the following of the rules does not militate against anything declared in the Veda, they are not in conflict with it' (Su. 5), -then, our answer to this is that it is not so: because if these rules were followed, then they would militate against the Order (of acts) laid down in the scriptures .- How ?-Well, if one were to perform the mouth-rinsing and other acts (mentioned in the said rules) between the making of the Veda (a bundle of kusha-grass) and the making of the Vedi (a four-inch deep altar between two Fires),-it would militate against the Vedic text 'One should make the Vedi after making the Veda' [where the order prescribed is that the making of the Veda should be followed by the making of the Vedi; and if the rinsing of the mouth were to be done between the two, then that order would be infringed].-Similarly if one were to do all the acts with the right hand only (as laid down in the Smṛti-rule), sometimes the performance of the primary act might go beyond its prescribed time (by reason of the delay due to every act being done with the right hand only, which must get tired very soon); while by using both hands, the Primary Act would be completed well within its prescribed time."

SUTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT WHEN NO MOTIVE CAN BE DETECTED, THEY SHOULD BE RECOGNISED AS USEFUL.

Bhāsya.

The phrase 'api va' ('but') serves to reject the view stated above.

The right view is that when Smṛti-texts like those under consideration are such as are not found to have been prompted by an improper motive, they must be accepted as authoritative.—"But they are found to militate against the prescribed order of sequence and the prescribed time."—Let them militate against it; that does not vitiate their authority; because the insing of the mouth is an act, while the order of sequence is only a quality of (accessory to) the act; and an act cannot be omitted for the sake of an accessory.—Further, it is only when the acts are already done that the order of sequence comes in subsequently; so that at the time that the acts appear there is no order present,—with what then will the acts be in conflict? [Hence there is nothing against the authority of the Smṛti-rule in question.]

Similarly, if with a view to guard against the transgression of time, one were to cease to act with the right hand only,—in this case also considerations of time should not alter the form of the act [i.e. the act to be done by the right hand should not be done by the left]; because Time is only a subsidiary factor in the performance and auxiliary to it; and hence for the sake of the Time, the act should not be disturbed.

Further, acting with the right hand and wearing the sacrificial thread constitute purity (or cleanliness), and such things are not regarded as interruptions at all; because purity or cleanliness is a necessary adjunct to all actions. [And a necessary adjunct cannot be regarded as an interruption—says Rjuvimalā.]

From all this it follows that the Smrti-rules relating to all these acts—Rinsing, Using the Right Hand, Wearing the Sacrificial Thread and the like—are authoritative (trustworthy).

On this adhikarana also, Kumārila holds an entirely different opinion. His contention is that none of the Smrti-rules dealt with here are in any way against any Vedic texts; and as such there need be no separate Adhikarana devoted to their consideration. According to him therefore, sūtras 5 and 6 form part of the foregoing Adhikarana, and sūtra 7 forms a distinct adhikarana by itself. By this interpretation the sense of sūtras (5) and (6) is held to be as follows: - 'If the Opponent argues that-" a rule emanating even from a heretic should be accepted as authoritative when it is found that it is not contrary to the Veda,-such rules for instance as that one should be truthful, charitable and so forth ", [sū. 5], then we deny this, because the extent and number of authoritative scriptures is limited' [sū. 6];-the conclusion therefore is that 'Dharma can bring about its results only when it is understood with the help of those scriptures which are recognised as having their basis in the Veda. '-As for sūtra (7), it stands, by itself embodying the Adhikarana treating of the authoritative character of the Practices of Good Men; the sense of the sutra being that 'those acts which cannot be ascribed to any worldly motives, and which are yet performed (by good men), must

be recognised as dharma; this would be the Siddhānta as against the Pūrvapoka that "many practices are found to be such as are repugnant to the Veda, consequently no authority should attach to Practices." The meaning of the Siddhānta is that when, in regard to any particular Practice, we find that it is current among good men,—and we cannot attribute it to greed or any such sordid motive,—we should accept it as authoritative, as Dharma.

There is another interpretation suggested by Kumārila, by which Sūtra (5) is to be taken as part of Adhikarana (4), and sūtras (6) and (7) as embodying the Adhikarana dealing with the Practices of Good Men; under which sūtra (6) embodies the Pūraapaksa in the sense that "those practices cannot be regarded as authoritative in matters relating to Dharma, because the number and extent of authoritative scriptures is limited to the Veda and its auxiliaries;" and the Sūtdhānta in answer to this is found in Sūtra (7), in the sense already explained in the preceding paragraph.

There is yet another interpretation suggested by Kumārila, whereby all these three sūtras (5), (6), and (7) are taken as embodying the Siddhānta in answer to a Pūrvapaksa from without, bearing upon the Practices of Good Men. The sense of the three sūtras, in this case, would be as follows—'That which is taught in the Veda and the Smṛti,—if this is not contradicted by the Practices of Good Men,—such practices can be accepted as authority on Dharma; but whenever there is the least thing repugnant to the teachings of the Veda, then, as there would be a conflict of authorities, the Practices cannot be accepted to have any authority at all.—

See Tantravārtika—Translation, pp. 173-203.]

Adhikarana (5): A word should always be understood in the sense assigned to it in the scriptures.

SŪTRA (8).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"INASMUCH AS NO INCONGRUITY IS FOUND IN ANY OF THEM, THE SEVERAL SIGNIFICATIONS SHOULD BE EQUALLY (ACCEPTABLE)."

It has been established that Veda and Sm_Tti are authoritative means of knowing Dharma. Now arises the question of the right comprehension of the meanings of words occurring in Vedic and Sm_Tti texts.]

Bhāsya.

In such texts as—(a) 'The cooked offering consists of Yawa', (b) 'Shoes of 'larāha-skin', (Taitti. Brā. 1. 7. 9. 4; Maitrā. Sam. 4. 46; cf. Shata. Brā. 5. 4. 3. 19), (c) 'One collects the Prājāpatņas on the Vetasa-mat',—we find the words (a) 'yava', 'varāha' and 'vētasa'.—Now (a) some people use the word 'yava' in the sense of Barley-corn, others in the sense of Long-pepper;—(b) the word 'varāha' is used by some in the sense of the Hog, by others in the sense of the Back Birā;—(c) some people use the word 'vetasa' in the sense of the Back Birā;—(c) some people use the word 'vetasa' in the sense of the Back Birā;—(c) some people use the word 'vetasa' garded as options, and we may accept the one or the other as we choose.

[The question being as to which of the two significations is the right one, the Pūrvapalea view is that]—"Since both the meanings are found to be signified by the word, the acceptance of one or the other is optional (we may accept whichever we choose)".

SUTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN BEALITY, THAT WHICH IS BASED ON THE SCRIPTURES (IS TO BE REGARDED AS MORE AUTHORITATIVE);
BECAUSE THE SCRIPTURES ARE THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY. [OR, THAT SENSE IN WHICH THE WORD IS USED BY PERSONS WHO TAKE THEIR STAND UPON THE SCRIPTURES IS TO BE ACCEPTED AS THE MORE AUTHORITATIVE; BECAUSE

IT IS MORE RELIABLE THAN

IS MORE RELIABLE TH.
ANY OTHER.

Bhāsya.

The particle 'vā' ('in reality') sets aside the Pūrvapakṣa view.

(a) As regards the word 'yava' (the explanation of the two-fold usage lies in the fact that), if the word denotes the Barley-corn, then it can be

applied (indirectly) to the Long-pepper, by reason of its similarity to Barley; and conversely, if it denotes the Long-pepper, it can be applied to the Barley, by reason of its similarity to the Long-pepper.—"What is the similarity between the two?"—The similarity between the two consists in the fact that both Barley and Long-pepper plants grow after previous corn-plants are over.—"What then is the factor that determines which is the right signification of the term?"—That signification is the right one which is accepted by persons who rely upon the scriptures.—"Who are the persons that rely upon the scriptures?"—They that are cultured and learned; because such persons are conversant with the unbroken tradition bearing upon words and the Vedas; that is the reason why cultured persons are the 'basis', means, for ascertaining the sense of Vedic and Smṛti texts.

In regard to the subject under consideration,—following upon the injunction that 'the Karambha_vessel should be filled with Yava,' the declaration (of the scriptures) is to the effect that the 'Yava_plants flourish merrily when all other plants are withering', where the Veda shows that the word 'Yawa' stands for Barley [as the Barley-plant flourishes just before the spring when all other plants shed their leaves]. And since we find this indication in the Veda, we conclude that there is a long unbroken tradition behind the use of the word 'Yava' in the sense of Barley; from which it follows that the word can be applied to the Long-papper only indirectly (figuratively);—hence the conclusion is that the cake is to be made of Barley-meal.

(b) In regard to the word 'varāha', the Vedic text 'therefore cows run after the varāha' (Shata. Brā. 4. 4. 3. 19) shows that the word 'varāha' denotes the Hog, as it is the Hog that cows run after [at a festival held along with the Dipāvalā].

(c) In regard to the 'vetasa', the Vedic text 'the Vetasa is water-born' indicates that the word 'vetasa' stands; for the Bañjūla-creeper, as it is the Bañjūla-creeper that grows in water, while the Blackberry-tree grows either on dry ground or on hill-streams.

[Kumārila takse exception to the above presentation of the Adhikarana; for reasons, see Tantravārtika, Translation, pp. 207-208. He therefore takes the Adhikarana as discriminating between the usage of words among Aryas and among Mechchhas. The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"In regard to all visible things, the signification accepted by the Arya and the Mechchha is equally authoritative (Sū. 8); it is only in regard to superphysical things that the usage of the Arya has superior authority; in the case of ordinary things the expressiveness of all words has to be accepted as equally eternal,—from the mere fact of their being expressive; consequently, so long as the word denotes a certain meaning, it does not make any difference whether the signification is known among Aryas or Mechchhas."—In reply to this we have the Siddhāma in Sū. (9) in the sense that that sense has to be accepted as more authoritative which is accepted by people who take their stand upon scriptures—i.e. the Aryas.

Kumārila offers another interpretation of the Adhikaraņa as dealing with the comparative authority of Smytis and Custom. In cases where a Custom is repugnant to a Smyti-text, the Pürvapakṣa view is that "both are to be regarded as equally authoritative (SL 3); because both equally derive their authority from the

Veda".—The Siddhānta in answer to this says that the Smṛti is possessed of superior authority, because it is the Smṛti that is based directly on the Veda (Sū. 9). In the case of the Smṛti, the corroborative Vedic text is assumed directly from the fact of its being compiled by people learned in the Veda; whereas in the case of Custom, we have first to assume a corresponding Smṛti-text, and then on the strength of this assumed Smṛti-text, we have to assume the corroborative Vedic text; the support of the Veda thus in this case is one step further removed.

There is yet another interpretation of the Adhikurana suggested by Kumārila, by which it deals with the comparative authority of the sense conveyed by words in the Veda and that conveyed in common parlanee. The word 'ashawāla', for instance, used in the Veda, denotes reed, while in common parlance, it denotes horse's hair:—the question arising which of these should be accepted as authoritative, the Pirvapakse view is that "both are of equal authority (Sū. 8), because in the matter of the signification of words, the Veda does not in any way differ from other sources of verbal knowledge; its superior authority being restricted only to things pertaining to Dharma".—The Süddhānta in answer to this is that that signification of words which is based upon the scriptures is decidedly more authoritative, because the knowledge of Dharma is obtained by means of the scriptures alone (Sū. 9). A signification accepted and sanctioned by the Veda is irrevocably fixed and can never be set aside, while that sanctioned by ordinary usage is variable and liable to change.]

Adhikarana (6): The usage of words current among Mlechchhas is also authoritative.

SUTRA (10).

THE MEANING IMPARTED (BY THE MLECHCHHA, TO A WORD) WOULD BE DULY COMPREHENDED BECAUSE IT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ANY AUTHORITY [OR, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS SANCTIONED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE VEDA, BECAUSE IT IS NOT INCONGRUOUS].

Bhāsya.

[It has been established that that meaning is to be regarded as more authoritative which is accepted by persons who take their stand upon the scriptures.] Now in the Veda we meet with certain words which are not used by the Āryas (who are the people that take their stand on the scriptures) in any sense at all, but are in use among Mleckehkas; such are the words 'pika', 'nēma', 'sata', 'tēmarasa' and such others. In regard to these, there arises the question—Are we to deduce their meaning from their etymology, commentaries and roots with the help of lexicons and grammar? Or should we accept that as their meaning in which sense they are used by the Mleckehkas?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa—"What has been established as authoritative is the usage of cultured people, not the Snrti (Remembrance) of uncultured people (like the Mlechchhas). Hence it should be necessary to assume the meaning through explanations, etymology and grammar; and it is only thus that these latter would be of use. Further, uncultured people are not very careful in regard to words and their meanings, while the others (i.e. the cultured people) are very careful. From all this it follows that in the case of the words mentioned, their meaning should be deduced from the roots from which they are derived."

In answer to this we have the following Siddhānta—The meaning that is imparted to a word even by uncultured people,—even though not known to the cultured,—would be comprehended, and it would not be right to reject what has been comprehended and which is not incompatible with any authority.—The argument has been urged that "what can be accepted as authoritative is the usage of cultured people only".—But that refers to such things as are not amenable to sense-perception.—The other argument urged (by the Pūrvapakṣin) is that "it is only cultured people that are careful regarding the use of words".—In answer to that we say that there are some things in which the Mlechchhas are more careful (and reliable); for instance, in the catching and rearing of birds.—The third argument urged is that "it is only thus that explanations, etymologies and grammar would be of use".—But these will have their use in regard to those words whose meaning is not known even to the Mlechchhas (and so we have not even

that usage to guide us).—Further, if we were to deduce the meanings of words from their etymology, etc., then, there would be no fixity (and definiteness) regarding the meaning of words, and there would always be uncertainty.—From all this we conclude that (according to the usage of the Mlechchhas), the word 'pika' should be taken in the sense of the cuckoo,—the word 'nāma' in the sense of half,—the word 'tāmarusa' in the sense of lotus,—the word 'sata' in the sense of 'wooden vessel, round in shape and with hundred-holes'.

Adhikarana (7): The authority of the Kalpasūtras is not self-sufficient.

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—IF IT BE URGED THAT "[THE KALPASŪTRAS CONSTITUTE] THE SCRIPTURE OF RITUALS",—

Bhāsya.

[The case of the Kalpasūtras stands on a different basis from that of the Santis; they contain nothing more than the Vedic Ritualistic Procedure in a systematised form; there is nothing in their contents beyond what is actually found in the Vedic texts available. In the Santis, as we have found, there are many things which are not found in the Veda, and for which corroborative Vedic texts have got to be assumed. With all this however, the Kalpasūtras are compilations made by human authors, and to this extent their authority is open to doubt.—Kumārila (Tantra-wīṣtika—Translation, p. 224) has explained the term (Kalpa') in this connection as 'treatises that point out the method and procedure of sacrifices in the form of definite regulations'. These Sūtras are the work of Baudhāyana, Varāha, Mashaka, and others—says Kumārila.]

What are treated of here are the Kalpasütras—by Mashaka, Hastika, and Kaundinya.—The question is—Are these authoritative (in themselves) or not authoritative?

On this we have the following Pūrvapaksa:-"Inasmuch as these Sūtras constitute the 'Ritualistic scripture', they must be authoritative .we assert. These are statements made by truthful persons.- 'How is that known?'-We know this from the fact that there is perfect agreement between these statements and those contained in the Vedas. For instance, the 'cups' mentioned in these are the same as those mentioned in the Veda: the 'bricks' mentioned in these are the same as those mentioned in the Veda. From this it follows that the teachers (who compiled the Kalpasūtras) were truthful persons; and the Shruti also declares that 'the word of the Teacher is authoritative' .- It might be argued that 'the authoritative character of these Sūtras is not directly perceived (to be inherent in themselves, as is done in the case of the Veda)' .- But this objection would have no force; as the said authoritative character is ascertained by another means of cognition. in the shape of a verbal assertion. This assertion being in the form of the text quoted above regarding 'The Teacher's Word' being authoritative, and also in the form of the text wherein the Kalpas are mentioned along with the Mantra and the Brahmana as to be read daily. - Lastly, the Kalpas are actually treated with the same regard as the Vedic texts.-For these reasons, the Kalpasütras are authoritative (by themselves)."

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHANTA]—THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THERE IS NO PROPER COMPOSITION.

Bhāsya.

What has been asserted in the Pūrvapakṣa is not possible, because there is no proper composition; as a matter of fact, the Kalpasūtra is not composed in the proper manner, there being no accentuation in it (and hence it cannot be treated on the same footing as the Vedic text).

SŪTRA (13).

Also because there are no supplementary passages.

Bhāsya.

(In the Kalpasūtra) we meet with such texts as 'He appoints the Priests:-the Priests thus appointed perform the sacrifice;-they take their seat on the sacrificial ground'. In all this no injunctive word is found, because throughout it is the Present Tense ending that has been used. any valedictory supplementary passage (from which the Injunction could be deduced). For this reason such a text can have no authority (regarding Dharma).—As for the 'regard' that people have been spoken of (in the Pūrvapaksa) as having for the Kalpasūtra,—that is due to concomitance: i.e. to the fact that Kalpa-texts are interspersed with Vedic texts.—As regards the Vedic text (quoted by the Pūrvapaksa, that 'the Teacher's word is authoritative').—that means nothing: as it is a purely commendatory statement.—"Why should it be treated as a commendatory statement?"— Because in the context where this text occurs there is a totally different Injunction—to the effect that 'the cake dedicated to Agni is baked upon eight pans'; and it is in this connection that we have the said text ('The Words of the Teacher, Acharya, is authoritative'), where the term 'acharya' is meant to stand for the Veda, in its etymological sense of 'strengthening the intellect' ['āchinoti buddhim']. Or, what the said text means is that 'the word of the Teacher is authoritative 'through its dependence upon something':-"what is that something?"-it is that which is itself rightly recognised as self-authoritative (i.e. the Veda).

As for the Pūrvapakṣa argument that the Kalpasūtras are the work of truthful persons,—our answer is that—that is not so, because—

SŪTRA (14).

THE WORD 'ALL' HAS BEEN USED (IN THE KALPASÜTRA), WHILE THERE IS AT HAND A SCRIPTURAL TEXT (TO THE CONTRARY).

Bhāsya.

The words of the Pūrvapakṣin's 'āchārya', 'Teacher' (the author of the Kalpasūtra) are—'The Amāvāsyā (Darsha) sacrifice is to be performed on ail days'; while there is at hand the scriptural (Vedic text)—'The Pauma-

masa is to be performed on the Full-moon day and the Amāvāsya (Darsha) on the Moonless Day'.—Thus, inasmuch as these authors have made statements contrary to the Veda, they cannot be 'truthful'; and hence their work (the Kalpasütra) cannot be authoritative.

[From Sütras 11 and 12, Kumārila has deduced two additional Adhikaraṇas:—
(1) That the Smṛtis and the six subsidiary sciences of the Veda, like the Kalpasūtra, have no authority independent of the Veda; and (2) that no authority attaches to the non-Vedic scriptures—such as those of the Bauddha and other heretical sects.]

ADHIKARANA (8): Holākādhīkarana—The Authoritative Character of Popular Customs.

SŪTRA (15).

[PÜRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS ALL ASSUMPTION IS LIMITED IN ITS SCOPE, THE AUTHORITY (OF CUSTOMS, BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTION OF VEDIC TEXTS) MUST BE QUALIFIED BY THAT LIMITATION".

Bhāsua.

[The authority of Usages and Customs having been established in a general way, the question is raised regarding the extent of the authority of particular customs—Is this authority local or universal?]

"The authority of Smṛti and Custom is held to depend upon the assumption (of corroborative Vedic texts);—the very fact that establishes their authority also proves that that authority is limited (localised). Hence such customs as Holkkā and the rest should be practised by 'easterners' only;—the Āhninaibukā and the like, by 'southerners';—the Udwṛsabha-yajfia and the rest by the 'Northerners' only; just as the practice regarding the various numbers of Hair-tufts on the head is local,—some people keeping three, some five."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE DUTY SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL, AS ALL INJUNCTION HAS THAT (UNIVERSAL) CHARACTER.

Bhāsya.

The phrase ' $ap\bar{\imath}\ v\bar{a}$ ', 'in reality ', serves to set aside the view expressed above.

Customs like those mentioned should be 'dharma' (Duty) for all ;why ?-because all Injunction has that character :- the term 'vidhana' 'Injunction' (in the Sūtra) stands for that by which the enjoining is done, i.e. the injunctive word ;-it is the injunctive word that is assumed in support of the Smrti; -and the injunctive word cannot denote either the Class (universal) or the Individual (particular); -in fact, there is no one single word that denotes the universal character common to all persons (performers of actions) which could be assumed (as part of the Vedic text in support of the Custom).-Hence the only reasonable view to take is that the Injunction applies to all persons. The Vedic text assumed cannot refer to any particular Class, like the 'Easterner', etc.; or to any individual person; nor is there any such universal class-character as would include all persons; -hence the absence in the assumed Vedic text of such an allcomprehensive word cannot be rightly urged as a reason for restricting the authority of the particular Customs.—Rjuvimala].—Why so ?—Because all that the basic authority (i.e. the assumed Vedic text) says is that 'such

and such an act should be done', and there is no authority for restricting its application (to any particular persons).

The Pūrvapaksin has cited the case of the variety in the custom relating to the number of Hair-tufts on the head.—The answer to this is given in the following Sūtra:—

SŪTRA (17).

RESTRICTION COULD ONLY BE DUE TO DIRECT PERCEPTION.

Bhāsya.

In the case of the Hair-tufts, we clearly perceive that the restriction is due to restrictions of the *Gotra*. [Persons belonging to one *Gotra* keeping three tufts, those belonging to another keeping five, and so on.]

SŪTRA (18).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO SUCH INDICATIVE MARK AS WOULD INCLUDE ALL (THOSE PARTICULAR PERSONS TO WHOM THE CUSTOM MAY BE SOUGHT TO BE RESTRICTED).

Bhāsya.

This Sūtra is to be prefaced by a few words.—"What are those words?"—(These words are)—"Why cannot there be a restriction through indicative marks,—such as we have in such rules as 'the white man shall be the Hotr priest' [where the work of the Hotr priest is restricted to such men as are white]?"—[It is in answer to this question that we have the Sūtra which means as follows:]—There is no such indicative mark as would include all those who are actually found to follow a particular custom.—As for such characteristics as 'dark, large-bodied, red-eyed' (which have been mentioned as the indicative marks of persons following the Āhmīnaibuka rites), we find, as a matter of fact, that all men possessing these marks do not follow that custom, and also that persons who do not possess these marks do actually follow it.—For this reason there can be no restriction.—As for the instance cited of 'the white Hotr', that is a clear Vedic text (and so we have to accept it).

SŪTRA (19).

THE NAME ALSO IS DUE TO CONNECTION WITH (RESIDENCE IN) A COUNTRY.

Bhāsya.

Says the Opponent—"Why cannot the restriction be due to the name? Those who are named 'Southerners' would perform the Ahninaibuka; those who are named 'Northerners' would perform the Udvyabha-yajña;—those who are named 'Easterners' would perform the Holākā; just as in the case of the Rājasūya sacrifice, we have the restriction that 'the Rājā shall perform the Rājasūya sacrifice' (where the restriction is due to the name 'rājā', which can apply to the Ksatīriya only)".

This cannot be; the names (mentioned) are due to connection with a particular country [i.e. the name 'Southerner' applies to the person connected with, living in the Southern country]; but as a matter of fact, we find that a man who has gone out of the Southern country (and his connection with that country has ceased) and is residing in the East or in the North (and hence entitled to the name 'Easterner' or 'Northerners' still continues to perform the Ahnīnaibuka. Similarly, the 'Northerners' though residing in other countries, still continue to perform the Udvṛṣabha-yajña; and the 'Easterners' residing in other countries still continue to perform the Holākā. In fact, when a man migrates from one country to another, he does not necessarily follow the customs of the latter.—From all this, we conclude that there can be no restriction (in the authority of the Popular Customs).—As for the case of 'the Rājasāya being performed by the Rājā' only,—'rājā', Kṣattriya, is a definite caste, restricted within well-defined limits.

SŪTRA (20).

IF THE OPPONENT SHOULD URGE THAT—"[IF THE NAMES WERE DUE TO ACTUAL RESIDENCE IN A COUNTRY, THEN] IT COULD NOT BE APPLIED TO ONE WHO HAS GONE AWAY FROM THAT COUNTRY TO ANOTHER COUNTRY",—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE NEXT SUITA.]

Bhāsya.

If you think that—"if the names were due to actual residence in the country, then the name could not be applied to one who has gone to, and is residing in, another country; as a matter of fact however, we find that the name "Māthwra" (which according to the Siddhānta would be a name for one actually resident in Mathwrā) is actually applied to a man who has no connection with (is not resident in) Mathwrā, and is residing in another country; from this it follows that the name is not due to residence in the country";—if such is the argument of the Opponent, then our answer is as follows:—

SŪTRA (21).

The name would be due to connection (residence), as in the case of the name ' $M\bar{a}thura$ '.

Bhāsya.

Even when the name is due to connection with the country, the name would not be inapplicable to one who has gone out of that country; because the name is 'due to connection'—i.e. due to mere connection, not due to connection in the past only, or in the present only, or in the future only. Because we actually find the name 'Māthura' applied—(a) to one who has started for Mathurā (his 'connection' thus being in the future), (b) to one who is residing in Mathurā (his 'connection' being in the present), and (e) to one who has migrated from Mathurā (his 'connection' being in the past); and it is only when a man has none of these 'connections' with Mathurā that he is not called 'Māthura'.

From this it is clear that there could be no restriction based upon name.

SŪTRA (22).

[Says the Opponent]—"[The country in which a certain practice is prevalent] may be the qualification of that Custom itself,—just as 'sloping' (which qualifies the ground)."

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

"Why cannot the country be subsidiary (qualification) to the act or practice? For instance, that country where the soil is mostly black is the one where the Ahninaibuka is performed.—Just as in the text 'One should perform the Vaishvadeva sacrifice on ground sloping eastward' (Mān. Shr. Sh. 1. 7. 1. 5) (where the particular sloping ground qualifies the sacrificial act)".

SUTRA (23).

BUT THAT (SPECIFICATION) WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THAT BY A QUALIFICATION OF THE PERFORMER.

Bhāsya.

It has been shown above that such indicative qualifications as 'dark-skinned', 'red-eyed' and the like as belonging to the performer, are and finite, and are not in keeping with the actual state of things;—any indication by the name of a country would be equally indefinite. Because as a matter of fact, even in the country 'where the soil is dark', there are many people who do not perform the act (of the Ahninaibuka),—and conversely men residing in a country with other characteristics (than the dark soil) actually do perform it.—Thus then, there could be no restriction through the name of the country.

As for the 'ground sloping eastward', its connection with the Vaishvadeva sacrifice has been fixed by the Veda itself (hence its ease is not analogous to that of the Customs under discussion).

[Sütras 15 and 16 have been taken by Kumārila as also embodying an independent Adhikaraya, dealing with the authority of such locally-accepted Dharma-hātara as at those of Gautama, Shakha-Likhita and the like. There arises a doubt regarding the exact nature of the authority of these,—because in actual practice the work of Gautama and of Gobhila are followed only by \$Bamacekins,—the work of Vashishka only by \$Backins,—these of Shakhka-Likhita only by the Vājacaneyi-Shukla-Yajurocdins.—The Pūrvapakṣa is that "these works cannot be put in the same eategory as the universally recognised Smṛtis of Manu and others; their authority must be limited."—The Siddhānta is that on account of the universal character of the injunctions contained in the works in question, these must be accepted as applicable to all persons who are capable of acting up to them; as the said Smṛtis themselves do not contain any words that would limit their operation, the Vedic texts also that would be assumed in support of them would not contain any such restrictions being placed upon the Smṛti-works in question.]

Adhikarana (9): Treating of the Grammatical Smrtis.

SŪTRA (24).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO INJUNCTION REGARDING THEIR USE, THERE SHOULD BE NO RESTRIC-TION IN REGARD TO WORDS."

[Works dealing with grammar have also been classed under 'Smrtis'. The use and authority of these is now discussed. The Brhati has raised an objection against introducing this topic here. It says-'What has the authoritative or unauthoritative character of the Grammatical rules got to do with the authority of the Veda, which is the sole subject-matter of the present adhyāya ?- Even if the corrupt forms of words, as 'gāvī', etc., were really expressive and eternal, what effect would that have upon the Vedic Injunction ?- The answer that the Brhati supplies is that if there were no restrictions regarding the exact form in which a word denotes a certain thing, then the comprehension of Vedic texts would be vague and indefinite, and there would be no certainty regarding a certain word being expressive of a certain thing; and this vagueness and uncertainty would shake the authority and trustworthy character of the Veda itself. The rules of Grammar however help us to know in what particular form the word-'horse' for instance—really denotes the particular thing, horse; and thus they help us to obtain a definite idea of the meaning of Vedic Texts.

Bhāsya.

This Adhikarana is going to deal with the case of such words as 'gauh' (the grammatically correct Sanskrit word) and ' $g\bar{a}v\bar{i}$ ', ' $gon\bar{i}$ ', 'gonalbia' and other corrupt (Vernacular) forms of the Sanskrit word.

The question to consider is—Are, or are not, the corrupt forms 'gāvi; and the rest rightly expressive of the animal with the dewlap (the cow), in the same manner as the correct form 'gauh' is? That is, is it only the one (Sanskrit) word, which has behind its use an unbroken tradition, that is rightly expressive of the thing and all the rest are mere corrupt forms of it? Or are they all equally eternal (in their expressive potency)?

The Pürappakṣa view is as follows:—"They are all equally expressive deternal.—Why?—Because there is actual cognition; the animal with the dewlap is cognised through the corrupt words 'gāvi' and the rest; this shows that even a hundred years back the expressive relation between these words and the said animal was there; and so on and on backwards which establishes their beginningless (eternal) character. Nor is there any originator of this relationship (between the corrupt word and its meaning),—as has been fully established.—From all this it follows that all the words (the original Sanskrit and the corrupt Vernacular) are correct,—people should make use of all of them,—because they all serve the purpose

of expressing the meaning; and they are to be treated as synonymous in the same manner as the Sanskrit words 'hasta', 'pāni' and 'kara' are.—In fact words are used for a definite purpose (that of expressing their meaning), and not for any transcendental result. Nor is there any injunction regarding their use. Hence there can be no such restriction as that only one is correct and the others incorrect".

SŪTRA (25).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—BECAUSE ITS UTTERANCE IS DUE TO (HUMAN) EFFORT, THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF SLIPS.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

It is with a considerable effort that people pronounce words: for instance, (in every act of utterance) the wind rises from the navel, expands in the chest, undergoes evolutions in the throat, strikes the head, turns back and spreading over the regions of the mouth, renders manifest the various sounds. In this (long drawn-out process) there is every possibility of the utterer making slips; just as a man falls in the mud, when he thinks that he is falling on dry ground; or he touches a thing twice while he thinks of touching it only once.—The utterance and use of the corrupt words may have originated from such slips,—and they need not necessarily be taken as having an unbroken tradition behind them.

SŪTRA (26).

It is not reasonable to have several words (to denote the same thing).

Bhāsya.

It is not reasonable to hold that 'there are similar words having the same meaning and all having an unbroken tradition (of usage) behind them'. Because this view is held entirely on the strength of the fact that we find the corrupt words bringing about the cognition of the thing denoted;—but this cognition can be explained as coming about through the correct word itself which is brought to the mind by its similarity (to the corrupt word pronounced); [the word 'gāvi', e.g. brings to mind the correct word 'gauh' or 'gāvah', which brings about the cognition of the thing denoted, row.]—Thus then, we conclude that among all the words cited, there is only one ('gauh') which is beginningless (eternal), all the rest are corrupt forms.

In the case of the synonyms 'hastah', 'karah', 'pānih', the connection of every one of them with the thing denoted is beginningless,—such being the teaching of authoritative teachers [according to whom all these words are grammatically correct; while 'gāvī', 'gonī', etc., are not grammatically correct!

SŪTRA (27).

On this point, the truth can be ascertained 'through close attention' [or, 'through the application of certain general principles'—acc. to $Tantrav\bar{a}rtika$].

Bhāsya.

"But how are we to ascertain the truth in this matter (as to which word is correct and which incorrect)?"

The Sitra says that this can be ascertained (easily).—People desirous of gaining an end are found to be prone to close attention; (in the case of persons desirous of retaining the correct form of a word) we find that those who give close attention keep on repeating (that word), and thus it becomes possible for them to retain it in their memory. It is a fact that we see in our experience that what is frequently repeated is not lost hold of (forgotten).—Hence that form of the word is to be accepted as 'correct' which is declared to be 'correct' by people who have given this close attention to it.

SUTRA (28).

People are unable (to pronounce the correct word;—and yet the meaning is expressed) because of the similarity (of the corrupt to the correct word).

Bhāsya.

It has been urged by the Pūrvapakṣin that "as a matter of fact, even from the corrupt words 'gāvī' and the rest, the meaning is comprehended, consequently, the relationship of these also to that meaning should be regarded as eternal."—But the fact of the matter is that when a corrupt word is uttered, it is a sign of incapacity; that the man desiring to pronounce the word 'gauḥ', pronounces it, through some incapacity, as 'gāvī', and yet the other person hearing the word thus pronounced realises that this man wishes to speak of the animal with the dewlap, and to that end he wishes to utter the word 'gauḥ', but pronounces it as 'gāvī'.—Now other people who have heard the word thus uttered and understood as denoting the animal with the dewlap, come to use the form 'gāvī' when they themselves wish to speak of that animal;—and it is thus that the corrupt words 'gāvī' and the rest come to bring about the cognition of the animal with the dewlap;—this is rendered possible by the fact that the word 'gāvī' is similar to the correct word 'gauh'.

SŪTRA (29).

In the case of the wrong use of affixes, (the comprehension of the meaning of the word) is due to the fact of a part (of the incorrect word, i.e. the base) being the same (as that of the correct word).

Bhāsya.

In those cases also where a word is used with a wrong affix, the comprehension of the meaning is due to the same (similarity); e.g. when one says ashmakaih āgachchhāmi' (instead of 'ashmakābhyah āgachchhāmi' in the sense of 'I am coming from the Ashmaka country'), the fact of the basic term 'ashmakā' being common brings to the mind of the hearer the correct word 'ashmakābhyah' (with the Ablative affix), and then only does he comprehend the right meaning ('I am coming from the Ashmaka country').—Similarly when we come across the corrupt form 'gāvī', we are reminded of the correct term 'gō', and thence the animal with the devolap becomes comprehended.

Adhikarana (10 A): The Word in the Veda and the thing spoken of by it are the same as those in common parlance.

SŪTRA (30).

[(a) SIDDHANTA OF ADHIKARAŅA A]—THE MEANING (AND THE WORD)
MUST BE ONE AND THE SAME, AS THUS ALONE ARE INJUNCTIONS
OF ACTIONS POSSIBLE; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THERE IS NO
DIFFERENTIATION (BETWEEN THE TWO).

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

Now there arises the question—Are the words 'gauh' and the rest expressive of the Class or of the Individual?

(Before this question can be answered) we have to investigate the question—are the words in the Veda the same as those used in common parlance or different? Are they denotative of the same things as in common parlance or different ones?

The Pūrvapaksa on this question is as follows:—"The words in the Veda are different from those in common parlance, and their meanings also are different.-Why ?-Because they are named differently and their forms also are different. The difference in their naming is apparent in such statements as 'These words and expressions are Vaidika and those others are laukika'. In the Veda we find the statement that 'Agni killed the Vrttras' (Rgveda 6. 16. 34); and the form of this word 'agni' (as denoting Indra) must be different from that of the word 'agni' as used in common parlance (as denoting Fire).-The words being different, the things spoken of (by means of those words) must also be different. Further, we meet with the statement that ' Uttānā vai devagavā vahanti' (Āpastamba—Shrauta-Sūtra 11. 7. 6),—which means 'the cows that belong to the deities move on their backs'; and from this statement it follows that the animals spoken of by the word 'go' (in 'gava') are those that walk on their backs; and thus it is clear that the thing denoted by the word 'gauh' in the Veda is different from that spoken of by that word in common parlance. Similarly, there is another statement-' Dēvēbhyo vanaspatē havīmsi hiraņyaparņa pradivastē artham' (Taittirīya-Brahmana 3. 6. 11. 2), from which it follows that the thing spoken of in the Veda by the word 'vanaspati' is a divinity with golden leaves. Again, we have the statement 'Etat vai daivyam madhu yad ghrtam', where the word 'ghrta' has been used in the sense of Honey .- From all these it is clear that the meanings of words used in the Veda are different (from those of the same words as used in common parlance)."

The Siddhanta in answer to the above is as follows:-

The words in the Veda are the same as those in common parlance, and the things expressed by them are also the same.—Why?—Because thus

alone are injunctions of actions possible; it is possible to have an injunction of action, only when the words are the same and the things denoted by them are the same. If the two sets of words were different, then their meanings could not be understood (by ordinary men). Hence the two sets of words must be the same.

"What you are pointing out is the useful purpose served by the two being the same; please point out some reason for regarding them as the same."

This reason is provided by the next clause in the Sutra- avibhagat'. 'because there is no differentiation between the two'; that is, we do not perceive any difference between the words in the Veda and those in common parlance; hence it follows that the words are one and the same. Similarly we comprehend the same things denoted by the words in the Veda as those denoted by those in common parlance; and hence we declare that these also are not different.—As regards the argument that (a) (in the Veda) those animals are called cows which move on their backs-(b) honey is called 'ghrta'-and (c) 'vanaspati' is the name given to that which has golden leaves.—there are no such statements (in the Veda) as that 'those animals are to be called go which move on their backs'; all that the statement says is that 'the cows move on their backs'. If this statement were taken as predicating the 'gotva' (the character of cow, of those that move on their backs). then the clause 'move on the backs' would be a mere reiteration (a reference to something already known); and yet no such animals are known as 'move on their backs'; [any reference to those therefore being not possible] it will thus be necessary to take this 'moving on the back' as the predicate of the sentence; and if that is the predicate, then the 'character of the cow' could not be the predicate (of the same sentence); as in that case there would be a syntactical split.—Further, if the words of the Veda were different from those in common parlance, then we could not ever comprehend the meanings of the words 'uttānāh' (on their backs) and the rest found in the Veda; so that it would be all the more impossible for us to comprehend the 'character of the cow', which also is unknown to us (and which forms the predicate of the Vedic sentence containing the words 'uttanah', etc). -Nor is the statement of the 'cows moving on their backs' quite meaningless and useless: because it could be taken as serving the useful purpose of commendation.-These same considerations apply to the case of the other two statements-regarding Honey being spoken of as Ghrta, and the goldenleafed thing being spoken of as 'Vanaspati'.-From all this it follows that the words and their meanings are the same in the Veda and in common parlance.

[This same sūtra 30 is also taken as embodying the Pūrvapaksa of the following Adhikarana 10 B.]

ADHIKARANA (10 B): Words denote Classes.

SUTRA (30).

[PÜRVAPAKSA-" (a) [WORDS CANNOT DENOTE CLASS], AS IF THEY DID SO, NO INJUNCTION OF ACTIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE;-

(b) [NOR CAN WORDS DENOTE BOTH CLASS AND INDIVIDUAL, BECAUSE A WORD CAN HAVE ONLY ONE MEANING :- (c) [As FOR THE NOTION OF CLASS THAT ARISES FROM THE WORD! THAT IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE TWO [CLASS AND INDIVIDUAL) ARE

INSEPARABLE "

Bhāsya.

If (i.e. admitting that) the things denoted by words in common parlance are the same (as those denoted by them in the Veda), there arises the further question-Is it the Class or the Individual that is denoted by the word?

But first of all we have to consider-what is 'Class' and what is 'Individual'?

Among Substances, Qualities and Actions—that factor which is common to several individuals is the 'Class', and that which possesses certain specific (uncommon) characteristics is the 'Individual'.

"Why then should there be a doubt (regarding the meaning of words)?"

Because when the word ' gauh' (' cow') is pronounced, there appears the notion of the Class, and yet it is the Individual that is connected with actions.

The Pūrvapaksa on this question is as follows:--

"It is the Individual that is denoted by the word—Why ?—Because if they did, no injunction of action would be possible; i.e. if words denoted the Class, there could be no injunction of such actions as killing, washing, cutting and so forth [as none of these actions could be done to the entire Class].

It might be argued that "in cases where the utterance of the word would otherwise become entirely useless, the word may be taken as denoting the Individual, but in all other cases it should be taken as denoting the Clase" .- But it has been already pointed out (as the conclusion of Adhikarana 10 A) that it is not right to have the same word denoting several things.

"'How then does the notion of the Class appear (when a word is pronounced) ? '

The answer to this is that the Class would be the distinguishing feature

of the *Individual* denoted by the word, the idea being that 'the animal that has this *Class (Commonalty or generic character)* is the *cow (gaul_t)*; —Just as we have the idea that 'the man who has the stick is the *stick-er*', and yet the word '*stick-er*' does not denote the *stick*, so also in the case in question (though we have the idea that 'the animal that has this *Class* or generic character is the cow', yet the word 'cow' does not denote the said *Class*)."

SŪTRA (31).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA—continued]—" ALSO BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE NO WORDS EXPRESSIVE OF (QUALITIES AS) SUBSISTING IN Substances."

Bhāsya.

"The term 'dravyashabda' (in the sūtra) stands for 'dravyāshrayashabda', i.e. 'word for,—i.e. expressive of—that of which substance is the substratum,—i.e. the Quality, [which is what subsits in substances].'—If words denoted the Class, then there would be no word expressive of qualities,—such as we have in the expressions 'six cows are to be given', 'twelve cows are to be given', 'twenty-four cows are to be given'; here, (if the word 'cows' denoted the Class) no connection with such a Class of the numbers six and the rest would be possible.—From this it follows that words do not denote the Class."

[The $Tantrav\bar{a}rtika$ —Trans. p. 340—has construed this $S\bar{u}tra$ somewhat differently.]

SŪTRA (32).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA—concluded]—" AND ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND THE WORD 'ANOTHER' USED."

Bhāsya.

"We meet with such Vedic texts as—'If the animal consecrated runs away, then one should secure another animal of the same colour and of the same age'.—Now, if words denoted the Class, then there could be no 'securing of another animal', as the other animal also would belong to the same Class as the one that has run away [and hence it should be spoken of as the same, not as another].

"From all this it follows that Words denote Individuals."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHANTA]—In reality, it is the class (that is denoted), as it is that which serves the purposes of actions.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The particle 'tu', 'in reality', sets aside the aforesaid view.

It is the Class that is denoted by the word.—Why?—Because it is that which serves the purposes of actions. The injunction 'Shyënactitam chinvita' one should erect the altar like the Shyena' is possible only with reference

to the class (the commonalty); i.e. if the word 'Shyēṇa' denotes the class. If it denoted an individual shyena bird,—then, inasmuch as it would be impossible for the performer to make or produce any individual bird,—the injunction would be laying down something impossible, and hence it would be meaningless or futile. Hence the word 'Shyena' must denote the Class.—[In this context, the term 'ākṛti' could best be rendered as 'configuration' and as this also is a factor that is common to all individuals, we would have adopted it; but the Tantravārtika having declared (Translation, pp. 330 and 331) that 'ākṛti' does not stand for the shape, it has been thought advisable to stick to the one uniform rendering 'elass'.]

Says the Opponent—"It would be possible (according to the Injunction quoted) to perform the *erecting* of the alter by means of the individual birds (killed and collected together)".

But the sentence does not speak of the Shyēna as the instrument; in fact, the word 'Shyēna' speaks of what is desired to be brought about;—the meaning of the injunction being that 'the Shyēna should be brought about by the erecting'; and this would give sense only if the word 'shyēna' denoted the class.

Says the Opponent—"In fact in both cases, the accomplishment of the action is equally impossible.—For instance, (a) the class cannot be taken as denoted by the word;—why '-because if the class were denoted, then no action would be possible—in the case of such injunctions as 'one should sprinkle water on the \(Vr\hat{hi}.corn'\) (cf. Taitti. Brā. 3. 2. 5. 4); [it would be impossible to sprinkle water on the entire class of the corn];—(b) the Individual also cannot be taken as denoted by the word;—if the word denoted individuals, no action would be possible,—as we find in the case of the injunction 'Shy\u00e4nachitam chimita', 'one should erect the altar like the Shyena'.—If it be urged that in the case of the sprinkling of water on the corn, the Class (directly denoted by the word) indirectly indicates the individual corns,—then in the case of the erecting of the altar also, we could say that the Individual (directly denoted by the word) indirectly indicates the Class.—Under the circumstances, which of the two views is more reasonable? \(\text{?} \)

Our answer is that it is more reasonable to take the word as denoting the Class.—If the word denoted an Individual, then it could not be used in reference to another Individual;—if it could be used in reference to another Individual; then it cannot be held to denote an Individual;—because an Individual is that which is free from all those characteristics that are common; [so that if a word is applicable in common to two things, then those things cannot be regarded as Individuals, in the real sense of the term].

Says the Opponent—"Our answer is that what has been urged does not vitiate our position: because when the word would be applied to another Individual, it would apply to it only as free from all common characteristics".

But if it does apply to another individual even as free from all common characteristics, then that (application of the one word to the two individuals) itself would constitute two common characteristics (belonging to the two individuals).

"Not so",—says the Opponent,—"that thing is an Individual which is the substratum of generic properties as well as of certain specific properties; and the word that denotes an Individual is not applied either to the generic property or to the specific property; it denotes only the substratum of these two; and hence there is nothing incongruous in the word being applied to another Individual; and yet it does not become a generic property; [when the word 'cow' is applied to one cow, it denotes that particular as the substratum of the generic character 'cow-ness', as also of the specific properties of that particular cow; similarly when it is applied to another cow, it denotes that second cow as the substratum of the same generic property 'cowness,' as also of the specific properties of that second cow; in this way the denotation of the word varying with each particular cow, the word or its application cannot constitute a common characteristic.]"

If the word 'cow' could be applied to another cow also, [because it is something free from all common characteristics] then, why is not that same word 'cow' applied to an individual horse, which also is something free from all common characteristics?

Says the Opponent—"The word would be applied only to such things to which it has been found to be applied in actual usage, and not to any and everything; and as a matter of fact, the word 'cow' has never been found to be applied to any individual Horse; for that simple reason the word 'cow' could not be applied to the Horse'.

If a word is to be applied to only that thing to which it has been found to have been actually applied in usage,—then the word 'cow' could not be applied for the first time to the cow (calf) just born, as the word has never before been found to have been applied to that particular calf. Nor in this case, would it be possible to have any such comprehensive (or common) notion as 'this is a cow,—and that also is a cow': the notion that we would have would be 'this is a cow—or that is a cow'.—As a matter of fact, we have the comprehensive notion (of 'cow') even with regard to the particular cow that we have never seen before. From this it follows that it cannot be accepted that the application of the word 'cow' to the Individual is dependent upon actual usage.

Says the Opponent—"In that case, (our explanation would be that) it is the nature of the potency (of the word) that it is applicable to one individual and not to another individual. Just as it is in the nature of things that Fire is hot and Water is cool, so would it be in the case in question also."

This will not do, we reply. Certainly a word is never understood to be applicable to one individual and not to another (without any determining factor).

"But the 'cow-ness' (the class 'cow') would be the determining factor (in the case of the word 'cow'); the word 'cow' being applicable to only that individual wherein 'cow-ness' (class 'cow') subsists."

If that is so, then, what would be cognised (as denoted by the word) would be a qualified Individual (i.e. the Individual qualified by the class 'cow'); and if it is the qualified Individual that is denoted, then, the qualifying factor (class 'cow') should be one that has been already cognised

before; because until the qualifying factor has been already cognised, people can never have any notion of the thing qualified by that factor.

"All right; the word will denote the Class as the qualifying factor, and the Individual as the qualified factor; there is no such law that the Individual cannot be denoted by the word that denotes the Class, or that the Class cannot be denoted by the word that denotes the Individual; so that both could be denoted by both; which of the two, Class or Individual, is the primary factor in the connotation, and which the secondary, will depend upon the intention of the speaker; if one intends to speak of the Class as the secondary factor, then he would speak of the Individual as the primary factor."

This cannot be so; between the two (Class and Individual) there could be a relation of primary and secondary only if both were denoted by the word. But if the Class is really comprehended as denoted by the word, then we cannot say that 'the Individual also is denoted by the word'.--Why?--Because the Class is permanently related to the Individual; so that when the Class, as the one relative, is cognised, the cognition of the other relative (Individual) would naturally follow. That the Individual is cognised on the utterance of the word is a fact evident to everyone; but what is not evident is the distinction as to whether the cognition of the Individual follows directly from the Word itself, or from the Class (which is first denoted by the Word). This can be ascertained only by induction (by reasoning based upon affirmative and negative premises), as follows: -(a) Even without the Word being uttered, if one cognises the Class, he necessarily cognises the Individual also (affirmative premise); (b) even on the word being uttered, if, by reason of some mental derangement, the man fails to cognise the Class, then he fails to cognise the Individual also (negative premise); -[and the irresistible conclusion from these premises is that it is the Class that is denoted by the Word, and the cognition of the Individual follows only from the cognition of the Class.]

"Well, the meaning of the Word may consist in the Class as qualified by the Individual."

In that case, if the Class were cognised as qualified by one Individual, it could not be cognised as qualified by another Individual.

From all this it follows that the Word is the direct cause of the cognition of the Class, and that the cognition of the Class is the cause of the cognition of the Individual.

"[We do not deny that the Class is denoted by the word], what we mean is that it is denoted as the secondary factor (the Individual being denoted as the primary factor)."

The fact of the Class being the secondary factor does not militate against our view; all that we mean is that in every case the Class is denoted; whether it is denoted as the secondary or the primary factor depends upon the purpose (and intention) of the speaker: if the Class is spoken of with a view to itself, then the Class is the primary factor; if, on the other hand, it is spoken of, not with a view to itself, but to something else, then it is of course the secondary factor. But the Word has got

nothing to do in this matter (of the Class being the primary or the secondary factor).

The Opponent takes up another position—"In the case of the word 'dandi' ('stick-or', 'the man with the stick') we find that the word 'dandi' does not denote the stick, and yet what is comprehended as denoted by the word is one qualified by the stick'; in the same manner, in the case in question also, even though the Class is not denoted by the Word, yet what would be comprehended as denoted by the Word would be the Individual qualified by the Class'.

This is not well said. It is true that the stick is not denoted by the word 'dandi'; but there is no cognition of the dandi, the man with the stick, until the stick has been cognised; then again, the term 'danda' ('stick') forms part of the term 'dandi' ('the man with the stick'), and it is this term 'danda' which has brought about the cognition of the stick; so that the statement remains unchallenged that 'the qualified is cognised only on the cognition of the qualifying factor'.—But in the case of the word 'go' ('cow'), there is no part of the word which would be denotative of the Class, and another (part or whole) would be denotative of the Individual, on the strength of which it could be said that "the class is comprehended from that part of the word, and the whole word 'go' is not expressive of the Class".-Further, in the case of the word 'dandi', it has been found that the word 'dandi' ('man with the stick') is never used in the sense of the stick; in the case in question, on the other hand, it is not that the word 'go' is never used in the sense of the Class. It is with a view to this that it has been shown above (Text, p. 80, line 21) that the word 'Shyëna' denotes the Class only.

Thus then, (a) from affirmative and negative premises, and (b) from the fact that the word 'shyēna' is used even when there is no connection with any individual shyēna,—it follows that the Word is expressive of the Class.

In the case of the word 'Vrihi' (Corn) also, the word is never found to be used with reference to any individual Vrihi, without some connection with the (lass 'Vrihi').

From all this we conclude that the view that the Word denotes the Class is the most reasonable one.

SŪTRA (34).

If it is urged—(a) that "no action would be possible",—
(b) that "there could be no injunction of 'another'",
—and (c) that "there would be no words expressive
of qualities as residing in substance",—[then
the answer is as given in the following
Satra.]

Bhāsya.

It has been urged above by the Pürvapaksin—(a) that "there would be no action consequent upon the injunction 'sprinkle water on Vrihi'"

(Sūtra 30),—(b) that "there would be no word expressive of qualities as substaing in substances" as we find in the texts 'Six cows are to be given, etc.'—(Sūtra 31),—and (c) that "there would be no injunction of 'another',—as we find in the texts, 'another animal of the same colour, etc.' (Sūtra 32)".—All this has got to be answered. [And this is what is going to be done in the following Sūtra].

SŪTRA (35).

As words denote classes [and through these, also Individuals]
There would be no dissociation (of individuals from

ACTIONS).

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

- (a) Insamuch as the Word denotes the Class, the action would pertain to that Individual which is related to that Class; for instance, in the case of the sentence 'sprinkles water on Vrihê' what is enjoined as to be done is the sprinkling with water, of a certain substance;—over which substance?—over that substance which is conducive to the accomplishment of the sacrifice; because the sprinkling is for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result. The sprinkling ould not be enjoined as to be done over the Class, because no sprinkling of a Class would be possible. So what happens in this case is that the word 'Vrihê', which is really expressive of the Class, is used for the purpose of qualifying (indicating) the receptacle of the action of sprinkling vater: and the word will naturally denote the Class, and this Class, on being cognised, would qualify (and indicate) the receptacle of the action of sprinkling water. Thus there would be nothing incongruous in regarding the Word as denoting the Class.
- (b) Similarly in the case of the text 'Six cows are to be given as the sacrificial fee', what it is intended to be declared'is the number of that substance which is to be given as the sacrificial fee, and the word 'cows', as denoting the Class, serves to qualify (and indicate) that substance.
- (c) Lastly, in the case of the injunction of 'another animal', what is meant to be spoken of as 'another' is the substitute for what has been lost, and hence the word 'animal', which denotes the Class, serves to qualify (and indicate) by that Class, the said substitute.
- Thus it is established that all such words as 'cow', 'horse' and the like are denotative of the Class.

Thus ends Pāda iii-the Smṛtipāda-of Adhyāya I.

ADHYĀYA I.

PĀDA IV.

Treating of the Names of Sacrifices.

Adhikarana (1): Words like 'Udbhid' are names of sacrifices.

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THE VEDA SERVES
THE PURPOSE OF ACTIONS; THEREFORE THE WHOLE (VEDA)
SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SERVING THAT PURPOSE."

Bhāsya.

[It has been established that the Veda is the only means of knowing Dharma; that is, the knowledge of what we ought to do can be obtained only from the Veda texts. Of Vedic texts, there are several kinds—(a) there is one which directly enjoins the act to be done or forbids the act to be avoided;—(b) there is the declamatory (commendatory or condemnatory) declaration, which has been shown to be useful in helping us to obtain a knowledge of our duty by commending the act enjoined or condemning the act forbidden, and thereby prompting us to activity:—(c) then there are the Mantras (Invocations), which have been shown to serve the purpose of indicating certain details of the act that has been enjoined;—(d) in addition to these we find in the Veda certain words and phrases the exact purpose and meaning of which are not so clear as those of the texts dealt with under the above three heaks. For instance, there is the text 'Udbhida' yielda'; the meaning of this sentence is not clear; as the exact signification of the term 'Udbhida' is doubtful.—The present Pāda is going to deal with texts of this latter kind.]

We meet with such Vedic texts as—'Udbhidā yajēta', 'one should sacrifice with the Udbhid' (Tāṇdya-Brāhmaṇa 19.7.2); 'Balabhidā yajēta', (Ibid. 19.7.1); 'Abhijitā yajēta', 'Vishvajitā yajēta'.—In regard to these there arises the question—Are these terms, 'Udbhid', '(Balabhid', 'Abhijit', and 'Vishvajit') meant to enjoin certain sacrificial accessories? Or are they the names of certain sacrifices?—''Why should such a question arise at all?''—Because from the sentence as it stands, both the meanings are deducible; from the syntax of the sentence, the term 'Udbhidā' ('with the Udbhid') is related to the verb 'Yajeta' ('should sacrifice'); now this syntactical connection between the two words may be either appositional,—the meaning being that 'one should sacrifice with the sacrifice named Udbhid',—or non-appositional,—the meaning being that 'one should perform the sacrifice with the Udbhid as the substance offered',—The sentence thus admitting of both these constructions, there naturally arises a doubt (as to which is the correct interpretation).

On this question, the Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:-"It has already

been explained by us that the Veda serves the purpose of actions; one part of it consists of Vidhi, Injunction, which makes known things not already known: e.g. 'Somena yajēta' ('One should sacrifice with the Some') :- (b) another part of it consists of the Arthavada, Declamatory Passage, which eulogises and commends the Injunction; e.g. 'Vayu is the eftest deity' (Taitti, Sam. 2. 1. 1. 1); -(c) another part is Mantra, the Invocational Passage, which indicates (brings to mind) the enjoined thing at the time of the performance; e.g. 'Varhirdevasadanan dāmi', ('I am lopping grass, the seat of the gods'-Maitra. Sain. I. 1. 2. 1), and so forth.-From this it follows that the terms in question—' Udbhid' and the rest should serve one of these three purposes. But they cannot be Arthavãdas, because an Arthavada always appears as a supplement to something that has been enjoined .- Nor can they be Mantras, as there is no such thing to be indicated (at the time of performance) as is spoken of in the words under consideration.—The only possible alternative left by elimination thus is that the words be taken as injunction of accessories: i.e. what is enjoined (by the word 'Udbhida') is that 'the sacrifice is to be performed with Udbhid as an accessory (i.e. substance of offering)'; and the reasons for the acceptance of this alternative are—(a) that it is in keeping with a well-recognised fact. (b) that the injunction of accessories serves a distinctly useful purpose, and (c) that it serves to prompt men to the particular course of action. [It also fulfils the condition of Injunctions, in that it makes known something not already known, as] the fact of the Udbhid being of use in a sacrifice is not known among people; nor has it been declared in the Veda (anywhere else).-Hence the texts in questions must be injunctions of accessories.-An objection may be raised-'If the sentence in question is the injunction of an accessory, then there is no injunction of the action (of sacrificing) itself (whereat the accessory could be used); and so long as the action itself is not enjoined, any injunction of accessories for that action would be entirely useless.'-Our answer to this is that it is not so: the injunction of the accessory (by the sentence in question) would be useful, in so far as it would be enjoining the particular accessory for the Primary Sacrifice Jyotistoma (which is the archetype of all Soma-sacrifices). If the word in question ('Udbhid') were only the name of the sacrifice, then 'Udbhidā yajēta' ('should offer the Udbhid-sacrifice') would be synonymous with 'Yajēta' ('should sacrifice'); [as Udbhid would be only the name of the sacrifice]; so that the presence of the word 'Udbhida' in the sentence would make no difference in the activity prompted by the injunction. If, on the other hand, the word is taken as enjoining an accessory, then through the addition of this accessory, the words 'Udbhid' and the like would be providing additional information and thus serve a distinctly useful purpose.—From all this it follows that all these words are injunctions of accessories."

In answer to this Pūrvapaksa we have the following Siddhānta-

SÜTRA (2).

[Siddhānta|—In reality, that term must be a Name 'which, at first, appears as new' [or, 'of that sacrifice which brings about an Apūrva, a transcendental result'],—because it cannot be injunctive (of anything).

Bhāsya.

The phrase 'api vā', 'in reality', rejects the above Pūrvapakṣa.

The term must be a name-we declare; -because it is only thus that the term would enjoin something not already enjoined,-i.e. a sacrifice other than the Jyotistoma; -and the Vedic text also would directly mention Otherwise, (i.e. if the term were not a name, but an injunction of accessories), the text speaking of the 'Udbhid' and other things would indirectly indicate that act at which the Udbhid is used, the meaning of the sentence 'Udbhidā yejēta' being that 'one should bring about (the result) by means of that sacrifice at which the Udbhid is used'; - that 'one should bring about the result by means of the sacrifice' is what is meant by the term 'should sacrifice' ('Yajēta'); - 'Yāga,' 'the sacrifice,' is an instrument; - the Udbhid also is an instrument, as it is spoken of by means of a word with the instrumental ending ('Udbhida'). Thus then, if we construe 'Udbhida yajēta' as 'Udbhidā yāgena kuryāt', and take the term 'Udbhid' occurring in the term 'Udbhida' with the Instrumental ending, as the name of the sacrifice, Yaqa, which is expressed by the term 'Yaqena', which also has the instrumental ending,-then the co-ordination between the two terms (' Udbhida' and 'Yayana') becomes quite logical. On the other hand, if the term 'Udbhid' were taken as denoting a substance (to be used at the sacrifice). then the requisite co-ordination (between 'Udbhida' and 'Yaqena') would be possible only by having recourse to possessive indication (in the term ' Udbhida', taking it as equivalent to 'Udbhidvata', 'one that possesses, i.e. uses, the Udbhid') .- And certainly when there is a doubt as to the acceptability of direct assertion and indirect indication, it is direct assertion that is more acceptable.-From all this it follows that the term 'Udbhid' is the name of a sacrifice.

Says the Opponent—"In that ease, the well-known fact of the term 'Udbhid' denoting a substance would be ignored and the entirely unknown fact of the word denoting an action (i.e. sacrifice) would be assumed".

The answer to this is that the fact of the term 'udbhid' being the name of an action is deduced from the force of the Instrumental ending in 'Udbhidd' — "How?"—The Instrumental ending is added to only such noun-bases as denote an Instrument, and in the sentence in question it is the 'Yāga', Sacrifice, that is the instrument; consequently we infer that the word 'udbhida', with the instrumental ending, being in the same case as 'yāgəna', the term 'udbhid' must denote the sacrifice.

Says the Opponent:-"This is not right. It could be as explained only

if the presence of the Instrumental ending had enabled the term 'udbhid' to bring about the notion of (i.e. to denote) the sacrifice :- as a matter of fact, however, no such notion of the sacrifice arises out of the word 'udbhid':-hence what has been asserted is not right.-It might be argued that-'The Instrumental ending would be inexplicable except on the basis of the explanation just provided' .- Let it be inexplicable; when, as a matter of fact, the sacrifice is not understood to be denoted by the term 'udbhid', this term cannot be regarded as expressive of it (simply for making the Instrumental ending explicable).-For these reasons, the words in question ('udbhid,' etc.), must be taken as injunctive of accessories .- It might be urged that 'this involves recourse to indirect indication'.- But it is better to assume an indirect indication than to assume the denotation of the sacrifice (by a word that does not denote it). Because recourse to indirect indication is an ordinary every-day process, while the assuming of an entirely unknown thing is sheer perversity.-Further, if the text 'Udbhidā vajeta' enjoins the name, it cannot enjoin the sacrifice; and if it enjoins the sacrifice, then it cannot enjoin the name; if it enjoins both, then there is syntactical split."

The answer to this is as follows:—The Name is not enjoined by the text in question; what we mean is that the word 'udbhida' contains a reference (by name) to the sacrifice.—"But where is that sacrifice enjoined, (to which reference is made in the term 'udbhida')?"—Our answer to this is that the term 'udbhid' denotes the act of sacrifice through the force of its constituents, 'ut' and the root 'bhid', which together express manifest, bring about; so that the particular sacrifice is referred to as 'udbhid' in the sense that it manifests, brings about, 'cattle' (the declared result of the sacrifice). Thus it is that this particular sacrifice is named 'udbhid'.

Similarly, the Abhijit-sacrifice is so called in the sense that it brings about straight victory.—The Vishvajit-sacrifice is so called in the sense that it brings about conquest of the world. And so in the case of other names of sacrifices.—For these reasons we conclude that all these words are names of so many sacrifices.

As regards the argument urged by the Pūrazpakṣin to the effect that—
"If taken as a name, the word would not lead to any special activity on the
part of the agent, and hence it would be useless",—the name also would be
useful, inasmuch as it would serve to connect the sacrifice with particular
accessories and results; [for instance, the sacrifice having been enjoined
in some other text, the text 'udbhidā yajāta pashukāmah' serves to connect
that sacrifice, here referred to by the name 'udbhid', with the particular
result in the shape of Cattle; similarly in other cases, the text may serve
the purpose of connecting the sacrifice with a particular accessory in the
shape of substance or deity, etc.].

From all this it becomes established that words like those under discussion are names of sacrifices.

[Kumārila has not accepted this interpretation of Sūtras 1 and 2 as embodying the single adhikarana that words like 'udbhia' are names of sacrifices.—According to him Sūtra (1) contains nothing that cannot be accepted by the Siddhāntin, and therefore it need not be taken as a Pūrvapakṣa sūtra. By his interpretation

Sūtra (1) embodies the Adhikaraṇa leading to the conclusion that words like 'udbhid' also are means of knowing Dharma; and Sūtra (2) embodies another adhikaraṇa leading to the conclusion that the said terms are names of sacrifices. The Pūrvapakṣa of both these Adhikaraṇas is, in this interpretation, to be supplied from outside the Sūtras.]

Adhikarana (2): Words like 'Chitra' are names of sacrifices.

SŪTRA (3).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—THAT WORD WHEREIN THERE WOULD BE AN INJUNCTION OF AN ACCESSORY DETAIL MUST BE RELATED TO THE PRINCIPAL

FACTOR.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[The foregoing Adhikarana has dealt with such words as have no commonly recognised meaning, and whose meaning had, in every case, to be deduced from their etymology. The present Adhikarana deals with such words as have common well-recognised meanings of their own.]

The texts to be dealt with here are—(a) 'Chitrayā yajēta pashukāmah' (Taitirīya-Samhitā 2. 4. 6. 1),—(b) 'Trivyt bahih pavamānum' (Tāndya-Brāhmana 20. 1. 2),—(c) 'Panchadashānyājyān' (Tāndya-Brāhmana 19. 11. 2],—(d) 'Saptadasha pṛṣthāni' (Tāndya-Brāhmana 19. 1. 2).

The question in regard to these is—Are the words (a) 'Chitrā', (b) 'Pavamāṇa', (c) 'Ājya', and (d) 'Pṛṣṭha'—injunctive of accessories, or names of sacrifices ?

The Pūrvapaksa on this question is as follows:—"These words must be taken as injunctive of accessories,-(a) because such is their well-recognised meaning, (b) because it is only in that sense that they could serve a useful purpose, and (c) because it is only in that sense that they would lead to a particular kind of activity. These words are not known as denoting any acts (sacrifices); nor have they any etymological meaning; they are ordinary common nouns (denoting classes). For instance, the word 'Chitra' is an adjective, expressing quality; the sentence 'Chitrayā yajēta' is a reference to a sacrifice, and not the injunction of the sacrifice, as the sacrifice is one already known; in fact, what the sentence is meant to express is the fact of a particular result (acquisition of cattle) following from certain accessory details in relation to the sacrifice; and hence it is not necessary for this sentence itself to enjoin the sacrifice.—Similarly also in the case of the sentences 'Pañchadashāni ājyāni' and 'Saptadashāni prsthāni'. -Nor is it necessary to have recourse to indirect indication, even when the words are taken as injunctive of accessories.—Hence the words must be taken as injunctive of accessories."

In answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—
That word—in regard to which there is a doubt as to whether it is injunctive
of accessories or a Name—wherein would be enjoined another accessory detail,
—must be related to the principal factor, i.e. the action.—That is to say,
such a word must be taken as the Name of an action (sacrifice).—If it were
taken as injunctive of an accessory, then there would be syntactical split.
For instance, (in the case of the text 'Chitrayā yajeta pashukāmah' if the
word 'Chitrayā' were taken as injunctive of an accessory, the meaning of the

whole sentence would have to be that) there being a possibility of a male animal being used, (1) 'the animal that is used (2) should be a female one, (3) with the additional qualification of being of variegated colour, and (4) from using such an animal at the sacrifice, cattle will follow as the result'.—Certainly no single sentence can enjoin so many things. Thus then, [it being possible to enjoin only one thing at a time], if the variegated colour were enjoined, it could be enjoined (or predicated) only in reference to the female animal (which will have to be already enjoined elsewhere, in order to be able to be referred to here);—as a matter of fact however, no female animal could be enjoined either in reference to the Agnisomiya (animal dedicated to Agni-Soma), or in reference to the desire for cattle; nor could this latter be enjoined in reference to the animal dedicated to Agni-Soma.

Similarly in the case of the text 'Panchadashani ajyani bhavanti', what is meant is that the number fifteen pertains to the 'Ajyas'. Now, until the 'Ajyas' have been enjoined, they cannot be used in connection with the Stotra-Chants; -but there is no other text injunctive of the Ajyas; -hence the text in question (according to the Pūrvapaksa) would have to enjoin the \bar{A}_{jyas} , and to enjoin also the number fifteen in regard to the \bar{A}_{jyas} thus enjoined; and a connection between these two-the 'Ajyas' and the · number fifteen' is clearly recognised (in the text under consideration); but the connection of the 'Ajyas' with the Stotra-chant has been hitherto unknown; so also the connection between the Ajyas and the number fifteen has been unknown (apart from the text under consideration); and vet it is impossible for both these connections to be enjoined (and predicated) by the single sentence ('Pañchadashani ājyāni bhavanti').—On the other hand, if ' $\bar{A}jya$ ' is taken as the name (of an act), there is no such incongruity (of double predication); as in that case the only connection to be predicated is that with the number (fifteen).-Further, the idea that · Ajyas are Stotra-chants' could be obtained from the text under consideration, only by recourse to indirect indication .- From all this it follows that words like 'ajya' are names of actions (chants)—these actions being enjoined by other texts such as 'Ajyaih sturate' ('pray with the Ajyas'), 'Prsthaih stuvate' (' Pray with the Prsthas').

As regards the Pūrvapakṣa-argument that "no such name of action is known (as 'ājya' or 'Pṛṣtha')",—our answer is that the particular chants would be named 'ājyas', through the etymological signification of this word which signifies 'going to the battle' (āji-gamana),—"What would be this yoing to battle (in regard to the chants)?"—The explanation is supplied by the subsequent Arthavāda passage, which declares that 'The Ājya-chants are so called because the deities went to battle after reciting these chants'.—Similarly the 'Pṛṣtha chants' are so called because they speak of touching (sparsha), [the Rathantara-āma is described as having come out of the water touched by Vāyu].—Similarly also the Bahiṣpavamāna chant is so called because its mantra-texts are expressive of the Pavamāna, and because it has some connection with the outside (bahit).—A particular sacrifice is named 'chinto' (lit. multi-coloured), because several kinds of substances are used thereat, such as 'curds, honey, milk, clarified butter, fried grains, rice and water'.

From all this it follows that all such words (as 'chirā') are names of actions.

Question:—"Why cannot the text 'Pañchadashāni ājyāni bhavanti' be taken as enjoining the Ajyas qualified by the number Fifteen with reference to the act of chanting [thereby avoiding a syntactical split]?"

Answer:—For the simple reason that in the text there is no word expressive of the qualified $\tilde{A}jyas$.

"But there are the two words 'panchadashāni' and 'ājyāni', which together express the Ājyas qualified by the number Fifteen, and it would be these that the text would enjoin with reference to the Stotra-chants."

Both these words cannot be injunctive; only one can be injunctive (predicative) and the other must be the subject (of the proposition); if both were predicative, then they could not be related to one another; if neither of them were injunctive, then there could be nothing to enjoin (or predicate) connection with the Stotra-chant. Nor will it be possible to take one of the two words ('ājyāni') as the subject in reference to the qualification (number 'fitteen') and as injunctive (predicative) in reference to the Stotra-chant; as such a construction would involve two distinct sentences. Hence the answer proposed is no answer to the Stothanta.

Adhikarana (3): Words like 'Agnihotra' are names of Actions (Tatprakhyanyāya).

SŪTRA (4).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THERE IS ANOTHER TEXT INJUNCTIVE OF THAT ACCESSORY.

Bhāsya.

[Adhikaraṇa (1) has dealt with words whose etymological signification pointed to the sacrificial accessory only indirectly; 'wibhida' for instance, had to be taken by the Pūrnapaksin as 'wibhida'aā' before it could be construed as laying down the offering-material; and it was this necessity of having recourse to indirect possessive indication that was found to be the weak point in the Pūrnapaksa. The present Adhikaraṇa is going to deal with those words whose direct signification itself points to a sacrificial accessory and no recourse to indirect indication is necessary.]

We meet with such Vedic texts as—(a) 'Agnihotram juhoti svargakamaḥ (Taittiriya-Sanhitiā 1. 5. 9), (b) 'Aghāramāghārayati' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 3, 7. 3; Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa 3. 3. 7).—In regard to these there arises the following question—Are the terms 'agnihotra' and 'āghāra' injunctive of accessories, or names of actions?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapaksa:-"(a) The term 'agnihotra' (taken as a Bahuvrihi compound) signifies 'that in which the libation is offered to Agni'; (b) and the phrase 'aghāramāghārayati' signifies that 'one pours the Aghara, i.e. a fluid substance', such as Clarified Butter. By accepting these significations, we accept the well-recognised meanings of the terms. And with these significations, (a) the term 'agnihotra' is injunctive of the accessory (Deity, Agni) of the Darvihoma offering, and (b) the term 'aghara' is injunctive of the accessory (offering material, a fluid substance) of the Upāmshuyāja-offering; -and in this manner, both these terms serve a distinctly useful purpose and are also conducive to particular forms of activity (on the part of the performers).-Nor does the view that these terms are injunctive of accessories involve any necessity for having recourse to indirect indication, as was found necessary in the case of the sentence 'udbhidā yajēta' [under Adhikarana (1)]; because (a) in the case of the term 'agnihotra', the injunction of the accessory (Deity) is got at from the compound itself, and (b) in the case of the term 'aghāra', the injunction of the accessory (material) is got at directly (from the accusative ending in 'āghāram'); just as in the case of the sentence 'āghāram nirvartayati' ('prepares the fluid substance').-From all this it follows that the two terms are injunctive of accessories,"

In answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—
There is another text injunctive of that accessory. (Sū.)—That is to say, the
two accessories that might be suspected of being enjoined by the two terms
under discussion are such as have been already learnt from other texts.
For instance, (a) the deity, (Agni, for the Darvihoma) is already enjoined in

the text 'Yadagnayê cha prajāpatayê cha sāyam juhoti' (cf. Maitrā. Sain. 1. 8. 7); and (b) the material (Clarified Butter) for the Aghara also is already enjoined in the text 'Chaturgrhitam vā ētadabhūt tasyāghāramāghāryā' (where 'chaturgrhītam' stands for Clarified Butter taken up in the Sruva four times).—An Injunction is a real injunction only when it makes known something not already known:-in the present instance, we find that the two accessories have been already enjoined by other texts;hence it follows that the words in question cannot be injunctive of these accessories.—On the other hand, it is quite possible for the two terms to be names of actions; (a) 'Agnihotra' being that act in which the libation (hotra) is offered to Agni (agnaye), and (b) 'Aghara' is well-known as signifying the act of pouring a long stream. Thus both the terms are names of actions.—As regards the argument that "the well-known meaning of the terms is preserved if they are taken as injunctive of materials",-this has been already answered (under sūtras 1, 2 and 3).

[In answer to the Siddhānta argument that Agni having been already enjoined by another text as the deity of the Darvihoma, there would be a superfluity if the term 'agnihotra' also were taken as injunctive of the same] the Pūrvapakṣin says that—"the injunction of Agni over again as the deity of Darvihoma would serve the useful purpose of precluding the possibility of Prajāpati being regarded as the deity of that offering."

Our answer to this is that that cannot be; the text in question ('Agmi-hotram juhuyāt') is capable of enjoining Agni, it is not capable of precluding Prajāpati; specially as if Prajāpati were precluded, then the enjoining of that Deity (by another text) would be entirely futile,—when Prajāpati is understood (from a certain text) to be the deity (of a certain offering); and what is so understood cannot be regarded as false (or wrong, which is what the alleged precluding would mean). Hence what the Pūrvapākṣin says does not meet our argument at all.

(The Pürvapaksin next urges an objection against the Siddhānta view regarding the term 'āghāra' being the name of an actj—"(a) The sentence 'āghāramāghārayati' is the injunction of a material;—(b) according to the rule 'Yaistu dravyam chikirṣyatē, etc.,' (Sū. 2. 1. 8), an act which tends to bring about a material is an Accessory;—(c) by the act of Pouring herein enjoined, the material $(\bar{A}gh\bar{a}ra)$ is brought about;—(d) being thus poured out, the said material accomplishes the sacrifice;—such being the case, what is that principal act of which ' $\bar{A}gh\bar{a}ra$ ' would be the name [the Pouring out having been found to be only an Auxiliary or Accessory]. ?"

Answer: -This 'agharana', Pouring out, itself is the principal act.

Objection:—"But there is neither a material nor a deity for any such act (and in connection with every Principal Act, there should be a material and a Deity)."

Answer:—We say that there are both; from the text 'Tasyāghāra-māghāryā', it is clear that Clarified Butter is the material used at the offering; and the Deity is indicated by the words of the Mantra 'Indra urdhwoddhara—ityāghāramāghāryatē' (cf. Shata. Brā. 1. 5. 1. 4; Taitti. Brā. 3. 3. 7. 7; for Mantra. See Mādh. Sam. 2. 8 and Taittirīya-Sashhitā 1. 1. 12);—a mantra which speaks of an act, or of the means of accomplishing the act,

becomes an integral part of that act;—and the mantra just quoted is found capable of speaking of the deity Indra;—so that, if this Indra were a means of accomplishing that act (of pouring out), the said mantra could be used in that act of Pouring out; and this Indra being the required deity [and Clarified Butter the required material], the act of Pouring Out is one with a definite deity and a definite material; hence it is an act of 'sacrifice'; and it is of this sacrifice that 'Aphāra' is the name.

Adhikarana (4): Words like 'Shyēna' are names of Sacrifices: Tadvyapadeshanyāya.

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHANTA]—THAT ALSO (SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE NAME OF AN ACTION) WHICH IS SPOKEN OF (AS SIMILAR TO SOMETHING WELL-KNOWN).

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[Adhikaraṇa (1) has dealt with words like 'udbhid', which are taken in their etymological sense both in the Pūrvaṇakṣa and the Sūdāhānta; in the case of the word 'Shipha' dealt with in the present Adhikaraṇa, in the Sādāhānta view it would have to be taken in its etymological sense, while in the Pūrvaṇakṣa, it is taken in its ordinary popular sense.—Then again, Adhikaraṇa (2) has dealt with those words which, though being taken directly as injunctive of accessories, give rise, if so taken, to unnecessary syntactical splits: while the present Adhikaraṇa takes up the case of those words whose direct signification points to things that can be used as materials for offering, etc., and which, when taken in this sense, do not occasion any syntactical split.]

We meet with such Vedic texts as—(a) 'Athaisa shyenēnābhicharan yajēta, (see Ṣaḍviṁsha-Brā. 3. 8. 1), (b) 'Athaisa sandaṁshenābhicharan yajēta', (c) 'Athaisa gavābhicharan yajēta'—The question that arises in connection with these is—are the words (a) 'shyena', (b) 'sandaṁsha' and 'yauḥ' injunctive of accessories or names of acts?

The Pūruapakṣa, as in the case of the word 'udbhid', is based upon the well-known meanings of the words; the only difference between the two cases being, that while the word 'udbhid' (being derived from a verbal root and hence) expressive of actions, is capable of indicating the sacrifice, the words being considered now are nouns expressive of classes and hence unable to indicate the sacrifice. The Pūrvapakṣa view is that words like 'Shyēna' are injunctive of accessories.

The Siddhānta, in answer to this Pūrvapakṣa is as follows:—That also should be taken as the name of an action which is spoken of as similar to something well-known;—i.e. that which is spoken of as similar to the well-known, (a) bird, kite [(b) pincers and (c) cow] is the name of an action; because in support of its being a name, we have the direct assertion (of the Shruti text which speaks of the act as similar to the Kite), while it is only through indirect indication that it could be taken as injunctive of accessories.—As for the argument that "these words are common nouns (expressive of classes) and cannot indicate the sacrifice",—they can certainly indicate the sacrifice through the mention of similarity (in Vedic texts); for instance, we find the similarity mentioned in the text—' Just as the kite falls upon and seize its prey, in the same manner does one fall upon and seize his enemy against whom one sacrifices with the Shyēna' (Ṣadvimsha-Brā. 3. 8. 3);

which shows that through the similarity of the act of 'falling upon and seizing', the term 'shyāna' becomes applicable to the sacrifice; just as the term 'lion' becomes applicable to Devadata (through the similarity of such qualities as courage, nobility and so forth).—Hence the term 'shyāna' should be taken as the name of a sacrifice.—(b) In regard to the 'sandamsha' also, there is the similarity expressed in the words 'Just as by means of the pincer one picks up something that cannot be picked up, etc.';—and (e) in regard to the 'go' the similarity is 'just as the cow preserves, etc.' Hence the terms 'sandamsha' and 'go' also should be taken as names of sacrifices.

Adhikarana (5): Words like 'vājapēya' are names of sacrifices.

SŪTRA (6).

[Pürvapakṣa]—" In the case of (what appears to be) a Name,—
Inasmuch as there is direct mention of an accessory,
It should be taken as an Injunction (of that accessory)",—If this is urged (then the answer
Is as follows in the next sütra).

Bhāsya.

[What is said in this Adhikarana applies to all those cases where words appear to be names of sacrifices; hence it is applicable also to the case of 'udbhid' and other words already dealt with. And yet the $Bh\bar{a}eya$ has cited in particular the case of the term ' $v\bar{a}jap\bar{e}ya$ ' only with a view to discuss and ascertain the exact meaning of the text ' $V\bar{a}jap\bar{e}y\bar{e}na$ sv $\bar{a}rajyak\bar{a}mo$ $yaj\bar{e}ta$ ',—and also because in regard to this term and passage, there is available the additional argument set forth under $S\bar{u}tra$ 7.]

We find the text—' Vājapēyēna svārajyakāmo yajeta' (see Taitti. Brā. 1. 3-6. 9). In regard to the term 'vājapēya', there arises the question as to its being injunctive of an accessory or a Name.

Says the Pārvapakṣin—"If such is the question, then there can be no question or doubt at all on the point, since it is clearly seen that it is injunctive of an accessory; as a matter of fact we find an accessory directly mentioned [in the word 'vājapeja', which means 'that at which vāja is peja', where the material vāja, food-grains, is distinctly mentioned]; and when that accessory is duly recognised, it cannot be said that it is not (expressed) there.—Hence the name 'vājapēya' must be taken as injunctive of an accessory."

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS TWO ACTIONS WOULD BECOME IDENTICAL.

Bhāsya.

What has been asserted in the Pūrwapakṣa cannot be right; as, in that case, the two acts—of Vājapēya and of Darshapūrnamāsa—would become identical; as both would have exactly the same detailed procedure as that which has been laid down in connection with the Darshapūrnamāsa; and the result of this would be that the Dīkṣās and the Upasads would disappear from the Vājapeya, in connection with which they have been specially prescribed in such texts as—'In the Vājapēya there are seventeen Dīkṣās', 'In the Vājapēya, there are seventeen Upasads'.

Or, the meaning of the Sūtra may be that if the word 'Vājapēya' were

injunctive of an accessory, then the $V\bar{a}jap\bar{v}ya$ sacrifice would be identical with the Jyotistoma sacrifice,—thus alone would the presence of the $D\bar{\imath}ks\bar{a}s$ and the Upasads be possible.

From all this it follows that the term ' $V\bar{a}jap\bar{e}ya$ ' is the name of a sacrifice.

[If the word ' $V\bar{a}jap\bar{s}ya$ ' signified and enjoined a material; the only material it could signify would be the $V\bar{a}ja$ which is a preparation of flour, sugar and some other ingredients; and the sacrifice at which such a material would be used would become an Ieti, as at an Ieti alone is a food-grain-offering made; and as the archetype of all Ietis is the $Darshapirnam\bar{a}sa$, it would be the procedure of this latter that would be adopted at the sacrifice at which $V\bar{s}ja$ would be offered; whereas as a matter of fact, the procedure actually followed at the $V\bar{s}jap\bar{s}ya$ sacrifice is that of the Jyotietoma sucrifice, as is clear from the fact that the $Dik\bar{c}\bar{s}s$ and Upasads have been specially enjoined for the $V\bar{s}jap\bar{s}ya$ and those $Dik\bar{c}\bar{s}s$ and Upasads form part of the procedure of the Jyotietoma, not of the $Darshap\bar{u}rnam\bar{s}sa-Tantrav\bar{u}rtika$.]

What we have said so far in answer to the Pūrvapakṣa is only an (inferential) argument against it; the real Siddhānta position is as set forth in the following Sūtra.

SŪTRA (8).

A SINGLE WORD WOULD HAVE (ITS OWN AS WELL AS) AN EXTRA-NEOUS SIGNIFICATION.

Bhāsya.

If the word 'vājapēya' were injunctive of an accessory, then the single word 'yajāta' would have its own as well as an extraneous signification; and this would be an incongruity. That is to say, the intrinsic signification of the text '(vājapēyena) svārājyakāmo yajāta' is that it enjoins a sacrifice for the person desiring 'world-wide sovereignty'—[the term 'svārājya' has this technical signification attached to it in Aita. Brā. 8. 14]—and that being so, the same word 'yajāta' could not have the extraneous signification whereby it could be only referring to the sacrifice for the purpose of connecting it with the material 'vājapeya',—the meaning of the sentence, in the latter case, being 'by means of the sacrifice at which Vājapeya is used as the material'. If the words were to have those two (mutually incompatible) significations, there would be a syntactical split.

Says the Opponent:—"In the text in question, we distinctly perceive two separate sentences—the first sentence consisting of two words is—"svārā-jyakāmo yajēta" ('one desiring world-wide sovereignty should sacrifice'), and the second sentence equally distinctly perceptible is "yajēta vājapēyēna" ('should sacrifice with the Vājapēya') [and as there are two distinct sentences, this cannot be regarded as a case of symtactical sphil.')

This is not so, we reply. If there were two distinct sentences, as first mentioned, then there would be four words in the sentence, while in reality we find only three words.

"Our explanation is that the word 'yajēta' could be construed with both the words ('svārājyakāmaḥ' and 'vājapēyēna') separately."

How can the word occurring once only be construed with both the words?
"That would be possible because the form of the word remains the same

in both cases; its form when construed with 'svārājyakāmaḥ' is precisely the same as that in which it is construed with 'uɔjapēyēna'; and hence it would be construed with both the words by what is technically known as 'simultaneous relationship'."

That cannot be; if the exact nature of the act expressed by the word 'yajēta' is not known already, then alone can the word be an injunction of it (as in 'svārājyakāmo yajēta'); and if that exact nature is known already, then the word could be only a reference to that act (as 'yad yajēta tad vājapēyēna'); but it is not possible for the same act (sacrifice) to be known as well as not known at one and the same time [and this is what it would be if the sentence 'vājapēyēna svārājyakāmo yajēta' were construed as suggested by the Pūrnapaksin.].

Says the Opponent—"It has been argued by the Siddhāntin that 'if the word vājapēyēna were injunctive of an accessory, the word yajēta would contain a mere reference to the sacrifice already enjoined elsewhere'.—But if the word 'yajēta' contained a mere reference, which word would be there that would enjoin the accessory? [There is no other injunctive verb in the sentence].—Do not say please that the accessory (Material) would be enjoined by the word 'vājapēyēna'; because unless there is a verb, there can be no injunction of something to be done as expressed by a word. The only verb in the sentence is 'yajēta' and it has been declared (by the Siddhāntin) to be a mere reference (to a previously enjoined sacrifice); which word then is there that would enjoin the act spoken of by that word (yajēta')? Hence it follows that 'yajēta' is an Injunction that goes with 'the man desiring world-wide sovereignty' (svārājyakāmaḥ), as well as with the accessory, Vājapēya; and in this manner 'yajēta' could be construed with both the words."

If there are two independent injunctions (one to the effect that 'one desiring world-wide sovereignty should sacrifice' and 'one should offer the sacrifice with the material vājapeya'), then there would be no connection between the Vājapeya and the sacrifice performed by the man desiring world-wide sovereignty; and according to the explanation suggested by the Pūrvapakṣin, there would be no separate sentences; and therefore the sacrifice performed by the man desiring sovereignty could not be syntactically connected with the injunction of the accessory (Vājapēya).

"But the connection of the sacrifice performed by the man desiring world-wide sovereignty (with the injunction of the accessory) would be got at through the force of the Context (i.e. though the fact of the two injunctions occurring in the same context)."

That is not right; as all that the syntactical connection (of the sentence 'vājapēyāna yajēta') does is to enjoin the material, vājapēya, in reference to the sacrifice only (without any reference to the desire for world-wide sovereignty).

"All right, let there be connection (of the material, $V\bar{a}jap\bar{e}ya$) with the sacrifice only."

[But that would not be correct, as] in reality the connection between the material Vājapēya and the sacrifice performed by one desiring world-wide sovereignty is also implied by the two sentences being construed together.

From all this we conclude that if the term ' $v\bar{a}jap\bar{e}ya$ ' is the name of a sacrifice, then we can safely discard both Context and Syntactical Connection. [i.e. if ' $v\bar{a}jap\bar{e}ya$ ' is the name of the sacrifice, then, even without calling in the aid of Context and Syntactical Connection, we could have all that we desire in the shape of the notion that 'The man desiring world-wide sovereignty should accomplish his purpose by means of the sacrifice named $V\bar{a}jap\bar{e}ya$.)—If on the other hand, the term ' $v\bar{a}jap\bar{e}ya$ ' is taken as injunctive of an accessory, then there crop up all those incongruities of Syntactical split and the rest.

Thus it is established that the term ' $v\bar{a}jap\bar{e}ya$ ' is the name of a sacrificial act.

Adhikarana (6): Words like 'āgnēya' are not names of sacrifices.

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—THE ACTION AS WELL AS ITS ACCESSORIES SHOULD BE (TAKEN AS) ENJOINED:—AS THEY ARE NOT DIVORCED IN THE INJUNCTIVE WORD;—SPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ALREADY ENJOINED BY ANOTHER (TEXT).

 $Bh\bar{a}sya$.

[The general character and functions of Names have been discussed so far; with the present Sūtru begins the consideration of certain exceptions to the general principles set forth above.]

We meet with such texts as—'Xadājnēyo'sļākapālo'māvāsyāyām paurnamāsyānchāchyuto bhavati' (Taitītīrya-Samhitā 2. 6. 3. 3).—In regard to the term 'āgnēya' here, there arises the question—Are words like 'āgnēya', 'agnīsomīya' and the rest injunctive of accessories or names of actions?

On this question, the $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$ view is that—"If the word ' $\bar{a}gn\bar{e}ya$ ' were injunctive of accessories, then it would have to be taken as enjoining more than one accessory,—such as Agni, the Cake and the $Eight\ Pans$ (which would not be right); hence such words should not be taken as injunctive of accessories".

In answer to this Pārvapaksa, we have the following Siddhānta:—The action, as also its accessories, should be taken as enjoined (by the word),—as they are not divorced in the injunctive word;—i.e. in the word 'āgnēya', which ends with the nominal affix 'āhak'. In fact, what is enjoined is the fact of the cake baked on eight pans being 'āgnēya'; and it becomes 'āgnēya' only when it is dedicated and offered to Agni; and thus in this manner, the act of offering (sacrifice) also becomes enjoined by the word;—when this act of offering is enjoined, it cannot be enjoined without Agni and the Cake baked on eight Pans also being enjoined; because when a relationship is enjoined, it cannot be said to be 'enjoined' unless it enjoins the relatives themselves. Hence words like 'āgnēya' must be injunctive of accessories.

As regards the term 'aṣṭākapāla', it is a well-known fact that it is the cake made up of vrihi or ywwa when baked on eight pans, that becomes 'aṣṭākapāla';—consequently it is to be taken as mentioned here only by way of reference; because what is spoken of by the word is the well-accomplished entity, 'cake baked on eight pans', which has been already enjoined in such texts as 'cooks upon pans' (Taitti.-Sam. 2. 3. 6. 2); whereby they do not use a cake prepared in any other manner; so that this interpretation does not involve any syntactical split.

'If they have not been already enjoined by another text' (Sū.); that is to say, in a case where the accessories in question have been already enjoined by another text, the word in question has to be taken as a name, as we have found in the case of the text 'agnihotrahjuhoti' (under Sū. 4, above).

Adhikarana (7): Words like 'varhih' denote the common things.

SŪTRA (10).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THE TERMS 'VARHIḤ' AND 'ĀJYA' ARE FOUND TO BE APPLIED EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN NO CONSECRATION, THEY CANNOT BE TAKEN AS SIGNIFYING ONLY CONSECRATED THINGS.

Bhāsua.

[In connection with Names, we proceed to consider the exact signification of the names of certain substances.]

In regard to such names of substances as 'warhih' (grass), 'ājya' (clarified butter) and 'puroḍāsha' (cake),—there arises the question—Are these expressive of consecrated things only? or of common things?

On this question, the Pūrvapaksa view is as follows—"They are words expressive of the consecrated things; in all cases, we find people using the term 'varhis' in the sense of consecrated grass, not to the unconsecrated common grass :- similarly they use the term 'ajya' only in the sense of consecrated clarified butter; -and they use the term 'purodasha' only in the sense of the consecrated flour-cake .- But in some places, the terms are applied to unconsecrated things also; e.g. we find people saying-The cows have run away after having eaten varhis (grass); -similarly they speak of the Ajya as to be purchased; -and also of my mother giving me sweets made of Puradasha'.-But all such use is due to similarity (between the consecrated and the unconsecrated article); just as the term 'yūpa' is sometimes applied to the unplaned log of wood.- But why should this usage be regarded as secondary or figurative (based upon similarity)?'-Because such usage is found only in a few places [and not in all places; and it is only universal usage that counts as direct or primary signification].-From all this it follows that the words in question are expressive of consecrated things only."

In answer to the above Pārvapākṣā we have the following Sīddhānta:—Inasmuch as words like 'vārhis' are found to be applied to the unconsecrated things also, they cannot be taken as expressive of the consecrated things only.—"It has already been pointed out that such use is only local, and it is based upon similarity."—But that is not right; if it were generally recognised that the term denotes the consecrated thing only,—then alone could it be said that when the term is applied to the unconsecrated thing, it is only through similarity. In reality, however, the said fact is not invariably recognised.—"How so?"—Because we find certain consecrations prescribed for things spoken of by such names as 'varhis' and the like;—this shows that the consecrations are to come when the words are there already (to express the things themselves); under the circumstances, if the

words were taken to be applicable only when the consecrations were there.there would be an objectionable interdependence (consecration depending upon the use of the word, and the use of the word depending upon the consecration). Nor is it possible to have any consecrations that have not been prescribed (by words); so that the use of the words by people could not be based upon such (unprescribed) consecrations.—It is for this reason that people do not apply words like 'varhis' to the consecrated things only. And when we find the words being applied to common (unconsecrated) things in one place, it is natural that they should denote the same in all places. Even when we have a number of words expressive of super-physical things. (like consecration, for instance), it is not possible for us to attribute to such words significations assumed entirely upon the basis of the Veda. without paying any heed to the signification of the ordinary words that precede and follow the aforesaid words (denoting super-physical things); for in reality the only justification for the assuming of a super-physical signification for those words lies in the fact that, in the absence of such assumption. the ordinary words (with well-known meanings) occurring in the same sentence-either before or after the words whose meanings are to be assumed -would become meaningless; -and it is not possible to assume what is not known; as a matter of fact, the ordinary words that precede and follow (the words in question) would thus have their use in their being applied to unconsecrated things.-Hence the conclusion is that all such words are expressive of common (unconsecrated) things.

The purpose served by this discussion is that when we have the direction that 'the pit of the sacrificial post is to be covered over with grass',—it would have to be covered with consecrated grass if the Pūrvapakṣa view were correct, but with common (unconsecrated) grass, if the Siddhūnta is the correct view.

ADHIKARANA (8): Words like 'Prokṣaṇī' are to be taken in their etymological signification.

SŪTRA (11).

Inasmuch as, in the case of such words as 'prokṣaṇi'.

The etymological signification is applicable [the

Word is to be taken as used in its

Etymological sense].

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[The foregoing Adhikarana has dealt with the question of certain words being expressive of common things or of consecrated things, and it was found that they were expressive of common things,—and in both cases the words were used in the ordinary conventional, not the etymological, sense. The present Adhikarana proceeds to deal with words that are found to be taken in their etymological sense.]

We meet with the text 'Prokṣaṇirāṣādaya' (Taittirīya Brā. 3. 2. 9. 14). In regard to the term 'prokṣaṇi' there arises the question—Does it denote consecrated water or common water? Or is it to be taken in its etymological sense (of 'sprinkling fluid')?

On this question, the Pāranpakṣa is as follows—"It being understood that a word can be regarded as expressive of the consecrated thing only if it is found that it is always applied to the consecrated thing,—inasmuch as in the case of the word 'prokṣaṇi', it is found that it is used in the sense of the unconsecrated thing, it is taken as denoting the common thing; specially as in some places we find people making use of such expressions as 'we are very much disturbed by the Prokṣaṇi (water-splashing)', where the term is used in the sense of the unconsecrated (common) water. From all this it follows that the word denotes the common vater. [This conclusion is in accordance with the principle of the foregoing to Adhikarana.]"

In answer to this Pūrvapaksa, we have the following Siddhānta:-The word is to be taken in its etymological sense; -why? -Because the etymological signification is applicable; that is to say, from actual usage we deduce the fact that the prefix (Pra), the verbal root ('uksa' to sprinkle) and the affix (active 'lyut'), that go to constitute the term 'proksani', is expressive of the common thing (sprinkling fluid in general); -but if the wordconsisting as it does of the particular Prefix, Root, and Affix,-is applied to water. on account of its connection with the act of sprinkling, -- then the universally recognised meaning of the word becomes accepted (and this entirely on the basis of the etymology of the word). Inasmuch as we find other sprinkling substances also spoken of as 'proksana', -on the ground of their connection with the act of sprinkling,-it may be concluded that to water also the term is applied on the same ground of its connection with the act of sprinkling: so that there is no occasion for assuming any conventional meaning for the word as a whole (independently of its etymology): and the conclusion is that the word is to be taken in its etymological sense.

The purpose served by the Adhikarana is that the term 'prokṣaṇa' becomes applicable to clarified butter also; (a) If the term 'prokṣaṇā' were expressive of the consecrated substance, then the form of the direction would be, in every case, 'Prokṣaṇī'nṣāādaya';—(b) if it were expressive of the common water only, then (in the case of clarified butter being used) the form of the direction would have to be 'ghṛtam āṣādaya' (the denotation of 'prokṣaṇī' being restricted to water);—(c) lastly, if the term is to be taken in its etymological sense, then the form of the direction would be 'prokṣaṇam āṣādaya'. [In the case of clarified butter being used, as 'ghṛtam' being a word of the neuter gender, the gender of 'prokṣaṇa' would have to be neuter; in the case of water, the same term would take the form prokṣaṇih' in keeping with the feminine gender of 'āpah', water].

ADHIKARANA (9): The word 'nirmanthya' is to be taken in its etymological sense.

SÜTRA (12).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—So ALSO IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'NIRMANTHYA'

Bhāsya.

We have the text 'Nirmanthyēna iṣtakāḥ pachanti' ['they bake the bricks in Nirmanthya (Fire)] '—[and in regard to the term 'nirmanthya' there arises the question—Is it to be taken as expressive of the consecrated Fire? or is to be taken in its etymological sense (of fire produced by friction)?].

The Pūrvapakṣa on this question is that "in the text quoted, it is clear that the term 'nirmanthya' has been used in the sense of the consecruted fire; hence the conclusion is that the term 'nirmanthya' is expressive of the consecruted Fire only".

In answer to this we have the following Siddhānta:—As a matter of fact, we find the term used in the sense of unconsecrated fire also, in such expressions as 'Bring nirmanthya, we shall cook rice' (where the word must stand for the ordinary Fire). From this it becomes established that like the term 'proksanī', the term 'nirmanthya' is to be taken in its etymological sense.

The purpose served by the Adhikarana is that—(a) if the word denoted consecrated fire, then the Bricks would have to be baked in consecrated fire only:—(b) if it denoted Fire in general, then they could be baked in fire kindled in any way available; (c) if it is to be taken in its etymological sense, then the bricks have to be baked in fire recently kindled by friction; just as when one is spoken of as 'eating with navanita (Butter),' the sense is that the Butter meant is one that has been freshly prepared (nava, fresh nita, prepared).

ADHIKARANA (10): Words like 'Vaish vadēva' are Names.

SÜTRA (13).

|PURVAPAKSA]-"IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'Vaishvadeva' THERE IS OPTION" .-- IF THIS IS URGED THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE NEXT SUTRA].

Bhāsua.

[The case of the term 'vaishvadeva' differs from that of all others that have been dealt with :- For instance, (a) if it is taken as laying down the deity, we find that sense following directly from the word, without recourse to any indirect indication, as was found necessary in the case of the term 'udbhida ;-(b) it does not enjoin any accessories and hence causes no syntactical split, -as the word 'chitra' does;-(c) there is no ambiguity in the meaning of the term as pointing to the Deity, -as was found in the case of the word 'agnihotra'; -(d) the term 'vaishvadēva' does not point to any particular sacrifice, like the term 'shyēna'; (e) there being no mention of any result in this case, there could be no difficulty in regard to the construing of the verb 'yajēta', as we found in the case of the 'Vājapēya'].

In connection with the first part of the Chāturmāsua sacrifice, we have the text 'Vaishvadēvēna yajēta' (Maitrā. Sam. 1. 10.8; Taitti, Brā. 1.4, 10.1; Shata. Brā. 5. 2. 4. 1); and in regard to the term 'vaishvadēva', there arises the question-Does it enjoin an accessory? or is it the Name of an action?

On this question we have the following Pūrvanaksa-"If that is the question, then no such question can arise, because in the case of the term 'vaishvēdeva' there is option; that is, the term 'vaishvadēva' is injunctive of an accessory, because we actually find in it the injunction of the accessory—in the shape of the Vishvēdēvas as the deity of the Agnēya and other sacrifices; and as, for these sacrifices there are other deities in the shape of Agni and the rest (already indicated by other sources), these latter, Agni and the rest, are regarded as optional alternatives to the Vishvēdēvas (i.e. it is open to the performer to make the offerings to Agni and the rest or to the Vishvēdēvas); as it is only thus that the well-recognised meaning of the term would be followed, so that the conclusion is that the term 'vaishvadeva' is injunctive of an accessory]."

SÜTRA (14).

[SIDDHANTA]-NOT SO; BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT [BEING THE SOLE AUTHORITY FOR REGARDING THE WORD AS POINTING OUT THE DEITY],-WHILE THERE IS A DIRECT INJUNCTION [OF ANOTHER DEITY]; AND CERTAINLY THE CONTEXT CANNOT SET ASIDE THE THING [LAID DOWN BY DIRECT INJUNCTION .

Bhāsya.

What the Pūrvapaksa has declared is not possible; for the sacrifices in question, Agni and others have been enjoined as Deities by direct Vedic Injunction; while the indication of the Vishvēdēvas could be got at only by Syntactical Connection, and through that, by Context. [The Tantravartika, Trans., pp. 425-426, explains this passage as follows: - The process of connecting the Vishvēdēvas with any particular sacrificial material would be a highly complicated one; we shall have to assume a word signifying the connection of the deity Vishvedevas with a certain material that will have to be taken as indirectly indicated by the verb 'yajēta'; all that we can say is (a) that the co-ordination of the term 'vaishvadēvēna' with the term 'yagēna' (as implied in the word 'yajēta') points to the syntactical connection-Bu means of the sacrifice which is vaishvadēva,-i.e. has Vishvēdēva for its deity, etc., etc.',-and (b) that as there can be no sacrifice without a material, the only material that could be connected with the Vishvēdēvas would be just that which is indicated by the requirements of the sacrifice. But the said syntactical connection indicates only the relationship of the sacrifice with the Deity; so that the relationship of the material with the Deity (Vishvēdēva) could be assumed only by means of the exigencies of the Context, and such an assumption could be only in this form-'when offering the Agneya sacrifice, one should offer it as a sacrifice of which the Vishvedēvas are the deity'. —Thus then Vishvēdēvas as the deity being pointed out by a means which is not equal in authority (to the Direct Injunction pointing out Agni and other deities), the former cannot be accepted as an optional alternative to these latter; and this for the simple reason that the Context can never aside the thing (i.e. the Deity) that is directly enjoined .- Hence it follows that the term 'vaishvadeva' is the name of a sacrifice.

SŪTRA (15).

THERE CAN BE NO MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The Opponent might urge the following:—"The term 'vaishvadēva' directly indicates the group of sacrifices of which Agni and others are accessories (i.e. Deities),—on the ground that the material used at these latter is the vaishvadēvi āmikṣā (the Āmikṣā delicated to the Viṣhvēdēvaṣ)."

But if the term 'vaishvadēva' indicates the group of sacrifices, then it cannot enjoin the Vishvēdēva as the deity;—for how could the word 'vaishvadēva' pronounced once only indicate the group of sacrifices and also enjoin the Vishvēdēvas as the deity? Consequently, it is not possible to connect the term 'vaishvadēva' with the Vishvēdēvas. Hence the term must be taken as a Name, and not as injunctive of an accessory.

SŪTRA (16).

BECAUSE ACCESSORIES ARE SUBSERVIENT TO OTHERS (AND OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE).

Bhāsya.

Further, accessories are only subservient to other things; hence they cannot justify the repetition of the principal factor (Act of offering);

hence (according to the Pūrvapakṣa view, by which the term 'vaishvadēva' lays down the common deity for the offering of all materials), the right course to adopt would be to make a single offering (consisting all the various materials āmikṣa, vājina and so forth), and we should not repeat the act of offering in accordance with the number of materials;—there would be no incongruity in this joint offering as the deity for all is one and the same (i.e. Vishvēdēva). The result of this would be that all the thirty libations (that have been laid down as to be offered) would be offered (as included) in the single Principal Libation, and thus there would be no completion of the number 'thirty' in regard to the offerings into the Āhavaniya Fire. [This being the inevitable result of taking the term 'vaishvadēva' as injunctive of an accessory'] it becomes established that the term is the Name of a sacrifice.

ADHIKABANA (11): In connection with the Vaishvānara, the mention of the number 'eight' is only an Arthavāda.

SŪTRA (17).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"IT IS ONLY WORDS EXPRESSIVE OF WHAT IS AL-READY KNOWN THAT CANNOT BE TAKEN AS INJUNCTIONS; IN THE TEXT IN QUESTION THE CAPACITY TO BE TAKEN AS AN INJUNCTION IS THERE".

Bhāsya.

[Hitherto we have been considering the question as to certain words being names of sacrifices or injunctive of accessories. We are now going to consider the question as to whether or not certain words are injunctive of accessories, without considering whether or not they are names of sacrifices.]

We meet with the text 'Vaishvānaram dvīdaslakapīdam nirvapēt putrē jūtē' ['On the birth of a son one should offer the Vaishvānara cake baked on twelve pans'] (Taiti Sainhitā 2. 2. 5. 3; also Vājasa. Sain. 29. 60);—in connection with this same offering we find laid down several alternatives regarding the number of Pans to be used—'Yadaṣjākapālo bhavati qāyatryavain inam brahmavarchasēna punāti' ['If the Cake is baked on eight pans, Gāyatrī herself sanctifies him with Brahmic glory'] and so forth.—In regard to these latter, there arises the question—Is the mention of 'eight' and other numbers injunctive of accessories, or only Arthavāda (commendatory declaration)?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapaksa:—"All these are injunctive of accessories;—why?—because only those words that are expressive of what is already known—i.e. which speak of things already known—cannot be taken as injunctions; but the sentence in question has this capacity that it speaks of things not already enjoined;—what is that capacity?—it is the capacity of enjoining things; i.e. it will be able to enjoin something not already enjoined; otherwise all such texts would be merely Arthavāda, declamatory, and as such, serving no useful purpose. Nor can the number 'eight' be taken as already included in the number 'twelve' (mentioned in the first sentence) [and hence not needed to be enjoined again]; because the commendation of the 'eight pans' is found in a clear direct assertion of the Veda ('yadaştākapālo bhavati, etc.'), while the commendation of the 'twelve pans' can be only indirect; and the indirect can be accepted only in the absence of the direct.—From all this it follows that the numbers are injunctive of accessories."

SŪTRA (18).

[SIDDHANTA]—IF THE WORDS ENJOINED ACCESSORIES, THESE ACCESSORIES, NOT BELONGING TO THE SACRIFICE, WOULD BE USELESS IN ITS ACTUAL PERFORMANCE; AS THEY COULD NOT SERVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE WITH REGARD TO IT.

Bhāsya.

It is not right that the words in question should be taken as injunctive of accessories. If they were injunctive of accessories, all they could do would be to lay down a particular number in regard to the pans on which the cakes would be baked; and they could not enjoin anything in regard to the actual performance of the sacrifice. The connection of the number 'twelve' with the sacrifice is indicated by the syntactical connection (of the sentence · Vaishvānaram dvādashakapālam, etc.'), while that of the other numbers, 'eight' and the rest could, at best, be indicated only by Context; consequently these latter could not enter into the sacrificial performance at all. Further, these other numbers, 'eight' and the rest, having become connected with the Cakes, by direct syntactical connection, would naturally set aside the indication of the Context, and the indication of the Context being set aside, the said numbers could not become connected with the Vaishvanara sacrifice (for connection wherewith, the said Context would be the sole authority, and that has been set aside);—and not being connected with the sacrifice, they would be useless; as no results could follow from their connection with the Cakes only.—On the other hand, if the words are taken as Arthavada, it is possible for them to be taken as commendatory of the Vaishvānara sacrifice. Hence they should be taken as Arthavada.

SŪTRA (19).

Objection: "It is not possible for the numbers 'eight' and the rest to be supplementary to the Injunction (of the Vaishvänara)"

Bhāsya.

This objection has been urged by the Pūrvapakṣin and has to be refuted. This sūtra ends with the mere statement of the objection. ["The Injunction lays down baking on twelve pans; while the words in question speak of eight pans only. How then can the latter be supplementary to the former? And if it cannot be so supplementary, then it cannot be an Arthavāda commending what has been laid down in the Injunction."]

SŪTRA (20).

[Answer]—Inasmuch as [the smaller number] is not excluded [from the greater number], it is quite possible for the words in question to serve the purpose of commending what has been enjoined.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

When it is clearly understood that any commending of the 'eight pans', etc., is useless (for the simple reason that these numbers, 'eight' and the rest, have not been enjoined, and it is only the commendation of what has been enjoined that can serve the useful purpose of prompting men to the enjoined act), then the words in question must be taken as indirectly eulogising 'the cake baked on twelve pans', and thereby serving to commend the 'Vaishvānara's sacrifice (at which the cake baked on twelve pans is used); and this indirect eulogising would be done through the fact that the numbers 'eight' and the rest are included in, 'not excluded from', the number 'twelve'; and hence the eulogy of the part (eight) could very well serve as the eulogy of the whole (twelve):—just as in praising the wheel, we praise its parts—'How beautiful are its felly and nave!'—or as in praising the army we praise its parts—'How beautiful are the elephants, horses, chariots and infantry in this army!'—Thus it is quite possible for the words in question to be taken as commendatory declarations.

SŪTRA (21).

[Objection]—"It might be the instigating motive",—if this is urged, [then the answer is as given in the following

SŪTRA. j

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

You (Pūrvapaksin) may argue as follows—"The texts in question are regarded (by the Siddhantin) to be Arthavada (commendatory of the Vaishvanara); but why cannot the Brahmic glory and other desirable things (mentioned in the text in question) serve as the prompting motive for adopting the other numbers 'eight' and the rest? The meaning would be that if the sacrificer desires Brahmic glory, he should bake the cake on eight pans, and so on; the same may be said in regard to the other desirable results that are mentioned in connection with the other numbers; ['Vigour' resulting from nine, 'Food' resulting from ten, efficient sense-organs resulting from eleven, 'cattle' resulting from twelve] .- What would be the advantage of taking the texts in this manner?-The advantage would be that the enjoining of the accessory (number) of the cake would not be useless (as has been urged by the Siddhantin, under Sutra 18 above), and also there would be no need to assume the texts to be indirect commendations of the 'cake baked on twelve pans'. Hence the texts should be taken as enjoining things , (the different numbers) for the purpose of the fulfilment of certain desirable results."

SŪTRA (22).

[Answer]—They cannot be taken as instigating motives;
as in that case, they would be useless;—motives
appertain to the performer; while what is
stated in the texts is only with a view
to eulogising the sacrifice.

$Bh\tilde{a}sya$.

If the texts in question were taken as enjoining things for the fulfilment of certain desirable results, then they should be so many distinct sentences: -as a matter of fact, however, we find that the whole comprises a single sentence—beginning with the words (a) 'on the birth of a son, one should offer the Vaishvanara cake baked on twelve pans', and ending with the words—'if it is baked on twelve pans, the Jagati bestows upon him cattle. -if this sacrifice is performed on the birth of a son, that son becomes sanctified, glorious, partaker of food, endowed with efficient sense-organs and possessed of cattle' (Tai. Sam. 2. 2. 5. 3); and between these two passages in the beginning and in the end, we have the texts speaking of the 'cake baked on eight pans' and so forth; -now if these latter were not syntactically connected with opening and closing passages (quoted above), they would be so many distinct sentences.—Then again, all motives such as becoming sanctified and the like-would always appertain to the performer; while what is stated in the texts in question here regarding 'becoming sanctified' and the rest is clearly for the purpose of eulogising the Vaishvanara sacrifice; and the intervening texts speaking of the numbers 'eight' and the rest become connected with this same eulogy, as supplying so many reasons for the eulogy; -the sense of the entire passage being-'Because the Gayatri sanctifies him with Brahmic glory, therefore he becomes sanctified ;-because the Trivit bestows upon him vigour, therefore he becomes vigorous: because the Virāi bestows upon him food, therefore he becomes partaker of food: -because the Tristub bestows upon him efficient senseorgans, therefore he becomes endowed with efficient sense-organs; -- because the Jagati bestows upon him cattle, therefore he becomes rich in cattle'.

Thus then, we find that, as the texts cannot be taken as enjoining things for the accomplishment of certain desirable results,—if they were not taken even as *Arthavāda* (commendatory), they would become entirely useless.

From all this we conclude that 'Brahmic glory' and the rest cannot be taken as motives instigating the use of the numbers 'eight' and the rest. These numbers, 'eight' and the rest, therefore must be taken as purely commendatory.

Adhikarana (12): The word 'yajamāna' serves to eulogise the grass-bundle.

SŪTRA (23).

[SIDDHĀNTA]-(a) THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PURPOSE.

Bhāsya.

[In connection with Arthavādas, declaratory declarations, it is to be noted that they are helped by figurative descriptions; we now proceed to explain and exemplify the various factors that serve as the basis of these descriptions. Sūtras 23-28 enumerate six such bases for Figurative Description.]

We meet with such texts as 'Yajamānah prastarah' ('The Sacrificer is the grass-bundle') [Taittiriya Samhitā 2. 6. 5], 'Yajamana ekakapālah' ('The Sacrificer is the cake baked upon one pan') (Taītti, Brā. 1. 6. 3. 4). In regard to these there arises the question—Is the statement 'The sacrificer is the grass-bundle' injunctive of accessories or mere Arthavāda? Similarly with the other statement—'The sacrificer is the cake baked upon one pan.'

On this question, the Pūrvapakṣā is as follows:—"The statement is injunctive of an accessory.—What would be the effect of this ?—The effect would be that in this manner the statement would enjoin something not already known; otherwise, if it were taken as an Arthavāda, it would serve no useful purpose; and it is more reasonable to have the text serving a useful purpose. Hence it should be taken as an Injunction.

[In answer to this, the Siddhanta is as follows]:-It cannot be so; if the text were an Injunction, then (as a result of it) the Sacrificer would have to be used to serve the purpose that is served by the Grass-bundle, or the Grassbundle would be used to serve the purpose that is served by the Sacrificer. So that the purpose served by the Grass-bundle being that the Juhū or all the Sruks are kept upon it,—this Juhā and Sruks would be kept upon the Sacrificer (as a result of the said injunction)! Under the circumstances, the Sacrificer would be unable to perform the duties of the Sacrificer, -such duties for instance as are laid down in such texts as 'The Sacrificer and the Brahman-priest sit down to the south (right) of the rite that is being performed (i.e. the altar)'. Nor is it possible for the Grass-bundle to carry on the duties of the Sacrificer, -Similarly if the Sacrificer were employed to serve the purpose that the 'cake baked on one cake' is meant to serve,—then, he would have to be entirely offered as an oblation (as this is what is meant to be done by the said cake) :-- and when the Sacrificer will have been offered into the fire, all the rest of the Ritual would disappear.-Nor again is the cake baked on one pan capable of performing the duties of the Sacrificer .-For these reasons, the texts in question cannot be taken as Injunctions.

Then again, there is another injunction in regard to the Grass-bundle— 'He keeps the Grass-bundle upon the Barhis grass',—and also in regard to the Cake baked on one Pan—'He makes one entire oblation of the cake baked on one pan'.—For this reason also, the texts cannot be injunctions.

If the texts are taken as $Arthav\bar{u}da$, the meaning is that 'the Sacrificer is to be known as the Grass-bundle,—and also as the Cake baked on one pan'.

"But what sort of co-ordination can be recognised between the Sacrificer and the Grass-bundle or the Cake? Neither the Grass-bundle nor the Cake can be the Sacrificer; nor can the Sacrificer be the cake baked on one pan or the First Bundle of grass.—How then can a word expressive of one thing be applied to what is expressed by another word? And for what purpose should there be a description of what is already known?"

The reply to the above is as follows:—It is for the purpose of eulogising, if that which is already known is mentioned. The implication of the text 'the sacrificer is the grass-bundle' is that 'the grass-bundle is to be kept upon Barhis grass, because it is the Sacrificer (who is the most important person)';—similarly the meaning of the text 'the sacrificer is the cake baked on one pan and should be offered as a single oblation' is that 'Heaven is the Sacrificial Fire, and the Sacrificer is installed in Heaven in the same manner as the Cake is placed on the fire.'

"But how can a word expressive of one thing, be applied to a thing expressed by another word?"

It is by way of indirect or figurative description; i.e. such a description is based upon certain qualities.

"But how can a word not expressive of a quality (such as 'sacrificer,', 'grass-bundle', 'fire') denote a quality?"

It would do so by denoting its own meaning. All the words that are used in their secondary or figurative sense do not denote that sense after having entirely abandoned their own meaning; as in that case there would be an abandoning of what is well-known and an assuming of what is not known at all. Further, all such words are not expressive of a number of qualities; because we meet with figurative description even with regard to things wanting in some of the qualities. For instance, the lioness' out, struck by disease, and hence not courageous in his behaviour, (and thus devoid of many leonine qualities), is still called a 'lion'. The word that denotes a group of things is not used to denote a part of that group; if it did so, then this would be against the law that 'the word Lion is expressive of that well-recognised factor which is common to all individual lions.' Nor could the term 'lion' be applied, by an assumption, to what is not a lion; because any such assumption would be impossible.

Question:—"If figurative description were based upon the actual meaning of the words, how could there be any restriction as to the extent of such description?"

Answer:—The restriction would be due to the actual presence of (at least part of) that meaning. For instance, when the term 'lion' is applied to something else (a man for instance), what is understood is that he is a man of courageous action, and this is due to the recognition of the fact that courageous action is the quality of the lion (which is denoted by the word 'lion'). Hence it is that when a man thinks of speaking of a man of courageous action, his intention is fulfilled if he uses the term 'lion'.

for that purpose; and what happens is that the animal lion, which is denoted by the word 'lion', on being cognised, brings about the notion of 'courageous action' which is associated with that animal; and in this manner, by denoting its own meaning, the word ('lion') brings about the notion of the presence of the qualities associated with that meaning.

"Now, in the case of the Sacrificer being spoken as the 'grass-bundle', or of the Sacrificer being spoken of as 'the cake baked on one pan',—what sort of quality is recognised as present?"

The quality recognised is that of 'accomplishment of purpose' (Sūtra). Every one accomplishes his own work,—if some one else does that man's work, he is remembered whenever the other is spoken of; for instance, in the case of the King and the Keeper of the Muster-Roll, the latter does the King's work, and hence whenever the King is spoken of, the said Keeper comes to the mind as associated with him. In the same manner, in the case in question, the Grass-bundle and the Cake baked on one Pan accomplish the Sacrificer's purposes, and hence when the Sacrificer is spoken of, they also come to the mind; and thus it is that they also come to be denoted by the term 'sacrificer'—But why?—Because by being so denoted they become eulogised,—and that in reference to the placing on top (in the case of the Grassbundle) and being offered as an entire obtation (in the case of the Cake).

From all this we conclude that words and texts like those under consideration are Arthavadas, not Injunctions.

Adhikarana (13): Words like 'āgnēya' serve to eulogise the Brāhmana and others.

SÜTRA (24).

(b) BIRTH (OR ORIGIN).

 $Bh\bar{a}sya$.

We meet with such texts as 'The Brāhmana is āgnēya' (Taittirīya Brā. 2. 7. 3. 1)—'The Kṣattriya is aindra' (Taitti. Sain. 2. 4. 13)—'the Vaīshya is vaishvadēva (Taī. Brā. 2. 7. 2. 2).—In regard to these, the question is—Are these statements injunctive of accessories or arthavādas?

The Pūrvapakṣa is that "they are injunctive of accessories; as it is only thus that they would enjoin something not already known; otherwise, being mere Arthavāda, they would be useless."

The Siddhānta is as follows:—They are not injunctions, because the requisite injunctions are found elsewhere. Therefore they must be arthanāda; and the statement is for the purpose of eulogising what has been enjoined by another text.

Question:—"But in what manner would the words 'āgnēya' and the rest be applied to (the Brāhmaṇa and the rest) who are not really āgnēya, etc.?"

Answer:—They would be applicable by way of figurative description.— "What is the basis of this figurative description?"-The relationship to Fire.—"How so?" The relationship between the Agneya and the Brahmana is that both have the same origin .- "In what way have they the same origin?"—This is made clear in the following passage—"Prajāpati desired to create progeny,-from out of his mouth, he created the Tryrt; after that, the deity Agni, the Gayatri metre, the Rathantara-Saman, the Brahmana among men, the Goat among animals; thus it is that these are called mukhua (Principal, literally, 'of the mouth'), as they were created out of the mouth ;-out of His chest and arms He created the Panchadasha; after that the deity Indra, the Tristup metre, the Brhat Saman, the Ksattriya among men, the Sheep among animals; thus it is that these are powerful, because they came about of Power: -out of His thighs and the waist He created the Saptadasha, and after that the deity Vishvēdēva, the Jagatī metre, the Vairūpa Sāman, the Vaishya among men, the Cows among animals". (Taittiriya Samhita 7. 1. 1. 4-5) .- In view of this statement, (of the origin of things), if any one out of any of the three groups of things happen to be spoken of, another one of the same group also comes to the mind.

For these reasons, the texts in question must be taken as Arthavāda.

ADHIKABANA (14): Words like 'y ū p a' serve the purpose of eulogising the Sacrificer.

SUTRA (25).

(c) THROUGH SIMILARITY OF SHAPE.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

We meet with such texts as 'The sacrificer is the sacrificial post', 'Aditya is the sacrificial post' (Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa 2. 1. 5. 2). The question is—Is this injunctive of accessories or an Arthavāda?

The Pūrvapakṣa is that "it is injunctive of accessories, as it is only thus that it serves a useful purpose."

The Stddhanta is as follows—It cannot be an injunction, (a) because the Sacrificer cannot do the work of the Post, nor can the Post do the work of the Sacrificer; and (b) because we have other Injunctions.—Hence the text must be taken as an arthavada serving the purpose of eulogising what has been enjoined. The co-ordination (between the Sacrificer and the Post) is got at through figurative description—"What is the quality on the basis of which you have this figurative description?"—It is the similarity of shape (Sūtra)—"what is the similarity of shape ?"—Tallness and Brightness.

From all this it follows that texts like those under consideration are Arthavadas.

ADHIKABANA (15): Words like 'Apashu' (Not-animal) serve the purpose of eulogising the Cow and other animals.

SŪTRA (26).

(d) PRAISE.

Bhāsya.

We meet with such texts as (a) 'Animals other than cows and horses are not-animals' (Taitti. Sam. 5. 2. 9. 4).—(b) 'A sacrifice without Sāman is not-sacrifice' (Taitti. Sam. 1. 5. 7. 1).—(c) 'That which is without the Ohhandoma is not-Sattra'—(Taittirīya Sāmhitā 7. 3. 8. 1).—In connection with these, the question arising as to whether these texts are injunctive of accessories or Arthavādas,—the Pūrvapakṣa is that "they are injunctions, as it is only thus that they can serve a useful purpose".

The Siddhānta is as follows:—If these were injunctions, then (a) only cows and horses would be animals, (b) that alone would be a sacrifice in which sāmans are used, (c) and that alone would be Sattra which contained the Chhandoma;—and the mention (or injunction or creation) of other (a) animals, (b) sacrifices and (c) Sattras would be entirely useless;—nor would there be any possibility of there being another Injunction (as there is).—For this reason, the text must be taken as an Arthavāda serving the purpose of eulogising; that is, (a) it cries down all other animals (by calling them 'not-animals') for eulogising the cow and the horse; (b) the Sāman is (c) the Sāttras without the Chhandoma are cried down, for the purpose of eulogising those with the Chhandoma,—just as we have in the case of such assertions as 'eating without clarified butter is not-eating', 'dirty clothes are no-clothes'.

Adhikarana (16): Figurative Description based upon large numbers.

SUTRA (27).

(e) LARGE NUMBERS.

Bhāsua.

We find the text 'Sṛṣṭirupadadhāti' ('Places the Sṛṣṭi bricks) [Taittiriya Samhitā 5. 3. 4]. In regard to this there being a doubt as to its being injunctive of accessories or an Arthavāda,—the Pūrvapakṣa is that "it is injunctive of accessories, as it is only thus that it will enjoin something not already known".

In answer to this we have the following Siddhānta:—If the text were an Injunction, then the meaning would be that 'one should place the bricks having the Sṛṣṭi-mantras'; but there is no peculiarity mentioned with regard to the Bricks, as to which are, and which are not, with the Sṛṣṭi-mantras; so that the Sṛṣṭi-mantras (i.e. Mantras containing the term 'sṛṣṭi') would have to be recited in connection with all the bricks; and under the circumstances, the reciting of those mantras which have no connection with the rite of Brick-placing would be entirely useless.—For these reasons we conclude that the text is to be taken as Descriptive of, or Reference to, only those of the Mantra-texts which have been enjoined as to be recited in connection with the Placing of Bricks; and the mention of the term 'sṛṣṭi' serves the purpose of eulogising the act of erection (sarjana).

Further, if the text were an Injunction, recourse to indirect indication would be inevitable; and this indirect indication would be of those mantus devoid of the term 'sṛṣṭi' which are found in the hymn 'Ekayā stuvatē, etc.' (Paittiriya Samhitā 4.3. 10).—[What is meant is that, though the mantus in question are spoken of as one collective whole, as in the sentence 'ekayā stuvatē',—yet the distinguishing term 'sṛṣṭi' is found only among a few of them, such as the Anuvākyā, etc., and hence if the name 'Sṛṣṭi' were applied to all the mantus, it would be abandoning its direct signification and accepting an indirect one, which is not permissible in an Injunction; and while indirectly indicating the mantus not containing the term 'sṛṣṭi', it would also denote those that do contain it; and this would be a very complicated process. If, on the other hand, it is taken as a mere descriptive eulogy of the Brick-placing, a recourse to indirect indication or figurative expression would not be considered improper.—Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 455-456].

Objection:—"There may be the same incongruity when the text is taken as a descriptive reference and recourse is had to indirect indication".

Answer:—Recourse to indirect indication would not be improper in the case of the text being taken as a descriptive reference.

Question:—"But how can the name 'Srsti' be applied to mantras not containing the term 'srsti'?"

Answer:—It would be applied by reason of the fact of 'a large number of the mantras concerned containing that term :—as a matter of fact, among the mantras, there are many that contain that distinguishing term. and only a very few that do not contain it.

Adhikarana (17): Words like 'Prāṇabhṛt' serve the purpose of eulogising.

SUTRA (28).

(f) BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF INDICATIVE SIGNS.

Bhāsya.

There are such texts as 'Prāṇabhṛta upadadhāti' (Taitti, Sam. 5. 2. 10 or 5. 3. 12), 'Ajyānīrupadadhāti' (Taittirya Sanhitā 5. 7. 2. 5) [where also the terms 'prāṇabhṛtaḥ' stands for the bricks placed with a set of Mantras beginning with the word 'praṇabhṛtaḥ', and the case stands on the same footing as the text 'sṛṣtīrupadadhāti' dealt with in the foregoing adhikaraṇa; the only difference being that the mantras actually beginning with the word 'prāṇabhṛtaḥ' are fewer than those beginning with 'sṛṣṭi'; and yet the word 'prāṇabhṛtaḥ' gives its name to a larger number of mantras than those to which the name 'Sṛṣṭi' is applied].

Here also, if the text were an injunction, then, when the bricks with the 'Prānabhyt'-mantras would be placed, those mantras which do not contain the term 'prānabhyt' would be rendered useless. Hence the text must be taken as a mere declaration or reference; what happens is that 'because of the presence of indicative signs', the word expressing one thing is applied to another thing; as when we find in the case of the assertion 'chhartino gachchhart'. '('Persons with umbrellas are going along'), where even though a single man of the lot may be carrying an umbrella, the whole lot become indicated by that indicative sign.—Neither the term 'prānabhrt', nor the term 'orsti' could be taken as having its indication restricted to those mantras that do not contain the indicative words; in fact those mantras also are included which contain the terms 'prānabhrt' and 'srṣti'; just as in the case of the term 'chhartinah', the term includes the one man with the umbrella as also others not carrying the umbrella.

ADHIKARANA (18): Doubts regarding the meaning of words and sentences set aside by subsequent (supplementary) passages.

SŪTRA (29).

IN DOUBTFUL CASES, [A DEFINITE CONCLUSION IS ARRIVED AT]
WITH THE HELP OF SUBSEQUENT PASSAGES.

Bhāṣya.

[In interpreting Injunctions and Declamatory Declarations, sometimes doubts will arise as to which Declaration, Arthavida, is to be taken with which Injunction and so on. Hence the Author is going to propound a general principle according to which these doubtful points could be settled.]

We have the Injunction- Aktāh sharkarā upadadhāti' ('One puts in wetted pebbles') [Taittīrīya Brāhmana 3. 12. 5. 12],-which is followed by the Arthavada 'Tejo vai ghrtam' ('Clarified Butter is glory itself') .- Now there arises the question-Are the 'pebbles' to be wetted with any one of the fluid substances, clarified butter, oil and fat? Or are they to be wetted with Clarified Butter only ?- "Why should such a doubt arise?"-Because the passage opens with the statement speaking of mere wetting in general, while it ends with the statement speaking of the particular fluid substance, Clarified Butter .- Now, it is agreed that the opening sentence and the concluding sentence should be taken together as forming one sentence, to get at the meaning of the entire passage; but there arises the question as to whether the general statement in the opening sentence is to be qualified and restricted in its scope by the concluding particular statement, or the particular statement in the concluding sentence is to be extended in its scope by the general statement in the opening sentence. So that the question remains—as between the opening and the concluding statements, which is to be accepted as the final conclusion?

The Pūrvapaksa view on this question is as follows:-

"In doubtful cases like the one cited, the general statement in the opening sentence having given rise to the general conception untrammelled by anything to the contrary (long before the concluding particular statement comes in),—there is nothing to justify its restriction to any particular conception; on the other hand, as regards the concluding statement, before it has come to the field, the general conception (that the wetting may be done by any wetting fluid) has been already brought about by the opening general statement; so that the particular statement, regarding the particular wetting substance being Clarified Butter only, runs counter to the said general conception already in the field. The only reasonable course to adopt in this case therefore is to take the term 'clarified butter' in the concluding sentence in a qualified figurative sense, indicating 'Clarified Butter' as also all other wetting fluids; just as in a preceding Adhikarana, the term 'ssph'

has been taken to include the Mantras containing the term 'srsti' as well as those not containing that term,—so the term 'Clarified Butter' here stands for Clarified Butter as also for what is not-Clarified-Butter."

In answer to the above $P\bar{u}rvapakya$ regarding doubtful cases, we have the following $Siddh\bar{u}nta:$ —

It is true that the entire passage opens with the general statement: but the general statement always stands in need of specification; [as no wetting is possible except with a particular substance, the general statement in the opening sentence has to be restricted in its scope at the very outset, and this restriction (to one definite substance) is done by the particular statement in the concluding sentence.-"Why so?"-Because, as a matter of fact, there can be no injunction of mere wetting in general: [when there is Injunction of wetting, it must be wetting by some one substance]; so that the particular statement in the concluding sentence is in no way incompatible with the opening statement .- "But how can it be said that the wetting in general is not enjoined?"-Because so long as the doubt is there, no word in the passage can be regarded as having the injunctive force; so that there is no injunctive word at all; specially as the words of the text are 'aktāh sharkarā upadadhātī' ('one puts in wetted pebbles'), where the verb is in the Present Tense. Then again, there is no commendatory text directly eulogising wetting substance in general; while of the particular wetting substance, Clarified Butter, we have the eulogy contained in the direct assertion ('Clarified Butter is glory itself'); so that for the particular substance Clarified Butter, we have the direct commendation, whereas of the substance in general, the commendation is only indirect; and Direct Assertion is always more powerful than Indirect Indication; so that the injunction deduced from the passage as a whole is that of Clarified Butter.

Similarly in the passage—'One wears clothes;the cloth sacred to all the gods is silk' [where the entire passage is taken as enjoining the wearing of silk clothes]; —and also in the passage—'Touching this, one should sing;all beings live upon this Audumbari' [where the whole passage is taken as enjoining the touching of the particular object, Audumbari.

Adhikarana (19): The Indefinite becomes definite by the capacity of things.

SÜTRA (30).

OR, THE DEDUCING OF THE CONCLUSION MAY BE BASED UPON THE CAPACITY OF THINGS,—BECAUSE THAT (CAPACITY OF THINGS)
FORMS AN INTEGRAL PART (OF WHAT IS ENJOINED IN
THE VEDA).

Bhāsya.

[Another kind of doubtful cases is dealt with here.]

We have such texts as—'Sruvēṇa avadyəti' ('Slices with the Razor'),—'Hastēna avadyəti' ('Slices with the Razor'),—'Hastēna avadyəti' ('Slices with the hand').—In regard to these, there arises the question—Is every substance—liquid, solid and meat,—to be sliced with the Ladle, the Razor and the Hand? Or the particular instrument for slicing is to be selected in accordance with the capacity of each (to do the slicing of the particular substance concerned);—i.e. that of liquids, with the Ladle,—that of meat, with the Razor,—and that of solids, with the Hand?

The Pūrvapakṣa is that "as the texts lay down no restriction, there need be no restriction at all (as to which instrument is to be used for slicing in any particular case)."

In answer to this Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—The deducing of the conclusion may be based upon the capacity of things;—that is, the assumption of a definite conclusion is to be based upon the capacity of the things concerned. So that, the slicing could be done with the Ladle, only to that substance of which it could be done with the Ladle;—similarly by any instrument, the slicing could be done of that substance only which would be capable of being sliced with that particular instrument. Because it is a general rule that when a verb denotes an action, the potency or capacity (of things) is always helpful (in determining the exact form of the action denoted). Thus then, in the case in question, there would be restriction in accordance with the capacity of the things concerned.

Similarly in the case of the text—'Añjalinā saktūn pradāvyē juhoti'. (cf. Taittirīya Samhitā 3.3.8.4),—the term 'añjali' stands for 'joined palms' (in general, without restricting it to any particular way of joining the two palms); but it is taken to be restricted by the 'capacity of things' to that way of joining the palms which brings about the shape of a flower-bud (a hollowed cup); because it is only with the palms joined in this form that the Homa could be offered:—just as when one makes the statement 'Katë bhanktë—Kāmsyapātryām bhanktē', the exact meaning determined by the 'capacity of things' is that 'He sits on the māt—places the food in the bell-metal dish,— and eats it'.

End of Pāda IV of Adhyāya I.

End of Adhyāya I.

ADHYÂYA II.

Differentiation among Actions.

PĀDA I. (Introductory).

ADHIKARANA (1): Bhāvārthādhikarana.

[The Act as leading to the Apūrva is expressed by one word; and this word is the Verb.]

SŪTRA (1).

THOSE 'WORDS DENOTING ACTION' (i.e. VERBS) WHICH DENOTE BHĀVANĀ (ACTIVITY),—FROM THESE PROCEEDS THE COGNITION OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT [OF THE RESULTANT A p ū r v a]; AS IT IS THIS FACT

THAT IS ENJOINED.

Bhāsya.

[The first Adhyāya has described the means of knowing Dharma.—The second Adhyāya deals with the question as to what are the various acts that are called 'Dharma'; but before this is dealt with, it is necessary to ascertain the means of finding out whether and how one act is different from another. According to Kumārila the main subject-matter of the second Adhyāya is the Differentiation among Adtions, and the other matters dealt with are subsidiary to this.—According to Prabhākara, the subject-matter of the Adhyāya is the difference among the texts injunctive of the Acts.—Among the factors that go to differentiate one act from another, the most important is the result following from the Acts,—in the case of acts included under the category of 'Dharma', this result being the Apūrva, or Transcendental Potency.—Consequently it becomes necessary first of all to determine (1) what is this apūrva—and (2) what is the word that denotes it.]

In the first Discourse a full account has been given of the Means of knowing (Dharma); in course of which the real character of Injunctions, Declamatory Passages, Mantras and Smytis has been determined;—the Injunction of Accessories and also Names have been examined;—the salso been explained how doubtful cases are determined with the help of supplementary passages.—All this has to be borne in mind.—After this we are now going to consider what acts are Primary and what Secondary,—what acts are different and what not-different;—this is the subject-matter, and none other, that is to be dealt with (in the Second Discourse);—and such is the connection of the discourse (with what has gone before).

In connection with this, six kinds of differentiation among Actions are going to be described, as based on—(1) Different words (under 2. 2. 1), (2) Repetition (under 2. 2. 2), (3) Number (under 2. 2. 21), (4) Accessory details

(under 2. 2. 23 et seq.), (5) Context (under 2. 3. 24), and (6) Name (under 2. 2. 22).—We are mentioning here what we are going to explain because an explanation becomes readily understood when the subject has been already indicated beforehand; also the mind of the learner becomes concentrated.

Thus then, it is the treatment of the means of distinguishing the various acts that constitutes this, the second discourse; whatever else happens to be dealt with here is only what is introductory to, or connected, either directly or indirectly, with the said main theme.

(The correlation and sequence of the twelve discourses may be thus summarised:-Until the means of knowledge have been duly defined (Discourse I), there can be no discussion of the meaning of Vedic texts; and hence also no discussion regarding any two acts being the same or different (Discourse II) cannot be introduced:-the discussion of difference or non-difference is essential, as until some actions have been found to be different from others, there can be no idea as to one being the Primary act and the other secondary or subsidiary to it (Discourse III), -nor of the usefulness or otherwise of the acts (Discourse IV).nor of the order of their performance (Discourse V); -it is only when the nature of an action has been duly understood that there can be any consideration regarding the person entitled to its performance (Discourse VI), which last question therefore stands in need of all the foregoing five discourses, Similarly, Discourses VII-XII. treating as they do of such subjects as the Transference of Details and the like, presuppose a full knowledge of all the Injunctions regarding all the details of actions :- thus the latter half of the Sūtras (Discourses VII-XII) are dependent upon what has gone before in the earlier half (Discourses I-VI).]

The first point to be considered is this:—Under Discourse I it has been declared (a) that 'Dharma is that which is enjoined by the Injunction as conducive to the highest good' (Sūtra I. I. 2),—(b) that 'Injunction' is the sentence that denotes an action,—(c) that the words constituting a sentence have distinct meanings.—Now the first question (A) that has to be considered is—Is a different Dharma laid down by each one of the words composing the Injunctive sentence? or is a single Dharma laid down by all the words collectively?

Now on this question (A), we have the Pürvapakṣa (A) that "a different Dharma is laid down by each of the words."

The Siddhānta (A) in answer to this question is as follows:—If the Transcendental Potency (Apūrva) results from one act (laid down by one word in the sentence), then anything else that may be laid down by any other word in the sentence should be only auxiliary to the former act (and not an independent act leading up to a distinct result); as in this way there would be need for the assumption of fewer transcendental potencies. Hence the conclusion is that there is only one transcendental Potency (resulting from the one act that is denoted by one word in the Injunctive sentence).

Now—if there is only one *Transcendental Potency*,—then there arises the question (B)—Does this Potency result from (acts denoted by) verbs (words denoting activity), or from (those denoted by) nouns (words

denoting substances and qualities)?—(But before we can discuss this question), we have to determine what is an action and what are the words denoting activity?—These words are 'yajati' ('sacrifices'), 'dadāti' ('gives'), 'jāhoti' ('pours libations into the fire') and so forth.—"But these words are expressive of sacrifice, gift and libation-pouring,—and they cannot be 'expressive of activity.'"—It is not so; these words are expressive of sacrifice and the rest, and they are also expressive of activity; what is understood as expressed by the words is the sacrifice (gift and libation-pouring), as also activity in general,—the sense of the injunction in this latter case being that 'one should so act that something may come about (be accomplished)'. Thus it is that these are 'words expressive of activity'; from nouns, on the other hand, we derive notions of substances and qualities, not of activity; hence nouns are not 'words expressive of activity.'

The Pūrvapakṣa (B) on this question (B) is that "the Transcendental Potency results equally (from both kinds of words, Verbs as well as Nouns)."

In answer to this we have the following Siddhanta (B):-Those Verbs that are expressive of activity bring about the cognition of the accomplishment of the result,-i.e. such verbs as 'yajēta' ('should sacrifice').-Why so ?-Just because they are expressive of activity; those words that express the idea that 'one should make something come about' would be just those which, when combined with the term 'desirous of heaven', would express the idea that 'one should make heaven come about'; thus it is that from these words is derived the idea of the 'accomplishment'-i.e. the bringing about, the fulfilment,- of the result'; and what these words, as combined with the (special) acts of sacrifice, gift and libation-pouring, speak of is the fulfilment of heaven .- "How so?" -- Because 'it is this fact that is enjoined', -e.g. by the words expressive of the 'sacrifice' and other acts. The construction is like this-The question being 'By what should the man seeking Heaven bring about Heaven?'-the answer is-' By such acts as Sacrifice and the rest'; -and when what is denoted by a word brings about such a result (as Heaven for instance), it can do so only though bringing about an (intervening) transcendental potency,-not in any other way; it is thus that the Apūrva, the Transcendental Potency, comes to be comprehended; hence the said Transcendental Potency comes to be known through the word expressive of the act. It is in this sense that we declare that words expressive of activity' are expressive of the Transcendental Potency; not that there is any word which is directly expressive of that Potency.—The fact of the matter is that something has to be brought into existence by the activity denoted by the verb, -and the desire for Heaven has to be fulfilled by some means; -thus between these two (the Activity and the Heaven) there is a mutual relationship,—like that between a carter who has lost his horse and another carter who has burnt his cart (i.e. the one needing the help that the other can give). For instance (in the case of the sentence 'one desiring Heaven should sacrifice' and such others), the verbs like 'sacrifice' ('yajēta') stand in need of certain factors,-i.e. the meaning of the term 'yajēta' being, as explained before, that 'one should bring about something', it becomes necessary to know-(a) What is to be brought

about?—(b) By what it is to be brought about? and (c) How it is to be brought about?—The statement of the purpose by the term 'svargakāmaḥ' ('desirous of Heaven') supplies the information as to (a) what is to be brought about.—Such cannot be the explanation of words expressive of substances and qualities (i.e. Nouns).—Thus we conclude that verbs, being expressive of activity, express the Transcendental Potency.

Objection:—"Why has the Sūtra used both the terms 'bhāvārthāḥ' (words denoting activity) and 'karmashabdāḥ' (verbs, which also denote acts) [since both appear to be synonymous)?"

The answer to this is as follows: As a matter of fact, there are certain 'words denoting action' ('karmaskabda') which are not 'expressive of Bhāvanā or activity';—e.g. 'shyēna', 'chitrā' and such others (which are names of sacrifices, but do not by themselves convey any idea of the agent undertaking an activity with a view to bringing about a certain result). [The reading 'shyenaikatrikādayaḥ' appears to be defective, though it appears in the Tantravārtika also, Text, p. 356; from what follows 'shyenachitrādayaḥ' appears to be the correct reading];—on the other hand, there are certain 'words denoting activity' which are not 'expressive of action'; e.g. 'bhavana', 'bhāva' and 'bhūti' (Being).—

[The following extracts from the Tantravartika throw some light upon the exact signification of the terms 'karmashabda' and 'bhāvashabda': Savs the Bhāsya-There are certain Karmashabdas, etc.' Though the proper words to be cited as examples were 'yaga', 'yajana' and other nouns denoting the action of sacrificing, yet the Bhaeya has cited the words 'shyena', etc., which become names of actions: only when appearing in sentences as in apposition to words like 'yāga'; in fact they are recognised as Karmashabda because of their denoting certain actions after and along with the injunction of sacrifice as instrumental in the bringing about of certain results.—The Bhāeya continues—'There are certain Bhāvārtha words which √ are not Karmashabda'; -and in this connection, the proper words to cite would be · bhāvayēt (bring into existence)', 'kuryāt' (make or do) and the like; as those are expressive of the activity of the agent, and not 'bhavana,' 'bhūti' (Being) which is the action of the result that is brought about, not of the agent; though one of the three words cited by the Bhāsya-'bhāva'-may be taken as signifying an activity on the part of the Agent-by being derived as with the causal affix (in which case 'bhava' would be equivalent, not to being, but to bringing into existence Question-"why should not the bhavartha words be spoken of as 'karmashabda' when, as a matter of fact, every verbal root is a Karmashabda, expressive of action?"-Answer-An undefined general action, that of Being, is incapable of being performed; hence words denoting such general action cannot be spoken of as 'Karmashabda', expressive of action; and it is only words denoting particular acts capable of being performed that have been regarded as 'Karmashabda' .- Tantravārtika, Translation, pp. 492-493, Text, p. 356.]

How is this to be illustrated?—There are two texts—(a) 'Shyënënā-bhicharan yajēta' ('Going to kill, one should sacrifice with the Shyena'; Sad. Brā. 3. 8. 1),—(b) 'Chitrayā yajēta pashukāmah' ('Desirous of cattle, one should sacrifice with the Chitrā'; Tai, Sa. 2. 4. 6. 1). In regard to these, it is doubtful if the construction of (a) is 'shyënëna abhicharan' ('going to kill with the Shyena'), or 'yajēta abhicharan' ('going to kill, one should sacrifice'),—and that of (b) is 'chitrayā pashukāmah' ('Desirous of

cattle, with the Chîtrā'), or 'pashukāmo yajēta' ('Desirous of cattle, one should sacrifice').-It is only when these points are doubtful that there is any chance of the enquiry as to whether the words ('shyena' and 'chitra') are to be taken as injunctive of accessories or as names.—(c) Similarly, in connection with the text 'Darshapūrnamāsābhyām svargakāmo vaiēta' ('Desirous of heaven, one should sacrifice with the Darsha and the Purnamāsa'),—where the terms 'darsha' and 'pūrnamāsa' denote particular times,-is the construction to be 'darshapurnamasabhyam svarqakamah' ('Desirous of heaven, through Darsha and Pürnamāsa'), or 'svargakāmo vaiēta' ('Desirous of heaven, one should sacrifice').- In all these three texts, neither 'Darsha', nor 'Pürnamāsa', nor 'Chitrā', nor 'Shuēna' is 'expressive of activity'; nor have these words any connection with the agent desiring the particular result, because their case-endings are different from those found in the words denoting the agent.—From all this it follows that words expressive of substances and qualities are not expressive of the Apūrva (Transcendental Potency).

[The sense of these arguments is as follows:—If the words 'shyēna', 'chitrā', 'darsha' and 'pārṇamāsa' were directly related to the particular results (and as such, were Bhāvashabda, 'words expressive of activity'), then the yāga (sacrifice) itself would not be instrumental in the accomplishment of the results; and then words like 'shyēna' could not be taken as names of sacrifices; as it is only because of the coordination of the instrumental sacrifice with words like 'shyēnāra' that these latter come to be regarded as names; not being taken as names, these words could not be taken as injunctive of accessories. When however the sacrifice is taken as the instrument of the Bhāvanā (bringing into existence), then, the word 'shyēna' cannot but be taken as the name of that sacrifice—'na chaiṣāmarthinā sambandhaḥ'—says the Bhāṣya; this means that the mention of the result has no direct concern with the word 'chitrayā' or 'shyēnāra'.]

SŪTRA (2).

[Says the Opponent]—"As a matter of fact, 'activity' is denoted by all (words)";—If this is urged [then the answer is as in the following Sütra].

Bhāsya.

[Says the Opponent]—"If your view is that words expressive of substances and qualities are not indicative of the Transcendental Potency (Apūrva), because they are not 'expressive of activity (Bhāva)',—then, we urge that 'activity is denoted by all words'.—For instance, in the sentence 'Darshapūrnamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta' ('Desirous of heaven, one should sacrifice with the Darsha and Pūrnamāsa'), the connection between the terms 'desirous of heaven' and 'with the Darsha and Pūrnāmāsa' would be asserted by the term 'should sacrifice';—similarly in the

text 'Shyēnēnābhicharan yajēta' ('Going to kill, one should sacrifice with the Shyēna'), the connection between the terms 'going to kill' and 'with the shyēna' would be asserted by the term 'should sacrifice';—and in the text 'Chitrajā yajēta pashukāmah' ('Desirous of cattle, one should sacrifice with the Chitrā'), the connection between the terms 'desirous of cattle' and 'with the chitrā' would be asserted by the term 'should sacrifice';—and thus all these words (and not only the term 'should sacrifice') are such as want the help of some other word to complete their sense; so that all of them are equally expressive of 'activity';—hand when all the words are equally expressive of 'activity', there is nothing to justify the restriction that the Transcendental Potency is indicated only by 'words expressive of particular acts', and not by those expressive of substances and qualities."

SŪTRA (3).

THOSE WORDS ARE NOUNS,—ON THE UTTERANCE WHEREOF IN ACTUAL USAGE, THE FORMS OF THE OBJECTS DENOTED BY THEM BECOME APPREHENDED; CONSEQUENTLY ANY NEED FOR OTHERS IS FAR AWAY FROM THEM; SPECIALLY AS THEY ARE ACCOMPLISHED ENTITIES AT THE TIME OF BEING USED (AND SPOKEN OF).

Bhāsya.

There are certain words in whose case it so happens that whenever they are pronounced for the purpose of conveying the idea of what is denoted by them, what is so denoted becomes apprehended in its true form,—i.e. as being something which, having come into existence, continues to exist for some time,—and is not, like an act, destroyed as soon as it comes into existence;—these words are Nouns, and these are 'words expressive of substances and qualities', and such are the objects denoted by 'words expressive of substances and qualities'.

Instead of saying that these are 'words expressive of substances and qualities', the Sütra has said that 'these are Nouns', which means that the term 'Nouns' is synonymous (with the term 'words expressive of substances and qualities').—"How do-you know this ?"—We deduce this from the fact that the affixes taken by the words (expressive of substances and qualities) are known as 'nāmiki' (pertaining to Nouns)—"What are these affixes?"—They are those that are found in the terms 'wksah', 'wyksau', 'wyksāh' (denoting substances), and 'shuklah', 'shuklau', 'shuklāh', 'denoting qualities).—Thus the words used in the Sūtra are quite right.

Inasmuch as the objects denoted by these nouns are not momentary (but lasting),—'any need for others is far away from them'; that is, they do not stand in need of anything else in the shape of a Primary (to which they would be subsidiary); these have not got to be produced, 'because they are accomplished entities at the time of being used and spoken of',—i.e. they are already in existence at the time that they are used.

SŪTRA (4).

Those words, on the other hand, are Verbs—on the utterance whereof what is denoted by them is not in existence; hence it is through these that it (the Transcendental Potency) would be cognised; as what is denoted by them is dependent (upon other factors).

Bhāsya.

'Those words on the utterance whereof what is denoted by them is not inexistence',—i.e. what is denoted by them does not exist at the time that they are pronounced,—'are Verbs';—i.e. these are 'words denoting activity (Bhāva)'; the Sūtra has taught us this by using the other synonym ('verbs').—''In what way are the terms 'verbs' and 'words denoting activity' synonymous?''.—That they are so is indicated by the fact that the affixes taken by the 'words denoting activity' are called 'ākhyātiki' (pertaining to verbs)—''What are these affixes?''.—They are those that are found in the terms 'pachath', 'pachath', 'pachanti', and so forth.

For this reason the Transcendental Potency would be cognised through times words; because what is denoted by verbs is something to be brought into existence; hence when these verbs are pronounced along with words, the things denoted by which are accomplished entities,—these latter entities are taken as subserving the purposes of what is to be brought into existence; as it is only thus that they would be serving a visible purpose; because the coming into existence of what is to be brought into existence for a special purpose serves a distinctly useful purpose; and it is brought about by what is already an accomplished entity;—thus does a visible purpose become served.—There would be no such purpose found to be fulfilled if what is to be brought into existence were taken as subserving the purposes of what is already an accomplished entity; so that in this case an invisible (transcendental purpose) would have to be assumed. From this it follows that the sacrifice (which is yet to be accomplished) cannot be taken as subserving the purpose of a substance (which is already an accomplished entity).

Further, 'what is denoted by them is dependent upon other factors';—
that is, what is denoted by them is dependent upon the human agent;
*Bhāvanā' (Activity) is so called only when it is related to a human agent;
specially because the term 'bhāvayāt' ('should bring into existence') denotes
(through the conjugational affix) the human agent; it is for this reason that
the sentence 'one desirous of Heaven should sacrifice' conveys the idea of
(1) the human agent, as also (2) the sacrifice, and (3) the relationship (between
them).—On the other hand, if we had a sentence in the form 'svaryakāmo
daavyena' ('one desirous of Heaven, by substance', there being no Verb), it
would convey the idea of (1) the human agent, and (2) the substance, but
not of any relationship (between them).

Says the Opponent:—"What we mean is that the verb 'yajīta' ('should sacrifice') would signify the relationship between the human agent seeking to accomplish a purpose and the substance,—in the form 'one should bring into existence by means of the substance'; so that the 'bringing into existence' of the purpose is understood to be brought about by means of the substance; and thus there would be the required 'need for others' also."

True, it is so understood that 'one should bring into existence by means of the substance'; but this is understood through Syntactical Connection: while the idea that 'one should bring into existence by means of the sacrifice' is understood through Direct Assertion .- Further, when the relationship of the sacrifice is predicated in the form 'one should bring into existence by means of the sacrifice',—at that time, the relationship of the substance in the form 'one should bring into existence by means of the substance' could not be predicated. Then again, if the relationship of the substance would be predicated, any relationship with the verb 'yajēta' ('should sacrifice') also could not be predicated [as one and the same sentence could not have two predicates] ;-it could be possible if the former (the relationship of the substance) were only referred to; but in that case, there would be predication and reference at one and the same time, -which is impossible. Thus, there would be a conflict between Direct Assertion (of the relationship of Sacrifice) and Syntactical Connection (indicating the relationship of the Substance); and in the case of such conflict, it is Direct Assertion which is the more powerful; consequently there can be no connection between the human agent seeking to accomplish a purpose and the substance; -- so that, so long as there is no connection between the substance and 'the person desiring heaven', it is not possible for the substance to be conducive to the fulfilment of heaven.

This is the reason that justifies the restriction that the Transcendental Potency is indicated by 'words denoting activity', and not by 'words denoting Substances and Qualities'. When therefore the words used are 'ydgena kuryūt' ('should bring about by sacrifice'), then the word must be taken as expressive of the sacrifice,—and the connection of the term 'darshapūrnamāsābhyūm' ('by means of Darsha and Pūrnamāsa') would be obtained only by indirect indication, based upon the fact that the sacrifice is enjoined as to be performed on the Darsha and Pūrnamāsa days.

Adhikarana (2): There is such a thing as Apūrva, Transcendental Potency.

SŪTRA (5).

THERE IS APURVA, BECAUSE ACTION (IS ENJOINED).

Bhāsua.

[The foregoing discussion, as to the word that indicates the Transcendental Potency, has presupposed the existence of this Potency itself; but inasmuch as the existence of such a potency is not generally admitted, the present Adhikarana proceeds to establish its existence.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 497.]

[The Pūrvapakṣa of this Adhikaraṇa is set forth only in the form of the question]—"How is it known that there is such a thing as 'Apūrva', Transcendental Potency?"

The answer to this, which embodies the Siddhanta, is supplied by the Sūtra-There is Apūrva, because action is enjoined.-The word 'chodanā' (in the Sūtra) we explain as Apūrva; hence the meaning of the Sūtra is that there is such a thing as Apūrva, -because action is enjoined-in such injunctions as 'Desirous of Heaven, one should sacrifice.' Otherwise,-if there were no such thing as Apūrva—such an injunction would be meaningless; as the act of the sacrifice itself is perishable; so that if the sacrifice were to perish without bringing into existence something else, then the cause having ceased to exist, the result (in the shape of Heaven) could never come about.—From this it follows that the sacrifice does bring into existence something (some Force or Potency which continues to exist and operate till such time as the Result is actually brought about).-If it be argued that " on the strength of the declaration of a certain result following from a certain sacrificer, it may be presumed that the act of sacrifice itself does not perish (but continues to exist till the appearance of the result)".—the answer is that such a presumption cannot be right; because of the Act (sacrifice) itself, we do not perceive any other form (save the one that is perishable, and hence not able to bring about the final result); as a matter of fact, that alone is called an 'act' which transposes its substratum from one place to another; and no such transposition is possible for the Soul (which alone could be the lasting substratum for the act, if it were to continue till the appearance of the result),-because the Soul is omnipresent (and as such there can be no change of position for it); that the Soul is present in all places is indicated by the fact that its functioning (in the shape of the experiencing of pleasure, pain, etc.,) is found everywhere .- [Says the opponent, who holds that the Soul is no larger than the body encasing it]- "That same fact (of the Soul functioning everywhere) may be a sign of its going from one place to another".- We have adopted the reading 'nanu' for 'na tu'; the Tantravārtika favours 'nanu', though it provides an explanation of the other reading also-see Translation, p. 5171.- The answer to this is that] we perceive no incongruity in the view that the Soul does not move from place to place [while there are several incongruities in the view that it does so move, for which see Tantravartika-Translation. p. 5181.—Thus then, the only possible alternative is that the act (of sacrifice) subsists in the material substance (offered), and this substance has perished (ceased to exist); and when the substratum (in the shape of the substance) has perished, it is understood that the act (sacrifice) itself has perished.-If it be urged that "the substratum (substance) has not perished",-that cannot be true, as all that is found to be left of the substance (offered at the sacrifice) is mere ash.-It might be argued that "even while the ash is there the substance is there (in the form of that ash)",-that cannot be right; because what exists must be perceived, and yet the substance is not perceived (in the ashes) .- "The very fact of the bringing about of the result would be indicative of the presence of the substance (at the time of the appearance of the result)."-In that case, it is necessary for the other party to answer the objection that there is no perception of the substance.—It might be argued that "the non-perception might be due to one or the other of the various reasons of non-perception, such as the subtle character of the substance for 'being too remote' or 'too near', or 'the inefficiency of the perceptive organ', or 'absent-mindedness'-enumerated in Sānkhyakārikā].-If such is the view, then it comes to this that something has to be assumed; and the question to be considered is—is it the Apūrva that should be assumed or some reason for the non-perception of the existing substance? There is always some justification for making a general assumption, and none for a particular one [so that while there may be some justification for the assuming of a general potency in the shape of the Apūrva, there can be none for assuming a reason for the non-perception of every particular object, as there will have to be a separate reason for each particular case of non-perception]. -"[In order to avoid these difficulties, we may hold that] the Act continues to exist without any substratum".-But this assumption also would be open to the same objections (as those sought to be avoided)

[The translation follows the explanation supplied by the Tantravārtika, which says 'Bvumandshritakarmakalpanāyāmapi'—See Translation, p. 523.—It may also be rendered as follows:—'There will be this justification for assuming a special reason for the non-perception of the existing substance that, in the absence of such a substance, there would be no substratum for the Act.''—The answer to this is that even this remains open to the same objections].—(In order to avoid all these difficulties) it might be held that ''we shall assume some such character in the Act whereby it will not carry its substratum (i.e. the Soul) to another place''—This also will be open to the same objections [such as the incongruity of denying a perceptible fact and assuming of what is not perceptible—says Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 523].—From all this it follows that the act of sacrifice is perishable, and because it is perishable, therefore there is such a thing as Apūrva (brought into existence by the Act).

"What is the purpose served by this discussion?"

It is as follows:-If 'words denoting Substances and Qualities' also

were indicative of $Ap\bar{u}rva$,—as held by the $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$ —then, on substances and qualities being spoilt, no substitutes could be employed;—this would be the case if the $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$ view were accepted. If, on the other hand, the $Siddh\bar{u}nta$ view were accepted (that $Ap\bar{u}rva$ is indicated only by 'words denoting activity'), then, the performance of the Avt could be proceeded with after adopting a substitute for the substance or quality that may have been spoilt.

[The Pūrvapakṣa argument against the assumption of Apūrva is thus stated by Prabhākara:—"The injunction imparted by the injunctive word only urges the agent to the performance of a certain action, and not towards anything desired by him; the action is something ephemeral, and is not present immediately before the attainment of heaven by the agent; hence in order to meet these difficulties we must accept the sacrifice itself to be either everlasting, or bringing about either a certain faculty in the agent, or the favours of the deity; and there is no reason for assuming any such thing as Apūrva."

In answer to the above, he continues-

'At the very outset you commit a mistake in assuming that the injunction prompts the agent to action; what the injunction really does is to prompt him to exertion; and the particular action denoted by the root is only the object of that exertion. Thus then, what is denoted by the injunctive sentence is the 'Niyoga', decree or mandate; this 'mandate' urges the man to exertion; and this 'exertion' pertains to some sort of action denoted by the verb. The assumption that the action itself is everlasting is against all evidence; the Soul also is, by its very omnipresence, inactive; hence what brings about the final result cannot abide in the Soul.'

The above passage from the Bṛihatī is not quite clear; nor has it been possible for us to obtain a manuscript of this portion of the commentary, Rijuvimalā. But the whole subject is discussed, from the Prābhākara standpoint, in the Prakaranpaūchikā (page 185 et seq.), from which the following may be gleaned:

There can be no doubt as to the ephemeral character of the sacrifice itself; it is borne out by everyday experience. Nor can the sacrifice be held to be laid down for the purpose of obtaining the favour of the deity; as there is no evidence in support of this; as a matter of fact also, sacrifices are never performed for that purpose; the deity is only one to whom the offering is made; and we could please a deity by only such acts as could reach it; then again, it is not possible for any deity to get at all the offerings made by different men at all times; specially because no deity is eternal or omnipresent. Nor can we accept the view that the verb with the injunctive affix expresses an action tending to produce in the agent, a certain faculty, which is the immediate cause of the final result. This is the view, favoured by Kumārila. We cannot accept this view, as there is no proof for the postulating of the appearance of any such faculty in the agent. That the sacrifice produces such a faculty is not proved either by Perception or by Inference, or even by Verbal Assertion,-there being no Vedic texts pointing to any such faculty; specially as we find that the action is brought about by the exertion of the agent; and therefore the causal potency must reside in this exertion,-which exertion therefore should be denoted by the injunctive sentence. The assumption of the faculty in question might be said to be proved by presumption, based upon the consideration that the action cannot be the cause of the final result, without some such faculty lasting during the time intervening between the completion of the action and the appearance of the result. But what presumption can justify us in assuming is some faculty or potency in that thing

itself which is found to be incapable in the absence of that faculty; so in the case in question, the presumption can only point to some faculty in the action, and not in the agent; hence what is brought about by the faculty abiding in the agent cannot be regarded as produced by the action.

The whole matter of what the Bhātta calls 'Apūrva' and the Prābhākara 'Niyoga', is thus explained in the Prakaraṇapañchikā (p. 187):—

(1) The second aphorism of Adhyaya I has shown that what the injunctive sentence denotes is Kārya, something to be brought about. (2) In the beginning of Adhyava VI, it has been shown that, of this Karva denoted by the sentence, the Niyojya-i.e. the person prompted to its bringing about-is one who is desirous of acquiring for himself some desirable result in the shape of Heaven and the like,—this being related to the Karya. (3) In the Badaryadhikarana (III. I. 3) it has been proved that it is the karya that is the direct cause of the production of that desirable result which is desired by (and as such, qualifies) the prompted person. (4) In the Devatādhikarana (IX. I. 9) the Bhāsya has shown that this kārya cannot be the act (of sacrificing, for instance); as this act cannot possibly be the direct cause of the final result; nor could it be held to lead to the result through the favour of the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered; nor can it be regarded as leading to the result through a certain potency in the agent; and it is well-known that either the act itself, or any potency abiding in itself, does not last long enough to bring about the result. (5) In the Apūrvādhikarana (II. 1. 5), we have the final conclusions led up to by all the above adhikaranas. That which is denoted by the injunctive affix and other factors of the injunction is the karya inhering in the agent who is prompted by the sentence, and as connected with whom the karya is indicated; as this karya is not cognisable by any other means of knowledge, it has been called 'Apūrva', something new, not known before. The connection of this karva with the agent and the action may be thus traced :- the kūrya by its very nature is something brought about by kriti, or operation; and this operation is none other than the exertion of the agent. In the Bhavarthādhikarana (II. I. 1) again, it is shown that no such exertion is possible, independently of some act denoted by the verbal root. Hence what the injunctive sentence denotes, in this connection, is the Niyoga or prompting, relating to that act. This act, thus being the object of that prompting, comes to be spoken of as the 'instrument' by which that prompting is accomplished, as shown under III. 1. 3. Even though the karya is brought into existence at a time other than that of the appearance of the final result, yet, inasmuch as it is inseparably related to the prompted agent,-in whom the desire for that result is present,-there is nothing incongruous in regarding that karya as the direct cause of the result. This kārya has been called 'Apūrva' by the Bhāsya by reason of its being something new to all other means of knowledge, save the injunctive sentence; but the name given to it by Prabhakara is 'Niyoga' or prompting, by reason of the fact that it acts as an incentive to the prompted person (Niyojya) and makes him put forth an exertion towards the accomplishment of the action denoted by the verbal root. This kārya or Nivoga is expressed neither by the verbal root, nor by the injunctive affix, nor by any other word in the sentence, but it is denoted by the sentence as a whole; all other necessary factors being expressed by the several words of the sentence individually, what the sentence as a whole expresses is this Niuoga (Mandate) as related to the prompted person expressed by one of the words in the sentence (i.e. the word signifying the result, the person desiring which is the prompted person). That the Niyoga is thus expressed by a sentence is also proved by the fact that the general rule is that, that which is the principal thing made known by the sentence forms its 'meaning'; and there is no doubt that of all the things made known by the sentence, the Niyoga is the most important; for even though the final result has all the appearance of the most important factor, yet it is the Niyoga that is really such, because it is the direct and immediate cause of the result, and it is also the immediate effect of the action performed; also, because the result also has to be regarded as subservient to the Niyoga, in view of the fact that the result enters as one of the factors necessary for the making up of the full character of the Niyoga. To explain—The Niyoga cannot be a true Niyoga until there is a Niyojaa, the person to be prompted to exertion, as without exertion there can be no Niyoga; then again, without the agent there can be no exertion; and lastly, it is only the person desiring the result issuing from the undertaking that is entitled to its performance; thus indirectly, through the agent, the result becomes a necessary factor in the Niyoga; this relation between the Niyoga and the result being similar to that between the master and the servant; without the servant the master cannot be a true 'master', and yet it is the master that is the more important person of the two.

The Prakaranapañchiká raises an interesting question here:-

"Granted that the injunctive sentence—'One desiring heaven should perform the Jyotisjooma' expresses the Niyoga as proceeding from the action of Jyotisjoma sacrifice, and as being the direct cause of attaining heaven. But just as the sacrifice, being an effect, has only an ephemeral existence, and cannot continue till the appearance of the result,—so in the same manner, the Niyoga also, as an effect, could not but be transient, and as such unable to continue till the appearance of the result. Thus the very purpose for which the hypothesis of the Niyoga has been put forward, fails to be accomplished by it. This cuts off the ground entirely from under the whole fabric of the Niyoga or Apāra."

The author fails to answer this objection satisfactorily. All that he says is that the Nijaga does not bring about the result immediately after it itself comes into existence, but in its action towards the bringing about of the result, it stands in need of certain auxiliaries, which are not always available, and until whose appearance the result cannot appear. This explanation does not meet the difficulty that the Niyoga itself cannot, and does not, exist at the time that the result appears, He has explained in another place that it is through the prompted agent that the Niyoga, though itself appearing at the present time, brings about the result at a future time. This, however, is as much as to say that the Niyoga produces something in the agent, which latter something brings about the result; and thus this much-vaunted theory of the Prabhākara is found to be less acceptable than the Bhatta view, by which the action (of sacrificing) itself produces a certain faculty in the agent, which faculty brings about the result at the proper time; while Prabhakara appears to assume a Niyoga intervening between the action and the something lasting that is produced in the agent, he does not call it 'faculty', but which comes to be the same thing. In order to meet the difficulty, Shālikanātha has been forced to call in the aid of 'destiny'; he says that it is only when the Niyoga is aided by destiny that it brings about the result. This after all, is a very poor explanation to be offered by the 'Mīmāmsāniṣṇāta' as he has called the followers of Prabhākara.

Another question arising in this connexion is that, what has been said above may be all right, so far as those actions are concerned which are laid down to be performed with a view to a certain result; but how would it apply to those actions which are to be performed merely in fulfilment of a duty incumbent upon all persons, without reference to any result,—or to those passages that lay down the non-doing of certain acts? The answer to this is that, in the explanation of Niyogu, the Prabhakara has brought in the result, not as something desired by the agent, but only as something the presence of which makes a person entitled to the performance of a certain act; in the case of those actions, then, that are laid down as necessary duties to be performed throughout vife, any person who is endoused with life being

entitled to the performance of those acts, the character of the agent becomes fully accomplished; and this is all that is needed for the explanation of the Niyoga.

- By Kumarila's view the Apūrva is 'a potency in the principal action, or in the agent, which did not exist prior to the performance of the action, and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures.' Before the sacrifices laid down as leading to Heaven are performed, there is in the sacrifices themselves in the first place, an incapacity to lead any person to heaven, and in the second place, in the agent, to attain heaven. Both these incapacities are set aside by the performance of the sacrifice; and this performance also creates a positive potency or force, by virtue of which heaven is attained; and to this latter force or capacity we give the name 'Apūrva'. The proof of the existence of such an Apūrva lies in Presumption. -based upon the fact that without some such force or potency many Vedic passages are wholly inexplicable. For instance, there are many passages dealing with the fact that certain sacrifices lead the sacrificer to heaven,—the idea being that he goes to heaven, not indeed immediately on the completion of the sacrifice, but after death. The question then arises, that as a general rule the effect comes into existence while its cause is still present, or immediately after the cause has ceased to exist: but in the case in question, the sacrifice ceases to exist at the present time, while the attainment of heaven comes ten or twelve or more years later. This can be explained only by the hypothesis that the sacrifice, on its completion. produces directly a certain potency or faculty in the agent, which resides in him, like many other faculties, throughout life, at the end of which it leads him to heaven. Without some such intervening potency-as the connecting link between the sacrifice and its result—the causal relation between these two cannot be ex-Apūrva thus is nothing more than a force set in motion by the performance of the action—this force being the direct instrument whereby, sooner or later, the action accomplishes its result. There is nothing incongruous in this hypothesis; as every action is actually found to set going certain forces, either in some substance, or in persons connected with some substances; and the force thus set going accomplishes its result, as soon as it reaches its full development with the aid of attendant auxiliaries. The whole process is thus briefly stated systematically in Nûayamālāvistara :-
 - "The sentence—'one desiring heaven should perform sacrifices'—lays down the fact that the sacrifice is instrumental in the bringing about of the attainment of heaven.
 - (2) Then arises the question—how can the sacrifice which ceases to exist at the moment that it is complete, bring about the result at a much later time?
 - (3) The answer to this is that the sacrifice accomplishes the final result through the agency of the force called 'Apūrva'.
 - (4) A further question arises—how is the Apūrva brought into existence?
 - (5) The answer is-by the performance of the sacrifice.

In all simple sacrifices, there is a single Apūrva leading to a single result. But there are certain elaborate sacrifices which are highly complex, being made up of a number of subsidiary sacrifices. Such for instance as the Darshapaurnamāsa sacrifices. In all such sacrifices, there are as a rule four kinds of Apūrva:

- The Phalāpūrva—that which brings about the result directly, and which
 is the immediate cause of the result;
- (2) the Samudāyāpūrva;—in the Darshapaurnamāsa sacrifices, the three main sacrifices performed on the Moonless day form one group and the three performed on the Full Moon day another group; each of these groups occurring at different points of time could not have a single apūrva; hence each group has a distinct Apūrva of its own, the two Apūrvas

- combining to produce the final $Phal\bar{a}p\bar{u}rva$; and each of these distinct $Ap\bar{u}rvas$ is call a $samud\bar{a}y\bar{a}p\bar{u}rva$;
- (3) the Utpattyapūrva;—i.e. the three Apūrvas following from each of the three sacrifices forming the Darsha group: these three Apūrvas lead to the Samudāyāpūrva of the 'Paurnamāsa' group, which leads to the final Phalāpūrva;
- (4) the Angāpūva;—each of these sacrifices of the group is made up of a number of minor sets, each of which in its turn, must have a distinct Apūrva of its own; as otherwise the act could not help in the final Phalāpūrva.]

ADHIKARANA (3): Division of Acts into 'Primary' and 'Secondary'.

SŪTRA (6).

THEY (VERBS AND ACTS DENOTED BY THEM) ARE OF TWO KINDS—
SECONDARY AND PRIMARY.

Bhāsua.

[From the foregoing Adhikaraṇa it would appear as if there were an Apūrva resulting from every act. In order to remove this misconception, the author now proceeds to point out the division of Acts into 'secondary' and 'primary',—the idea being that it is only the Primary Act that directly brings about an Apūrva, the Secondary Act only helps the Primary.]

It has been understood that Bhāvashabdas (Verbs) are expressive of Acts. As a matter of fact, however, there are several kinds of Verbs,—such as 'yajati' ('sacrifices'), 'juhoti' ('pours the libation'), 'dadāti' ('gives'); also several of such other kinds as 'dogdhi' ('milks'), 'pinaṣṭi' ('pounds'), 'vilāvayadti' ('melts'), and so forth.

With regard to these Verbs, there arises the question—Are all these verbs expressive of a Primary Act? Or, are some expressive of only a preparatory (secondary) Act?

The Pūrvapakṣa on this point is that—"inasmuch as all are equally 'bhāvārtha', verbs expressive of activity, they are all expressive of Primary Acts".

In answer to this we have the following Siddhānta:—Verbs are to be classed under two heads—some are expressive of Primary Acts, others are expressive of preparatory (secondary) Acts. Even so, all these acts would be useful; and a useful purpose being thus served by all of them, there would be no justification for the assuming of an Apūrva following from all. Thus then all verbs are not expressive of Primary Acts.

Adhikarana (3A): Definition of the Primary Act. SŪTRA (7).

Those acts are 'Primary' which are not meant to be productive (or preparatory) of material substances; because the material substance is a subordinate factor.

Bhāsya.

Says the Opponent—"It is true that according to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing Adhikarana, there would be need for assuming fewer transcendental potencies; and to that extent, this view is quite reasonable. But we find no grounds for discrimination as to which Acts lead to Apūrva and which do not."

The answer to this is that those verbs that denote such acts as are not meant to be preparatory or productive of a material substance are 'Primary'—i.e. expressive of Primary Acts,—because the material substance is a sub-ordinate factor; i.e. the material substance is a secondary factor, being subservient to the accomplishment of the Act, which is what is most desired.

Adhikarana (3B): Definition of the Secondary (Subsidiary) Act.

SŪTRA (8).

Those, on the other hand, that are meant to be productive (or preparatory) of a material substance are to be regarded as 'subsidiary'; because in regard to these, the material substance is the dominant factor.

Bhāsya.

In those cases where the Acts are intended to be productive (or preparatory) of the material substance, the Act should be recognised as subsidiary;—why?—because in the case of such an Act, the material substance would be the dominant factor.—In the case of such acts as are expressed by verbs like 'yajāta' ('should sacrifice'), it is clear that they are not meant to be productive of any material substance; hence verbs like these are expressive of Primary Acts, because in the case of the acts, the material substance is the subordinate factor. But in the case of acts expressed by such verbs as 'pinaști' ('pounds'), it is clear that they are meant to be preparatory of a material substance; hence these verbs are expressive of subsidiary Acts.—This is the ground for differentiation among acts (as to which are, and which are not, productive of the Apūrva).

The purpose served by this differentiation is that Vrihi being the material at the archetypal sacrifice,—and threshing having been laid down as to be done to the Vrihi,—as, at the ectypal sacrifice, the material to be used for the cooked offering is the Priyangu corn,—if according to the Privangu corn,—if according to the Privangu is the prescribed material, it would be a primary set, no portion of which could be left out; so that even at the sacrifice where Priyangu is the prescribed material, it would become necessary to do the 'threshing of the Vrihi', and hence for that purpose, to bring in the Vrihi also; while according to the Siddhānta, the 'threshing of the Vrihi' would be a subsidiary act, meant only to be sanctificatory or preparatory of the particular material Vrihi; so that there would be no need for doing the 'threshing of the Vrihi', or bringing in the Vrihi, at a sacrifice where the prescribed material is Priyangu.

Adhikarana (4): Acts like 'Sammārjana' (Washing) ure not 'Primary'.

SŪTRA (9).

¡PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SO FAR AS THE ELEMENT OF 'DHARMA' IS CON-OERNED, EVERY ACT SHOULD BE 'PEIMARY'; BECAUSE OF NON-ACCOMPLISHMENT (OF ANY MATERIAL SUBSTANCE); AS IN THE CASE OF PRAVIJA''.

Bhāsya.

[The general principles of differentiation of acts into 'Primary' and 'Subsidiry' having been laid down, the author now proceeds to deal with the case of a few particular acts.]

We meet with such texts as 'Srucham sammārsti.—Agnim sammārsti,—Paridhim sammārsti,—Purodāsham paryagnikaroti'. (Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa 3.3.1).—In regard to these there arises the question—Are the two acts that are spoken of here—viz. Washing and Taking round the Fire—'primary' or 'subsidiary'?

The Pūrvapakṣa on this question is as follows:—"The mere act—i.e. to the extent that it does not suffice to fulfill the visible purpose (of bringing about a material substance)—is what we call 'the element of Dharma'; and this should be a 'primary' act;—why?—because of non-accomplishment of any help; i.e. an Act of this kind does not render any help to the material substance; it is only when an act of this kind accomplishes a material substance that it is regarded as 'subsidiary'; and as it is only an act of this latter kind that is 'subsidiary', the act under consideration must be regarded as 'primary'."

SŪTRA (10).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—BUT THE ACT IN QUESTION SHOULD BE OF THE SAME CHARACTER AS OTHERS; BECAUSE OF SIMILARITY IN THE TEXTS.

IBAIS.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The particle 'va' ('but') sets aside the Pūrvapakṣa.

Acts of the kind that are under consideration should be of the same character as other subsidiary acts,—such as the Threshing of Vrihi;—why?—because of the similarity in the texts;—i.e. in all these texts (speaking of the acts) we find the same Accusative ending in connection with the terms denoting material substances; for instance, just as we have the Accusative ending in the word 'wrihin', in the text 'Vrihin avahanti' (T. B. 3, 2, 5, 6) which enjoins the act of threshing,—so have we also in the word 'agmin' in the injunction 'Agmin sammärsti', and in the word 'wwordisham' in the

injunction 'Purodāsham paryagnikaroti'.—"Is there any such rule as that the Accusative ending is to be found only in connection with material substances mentioned in texts injunctive of subsidiary acts,—on the basis of which rule, you conclude the acts in question to be subsidiary, from the fact that these also contain the Accusative ending?"—Certainly not, we reply. What we mean is that the Accusative ending has been declared to convey the idea of 'what is most desired by the Agent',—that the same Accusative ending is found in the words in question,—hence it follows that what is signified by the term with that ending is 'what is most desired',—if that is the 'most desired' (and as such, the dominant factor), then the Act mentioned in the text must be a 'subsidiary' one.—Though it is true that the 'subsidiary character' of Acts is not cognisable by such Means of Cognition as Sense-perception and the like,—yet it is cognised by means of 'Word'.—From all this it follows that the Acts under question are 'subsidiary'.—From all this it

SUTRA (11).

[Objection]—" But (in many cases) there is injunction of the material substance (as the subordinate factor)",—if this be urged [then the answer is as in the following Sütra].

Bhāsya.

Says the Opponent—"Evidently your view is that—inasmuch as the word has the Accusative ending, the substance (signified by it) must be the predominant factor.—But this is not right, because we find the Accusative ending also in words which denote the substance as the subordinate factor;—e.g. in such texts as 'Saktin juhoti' (T. S. 3. 3. 8. 4), 'Mānutam juhoti',' [where the material substances Saktu and the rest are distinctly subordinate to the action of Homa]''.

SÜTRA (12):

[Answer]—Not so; because, in reality [the Accusative ending always indicates the predominant factor],

—as is found to be the case in common farlance; and it is only in special cases

that that factor may be taken as subservient, on account of its subserving the purposes of the Act.

Bh**ā**ṣya.

As a matter of fact, the Accusative ending never indicates the subordinate factor; learned people have taught us that (a) 'The Accusative case-ending signifies the objective' (Pāṇini 2. 3. 2), and (b) 'The objective is that which is most desired by the Agent' (Pāṇini 1. 4. 49).—In common parlance also we do not find the Accusative ending indicating a subordinate factor. Even in such instances as—(a) 'Tandulān odanam pacha' ('Prepare cooked rice of these rice'), what is meant is 'Prepare this rice for the

purpose of obtaining cooked rice'; so that it is the rice (to be prepared) which is still 'what is most desired'; similarly in the sentence 'Balvajān shikhandakān kuru' ('Make bundles of straws'), it is the straws themselves tied up in the form of bundles that are 'what is most desired'. The significance of words is determined by common, not Vedic, usage.—In common parlance also when the verb 'juhoti' ('offers into the Fire') is used along with a word with the Accusative ending, it is possible to say that the Accusative ending indicates 'what is most desired'; for instance, in the sentence 'Tandulān juhudhi' ('Offer the rice into the Fire'), the idea intended to be conveyed may be 'Relate the rice to the act of offering into fire' and many such others.—It has already been declared that it is not right to attribute several meanings to a single word

Thus then, it having been established that the Accusative ending indicates the predominant factor, it would be only in very special cases (where the said indication of the predominant factor would be impossible) that it could be assumed to indicate the subservient factor.

Question.—"But in the Veda, how could the subservient factor be indicated by the Accusative ending?"

Answer .- In fact, wherever the Accusative ending is used, the idea conveyed to us is always that of the predominant factor :- and when this predominance has been comprehended, it might be denied only if there were some stronger authority for such denial .- "How?"-Well, in the case of the text 'saktūn juhoti', the Accusative ending in 'saktūn' points to the saktu, Meal, as the predominant factor, -by which the meaning of the text would be that 'the act of offering into fire should be made to subserve some purpose for the Meal'; but in reality it is found that the act of offering cannot in any way serve any purpose for the Meal; -why ?--for the simple reason that the Meal can have no purpose of its own; in fact, we do not see, or hear of, any purpose that the Meal may have. Under the circumstances, if the Act of offering into Fire were to be taken as subserving some purpose for the Meal, that Act itself would have to be regarded as purposeless (aimless, useless). [Thus in this case, if we insist upon the direct signification of the Accusative ending as indicating the predominant factor, we find that a Vedic injunction becomes useless. -And yet as a matter of fact, the act of offering into Fire is one that actually serves as an indirect (remote) aid to the Primary Act of the Jvotistoma, and as such must be useful; and this usefulness of the act in question follows from the fact of the text occurring in the context of the Juotistoma; hence it cannot be said that the Act is useless; specially it is something needed by the text laying down the entire method of procedure of the Primary Act (Jyotistoma) .- "[What you say regarding the act of offering into Fire may be said regarding the Meal also] :- the Meal also, being mentioned in the same context, may have its use (and as such may be treated as the predominant factor)."-Who says that the Meal has no use; it is certainly of use; but it is of use only as tending to the fulfilment of the act of offering into Fire (for which a material is necessary), -and not in any other manner. -"But the Meal also is needed by the text laying down the entire method of procedure of the Primary Act (Jyotistoma)."-Our answer to this is that

a material substance is not what is needed by the method of procedure; what the Method of Procedure needs is only a detail of the method; and it is the act of offering into Fire, and not the material substance Meal, which is a detail of the Method .- "But when the offering into Fire is done with the Meal, a transcendental potency would result from the Meal."-There is no authority for this .- "The Accusative ending would be the requisite authority."-The Accusative ending does not indicate the fact of the act of offering into Fire subserving the purposes of the Meal.-" As the Meal itself serves no useful purpose, the act of offering into Fire would naturally subserve the purpose of the Meal, as thus would the Meal become related to the act of offering into Fire; as it is only when the offering into Fire has been made that the Meal (offered) becomes related to the act of offering into Fire."-If the Meal is something useless, then it is not possible for the act of offering into Fire to subserve the purpose of the Meal. The mere declaration of the act subserving the purposes of the Meal would be of no use either to the Agent or to the Sacrifice; so that it would still remain useless; because merely on the strength of the said declaration, it would not be possible to assume its use to either (the Agent or the Sacrifice).-Under the circumstances, we conclude that what the word with the Accusative ending ('saktūn') does is only to indicate the connection of the Meal-(saktu) with the act of offering into Fire; and whenever a material substance becomes related to an act, it can be so related only in a subordinate capacity, because it is an accomplished entity (and as such must be subservient to the act to be accomplished); and being so subordinate, it should be spoken of by a word with the Instrumental ending ('saktubhih juhoti'); -that is why it is asserted that in the text 'saktūn juhoti', the Accusative ending has been used in place of the Instrumental.

This is what is meant by the word 'tadarthatvät' (in the Sūtru), which means that, insamuch as the Meal subserves the purposes of the Act of offering into Fire, it cannot be regarded as the predominant factor, even though it is spoken of by a word with the Accusative ending. It is only thus that the declaration ('saktūn juhoti') could serve a useful purpose; and when it is found to serve a useful purpose, it cannot be said to be useless or aimless.

It is in this same manner that material substances, like the Cake, become subservient to the sacrifice and thereby serve a useful purpose.

Such being the case, the 'preparation' (sanctification) of the material substances also comes to serve a useful purpose.—If it be urged that "it serves no visible purpose",—then the answer is that, in that case it could be taken as serving an invisible (transcendental) purpose; because we find even in ordinary life that there is invisible 'preparation' (sanctification) also; for instance, when men come from other villages, the Fire is carried round, which is said to be productive of an invisible (transcendental) beneficial effect; and there can be no incongruity in what is actually found in ordinary experience.

The use of this Adhikarana is as follows:—(a) In connection with the Varumapraghāsa sacrifices (which have the Dashapūrnamāsa as their archetype) it is laid down that 'The sruks should be made of the Shami-wood, or of gold'; in the Archetypal Sacrifice, the Apūrva is brought about by the 'scouring' of the Sruks made of several kinds of wood; hence at the Varunapraghāsa, according to the Pūrvapaksa, Sruks made of several kinds of wood should have to be brought up for the purpose of 'scouring' (which is the predominant factor to which the Sruk is subservient, according to the Pūrvapaksa); while according to the Siddhanta (by which the scouring is subservient to the Sruk), only the Sruks made of Shami-wood or of gold have to be scoured. (b) Similarly, the Paridhi having been enjoined as tobe made 'with spokes', Paridhis made of Palasha-wood would have to be made for the purpose of being 'scoured', according to the Pūrvapaksa; while according to the Siddhanta only Paridhis with spokes should have to be 'scoured'.—(c) Again, in connection with the Avabhrtha, according to the Pūrvapaksa, the fire would have to be produced for the purpose of being 'stirred' while according to the Siddhanta, the Water only should have to be 'stirred'.-(d) Lastly, we read that at the Sattrinshatsamvatsara sacrifice, the Savaniya cakes are to be 'made of meat'; and according to the Pūrvapaksa, cakes of flour would have to be got ready for the purpose of being 'circumambulated by the Fire', while according to the Siddhanta, the circumambulating by the Fire' should be done to the meat-cakes themselves.

[This explanation of the use of the Adhikarana has not been accepted by Kunsrila, who has supplied a different explanation. See Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 538–541.]

Adhikarana (5): The 'primary' character of the Stuti and Shastra Hymns.

SŪTRA (13).

[Pŭrvaparṣa]—"The 'Stotra' and 'Shastra' hymns are sanctificatory in their character,—like the 'Yājyā' hymns as they are indicative of deities".

Bhāsya.

[It has been declared under Sütras 7 and 8 that those acts are to be regarded as 'subsidiary' which are preparatory or productive of material substances, and that those that are not so preparatory or productive are 'primary' acts. It is by way of an exception to this general principle that we have the present Adhikuwana.

"'Stotra" is the name given to the hymns consisting of Mantras that are set to music and sung; and 'Shastra' is the name given to those consisting of Mantras that are not set to music or sung.]

We have the texts—(a) 'Pra-ugam shainsati', (b) 'Nişkëvalyam shainsati' [each of these enjoining the reciting of a Shastra-hymn];—and (c) 'Ajyaih stuvatë', (d) 'Pṛṣthaih stuvatë' [each of which enjoins the reciting of a Stotra-hymn].—These hymns are descriptive of qualities, and are sung (as Stotra) or recited (as Shastra); an example of such hymns we have the Mantra 'Indrasya tu vēryāni pravocham, etc.' (Rgveda 1. 36.1) [which speaks of the good qualities of Indra].

Now, with regard to this Mantra descriptive of the good qualities (of Indra), there arises the question—Is this subsidiary (and subordinate) to the deity, or is it 'primary' in character?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa—"The Stotra and Shastra hymns are sanctificatory acts;—why?—because they are indicative of deities; i.e. when the mantras descriptive of certain qualities are recited, they point to the deity possessing those qualities; if it were not so, it would not be descriptive of qualities; in fact, there is a clear indication of the deity in this case; and through this indication of the Deity, there is a clear aid inparted to the act of sacrifice (to that deity), which act thus becomes accomplished.—For these reasons, the acts under question should be regarded as sanctificatory in their character, 'like the Yājyā mantras'; that is, just as the mantras spoken of in the text 'Yājyāmanvāha-Puronwākyāmanvāha' are descriptive of qualities and serve the useful purpose of indicating deities, so also the hymn under discussion".

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT IN THAT CASE THE MANTRA WOULD BE TAKEN
AWAY FROM ITS SPHERE BY THE PURPOSE (SERVED BY IT):
BECAUSE IT WOULD BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE NAME
OF THE DEITY MENTIONED IN IT.

Bhāsua.

If the reciting of the Stotra and Shastra hymns were a sanctificatory act, then it would be taken away from its sphere by the purpose served by it:

because it would be subservient to the name of the deity which is mentioned in the mantra; i.e. the mantra would be subservient to the purposes of the Deity; and as, in that case the Deity would be the predominant factor, the mantra would have to be taken away to that sacrifice where that Deity would be the recipient of the offering; and this would go against the indications of 'Order' and 'Position' (whereby the mantra has to be used at a different sacrifice).—For these reasons the view set forth in the Pūrvapakṣa is open to objection, and as such, should be rejected.—"Which is the particular mantra (in connection with which the contingency pointed out would arise)?"—It is the mantra 'Abhi tvā shūra, etc.' (Mā. Sa. 27. 35) which is called the 'Aindra Pragātha' (Hymn sacred to Indra);—this mantra, though occurring in proximity to (in the context of) the sacrificing of the Māhendra Cup (cup dedicated to Mahēndra), would have to be taken away to that sacrifice where Indra (not Mahēndra) would be the deity.

SŪTRA (15).

[Objection]—"But (in the instance cited) the word would serve the purpose of pointing to a qualification; just like the word 'vashā' ('barren')'".

Bhāsya.

[Says the Pürvapaksin]—"We shall not reject the Pürvapaksa view: in fact, we reiterate the view that the reciting of the Stotra and Shastra hymns is a sanctificatory act, simply because the mantras are indicative of deities .-As regards the argument that 'under this view the Aindra Pragatha (mantra 'Abhi tvā shūra, etc.') would have to be taken away from its sphere',-our answer is that there would be no such contingency; because even the word 'indra' would denote the deity Mahendra; as it is the same deity Indra who, when qualified by the quality of greatness (mahan), is called 'Mahendra' [and Mahendra would not be a different deity from Indra]; in fact, the term 'indra' (as occurring in the compound word 'Mahendra') clearly denotes the particular deity (Indra), and the term 'mahat' (as occurring in the same compound) as clearly denotes the quality of Greatness [so that the name 'mahendra' only means the Great Indra]; just as in the case of the terms 'Rājā' (King), 'Mahārāja' (Great King)-and 'Brāhmana', 'Mahābrāhmana' (Great Brāhmana).—This case would be analogous to that of the term 'vashā', 'barren'; in the text 'Sā vā ēsā sarvadevatyā yat ajāvashāvāyavyāmālabheta' ('This barren-goat is sacred to all deities—one should kill it as an offering to Vāyu'; T. S. 3. 4. 3. 2),—the term 'ajā vashā' ('barren-goat') points to the same 'goat' which has been mentioned in connection with the enjoined sacrifice; similarly where the qualified deity (Mahendra, Great Indra) is enjoined, it would be understood as the deity denoted by the term without the qualifying term (i.e. 'indra'). Thus then, there would be no 'taking away' of the mantra from its sphere (as urged by the Siddhantin, under Su. 14)."

SŪTRA (16).

[Answer]—That cannot be; as it forms an integral part of the Vedic Text.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

What has been urged by the Pūrvapakṣin is not possible;—in the case of the term 'māhendra-graha' ('the cup dedicated to Mahendra'). that the 'cup' meant is 'that of which Indra is the Deity' could be signified only by the presence of the nominal affix (in the term 'mahendra'); but as a matter of fact, this nominal affix would not be possible if what is denoted by the term 'indra' (as occurring in the compound 'mahendra') stood in need of being construed along with the greatness (denoted by the term 'mahat' as occurring in the compound 'mahendra'); [what is meant is that the word 'mahendra' cannot be taken in its literal sense of 'great-Indra', as if so taken, it would be incapable of taking the nominal affix in its compounded form; as in the operation of compounds, as also in that of nominal affixes, the capability of the terms concerned is essential; if then the term 'mahendra' were explained as 'mahān indro devatā yasya', "that of which the Great-Indra is the deity", then this essential 'capability' would be wanting; because if the chief stress is laid upon the factor of 'greatness' as needed by 'Indra'. then the word 'indra' would become 'incapable' of taking the nominal affix, which would have to go with 'mahat', an impossibility.-If, on the other hand, stress were laid upon the nominal affix, then there would be no connection with 'greatness'.-Tantravārtika-Trans., pp. 544-545]. Nor on the other hand, would it be possible to have the compound by connecting the term 'indra' with 'mahat', if the former stood in need of, and were taken along with, the nominal affix. [That is to say, if the word 'indra' is first taken along with the nominal affix, it takes the broadened form 'aindra': then as regards the quality of 'greatness' denoted by the term 'mahat', it could have no connection with the term 'indra' which occupies only a secondary position in the term 'aindra'; so that the term 'mahat' would have to go with 'aindra', not with 'indra', and the resultant form would be 'mahaindra' not 'mahendra', and the qualification of 'greatness' would have no connection with Indra.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 546].— Thus then, if the term 'indra' is taken up with the nominal affix, it can have no connection with 'greatness', while if it is taken up with 'greatness' and compounded with it, it can have no connection with the nominal affix. [That is, if the functioning of the compound and that of the Nominal Affix were explained separately, one after the other, then, inasmuch as the terms would have to be repeated oftentimes, it would involve a syntactical split.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 546].—Nor is it possible to have a single construction including the functioning of the compound as well as that of the Nominal Affix (as mahān indro dēvatā yasya'); as that would involve the incongruity that the same Indra would, in one instance, be something not already predicated and thus connect itself for the sake of its own predication, with the nominal affix,—and in the other, it would be something

already predicated and hence only referred to for the purpose of being connected with greatness.

Then again, as a matter of fact, the object Mahēndra—the Great-Indra (as the deity to whom the cup is dedicated)—is something quite distinct from Indra, who is the deity to whom the offering is made; so that both of them could not be spoken of by means of the word 'mahēndra' uttered only once.

From all this it follows that the deity $Mah\bar{e}ndra$ is not the same as $Indra\ qualified\ by\ greatness$; and in the term ' $mah\bar{e}ndra$ ', the nominal affix is added to the term ' $mah\bar{e}ndra$ '; from this also it follows that the basic noun (' $mah\bar{e}ndra$ ') has a distinct connotation of its own as one composite whole, and its connotation does not consist of the connotation of its component parts (' $mah\bar{a}n$ ' and 'Indra').—Thus the conclusion being that $Mah\bar{e}n$ ·dra is a deity distinct from Indra, the Anindra- $Prag\bar{a}tha$ would have to be taken away from its sphere (as urged in Sūtra 14, above). Consequently the $P\bar{u}rvupakşa$ view has got to be rejected.

It has been argued that the name 'Mahēndra' as applied to Indra signifies the greatness that accrued to him after his killing Vṛṭṭra;—as clearly declared in the text 'He who killed Vṛṭṭra became great' (Ai. Brā. 3. 21). But if this were so, then it would involve the incongruity of the Veda being regarded as having a beginning in time [i.e. the argument would imply that the Vedic text quoted came to be written after Indra had killed Vṛṭṭra].

From all this we conclude that Indra is distinct from Mahēndra.

SUTRA (17).

Also because the two names are mentioned separately.

$Bhar{a}sya.$

We find a separate mention of the two names, in the two mantras—(a) 'Bahadugdhindrāya dēvēbhyo havīḥ' (T. B. 3. 2. 38), and (b) 'Bahadugdhi mahēndrāya dēvēbhyo havīḥ' (Mā. Sh. S. 1. 1. 3. 29). From this also it follows that the two are distinct deities; if they were one and the same, then these two mantras would have been optional alternatives (which they are not).

SŪTRA (18).

THE MENTION OF THE QUALIFICATION ALSO WOULD BE USELESS.

Bhāsya.

When the Injunctive word itself provides the notion that Indra is the deity of the particular sacrifice, what would be the use of mentioning the qualification—that 'greatness' is the quality of Indra [according to the view that Mahēndra is the same as Indra qualified by greatness]?—In fact, whenever a deity is indicated, it is only for the purpose of showing how the offering is to be made to that deity; and the offering is made to the Deity even when its qualification is mentioned, and it is made to the same deity, even when the qualification is not mentioned; so that the mention of the qualification can serve no useful purpose—If it be argued that the idea

conveyed by the mention of the qualification is that "that Indra who is related to this cup is great",—then, that also cannot be right; because (apart from the text in question itself) any connection between the cup and Indra is entirely unknown; and hence no qualification could be mentioned in reference to that which is not known. Further, any connection between the qualification (and Indra) also being unknown, any characterisation (of Indra) by means of that qualification is not possible.—For this reason also Mahēndra should be a totally different deity from Indra.

SUTRA (19).

So also the mention of the two 'Yajya' and the 'Puroruch' Mantras.

Bhāsya.

It is only in accordance with the Siddhānta view that the distinctive mention of the two 'Yājyā-Puronuvākyā' mantras becomes justifiable; for instance, the mantras, 'Ēndra sānasim rayim, etc.' (Taitiriya Samhitā 3. 4. 11. 3) constitute the two 'Yājyā-Puronuvākyā' mantras sacred to Indra; and the mantras 'Mahān indro ya ojasā, etc.' (Rgveda 5. 8. 9) constitute the 'Yājyā-Puronuvākyā' sacred to Mahāndra. If Indra and Mahāndra were one and the same, these two sets of mantras would have to be regarded as optional alternatives; so that under one alternative course, one set would be rejected.

[Āshvalāyana, Shrauta-sutra 1. 5. 10. 5. 4, states that there are seven rk-verses included under the name 'Puroruch'; no such rks are found in the Raywed Samhitā. There is a separate Adhyāya called 'Nivid-Kuntāpa' which contains the Puroruch verses; but these are not in any way connected with the Yājyā; while the Puroruch verses are to be recited on the occasion of the repetition of what is known as the 'Pra-uga Shastra'. Hence the commentators have interpreted the name 'puroruch' as standing for 'puronuākyā'.—Kunte: Saddarshanachintanikā.]

SŪTRA (20).

As regards the term 'vashā' (Barren), what is expressed by it actually forms part of the sacrifice.

Bhāsya.

It has been urged (by the Pūrvapaksin, under Sū. 15) that though the animal laid down in connection with the enjoined act is the 'barren-goat', yet in actual practice it is the mere (unqualified) goat that is used [so that there is no distinction made between the 'goat' and the 'barren goat'; similarly there is no distinction between 'Indra' and 'Mahāndra'].—That is only right because in the case of the term 'vashā', we perceive that what is denoted actually does form an integral part of the sacrificial act; as is clear from the text 'Chhāgasya vapāyā mēdasonubrūhi' (cf. Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 3. 6. 8); from which it is clear that the 'vashā' (barren-goat) is the same as the 'chhāga' (goat).—Thus then, it is clear that if the Stotra and Shastra are merely sanctificatory, then, the Aināra-Pragūtha has to be

taken away from its sphere; for this reason they should be regarded as 'primary'.

SŪTRA (21).

[Objection]—"[There may be a taking away of the Hymn]

TO WHERE (MERE INDRA MAY BE THE DEITY); BUT THAT

SHOULD BE SO, IF IT SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE."

Bhāsya.

The particle 'vā' ('but') sets aside the view expressed above.—"In reality the Stotra and Shastra are sanctificatory acts. As for the taking away of the Aindra-Pragātha,—let it be carried over to the sacrifice where Indra is the deity; [it is only right that it should be so], as it is only right that what is indicated by the Indicative Power of the words of the text should set aside what is indicated by Order and Position."

SŪTRA (22).

[Answer]—This should not be so in the case of such Mantras as are directly laid down in the Veda.

Bhāsya.

As a matter of fact, in the case of many Mantras, we find that, if they are taken away from their sphere, they serve no useful purpose in the sphere to which they are carried over,—and that if so carried over, they become entirely useless. Such is the case with the Mantras mentioned in the following texts:—(a) 'Yāmyāh shamsanti', (b) 'Shipiviṣlavatīm shamsanti', (c) 'Piydevatyāh shamsati', (d) 'Agnimārutē', (e) 'Kusumbhaka-sūktam', (f) 'Aksasūktam', (g) 'Mūṣikāsūktam' and such others.

[The mantrus referred to here are to be recited on the occasion of the third Soma-Extraction of the Agmissoma sacrifice. They constitute the Agminanoti-shestra described in the Aitareya Brāhmana (3.35). In the case of the Mantrus spoken of as 'yāmyāh' in the text 'Yāmyāh shamsanh', it is found that, inasmuch as Yama is not the deity of the other Cups,—if the mantrus laid down in that context were to be taken away from there, they could not point to that deity; and as in that case the very injunction of these would become useless, it would be necessary to admit the fact of their leading to transcendental results.]

SŪTRA (23).

[OBJECTION]—"BUT IT IS ACTUALLY SEEN".

Bhāsya.

[Says the Opponent)—"What we assert is that all the mantras referred to have their use (even on being taken away from their own context):—
for instance, (a) the Mandūka-hymn is of use in connection with the Fire
(which has to be drawn in with the said hymn),—(b) the Akṣa-hymn is of
use at the Rājasūya (where the gambling is done with the Akṣa, Dice),—
(c) the Mūṣikā-hymn is of use at the Ekādashinī [where the Mantra 'Akhustā,
etc.' eulogises a certain spot];—(d) all the mantras have their use at the

Vāchastoma, as declared in the text 'Sarvā rohah sarvāni 'yajumṣi sarvāni sāmāni vāchastomē';—(e) similarly the Pāriplava-Ākhyāna is of use at the Ashvamādha;—(f) in connection with the Āshvina Sacrifice it is said—'Yasyāshvinē shasyamānē sūryo nodiyūdapi sarvā dāshatayīramubrūyāt [i.e. 'in case the sun does not rise when the Āshvina Shastra is being recited all the Rk. verses should be recited by way of expiation'—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 559].—From all this it is clear that Mantras carried away from their context do serve distinctly useful purposes.—Consequently the reciting of the Stotra and Shastra hymns should be regarded as sanctificatory in character'.

SŪTRA (24).

[Answer]—In reality however, on account of the actual presence (of the Gentive, Locative and other endings) in the Veda, the 'Stotra' and the 'Shastra' appearing in their own context should lay down the coming about of the Transcendental Potency

[and hence should be regarded as 'Primary' in their character].

Bhāsya.

In reality the reciting of the 'stotra' and 'shastra' must be regarded as 'primary' acts;—why?—because of 'the presence in the Veda, etc.'—In the Vedic texts we find the presence of the Locative ending;—for instance, 'Kavatīṣu stuvatē', 'Shipiviṣṭavatīṣu stuvatē' (cf. Taitti. Sam. 7. 5. 5. 2);—here the presence of the Locative ending (in 'kavatīṣu' or 'shipistavatīṣu') would be justifiable only if the mantra were taken as purely eulogistic, and as such subsisting in the letters composing the Mantra; on the other hand, if it were indicative of the Deity, then the Kavatīs (Sāms. S. 1. 169) should have been spoken of as the instrument (by means of the Instrumental ending), and not with the Locative ending.

There is another 'presence in the Veda', of such texts as 'Pra-ugam chamaati', 'Nişkevalıyam shamaati'; which shows that the mantras spoken of are to be used for the purpose of praising; and words descriptive of qualities used for the purpose of praising would bring about a transcendental result; and as such the reciting of these should be regarded as 'primary'.

There is yet another 'presence in the Veda',—of the Genitive case-ending; e.g. in the text 'Indrasya tu viryāni pravocham, etc.' (Taitti. Brā. 2. 5. 4. 1). Here the name of the deity (Indra) has been mentioned for the purpose of connecting him with the eulogy contained in the mantra; if it were meant to serve the purpose of indicating the Deity (of a sacrifice), then the word would have taken the Nominative ending; as in that case, the sense intended to be conveyed would be that of the basic noun by itself (independently of all relationship to other things).—" But even a word with the Nominative ending could denote something for the sake of the deity (and not

the deity itself); as we find in the case of the text 'Indro yato-vasitasya rājā, etc.' (Rgveda 1. 32. 15)."-Not so, we reply; because such words also would serve the purpose of praising, by virtue of their syntactical position in the sentence.-" But the indicative power of the words would be more powerful than their syntactical connection."-True; but what we assert would also be pointed to by the indicative power of the words,-this 'power' consisting in the capacity of the word to supply the requirements of the eulogistic sentence which is wanting in certain respects .- "Even so, when both the conclusions are pointed to by the indicative power of words, how could the truth be determined?"-From the supplementary passages, it is clear that the word is not expressive of the Deity.-If the word were intended to be expressive of the Deity, then the sentence conveying the sense of praise would remain defective and purposeless.-From all this it follows that the sentence conveying the sense of praise serves the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result, and consequently the reciting of the Stotra and Shastra hymns is a 'primary' act.

Further, the words 'stauti' and 'shamsati' are directly expressive of good qualities, and it is only through indirect indication that they could point to delities. Therefore [as this latter view involves recourse to indirect indication], the hymns should be taken as 'laying down the coming about of the transcendental potency—Aptirva'—[and as such should be regarded as 'primary' in their character].

SUTRA (25).

Also because the distinctness is implied by the words (of the Veda).

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, distinctness is implied by the words of the Veda; for instance, we have the Vedic text speaking of 'the Agnistoma sacrifice as accompanied by twelve Stotra and Shastra hymns'; if those hymns were not distinct, their number could never be Twelve; as the act of reciting or singing of the stotras and shastras would be one only. If, on the other hand, distinctness is admitted, then the number 'twelve' becomes secured.

[If each of the hymns were not meant to be distinct, and if all of them were taken as equally serving the one purpose of indicating the deity for the sacrifice, then, there would be no point in mentioning the number 'twelve'. If, in order to justify the mention of this number 'twelve', each word of the hymns were taken as indicating a distinct deity, then the number of such decities would be innumerable, not only 'twelve'.—On the other hand, if the reciting of the Hymns is a 'primary' act, then the reciting of each hymn would bring about a distinct Aphra; and if the number of these Aphras is 'twelve', the number of the Hymns also should be 'twelve', as each action leading to a definite result is counted as 'one.' And as regards the question as to what act can lead to an Aphra, the Veda is our sole authority; and according to the Veda, from the point that the reciting commences to the point where it halts, it is to be regarded as one act; and from the point of the re-starting of the reciting to the point of

the next halt, it would be the second act; and so on, in the case in question, the number of these recitings is twelve, as leading to twelve Apūrus. In this case there is no justification for taking each single verse as a distinct act, by which the number of acts would become more than 'twelve'.—
Trantravārtika—Trans., p. 5621.

SŪTRA (26).

Then again, the mention of it (again) would be useless. $Bh\tilde{a}sya.$

In connection with the Agnistut, we have the text 'Āgnēyā vai grahā barvanti'; and then again, we have the further text 'Āgnēyīṣu shamsanti, āgnēyīṣu stwanti'. Now this latter text lays down the reciting of the Stotra and Shastra in connection with certain things connected with Agni (Āgnēyī); the reciting herein laid down would be useless (superfluous), if the reciting were a sanctificatory act (and indicated only deities). For this reason also the recitings should be regarded as 'primary' acts.

SŪTRA (27.)

THE THING ITSELF IS RECOGNISED TO BE DIFFERENT.

Bhāsya.

In the Veda we find the text 'Sambaddhē vai stotrashastrē vā'; now this 'sambandha,' connection, relationship, between the 'stotra' and 'shastra' is possible only if the 'stotra' is something different from the 'shastra';—and the 'stotra' can be something different from the 'shastra' only if each of them is indicative of an Apūra; otherwise (if both signified the single deity, Indra), the 'stotra' would be the same thing as the 'shastra'.

SŪTRA (28).

THERE IS SIGNIFICATION ALSO, AS IN THE CASE OF OTHER (PRIMARY) ACTS.

Bhāṣya.

In the texts in question, 'Pra-ugam shamsati', 'Niskevalyam shamsati', there is signification (of a primary act), by the Accusative ending (in 'pra-ugam' and 'niskevalyam').

SŪTRA (29).

THERE IS FULFILMENT OF RESULTS ALSO (MENTIONED).

Bhāsya.

We find in the Veda also the mention of the fulfilment of results, (proceeding from the act of reciting the 'stotra' and 'skastra' hymns);—e.g. in such mantras as 'Stutusya stutamasi' (T. S. 3. 2. 7. 1). 'Indravanto mansmahi, bhakşimahi prajāmişam sā mē satjāshirjajňasya bhūyāt' (Taitiriya

Samhitā 1. 6. 4. 2), we find a reference to the results that follow from the reciting of the Stotra hymns,—not to those following from the Deity.—For this reason also the recitings of the Stotra and the Shastra are 'primary' acts.

Elsewhere in the Sātra—under Discourse X (Pāda iv, Sūtra 49)—we have dealt with the purpose served by this Adhikaraṇa,—where it has been shown that the deities of the Cups being distinct, the Agent is entitled to the performance (of the act of reciting) only when the reciting of the Stotra and the Shastra is a 'primary' act.

[Kumārila (Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 547-556) has taken exception to the Adhikarana. His contention is that 'Indra' and 'Makāndra' are names of the same deity (p. 552), as in the compound 'Makāndra', the two terms 'mahāt' and 'indra' do not, as the Bhāṣya says, function simultaneously; and by the gradual functioning of these two terms what the term 'makāndra' denotes is Indra qualified by greatness. Thus the main position of the Pārvapakṣa being sound, it is necessary to have recourse to another line of argumentation for the effective refutation of that Pārvapakṣa. This line of argumentation, representing Kumārila's Sūdalānta, may be thus summed up:—As a matter of fact, the Deity enters into the sacrifice, not in his material form, but only in its verbal form,—the form in which he is mentioned in the Vedic Injunction; hence, inasmuch as, in the particular act in question, the deity has been mentioned in the injunction in the form of 'Mahāndra', the deity for this act must be Mahāndra, not simply Indra,—even if the two are names of the same Deity. In this sense, and to this extent, Mahāndra and Indra are to be regarded as distinct deities.]

Adhikarana (6): Mantras are not injunctive.

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE INJUNCTION AND THE MANTRA MUST HAVE
THE SAME PURPORT, AS IT IS THE SAME WORD THAT OCCURS
IN BOTH."

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

[It has been held above, in Adhikurana (1) that Verbs serve to enjoin action and Apūrva; and we have dealt with the division of acts into 'Primary' and 'Subsidiary'. We now revert to the original subject, and proceed to consider if all verbs occurring in the Veda—in the injunctive passages, etc., and in Mantra texts—are injunctive; as the purpose of the Discourse is only to differentiate among such actions as are enjoined by Vedic texts.]

There is the text—'Na tā nashanti na dabhāti taskaro nāsām ā mitro vyathirā dadharsati.—Devāmshcha yābhiryajatē dadāti cha jyog ittābhiḥ sa cha tē gopatiḥ saha' (Taitirīya Brāhmana 2. 4. 6. 11):—The terms to be considered in the present Adhikarana are 'yajatē' and 'dadāti' contained in this mantra;—and the question that arises is—are the verbs (like 'yajatē' and 'dadāti') occurring in the mantra injunctive in the same way as those occurring in Brāhmaṇa-texts?

The Pūrvapakṣa on this question is as follows:—"The verb, occurring in the Brāhmaṇa-injunction and in the mantra, should have one and the same meaning,—'as it is the same word that occurs in both'; and under the circumstances, it is not possible that the same word occurring in the Brāhmaṇa should be injunctive, while occurring in the Mantra it should be unable to enjoin things.—Hence the Mantra also should be regarded as injunctive."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—IN REALITY, INASMUCH AS THE MANTBA FUNCTIONS
ONLY DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT, IT SHOULD BE
EXPRESSIVE OF MERE ASSERTION.

Bhāsya.

The phrase 'api vā' ('in reality') serves to set aside the Pūrvapakṣa view.—Words like those quoted 'should be expressive of mere assertion';—because 'the Mantra functions only during the performance of an act'; that is, it is only while the sacrifice is being performed that the mantra (quoted above) is able to function;—and this function is to 'assert'—speak of, not to enjoin—the acts of Godāna (giving of the cow) and Goyāga (cow-sacrifice);—why so ?—because both these acts are already enjoined elsewhere,—(a) the giving of the cow in course of the injunction of the Sacrificial Fee (which includes the Cow) and the cow-sacrifice at the Anwhandhyā Iṣṭs.—"But the

act as enjoined in the Mantra would be different from those enjoined elsewhere".—That is not possible; because even though the word (the name of the act) be repeated several times, the idea conveyed by it is always one and the same.—If the mantra were taken as expressing commendation (like Arthavāda), then it would be superfluous, as the Sacrifice has already been enjoined by an injunction aided by another commendatory text (Arthavāda).—For these reasons the verb occurring in Mantras quoted above cannot be injunctive.

[Kumārila has taken exception to the above exposition of the Adhikarana, on grounds for which see Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 566-567. According to him, there is no necessity for introducing any mantra in this discussion; and the Adhikarana is to be expounded as follows:—Verbs have been declared to be injunctive of acts, and acts have been divided into 'primary' and 'subsidiary'; the question that arises now is—Are these,—(1) the enjoining of the primary act, and (2) the enjoining of the subsidiary act—the only functions of the verb? Or is there any other also?—The Pitroppaka view is that there is no third function—The Siddhānta view is that in addition to the aforesaid function, there is yet another function of the verb,—that of simple assertion, which function takes place where the injunctive function is precluded by the presence of another injunctive word.]

[Prabhākars's exposition of this Adhīkarana is thus summed up in the BṛhatīFrom the very nature of Maniras it is clear that they cannot be taken as Injunctions,—being, as they are, entirely devoid of any kind of injunctive word; also
because all Maniras are found to be construable,—either by direct syntactical connection or by indirect implication,—with other passages, which are injunctive. So if
the Maniras themselves were to enjoin another action, there would be two actions
enjoined by what is practically only 'one sentence'.—Nor are the Maniras found to
contain any commendation or condemnation; so they cannot be taken as Arthavāda;—
with all this however, Maniras cannot be regarded as absolutely meaningless or
useless; forming an integral part of the Veda, they must serve some useful purpose,
they must have some meaning, expressing something that is needful in the acts
prescribed by the injunctive passages.]

Adhikarana (7): Definition of 'Mantra.' SŪTRA (32).

THE NAME 'MANTRA' IS APPLIED TO THOSE TEXTS THAT ARE EXPRESSIVE OF THE SAID (ASSERTION, OF THINGS CONNECTED WITH PRESCRIBED ACTS).

Bhāsya.

It has been established that the verbs occurring in mantras are no injunctive. Now it is explained what a 'mantra' is.

Without knowing what a 'mantra' is, how could the verb contained therein be discussed?—So, in reality, the present Adhikarana should have gone before the foregoing one.

The question to be considered in the present Adhikarana is—What is a 'mantra'?

The answer to this is given in the Sūtra—The name 'mantra' is applied to those texts that are expressive of the said 'assertion'. That is to say, it is in regard to those texts which express the 'assertion' (spoken of in Sū. 31), that learned men use the term 'mantras',—in such statements as 'we are reading the mantras', 'we are teaching the mantras', these are mantras' and so forth.

This definition is only illustrative; as there are certain texts which are not expressive of any assertion and are yet called 'mantra',—e.g. the text 'Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhatē' ('Kills Kapiñjala birds for Vasanta' V. S. 24. 20).

It is not possible to indicate each mantra individually scattered here and there; hence some sort of a general definition has been provided. As there is the saying—'Even sages can never come to the end of the enumeration of things individually; but wise men come to the end of things by means of definitions'. [The term'prsthākotam' is thus explained in the Tantravartika, p. 570: Without a definition, the teacher would have to indicate the mantras one by one, and this would be as painful a process as the curvings of the back undergone when several objects around one have to be looked at in different directions.]

The following are examples of Mantras of various kinds:—(a) Those ending in 'asi', e.g. 'Mādhosi, etc.';—(b) those ending in 'tvā', e.g. 'Işā tvorjē, etc.' (Vājasa. Samhitā 1. 1);—(c) benedictory, e.g. 'Ayurdā asi, etc.' (T. S. 1. 6. 6);—(d) Eulogistic, e.g. 'Aynirmārdhā, etc.' (Taittirīya Samhitā 4. 4. 4. 1);—(e) expressive of number, e.g. 'Eko mama, etc.' (Sh. Br. 1. 5. 5. 12;—(f) incoherent talk, e.g. 'Akṣī tē indra piŋgalē dulērius';—(g) bewailing, e.g. 'Ambē ambitā, etc.' (Vājasa. Samhitā 23. 18);—(h) directory, e.g. 'Agnīdagnīn vihara, etc.' (Taittirīya Samhitā 6. 3. 2);—(i) searchung, e.g. 'Kosi katamosi' (V. S. 7. 29);—(j) questioning, e.g. 'Prichhāmi tvā, etc.' (V. S. 13. 61);—(k) descriptive, e.g. 'Iyam vedih, etc.' (V. S. 23. 62);—(l) elliptical extension, e.g. 'Achchhādrēņa pavitrena, etc.' (Taittirīya Samhitā

1. 1. 5. 1);—(m) performance, e.g. 'Traisvaryam chātusvaryam, etc.';—(n) capability, i.e. power of expression.—All this (division of mantras) has been indicated by the Vrttikāra by means of examples.

All this also is merely illustrative (not exhaustive); there are several mantras which have the word 'asi' in the middle (not at the end):-e.g. "Idvashchāsi vandvashcha vājin" (V. S. 29. 3); also some having "tvā" in the middle,-e.g. 'Tattvāyāmi, etc.'-Further in the Brāhmanas also we find the (a) Benedictory texts :- e.g. 'So'kāmayata prajāh srjeya, etc.' :- (b) Eulogistic texts also are found in the Brāhmanas,-e.g. 'Vāyurvai ksepisthādevatā' [Taittiriva Samhitā 2, 1, 1, 1);—(c) incoherent talk,—e.g. 'Na chaitadvidmo brāhmanā vā smo 'brāhmānāh smo vā' (Mait. S. 1. 4. 11);—(d) bewailing, e.g. 'Yē māmadhuksanta te mām pratvamunchanta':-(e) directory.-e.g. 'Amutah somamāhara';—(f) searching,—e.g. 'Iha vā sa iha vā, etc.';—(g) questioning,-e.g. 'Veda karnavatīm sūrmim, etc.';-(h) answer,-e.g. 'Vidmo vā, etc.' ;-(i) Elliptical extension,-e.g. 'Hrdasyāgrvadyate atha jihvāyā atha vaksasi, etc.';-(j) performance,-e.g. 'Traisvaryanchātusvaryancha';-(k) capability.-e.g. 'Sruvēnāvadyati dravēsu, etc.' [So that the description supplied by the Vrttikāra is neither inclusive of all Mantras, nor exclusive of all non-mantras].

There is no necessity for stating the purpose served by propounding a definition, as it is well-known; in fact the knowledge of things obtained by means of a definition is much easier. On this point there is the following saying—"There is no necessity to point out any purpose in the case of (a) objections, (b) exceptions, (c) a prima facie statement, (d) providing a definition, and (e) after-thought';—and the reason for this lies in the fact that (a) in the case of objections, it is necessary to answer them, for the sake of the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Adhikarana; (b) in the case of exceptions, an explanation serves the purposes of the general rule to which the exceptions have been pointed out; (c) in the case of a prima facie statement, there is always the desire to state the final conclusion; and (e) in the case of an after-thought, an explanation serves the purposes of the Adhikarana that has gone before.

In the Veda itself we find the word 'Mantra' whose significance we have been discussing,—e.g. in the text—'Ahè budhniya mantram më qopāya yamrşayastrayividā viduh rchah sāmāni yajūmṣi.' (Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa 1. 2. 1. 26.)

Adhikarana (8): What is a Brāhmaņa? SŪTRA (33).

To the rest (of the Veda) the name 'Brahmaṇa' (is applied).

Bhāsya.

[The Veda has been defined as consisting of 'Mantras and Brāhmaṇas'; the Mantra has been defined; the Brāhmaṇa is defined in the present Adhikaraṇa.]

"What is the definition of the Brāhmaņa?"

'Mantra' and 'Brāhmaṇa' constitute the Veda; of these the Mantra having been defined, it follows naturally that all the rest of the Veda is Brāhmaṇa; so that it is not necessary to provide a definition of the Brāhmaṇa; from the definition of Mantra itself it follows that those parts of the Veda which do not possess the character indicated as differentiating Mantras are 'Brāhmaṇa'; thus it is by the simple process of elimination that we come to know what Brāhmaṇa is.

For the benefit of students however, the Vrttikara has supplied the following details regarding the characteristic features of the Brāhmaṇa:-(1) One abounding in the particle 'iti'; (2) one containing the phrase 'so they say': (3) anecdotal: (4) stating a reason—'Shūrpēna juhoti tena hyannam kriyate' (Shata. Brāhmana 2. 5. 2. 23); (5) Explanatory,- 'Tad dadhno dadhitvam' (Taittiriya Sam. 2. 5. 3. 4); (6) Deprecatory,—' Upavitā vā ētasyāgnayah'; (7) Eulogistic,—' Vāyurvai kṣēpiṣṭhā dēvaṭā' (Taittirīya Samhitā 2. 1. 1): (8) Doubtful.— 'Hotavyam gārhapatyē na hotavyam'; (9) Injunctive,— 'Yajamānasammitā audumbarī bhavati' (cf. T. S. 6. 2. 10. 3); (10) Something done by another, - 'Māsāneva mahyam pachati'; (11) Ancient history,- 'Ulmukairhasma pūrvē samājagmuh'; (12) Assumption of transposition,- 'Yāvatoshvān pratigrhnīyāt, etc.'-On this there is the following saying-'There are ten forms of Brahmana-(1) Statement of reason, (2) Explanatory, (3) Deprecatory, (4) Eulogistic, (5) Doubtful, (6) Injunctive, (7) Act of others, (8) Ancient history, (9) Assumption of transposition, and (10) Analogical; in all Vedas this is the definite characteristic feature of the Vidhi'.

This also is only illustrative (not exhaustive);—because among Mantras also, there are (a) some abounding in the particle 'it';—e.g. 'It' vā it' mā manah, etc.' (Rgveda 10. 119. 1);—(b) some containing the phrase 'so they say',—e.g. 'Bhaqam bhakṣityāha' (R. V. 7. 4.1. 2),—(c) aneodotal,—e.g. 'Ugro ha bhujyam, etc.' (Taitiriya Āranyaka 1. 10. 2);—(d) stating a reason,—e.g. 'Indavo māmushanti hi, etc.' (R. V. 1. 2. 4);—(e) explanatory,—e.g. 'Tasmādāponusthanā, etc.' (Taitiriya Samhitā 5. 6. 1. 3);—deprecatory,—e.g. 'Moghamannam bindate aprachetāh, etc.' (Rgveda 8. 6. 23);—eulogistic,—e.g. 'Agnirmūdhā, etc.' (Taitiriya Samhitā 4. 4. 4); doubtful,—e.g. 'Adhah

svidāsīdupari svidāsīt, etc.' (Rgveda 10. 129. 5); injunctive,—e.g. 'Pṛṇṣūdin-nādhamānāya, etc.' (Rgveda 10. 117. 15);—done by another,—e.g. 'Sahasra-mayutādadat, etc.' (R. V. 8. 21. 18);—ancient history,—e.g. 'Yajāena yajāamayajanta devāl, etc.' (Rgveda 10. 90. 16).

Adhikarana (9): Modifications in Mantras are not 'Mantra'

SŪTRA (34).

THE CHARACTER OF 'MANTRA' DOES NOT BELONG TO THOSE WORDS THAT DO NOT FORM PART OF THE TEXT OF THE VEDA; AS THE AFORESAID DISTINCTION IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE TEXTS THAT ACTUALLY FORM PART OF THE TEXT OF THE VEDA.

Bhāsya.

[(a) The Mantra 'Agnayê två juştam nirvapāmi', which is laid down as one to be employed in connection with an offering it Agni, is modified into 'Suryāya tvā, etc.', when the offering is made to Sūrya; this is an instance of 'Ūha', Modification proper.—(b) When the names of the presiding Rsis of the family of a particular sacrificer are recounted, along with a certain Mantra, it is an instance of 'Pravara'.—(c) When, along with a Mantra, the names of the particular sacrificer, and his son and other descendants are recounted, it is an instance of 'Nāmadhēya'—Tantravārtika—Trans, p. 573].—In regard to these—'Ūha', 'Pravara' and 'Nāmadhēya', there arises the question—Are these to be regarded as 'Mantra'?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is khat, "inasmuch as they are assertive in their character (mentioning things in connection with the sacrifice), they are to be regarded as 'Mantra'".

In answer to this, the Siddhānta view is that those words that do not form part of the Vedic text are not to be regarded as 'Mantra',—even though they be 'assertive' in their character; because the fact of certain words being 'assertive' is not a ground for regarding them as 'Mantra'; the only ground for it is the usage of learned men; so that those words which the learned do not cell 'Mantra' cannot be regarded as 'Mantra'. As regards the three kinds of words in question— $\overline{U}ha$ and the rest—they are not found to form part of the text of the Veda; hence they cannot be regarded as 'Mantra'.

The purpose served by this discussion is that, if there is some mistake in the utterance of these words, it is not necessary to perform that expiatory rite which has been laid down in connection with mistakes in the pronouncing of Mantras.

[Kumārila has a supplementary Adhikarana, the conclusion of which is that the character of 'Mantra' is denied to just those words that have been discussed,—i.e. the modifications and the names recounted along with the Mantra; so far as the unmodified parts of the Mantra, or the Mantras along with which the names are recounted, are concerned,—the 'Mantric' character of those is not affected.]

Adhikarana (10): What is 'Rk'?

SŪTRA (35).

Of these (Mantras), those are called 'Rk' wherein there is division into 'feet' (quarters), on the basis of the meaning.

Bhāsya.

[Though the definition of the several kinds of Mantra does not form the subjectmatter of the present Discourse, yet the Sūtra treats of it, because a consideration of it is connected with the subject of Mantras, whose character has been discussed in connection with the division of acts into 'primary' and 'subsidiary'.—Tantravārtika —Trans., p. 578.]

We find the term 'rk' used in the Veda;—e.g. in the text, 'Ahē bulhmiya mantram me gopāya yamrşayastrayividā viduḥ rcho yayāmsi sāmāni'. (Taittiriya Brāhmana 1. 2. 1. 26.)

The question is-"What is the definition of 'Rk'?"

The answer is—Of the mantras, those are called 'Rk' where there is division into 'feet', on the vasis of the meaning. That is, that mantra is called 'rk' where there is division into 'feet'; e.g. 'Agnimill, etc.' ($Rgveda\ 1.\ 1.\ 1$). It is only in regard to mantras like these that learned men use the term 'rk', in such statements as 'we are reading Rks', 'we are teaching Rks', 'these are Rks'.

If the fact of the division into 'feet' being on the basis of the meaning were emphasised, then the definition would cease to apply to those Ries where the said division is on the basis of the metre; as in the Rie 'Amih purvebhirrysibhih, etc.' (R. V. 1. 1. 2). The phrase 'on the basis of meaning' is to be taken, not as meant to exclude the cases of division on the basis of metre and other things, but only as an illustrative reference. This should be clearly understood; as otherwise, if the phrase in question were taken as meant to exclude the cases of division on the basis of metre and other things, then there would be syntactical split.—Hence the definition of 'Rk' is to be taken simply as 'that wherein there is division into feet'.

Adhikarana (11): What is 'Sāman'? SŪTRA (36).

THE NAME 'SAMAN' IS APPLIED TO THE MUSIC.

$Bhar{a}$ sya.

"What is the definition of the Sāman?"

The particular music (to which a Mantra is set) is called 'Sāman'; it is only when a mantra-text is set to music and so sung, that the learned use with regard to it the term 'Sāman', in such statements as 'we are studying the Sāman', 'we are teaching the Sāman', 'these are Sāman'. And in this matter, the teaching of the learned is our sole authority. [See Mimāmsā-Sūtra VII—ii—1 to 21; also IX—ii—3 to 13 and 29, 30, 31, 46.]

Just as, in the case of the expression 'curd is sour', the term 'sour' stands only for the peculiar taste of the curd,—and in the expression 'molasses are sweet', the term 'sweet' stands only for the peculiar taste of the molasses,—similarly, when the term 'Sāman' is applied to mantras set to music, it should be understood that the name stands for the music to which the mantra has been set, and it is applied to the Mantra itself only because of its connection with that music.

Adhikarana (12): What is 'Yajuş'?

SŪTRA (37).

The name 'Yajuş' is applied to the rest (of the mantras). $Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"What is the definition of the Yajus?"

It is not necessary to propound a definition of Yajus; as by the process of elimination the nature of the 'Yajus' would be understood from the definitions of 'Rk' and 'Sāman';—i.e. that which is not set to music, and where there is no division into 'feet', is 'Yajus', which is a mixed sort of text.

Adhikarana (13): Nigadas are included under 'Yajus'.

SŪTRA (38).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE NIGADA SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE FOURTH KIND (OF MANTRA), BECAUSE OF ITS PECULIAR CHARACTER."

Bhāsya.

[Nigadas are texts containing addresses by one Priest to another.]

The question that arises now is—Is the Nigada the same as 'Yajuş'? or is it something different from Yajuş?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows—" Nigadas are not 'Yajuṣ';—why? —because of their peculiar character; the peculiar character is described in the text—'the Rk is recited loudly, the Sāman is sung loudly, the Yajuṣ is recited softly, the Nigada is recited loudly.' If the Nigada were 'Yajuṣ', then 'loudness' would not have been its peculiar character;—as a matter of fact however, we do find this to be its peculiar character (in contradistinction to the 'softness' of the Yajuṣ). Hence the Nigada must be a fourth kind of mantra.

SŪTRA (39).

[Pűrvapakşa concluded]—" Also because of the (distinct) name." $Bh\bar{u}sya$.

"We also find the names used as distinct: 'These are Yajus, not Nigadas', 'These are Nigadas, not Yajus'.—From this also it follows that Nigadas form a distinct class of 'Mantra'."

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS "YAJUŞ" BECAUSE THEY HAVE THE SAME FORM AS THAT.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

The Nigadas are Yajus;—why?—because they have the same form as that, the form of the Nigada is that same mixed-text which we found in Yajus, and the character of being different from Rk and $S\bar{u}man$ is also common to the Yajus and the Nigada.

SŪTRA (41).

THE PECULIAR CHARACTER IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT HAS TO BE ADDRESSED (TO OTHERS).

Bhāsya.

On account of being addressed to others,—i.e. on account of being capable of being addressed to, and understood by, others. In fact some Yajus texts

are found to have the power of being addressed to, and understood by, others; [and it is on the basis of this capacity that those particular texts are given distinct name of 'Nigada'].

SŪTRA (42).

ALSO BECAUSE OF A DISTINCT PURPOSE (SERVED BY IT).

Bhāsua.

There is a distinctly useful purpose served by the Nigadas being addressed to, and understood by, other persons;—if they were pronounced softy (they could not be heard by others, and) they could not convey any idea to the other persons; it is for this reason that 'the peculiar character' (of being recited loudly) comes to serve a useful purpose. Thus then, those Yajus-mantras are Nigadas which are recited loudly.—How so?—Because the prefix 'nt' (in the term 'nigada'), signifies excellence—just as, when the red colour of a thing is specially excellent, it is said to be 'nitarām rakta' (very red),—and the root 'qad' (in the term 'nigada'), denoting ulterance, signifies the act of reciting; and the excellence of this act of reciting consists in its being done loudly.

Objection.—"But it has been specially declared in the Vedic text that being recited softly is the quality of the Yajus-mantra [so that what is recited loudly cannot be Yajus]."

Answer—We say, no. That is said to be the 'quality' of a thing which helps that thing in its functioning. In the case in question, when the Yajus-mantras are recited for the purpose of conveying an idea to other persons, being recited softly could not help them in that function; in fact, it would hinder that function (by making the words inaudible); hence in the case of these Mantras, the quality is 'loudness', which helps the purpose of being addressed to, and understood by, other persons—The 'soft' reciting would be for other texts; i.e. there are other Yajus-mantras which are not meant to be addressed to others, and the character of 'softness' would pertain to the reciting of these mantras.

SŪTRA (43).

THE (DIFFERENT) NAME IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING THE PARTICULAR QUALIFICATION.

Bhāsya.

As regards the different name (which has been urged as an argument in favour of the Pūrvapakṣa, under Sū. 39),—that can be explained also when the Niyada and the Yajus are one and the same, on the basis of the 'particular qualification'; just as we have in such expressions as 'Feed the Brūhmaṇas here and the Wandering Mendicants there' (where, though the Mendicants also are Brūhmaṇas, yet they are named differently on account of special qualifications). In the same manner, when the name 'Niyada' is used, it is in reference to the Yajus-mantras themselves, as qualified by 'loudness'.

SŪTRA (44).

[Objection]—"The name 'nigada' would be applicable to all (Mantras)"—if this is urged [then the answer is as given in the following Sūtra].

Bhāsya.

"If the name 'nigada' is applicable to all that is recited loudly,—then the Rk-mantra also becomes liable to be called 'nigada'."

SUTRA (45).

NOT SO; AS THEY ARE DISTINCTLY NAMED 'RK'.

Bhāsya.

Rk-mantras are not called 'Nigada'; because in the text—'Ayājyā vai nigadāh rchaiva yajanti', we find the two (Rk and Nigada) mentioned separate ly, on the basis of a distinct difference between them.—"But the separate naming is only an indication, you have to give a reason."—The reason lies in the fact that the root 'gad' (in the term 'nigada') denotes such speech as is not divided into (metric) feet; it is for this reason that only such speech as is not divided into (metric) feet is called 'gadya', 'Prose' [so that Nigada is Prose, while Rk is Verse, and the name 'nigada' therefore cannot apply to Rk].

Adhtkarana (14): Principle of Syntactical Unit—' One Sentence'.

SŪTRA (46).

So long as a single 'purpose is served' by a number of words, which on being separated, are found to be wanting ('incapable of effecting the purpose'), they form 'one sentence'

(one Yajus-mantra).

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[In connection with Mantras, there arises the question as to what is there to determine that a certain mantra begins with such and such a word and ends with such and such. In the case of Rk and Sāman, the verse itself may form the determining factor, and it may not be difficult to determine the exact extent of the mantra; but it is not so easy in the case of Yajus-mantras, where the determining factor of the metre is not available.]

In regard to the Yajus-mantras, which are of mixed character, there arises the question.—How is it to be known that so far it is one Yajus?

The answer is that that group of words should be regarded as 'one Yajus' which is employed in the act of sacrifice.

"But how far does that group of words extend which is used at a sacrifice?"

[The Pūrvapaksa view is that in view of the fact that even single words express an idea, even incomplete and defective sentences should be treated as 'one sentence'.]

[The Siddhanta is as follows:--

It extends to that extent up to which the words serve the purpose of indicating things helpful to the act of sacrifice;—to that extent it is 'one sentence'—called 'vākya' or 'declaration', 'judgment,' 'proposition', because it is what is declared.—It is in this sense that we have the assertion of the Sûtra to the effect that—'So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, they form one sentence'. Because this is the condition that makes a number of words 'one sentence',—therefore it comes to this that a group of words serving a single purpose forms one sentence,—but only if any one of these words, on being disjoined from the rest, become 'wanting' (defective).

"What is the example of (such 'one sentence')?"

We have an example in the shape of the Yajus-mantra 'Devasya tod sauthuh prasavē, etc.' (Taithriya Sanhhita 1. 1. 4. 2) [where the words express a single idea and are so syntactically connected that if any word is taken out, it becomes meaningless].

Objection.—"But in the text quoted, each individual word denotes a single idea" [and as such each word should be treated as a 'sentence'].

True (each word denotes an idea); but it does not fulfil the second condition that 'on being disjoined, it becomes wanting or defective' [as no such disjoining is possible in the case of any single word].

"But in any case the mantra-text quoted cannot be said to express a single idea, as there are several ideas expressed by the several words (of the text); and apart from what is expressed by the component words, there is no single idea expressed by the sentence as a composite whole—as has been explained above.—It might be argued that difference (among the things denoted by the several words), constitutes the idea expressed by the sentence as a composite whole.—But even so, this idea so expressed could not be one only; as the number of 'differences' and 'correlationships' would be more than one (as there are more words than one)."

The assertion in the Sūtra is to be explained and justified as referring to the fulfilling of a single purpose. For instance, the mantra 'Devasya tvā, etc.' serves the purpose of indicating the act of 'nirvāpa' (offering); and the group of words in the mantra may be regarded as expressing this particular fact,—and hence as forming 'one sentence.'

"In the text quoted there are several sentences—the first is 'Dēvasya twā savituh prasavē nirvapāmi', and the second is 'Ashvinorbāhubhyām nirvapāmi', and so on, there are several other sentences."

If the word 'nirvapāmi' is to be supplied as an elliptical extension (in the manner shown by the opponent),-then certainly there are several sentences; but in reality there is no such elliptical extension [i.e. the verb is not to be supplied to each group of words]; for if the act denoted by the verb 'nirvapāmi' were a subordinate factor, then it would have to be taken as distinct with each of the primary acts. Then again, the action of Nirvāpa (offering) is not denoted by what is expressed by the words 'Devasya tvā, etc.'; so that if the implemental accessories were the predominant factors, then the mantra-text would have to be taken as serving only a transcendental purpose. On the other hand, if the Nirvapa itself is taken as the predominant factor, then the mantra-text serves the perceptible purpose of indicating that act of Nirvapa; and this act would then be indicated as qualified by all the adjectives contained in the entire Mantra-text under consideration; in this way there would be no incongruity at all. How one word is qualified by another word has been already explained under Sūtra "Talbhutanam, etc." (1. 1. 25).—Thus then, the whole of the Mantra-text forms a single sentence [speaking of the Nirvāpa as qualified by a number of qualifications].

Question:—"Why has the Sūtra laid down both the conditions—(a) that it should serve a single purpose, and (b) that on being disjoined, it be wanting?"

Answer:—There may be a sentence which may serve a single purpose, but which is not 'wanting' on being disjoined; e.g. the text—'Bhago vām vibhajatu aryamā vām vibhajatu' serves the single purpose of expressing 'vibhāga'.—'' But the vibhāga qualified by Bhaga is distinct from the vibhāga

qualified by Aryamā [so that the whole text does not express a single idea]." -Not so, we reply; because what is intended to be spoken of here is Vibhāga in general, not particular vibhāgas; as it is only by expressing vibhāga in general that it serves a perceptible purpose, which it could not do if it expressed particular vibhāgas.—And though the text serves the said single purpose, yet it is not found to be 'wanting' on being disjoined [each of the two parts-(1) 'Bhago vām vibhajatu' and (2) 'Aryamā vām vibhajatu' being syntactically complete in itself]; so that on being disjoined, there are two distinct sentences,-and each of them is treated as an optional alternative [and the whole is not taken as a single sentence] [and this result is due to both the conditions laid down in the Sūtra not being fulfilled].-Similarly in the case of the Mantra-text 'Syonan te sadanam kṛṇomi ghṛtasya dhārayā suṣēvam kalpayāmi tasmin sīdāmrtē pratitistha vrīhīnām medhah sumanasyamānah' (Taittirīya Brāhmana 3. 7. 5. 2-3),-the parts on being disjoined become syntactically 'wanting' (and hence the second condition of 'one sentence' is fulfilled), but there are two purposes served and expressed by the text-the preparing of the seat (expressed by the first part of the text 'syonam...kalpayāmi') and the depositing of the cake (expressed by the second part 'Tasmin sīda, etc.') [so that the first condition of 'one sentence' is not fulfilled]; consequently the Mantra text is taken and used as two distinct sentences,—the first part being used in the preparation of the seat and the second in the depositing of the cake.

Thus then we find that the words of the Sūtra are well chosen and no objection can be taken to it.

There is a difference among the Bhattas themselves regarding the exact meaning of the term 'artha' in the compound 'arthaikatvāt' in the Sūtra. Pārthasārathi Mishra takes it in the sense of purpose; according to which all the words, phrases and clauses that serve a single purpose-of indicating details connected with an act, for instance,—are to be treated as 'one sentence',—Someshvara Bhatta in the Nuavasuddha, on the other hand, takes the word 'artha' in the sense of idea; so that any group of words that expresses one complete idea or judgment is to be treated as 'one sentence'.-The difference in reality comes to this that while, by the former view, the definition of 'one sentence' is applicable to Vedic sentences only,by the latter, it becomes applicable to all kinds of sentences, Vedic as well as secular .- According to Prabhakara, 'artha' here means the 'reminding or indicating of what is to be done'; and this is more in keeping with Parthasarathi than with Somëshvara. As an Anvitābhidhānavādin, Prabhakara could not very well accept the words to have any meaning apart from the other words; it is for this reason that he says that the word 'artha' must mean prayojana, purpose; as the purpose is the most important factor and all the words in the sentence must be related to that important factor.-Brihati MSS., p. 51].

ADHIKARANA (15): Principle of Syntactical split— 'Distinct Sentences'.

SÚTRA (47).

WHEN THE SENTENCES ARE EQUALLY INDEPENDENT (OF ONE ANOTHER)
THEY SHOULD BE TREATED AS SYNTACTICALLY DISTINCT
(DISTINCT SENTENCES).

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[This is the antithesis to the principle formulated in the foregoing Adhikarana].

In regard to such mantra-texts as (a) 'Let va ūrjē tvā,' (Vājasaneya Samhitā 1. 1), and (b) 'Āyuyyajāena kalpatām prāņo yajāena kalpatām" (Taitti. Sam. 1. 7. 9. 1)—there arises the question—Are such sentences to be treated as 'one sentence' or 'several distinct sentence'?

The Păivapaķa view is as follows:—"Every such text is to be treated as 'one sentence'; for the utterance of the words 'Îṣē tvā' is not found to fulfil any perceptible purpose; nor is that of the words 'ārē tvā': [hence as not serving distinct purposes, each of these two groups of words cannot but be treated as 'one sentence']; on the other hand, on the strength of the text itself the implication is that they serve only transcendental purposes; and so far as transcendental purposes are concerned, it is more reasonable to assume a single transcendental purpose to be served by both sets of words, than to assume a distinct purpose for each set; such an assumption would be much simpler. Hence the whole should be regarded as 'one sentence'."

In answer to the above we have the following Siddhānta—'When the sentences are equally independent, they should be treated as syntactically distinct' (Sūtra). That is in cases where each set of words is independent of—does not stand in need of,—the other, they should be regarded as distinct sentences. For instance, in the case of the text 'Îşē tvā—ārjē tvā', we find that the words 'Îṣē tvā' serve one purpose (being used in the chopping of the tree-branch) and the words 'ūrjē tvā', a totally different purpose (being used in the planting of the lopped branch). [Hence the two sets of words must be treated as two distinct sentences].

Objection:—"It has just been said by us that neither set of words serves any perceptible purpose."

Though no such purpose is cognisable by sense-perception and other such means of cognition, yet it is learnt from the Veda, where we find such injunctions as 'With the words $I_{\theta\bar{\theta}}$ tvā one cuts off the branch; with the words $u_{r\bar{\theta}}$ tvā one planes it'. (Vide Shatapatha Brāhmana 1. 1. 6. 6; 1. 7. 1. 2; 4. 3. 1. 7.)

Similarly in the case of the mantra 'Ayuryajñëna kalpatām, prāno yajñena kalpatām', we find that the kalpana, bringing about, of 'Ayu', Long Life (which is the purpose served by the first set of words 'āyuryajñena kalpatām') is distinct from the kalpana, bringing about, of Prāṇa, vitality (which is the purpose served by the second set of words 'Prāno yajāena kalpatām').

Objection.—"All that is desired to be fulfilled here is the kalpana, bringing about, in general, and not particular kalpanas, and hence no differentiation is proper; just as it has been pointed out (by the Súdhānum himself) in connection with the words 'Agnayē justam nirvapāmi', that only nirvāpa in general is meant, and not its specifications as mentioned in the words 'Savituh prasavē ashvinorbāhubhyām pūṣṇo hastābhyām', and no differentiation of the Nirvāpa is meant [see Bhāṣya on Sūtra 46, Text, p. 132]. Exactly in the same manner, in the case in question what is meant is the single kalpana in general, which should not be differentiated on the basis of such specifications as those of 'āyu' and 'prāṇa'."

Answer—In connection with this mantra, we find the injunction 'Klpptih vāchayati' ('Pronounces the Klrpti-mantras'), where the Klrpti-mantras (which is the name given to the Mantra-text in question) are spoken of in the plural; so that when the text is recited, there should be a reciting of many mantras,—one of them being in the form 'Āyur yajñena kalpatām', where we have the 'klrpti' of Āyu, which would be one Mantra,—the next mantra being 'Prāṇa yājñena kalpatām' where we have the 'klrpti' of Prāṇa; and so on, with the other parts of the text which speak of the 'klrpti' of several other things. Thus the making up of so many distinct mantras to be recited would be the distinctly perceptible purpose served by each set of words; and as each set of words would be serving a distinct purpose, and various distinct purposes would be served,—each set should be regarded as a distinct sentence.

Objection.—"As in the case of 'Bhago vām vibhajatu, etc.', the Siddhān-tin has taken all the various sets of words as speaking of the single act of vibhāga in general (see Bhāya under Sütra 46, bottom of p. 132 Text), in the same manner we may take the various sets of words as speaking of the single act of 'khrots' in general."

Reply: That is not possible. In the case of the $Vibh\bar{a}ga$, the $vibh\bar{a}ga$ in general was something perceptible, while in the present case the Klrpti is not perceptible.

Further, we have the distinct injunction 'Recites the Klrpti-mantras (plural)'; and in the first set of words 'Ayur-yajñena kalpatām' we have a clear enunciation of the 'Klrpti' of Ayu, and similarly in the second set of words, 'Prāno yajñena kalpatām' we have an equally clear enunciation of the Klrpti of Prāna.—From all this it follows that these are distinct sentences.

[To the principle enunciated in this Adhikarana we have a corollary to the effect that, when different parts of a mantra are found by their implication to be meant for serving distinct purposes, each such part should be regarded as a distinct sentence. For instance, in the mantra—'Syonante sadanankrinomi....

tasmin sida (Taitti. Brâhmaṇa, 3. 7. 5. 2; Mānava Shrauta Stūtra 1. 2. 6. 19)—we find that the first part, by its meaning, is intended to be employed in the act of preparing the 'seat' for the cake, while the last part, in the same manner, for that of actually keeping the cake upon that 'seat'; hence the passage is regarded as containing two distinct mantras. This has been called 'Syntactical split due to difference in use' (see Brinati MSS., p. 786).]

Adhikarana (16): Principle of Elliptical Extension— Anusanga.

SŪTRA (48).

ELLIPTICAL EXTENSION SHOULD COMPLETE THE SENTENCES;
AS IT IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL.

Bhāsya.

[The consideration of the extent of Mantra-texts continues.]

We have the text—'Yā tē agnē ayāshayā-tanūrvarsishā gahvarēshā ugram vacho apābadhāt tvēṣam vacho apābadhāt tvēṣam vacho apābadhāt svāhā;—yā tē agnē rajāshayā- yā tē agnē harāshayā' (Taittirīya Samhitā 1. 2. 112).—In connection with this, there arises the question—Is the connection of the portion of the text beginning with 'Tanūrvarsishā' to be extended to each of the two clauses at the end ('yā tē agnē rajāshayā' and 'yā tē agnē harāshayā')'? Or are these two incomplete sentences to be completed by the adding of ordinary secular words?

The Pūrvapaksa view on this question is that "the sentence 'yā tē agne rajāshaya' is not to be completed by adding to it the words beginning with 'tanūrvarsisthā'; as these words are not found in the text appearing after the said incomplete sentence."

In answer to this we have the following Siddhānta;—The sentence is to be completed by means of the elliptical extension of the words 'tanūrvarṣiṣ-thā, etc.'; as these words are as construable with the clause 'yā tē aṇē rajā-shayā' and 'yā tē aṇē harāshayā' as with 'yā tē aṇē ayāṣhayā'

"But with the clause 'yā tē agnē harāshayā' the connection of the words 'tanūrvarsighā, etc.' is interrupted (by the intervention of the clause 'yā tē agnē rajāshayā')."

Not so; because there is nothing intervening between the words 'tanār-varṣiṣṭhā, etc.' and the two clauses ('yā tē agnē rajāshayā') taken as one composite whole; i.e. the composite whole consisting of the clause 'yā tē agnē rajāshayā' (and the clause 'yā tē agnē rajāshayā'). But, inasmuch as no useful purpose would be served by connecting the supplementary clause ('tanārvarṣiṣṭhā, etc.') with the composite whole (consisting of both the clauses 'yā tē agnē rajāshayā' and 'yā tē agnē harā-shayā'), the said supplementary clause is construed with each of the component clauses the supplementary clause is to be construed with, the elliptical extension (of the supplementary clause) is to apply to all the incomplete clauses.

[The sense of this somewhat obscure passage has been thus elucidated in the Tantravärtika—Trans., pp. 602-603.—The author of the Bhāsya holds that, inasmuch as the factor in question, 'Tanūrvarsishā, etc.' is read between the first and second mantras, it is not expressed to which of these

two it is more intimately connected; hence it must be taken as equally related to both of them. Then he raises the question of its connection with the third mantra, from which the supplementary clause is one step further removed; and in order to meet the difficulty of the intervention, what the Bhāṣya does is to take the second and third mantras together as forming a single composite whole; and this removes the difficulty due to the intervention of the second mantra between the supplementary clause and the third mantra. Then, there arises the difficulty that in that case the supplementary clause would complete the composite whole formed by the two mantras, and not each of them separately. This difficulty is met by the declaration that, inasmuch as the composite whole is incapable of being used at a sacrifice, the supplementary clause must be construed with each part of it; and hence it is concluded that both the clauses being equally incapable of being completed in any other way, the whole of the supplementary clause is to be construed with each one of the incomplete clauses.

Says the Opponent-"[In the case cited above the last two clauses were incomplete and hence there was need and justification for connecting the supplementary words 'Tanūrvarsisthā, etc.' with them]-How will it be in the case of the following text where the sets of words are complete in themselves and yet there is a supplementary set of words capable of being construed with the former sets:- 'Chitpatistvā punātu-vākpatistvā punātudevasya tvā savitā punātu-achchhidrēna pavitrēna vasoh sūryasya rashmibhih' (Taitti, Sam, 1, 2, 1, 2). Here each of the three clauses, each of which ends with the term 'punātu', is complete in itself and does not stand in need of any additional words (for the completion of its syntactical connection).- But the words beginning with achchhidrena would require some words to complete the sentence' .- True, those words do require some words; but this requirement would be met by connecting these words with only one of the three sets of sentences ending with 'punātu', and there would be no need for them to be connected with the other two sets. Because one set of words requires another only when the former, without the latter, remains meaningless; and the meaning of the set of words beginning with 'achchhidrena' becomes completed by its being connected with one sentence out of the three ending with 'punātu', and as thus it no longer remains meaningless, it would not require to be connected with the other two sentences. As for these two sentences, each of them is complete in itself, and hence does not require to be connected with the set of words beginning with 'achchhidrena' .- It might be argued that it is true that the requirements of the set of words beginning with 'achchhidrena' would be met by being connected with only one of the three sentences, but there is nothing to indicate the one particular sentence out of the three with which it might be connected, in preference to the other two, with which latter it may not be connected; -- and under the circumstances, it would be best to connect it with all the three sentences.—But this is not possible; there is a peculiar circumstance (which connects the words with only one of the three sentences), in the shape of the fact that the words follow immediately after one of the three sentences (i.e. the sentence 'Dēvasya tvā savitā punātu', with which the words may be connected (in preference to the other two sentences). So that the set of words beginning with 'achchhidrena' should be construed with the sentence immediately preceding it,—and the elliptical extension should not extend to all the three sentences."

The answer to the above is as follows:-It cannot be as urged above. In fact, the word that is found to immediately precede the set of words beginning with 'achchhidrena' is the word 'punātu';-this word 'punātu' itself is preceded by every one of the three clauses 'chitpatistva', 'vakpatistva" and 'devasya tva savita"; -- the term 'punatu' also is one and the same only repeated again and again ;-hence we conclude that wherever the word 'punātu' is found used, there the set of words beginning with 'achchhidrēna' should also be used, as it is syntactically connected with the word 'punātu'; -now the word 'punātu' having become connected with 'achchhidrena, etc.'-the clauses 'chitpatistvā', 'vākpatistvā' and 'dēvasya tvā savitā' remain 'wanting' (incomplete) without the word 'punātu'; and they require this word 'punātu' for their completion ;-this word has become connected with the words 'achchhidrena, etc.' :- from all this it follows that each of these clauses has to be completed (and has its requirements met) by the connection of the word 'punātu' along with the elliptical extension (in the shape of the words 'achchhidrena, etc.').—Thus it follows that the words 'achchhidrena, etc.' are 'equally applicable to all' the three sentences, and hence all these sentences have to be completed by the extension of those words.

Adhikabana (17): Cases where Elliptical Extension is not permissible.

SŪTRA (49).

THERE SHOULD BE NO ELLIPTICAL EXTENSION WHERE THERE IS INTERVENTION (OF UNCONNECTED WORDS).

Bhāṣya.

[This Adhikarana is brought in by way of a counter-instance to the functioning of mere Proximity in the matter of Anusanga, Elliptical Extension—Tantravāntika—Trans., p. 607.]

There is the text-'(a) Santē vāryurvātena gachchhatām, (b) Sam yajatrairangani, (c) Sam yajnapatirashisa' (Taitti, Sam. 1, 3, 8, 1). Here the (singular) 'qachchhatām' -- as occurring in (a) 'Santē vāyurqachchhatām' cannot be construed with (c) 'Sam yajñapatirāshişā', because the connection between these two is interrupted by the sentence (b) 'Sam uaiafrairanaani' (which cannot be construed with 'qachchhatām' of the preceding sentence. as the plural noun 'angāni' would need the plural verb 'gachchhantām'). that is, the supplementary word 'gachchhatām' to be connected with the last sentence, which stands in need of that word, is interrupted by the words 'Sam uajatrairanani': and unless the said word 'gachchhatam' has become connected with these intervening words, it could not, by reason of this interruption, become connected with the last sentence (ending with 'āshisā'). For this want of connection thus there is a special reason, in the shape of the said intervention; and so long as this special reason is there, it is not possible for the supplementary word ('gachchhatām) to betake itself to the third sentence.—For these reasons, the intervening sentence which needs a plural verb,-as also the sentence whose connection with the verb in the first sentence is interrupted by the intervening sentence,-have to be completed only by the adding of secular words.

DISCOURSE II.

PĀDA II.

GROUNDS OF DIFFERENTIATION AMONG ACTS.

ADHIKARANA (1):—Difference in the Apurva of Subsidiary
Acts: Difference among Acts based upon the difference
of words signifying the Acts.

SŪTRA (1).

Where there is a different word, there is a different Act; because of its special equipment.

Bhāşya.

[In the foregoing Pāda which is Introductory to the Second Discourse, we have dealt with all matters connected, directly or indirectly, with the subject-matter of the Discourse—Differentiation of Acts. And now, first of all we take up the differentiation of acts through difference in the words expressive of the acts.—
Tantravartika—Trans., p. 610.]

There is the Jyotistoma sacrifice, in connection with which we have the texts—(a) 'Somena yajēta', (b) 'Dūkṣiṇāni juhoti',* and (c) 'Hiranyamātrē-yāya adaāki' (Shata. Brā. 4. 3. 4-21)—which speak of the three acts of (a) 'sacrifice', (b) 'offering of libations into fire', and (c) 'giving'.—Now, in regard to these acts, there arises the question—Do these accomplish their result collectively or severally?—There is this doubt because instruments in general are found to accomplish their results collectively as well as severally; for instance, when we find the mortar standing upon three stone-pieces, we have a case of the act of supporting being done collectively by the three stone-pieces; in the case of pegs in the wall, on the other hand, we find each of them severally serving the purpose of supporting the hanging noose (on which articles of food, etc., are hung).—Thus it is that there arises the doubt as to whether the acts of sacrificing, offering libations into fire and giving accomplish the result collectively or severally.

The Pūrvapaksa on this question is as follows:—"These acts operate collectively:—why?—because of things with transcendental potency we should assume as few as possible.—Why so?—Because, when a thing is neither seen nor heard, it is understood that it does not exist; but only if its non-existence does not involve the inconsistency of a fact that has been perceived or heard of. In case, there is such inconsistency, it would be right to assume the existence of the thing which had been understood to be non-existent; as on being thus assumed, it serves the useful purpose (of rendering consistent and explaining the perceived fact). In case however, this

No one knows of any such material substance as 'dakṣināni': hence this word has to be taken, not as denoting something to be offered into the Fire, but as the name of the Homa.—(Tantrawārtika.—Trans., p. 620.)

special circumstance (of the inconsistency of a perceived fact) is not duly recognised, then there can be no assumption of anything at all.—In the case in question however, we do recognise a special circumstance,—viz. that the several acts bring about a single $Ap\bar{u}ruz$; hence it is that what is desired to be performed is the whole set of the three acts; and when we come to assume a transcendental potency arising from the performance, it is far more reasonable to assume a single potency arising out of the entire set than one potency from each one of the acts.—It will not be right to argue that (the acts being enjoined severally) there is no set of acts as a whole enjoined by the Veda.—Because the set as a whole is enjoined by the injunction of the several components themselves.—Thus it follows that what is meant to be performed is the entire set of the three acts.—

"Or, in the word 'yajeta' ('should sacrifice'), there are two factors; of which the first factor denotes the sacrifice and the second factor denotes the bhāvanā', 'bringing about';—similarly in the word 'dadāti', the first factor denotes the jwing and the second factor reiterates the same 'bringing about';—so also in the word 'jūhoti', the first factor denotes the offering into fire and the second factor reiterates the same 'bringing about'. Thus then, the three acts of sacrificing, offering of libation into fire and giving are enjoined by the Veda as the means to the single 'bringing about' (of the desired result); so that what is recognised is the peculiar (qualified) Bringing About of the Transcendental Potency by means of the three acts of sacrificing, offering into fire and giving. It is for this reason that it is asserted that the acts accomplish a single Transcendental Potency (Apūrva) collectivoly.—

"Or, it may be that the term 'yajēta' ('should sacrifice') itself denotes the act of qiving, which same qiving is mentioned again in the terms 'juhoti' ('offers into Fire') and 'dadāti' ('gives') for the purpose of connecting the act (of qiving) with the various accessory details.

"From all this it follows that there is a single Transcendental Potency (Apūrva, brought about by the three Acts collectively)."

In answer to the above Pūrvapaksa, we have the following Siddhānta:-There is a distinct Transcendental Potency with each individual word (denoting an action). This is what is meant by the Sūtra—' Where there is a different word, there is a different act, because of its special equipment'. As a matter of fact, the word 'yajēta' ('should sacrifice') lays down the propriety of performing the act of 'sacrificing', not the act of 'offering into Fire' which is spoken of by means of the second word 'juhoti', or the act of 'giving' which is spoken of by means of the third word 'dadāti', -simply because all these are 'different words'. The fact that the three acts form one composite whole is indicated only by the circumstance that they are spoken of by means of sentences which are construed together on the basis of a supposed directive sentence (which recapitulates all the subsidiaries as pertaining to a single Primary); while the fact that each of the components is a distinct entity is indicated directly by the Vedic text itself. That is to say, that the act of 'sacrifice' mentioned by the word 'yajēta' is to be taken along with the 'giving' and the 'offering into Fire' is indicated only by the syntactical connection based upon the proximity of the words speaking of these latter to

the word speaking of the sacrifice; while the act of 'sacrifice' mentioned by the word 'yajēta' expresses by direct denotation, the single act of 'sacrifice'. not the acts of 'offering into Fire' and 'giving'; and Direct Denotation (Shruti) is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection (Vakya). Thus the composite whole (composed of the three acts) is not what is denoted directly by the words of the text; so that if any such whole had to be assumed. it could be assumed only on the basis of the syntactical connection due to all the (three) sentences in the context being construed together .- The word 'dadāti' ('gives') is entirely distinct from the word 'yajati' ('sacrifices'), so that, even though the second part of these words ('yajati'. 'inhoti' and 'dadati'), which connotes the 'bringing about', is common to all, yet the first part of each of them is distinct from the rest; hence one composite (formed of the two parts) must be a word different from the other composite (formed of the two parts); and what is denoted by one composite must clearly be different from that denoted by the other composite.-For example, what the word 'dadyāt' ('should give') signifies is that 'one should bring about by the act of giving', where what is understood as the means of the 'bringing about' is the single act of giving, which does not stand in need of the help of the two acts of sacrificing and offering into Fire. Similarly, the word 'juhoti' ('offers into fire') signifies the 'bringing about' as accomplished by the act of offering into Fire, which does not stand in need of the help of the other two acts of giving and sacrifice. Thus all that we learn from the word ('dadāti') is that 'the Bringing About is accomplished by the act of giving only';-also what we learn from the word 'juhoti' is that 'the Bringing About is accomplished by the act of offering into Fire only'; and there is nothing by which the notion that 'the bringing about is accomplished by the act of giving only' could be set aside.

Thus then, we find that the act of giving, having become 'equipped' with all its special auxiliaries, does not stand in need of being equipped or connected with the other acts of sacrifice and offering into Fire;—and the conclusion therefore is that the three sentences are distinct, and there is a distinct Transcendental potency related to each of the three verbs.

It is not possible for the 'sacrifice' or the 'offering into Fire' to be taken as a reference to the act of giving; as that would lead to the incongruity that the acts of sacrifice and offering into Fire are not meant to be performed.—Nor can the 'giving' be regarded as a reference to the other two acts; because the purpose served by the 'giving' is the bringing about of the proprietory right of another person (the recipient of the gift,—in the article given away), while the purpose served by the other two acts is mere surrendering (of what belongs to the Agent).

The purpose served by the present discussion is that according to the Purvapaksa there would be a single Transcendental Potency resulting from all the three acts taken as one composite whole, [so that there would be no relation of 'primary' and 'subsidiary' among the three acts]; while according to the Sidhānta the Transcendental Potency results from the act of sacrifice alone and the other two acts are subsidiary to that act.

ADHIKABANA (2): Difference among Acts spoken of by the same word often repeated:—Different Apūrvas from the Samit, Tanūnapūt, etc. all of which are 'sacrifices'.

SŪTRA (2).

THE REPETITION OF ONE AND THE SAME WORD ALSO SHOULD [INDI-CATE DIFFERENCE AMONG ACTS]; BECAUSE, IF THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCE, THE REPETITION WOULD BE USELESS.

Bhāşya.

[The foregoing Adhikarana has treated of a case where the difference among acts was based upon the difference among the words expressive of those acts. This would give rise to the notion that the acts would be the same where they are expressed by the same words; i.e. when the same word is repeated several times, it stands for the same act. It is this notion on which the Pūrvapakea of the present Adhikaraṇa is based; which is finally rejected in favour of the Sidhāhāna, that when the same word is repeated several times, it stands for so many several acts.]

We have such texts as—'Samidho yajuti—Tanūnapātom yajuti, etc.—[I-do yajuti—Varhir yajuti—Sahākāram yajuti"]—'(Taitti. Sain. 2. 6. 1. 1-2),—where the same verb 'yajuti' is repeated five times. The question is—Does this word so repeated indicate a single Transcendental Potency (resulting from the acts collectively)? Or is there a distinct Transcendental Potency from each repetition of the Act?

The Pūrvapaksa view on this question is as follows:—"It has been declared (in the foregoing Adhikarana) that the acts are different when the words expressing them are different; in the present case it is the same word repeated again and again; hence in the present case there must be a single Transcendental Potency—'If different potencies were not indicated, then the repetition would be useless'.—True; the repetition would serve no useful purpose; but even though repeated several times, a word cannot have different meanings; in fact, what is understood from it at the first time of its utterance is exactly the same that is understood from it at the hundredth time.—Hence it follows that even though the word 'yajati' has been repeated five times, it stands for a (single Act and a) single Transcendental Potency (resulting from that act).—Nor does this make the repetition entirely useless; as it serves the purpose of enjoining the several deities Tanūnapāt and the rest.—Hence it is only a single Transcendental Potency that follows in the case in question."

In answer to the above, we have the following Siddhānta:—The repetition of one and the same word also would indicate difference among the acts; because if the mere single act were enjoined,—and 'if there were no difference,—then the repetition would be useless'.—"It has already been explained that the same word cannot enjoin different things".—Our answer to this is that even the very first sentence 'Samidho yajati' is only reiterative (not

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injunctive); the fact of the matter is that the act of sacrifice has already been enjoined by the (Primary) Injunction 'One should offer the Darsha-purnamāsa sacrifices':--now, it is not possible for deities for this sacrifice to be enjoined (by the sentences in question, 'Samidho yajati, etc.'); because the deity for that sacrifice has already been got at from the direct injunction (contained in the text 'Agneyo'stākapālah', where Agni is enjoined as the Deity); while, if the deity were to be indicated by the sentences in question, it could be done either through Syntactical Connection or through Context: and under the circumstances, it would not be right to regard the two deities (one, the directly enjoined one, and the other got at through Syntactical Connection or Context) as optional alternatives. And yet the connection between the act of sacrifice and the deities (Samit and the rest). thich is clearly enjoined (by the sentences 'Samidho yajati', etc.) could not be effected unless the act of sacrifice were performed; so that if the sacrifice were not performed, the injunction (of the deity) would be useless; on the other hand, if the sacrifice is performed, then the said connection (with the deities) can be effected. It is necessary therefore to repeat the act of sacrifice (for the purpose of connecting it with the several deities mentioned. Samit, Tanunapat and the rest); and with each such repetition there is a distinct Transcendental Result. Then again, the result that is brought about by the connection of the sacrifice with Samit cannot be the same that has brought about its connection with Tanunapat; because they are quite distinct; hence also they cannot be regarded as optional alternatives.

The purpose served by this discussion is that according to the Pūrvapaksa, there is a single performance, while according to the Siddhānta, the performance has to be repeated over and over again.

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ADHIKARANA (3): The Āghāra, etc. are subservient to the Āgnēya, etc.—Exceptions to the last two Adhikaranas.

SŪTRA (3).

THE CONTEXT CERTAINLY POINTS TO THE PAURNAMÄSI, AS THE DETAILS (OF ANY OTHER) ARE NOT MENTIONED.

Bhāşya.

[The form of this Sūtra has led some people to think that we have here a discussion of the primary and subsidiary character of certain acts,—and hence to raise the objection that it is irrelevant in the present Adhyāya. But in reality, as the Tantravārtika (Trans., p. 634) rightly points out, the present discussion had to be introduced as dealing with the exceptions to the principles of differentiation deduced from the last two discussions,—and not dealing with the question of the primary or subsidiary character of certain acts; this latter question comes in only incidentally.]

We have the text—(A) 'Yadāgnēyo'stākapālo' māvāsyāyām paurnamāsyāńchāchyuto bhavati' (Taitti, Sam. 2. 6, 3, 3)- Tāvabrūtāmagnīsomāvājyasyaiva tau-Upāmshu paurnamāsyām yajannīti '- Tābhyāmetamagnīsomīyamēkādashakapālam paurņamāsē prāyachchat' (cf. Shata. Brā. 1. 6. 2. 14)-'Aindrandadhyamāvāsyāyām aindram payo' māvāsyāyām' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 4. 1);—and then (B) 'Aghāramāghārayati' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 11. 6);—'Ajyabhāgau vaiati-Svistakrtē samavadvati-Patnīsamvājām vajati-Samistavajūrjuhoti' (Shata. Brā. 1. 9. 2. 25); -further (C) 'Ya evamvidvān paurnamāsīm yajatē ya evamvidvānamāvāsyām yajatē' (Taitti. Sam. 1, 6, 9, 1-2). -In regard to these, there arises the question-(1) Are all the acts here spoken of equally 'primary'? Or those beginning with Agneua and ending with Payas (i.e. all those spoken of in the set of sentences A) are 'primary' and those beginning with Aghara (spoken of in B) direct auxiliaries, and hence 'subsidiary' to the aforesaid ?-There also arises the further question (2)—Are the two sentences 'Ya evamvidvan, etc.' (C) conjointly only references to the original acts (spoken of in the preceding sentences)? Or are the two sentences 'Ya evamvidvan paurnamasim yajate' and 'Ya evamvidvānāmāsyām yajatē' injunctive of two entirely different acts, and the preceding sentences are injunctive of details regarding those two acts?

[The issues involved in these questions have been thus clearly stated in the Tantraārtika (Trans., pp. 634-635)—If the two sentences: Ya evonwideān paurņamāsim yajās' and 'Ya evonwideān mātāsām yajāst' lay down two distinct independent acts, then all the various sacrifices mentioned in the other sentences—viz: Agnēya, etc., and Āghara, etc.—would be all distinct acts, all of equal importance; while, if the two sentences contained only a reference to the six acts that have been mentioned in the first set of sentences (A),—then these alone would be 'primary' acts as being connected with the prescribed times of Amāvānyā and Paurņamāsi; and the two names 'Darsha' and 'Paurṇamāsa' would, in this case, be taken as the names of these six acts, which alone would therefore be directly connected with

the resultant $Ap\bar{u}rva$; and in that case the other set of acts, $\bar{A}gh\bar{u}ra$ and the rest, mentioned in the second set of sentences (B), become 'subsidiary' to the aforesaid acts.]

On the said question, we have the *Pūrvapakṣa* that "because of 'the words being different' and because of there being 'a repetition of the same words', all the acts spoken of in the texts are distinct acts, all equally 'primary'."

In answer to this Pūrvapaksa we have the following Siddhanta:-The context certainly points to the 'Paurnamasi'; that is, the two sentences (C) mentioning the words 'amāvāsyā' and 'paurnamāsī' are only references to the original acts. Agneva and the rest: -why? -because the details of any other are not mentioned :- the sentence 'Ya evamvidvan paurnamasim, etc.' ('One who knowing this offers the sacrifice named Paurnamäsi, etc.') speaks of all the said sacrifices; -nor do we know what is the form (details) of the particular (distinct) sacrifice named 'Paurnamāsi': so that if this were a distinct sacrifice by itself we would know nothing about it. It is for this reason that we assert that if the two sentences (C) were injunctive of distinct sacrifices, then they would be entirely useless ;- on the other hand, if these two sentences were only references to the actions prescribed in the first set of sentences, then the meaning of the two sentences comes to be that the sacrifices that have been mentioned in the preceding sentences in close proximity to these two sentences are related to (are to be performed at) the two points of time Amavasya and Paurnamasi; and thus the form (details) of the sacrifices thus referred to being well known, the two sentences come to serve the distinctly useful purpose (of pointing out the time of their performance).—"How can a word with the singular ending ('naurnamāsīm') speak of (refer to) several sacrifices (the six sacrifices mentioned in the first set of sentences)?"-To such an objection, if raised, our answer would be that the word with the singular ending would be taken as a collective noun; i.e. the sacrifices originally mentioned have their details laid down, and there is a collective group composed of these sacrifices, which collective group is what is referred to by the word with the singular ending (' paurnamāsīm'); so that there is nothing incongruous in the singular ending (in the word referring to the group of sacrifices); because there are many such words with the singular ending as refer to several things taken collectively, -such words, for instance, as 'company', 'forest', 'tribe', 'assembly'.-When the two sentences in question are taken as referring to the group composed of Agneya and the other acts, then these same acts come to be spoken of by means of the word 'Darsha-Paurnamasa,' and thus it is that they become connected with the result (spoken of in the sentence 'Darshapaurnamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta').

Such being the case, the $\bar{A}gh\bar{a}ra$ and other acts spoken of (in the second set of sentences B) in close proximity to the other acts ($\bar{A}gn\bar{e}ya$, etc. which are connected with the result, Heaven) come to be regarded as direct auxiliaries (to those acts).

SŪTRA (4).

Also because we find a peculiar feature in all; if they were all equally 'primary', that feature could not appear in them.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

If all the acts were equally 'primary', then the $Pray\bar{a}jas$ could not be found in the ectypal sacrifices (of which the Darsha-paurnanāsa are the Archetype);—but they are actually found in them; as is clear from the text that' $K_{P}raua$ is to be used at each $Pray\bar{a}ja$ '(Taitti. Sain. 2. 3. 2. 3) (when this $Pray\bar{a}ja$ is performed in connection with the ectypal sacrifices).—This (presence of the $Pray\bar{a}ja$ in the ectypal sacrifices) could not be possible if the $Pray\bar{a}ja$, were not subsidiary to the $Agn\bar{e}ya$ and the rest.—For this reason also all'the acts cannot be regarded as equally 'primary.'

[If the sacrifices mentioned in the two sentences 'Ya examidatin, etc.' were distinct from all the others spoken of in the connected texts, then Aghāra and the other acts would be equally 'primary'; and hence, in accordance with the principle enunciated under stara 8.1.20, the Prayājas also, like the Agnāya and the rest, would form part of the instrumental factor; and as such they would no longer be able to form part of the Procedure of the ectypal sacrifices, the instrumental factor of whose 'Bringing About' is already prescribed elsewhere; under the circumstances, the ectypal sacrifices could no longer take the Prayājas into themselves;—but as a matter of fact, the Prayāja act actually taken up by the ectypal sacrifices; as is clearly indicated by the fact that we have a text laying down Kṛṣṇala as the material to be used at the Prayāja when performed in connection with the extypal sacrifices. Consequently, in order to establish the fact of the Prayāja being subsidiary to the Agnāya, etc. we must take the two sentences ('Ya evamvidvān, etc.') as only referring to the sacrifices already spoken of in the preceding sentences.—Tantravārtika, Trans, pp. 657-658].

SŪTRA (5).

[Objection]—"But the requisite accessory details (of the two sacrifices enjoined by the two sentences 'ya evanvidván, etc.') are actually laid down directly in the Vedic texts."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not true that the texts containing the mention of Paumamäsi and Amārdsyā are expressive of the two groups of sacrifices; in fact, they are clearly injunctive of two distinct sacrifices. Being thus taken, the words would not have to be taken in an indirect figurative sense (as standing for the two groups of acts mentioned in other sentences).—But the form (details) of the two sacrifices is not mentioned.—This form we would find out from another text—such as 'Paumamāsyāmāgneyo'sjākayālo bhawati'—from which it is clear that the sacrifice named Paumamāsi (which is enjoined by the sentence 'Ya exameiluām, etc.') has this form that Agnó is the deity and Cake is the material offered'. Thus it is that the

sentences speaking of the Agnēya and the rest are to be taken as laying down the accessory details (of the two distinct acts, Paurnamāsi and Amāvāsyā, which are enjoined by the two sentences 'Ya evamvidvān, etc.')''.

SŪTRA (6).

[ANSWER]-IN REALITY, THE TEXTS ('YADĀGNĒYAH, ETC.') SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INJUNCTIONS; AS (OTHERWISE) SEVERAL ACCES-SORY DETAILS WOULD BE PRESCRIBED SIMULTANEOUSLY: [WHICH WOULD NOT BE RIGHT]; FOR, IF SEVERAL ACCES-SORIES WERE PRESCRIBED IN CONNECTION WITH A SACRIFICE ALREADY ENJOINED, -THEN, INAS-MUCH AS THE ACCESSORY DETAILS ARE FOR THE SAKE OF SACRIFICES ONLY, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HAVE THE INJUNCTION (OF A SACRIFICE) TN CONNECTION WITH EACH ONE OF THE ACCESSORIES CON-CERNED.

Bhāsya.

In reality the sentences speaking of the Agneya and other acts should be regarded as injunctions of actions; -why !-as otherwise several accessory details would be prescribed simultaneously: that is to say, what you mean is that all the texts (' Yadāgnēyah, etc.') are syntactically connected and they prescribe several accessories (Agni, etc. as deities and the Cake, etc. as materials) (in connection with the sacrifices enjoined in the sentence 'Ya ēvamvidvān, etc.').—But it is not possible for several accessories to be prescribed by one sentence in connection with a sacrifice that has been enjoined by another sentence, specially when there is no connection between the two sentences .- "Why?" - Well, if, in the case in question, the connection intended is that 'the Astakapala (the Cake baked upon eight pans) is the material used at the Paurnamasi sacrifice',—then whence shall we get the idea that 'there is such a thing in existence as the Astākapāla (Cake)':and under the circumstances (if there is no such thing in existence), what 'astākapāla' would be connected with the Paurnamāsī sacrifice? In the text speaking of the Astākapāla ('Yadāgneyo'stākapālo bhavati') we find the verb 'bhavati', which means that 'when the Astakapāla Cake is there, it is 'āgnēya'; if then the 'aṣṭākapāla' is taken out of its connection with 'bhavati' [and connected with the Paurnamäsi sacrifice enjoined in another sentence), then it could not be open to any such connection as that 'the Astākapāla is Āgnēya'.—If, on the other hand, the intended connection be that 'the Agneya is present at the 'Paurnamasi sacrifice',-then, in that case, there would be no connection between the Agneya and the Astakapāla Cake. - If, (in order to avoid these difficulties) it be held that what is enjoined is that 'the Astakapala Cake used at the Paurnamasi sacrifice should be Agneya',—then, it becomes necessary to point out the sentence that has enjoined the use of the Astākapāla Cake at the Paurnamāsī sacrifice.--If (to avoid this difficulty) it be held that that what is enjoined is that 'the Agneva used at the Paurnamāsi sacrifice should be Astākanāla',—then, also, there is the same difficulty [i.e. what is the sentence that has enjoined the use of the Agneya at the Paurnamasi sacrifice? |- If it be held that "the Paurnamāsī is connected with both (Agnēya and Astākapāla)," then there would be no connection between the material (Astakapāla Cake) and the Deitu (Agni, mentioned by the term 'agnēya').-If it be explained that "what are connected with the Paurnamäsi sacrifice are the material and the Deity as related to each other", -then the meaning would be that 'That Astākapāla Cake which is Agneva is to be used at the Paurnamasi sacrifice' .- and in that case, inasmuch as there is no such thing known as 'the Astākapāla Cake which is Agneya' [as no Cake can be 'agneya' unless and until it has been offered to Agni, so that until the sacrifice itself has been performed. there can be no such thing as 'the Astākapāla Cake which is Agnēya'], this explanation also would be improper.-If it be held that "what is enjoined in connection with the Paurnamäsi sacrifice is the Cake that has been dedicated by some one to Agni (and not actually offered) "-in that case, as the Deity of the Paurnamäsi itself would remain unmentioned [the term 'aanēva' denoting only the deity to whom the cake has only been dedicated by some one, and not the one to whom it is to be offered at the Paurnamāsī sacrificel, the form of the Paurnamāsī would remain incomplete.

[The Tantravārtīka—Trans., p. 663—does not favour this explanation of the phrase 'Kēnachit sankalpitah'—It says—some people take this phrase as meaning 'dedicated to Agni by another sacrificer'; but this is not correct; because the using of what has been dedicated by another sacrificer would be tantamount to stealing the material got ready by another person. The phrase has therefore to be taken as 'what has been prescribed by some other text'—the deity Agni being one that is prescribed, for instance, by the text that speaks of 'one desiring a bright complexion'.]

-If some one were to say that "Agni would be the deity at the Paurnamäsi sacrifice", -then, he should be told that 'there can be no mutual relationship' (Sū. 1. 4. 15); i.e. the term 'agnēya' cannot contain a reference (to the deity to whom the cake has been dedicated by some one) and also an injunction (of the deity for the Paurnamasi sacrifice),-" We shall then assume a deity (for the Paurnamäsi sacrifice)".-- That cannot be; as unless there is an actual Injunction of the Deity, there can be no Deity; the term 'deity' is a relative one; and while Ami is the 'deity' of the Astakanala Cake, it is not a deity of the $\bar{A}iya$ (Butter). It is necessary therefore that the connection between 'Agnēya' and the Astākapāla Cake should be actually enjoined; and that in regard to which such a connection would be enjoined would be an act of sacrifice (as the cake cannot be agneya, until it is actually offered in sacrifice to Agni); and the result of this would be that. if the sentence laying down the said connection between the Cake and Agnēya were taken as laying down an accessory for the Paumamāsi, what would be laid down as such an accessory for the Paurnamäsi would be this other sacrifice, and not a material or a deily;—and one sacrifice cannot constitute the form of another;—so that in this case, as the form of the Paurnamāsī remains unmentioned, the two sentences containing the terms 'Paurnamāsī' and 'Amāvāsyā' could not be taken as enjoining two distinct Acts.

It has been argued (Text—Bottom of p. 141) (against the Siddhānta) that "the terms 'Paurnamāsi' and 'Amāvāsyā' can refer to the sacrifices spoken of in the first set of sentences, only through indirect indication, not directly".—But this does not affect our position; under the circumstances, what is assumed even indirectly would be quite right; for instance, we have such expressions as 'agnau tighati'—'avatā tighati', where (the direct meaning of the words being found to be impossible, as no one can stand in the fire or in the well), it is taken to mean indirectly that 'one stands near the fire', 'one stands near the well'; so that indirect indication is what is accepted in ordinary usage also (and there is nothing incongruous in it).

SUTRA (7).

THE MENTION ALSO OF THESE IS LIKE THAT.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

We have the text 'Ugrāni ha vā ētāni havīmsi amāvāsyāyām sambhriyantë-agnëyam prathamam aindrë uttarë', which speaks of the two sets of offerings collectively; (1) the Agneya (Cake), and (2) the Aindra (Milk and Curd).—Now if (as held by the Pūrvapaksin) the Agneya and the rest were to be regarded as accessories at this same single sacrifice, the Amāvāsyā,—then the two sets of materials spoken of (Agnēya—Cake, and Aindra-Milk and Curd) would be optional alternatives, and in that ease there would be no point in mentioning an order of sequence in the getting together of these materials, which is mentioned in the sentence 'agneyam prathamam-aindre uttare'; as there can be no order of sequence between two optional alternatives .- [And further, according to the Pūrvapaksa, over and above the three-one, Agneua and two Aindra.-there would be a fourth also, in connection with the distinct sacrifice enjoined by the sentence 'Ya ēvamvidvān, etc.' so that we should have the plural form "uttarāni" and not the dual form 'uttarē' found in the text quoted .-Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 665.]

SŪTRA (8).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

We find a text also indicative of the same—viz.: 'Chaturdasha paumamäsyäm ähutayo hüyanti, mayodasha amänäsyäyäm' ('There are fourteen ilbations offered at the Paumamäsi and thirteen at the Amāvāsyā').—[If the sentences 'Ya ëuamidvān, etc.' enjoined two distinct sacrifices, then the number of libations would be more than Fourteen and Thirteen;—if the sentences 'Yadāgnēyo, etc.' were injunctive of accessories then the libations would be less than Fourteen and Thirteen; and both of these views would be incompatible with the numbers Fourteen and Thirteen mentioned in the text just quoted. In fact the said numbers are possible only when there are three principal libations at the Paurnanāsī and two principal libations at the Amāvāsyā.—Tantravārtika.

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Adhikarana (4): The Upāmshuyāja is a distinct sacrifice: Counter-instance to the foregoing Adhikarana.

SŪTRA (9).

[Pūrvapakṣa].—"The Upāmshuyāja should be like the Paurņamāsī."

Bhāṣya.

[The next three Adhikaranas treat of cases where a reference to a composite whole is not possible, as it is in the case of the Darsha-Paurnamāsa.]

We have the text 'Jāmi vā ētad yajātasya kriyatē yadannankham purodāshau—Upāmshuyājamantarā yajati', ['It is a Jāmi, flaw in the sacrifice, that the two cakes are in close proximity; in between the two, therefore, one should perform the Upāmshuyāja'—cf. T.S. 2. 6. 6. 4]; this is followed by another text—'Viṣṇurupāmshu yaṣṭavyo' jāmtivāya,—Prajā-patirupāmshu yaṣṭavyō' jāmtivāya,—Agnīṣomāvupāmshu yaṣṭavyāvajā-mitvāya' ['Viṣṇu should be sacrificed to for the removal of the flaw of Jāmi;—Prajāpati should be sacrificed to for the removal of the flaw of Jāmi'-Agnīṣ-Oma should be sacrificed to for the removal of the flaw of Jāmi'-Mow in regard to these two sets of texts, there arises the question—Does the sentence 'One should perform the Upāmshuyāja' contain a reference to the batch of the three sacrifices mentioned in the second set of sentences as having Viṣṇu, Prajāpati and Agnī-Soma as accessories' or the injunction of a distinct sacrifice?

The Pūrvapakṣa on this question is as follows:-

"The Upāmshuvāja also is capable of being treated like the Pauramāsi [i.e. as a mere reference to the batch of three sacrifices] :-- why ?-- because it is spoken of by its name only. It is only a sacrifice equipped with all its accessory details that is spoken of by the particular name 'Upāmshuyāja'; but in the sentence where it is so spoken of, we do not find any mention of any accessories in the shape of material and Deity; -in the second set of sentences however we find a number of sacrifices mentioned of which 'Upāmshu' is mentioned as a qualification [which makes the name 'Upāmshuyāja' applicable to them]:-from all of which it follows that the name 'Upāmshuyāja' applies to the batch of these latter sacrifices .- 'But what is enjoined in the sentence Upamshuyajamantarā yajati is an entirely different sacrifice with upāmshu as its qualification, and with a definite form of its own'.-In fact, words like those we find in this sentence are not capable of signifying a sacrifice with upamshu as its qualification; the only term that could signify such a sacrifice is the term 'Upāmshuyāga'; as the change of 'ja' into 'ga' would be necessary according to Pāṇini 7. 3-52; the term 'Upāmshuyāja' (with ja) is, in fact, grammatically incorrect. Hence there is no distinct sacrifice with a definite form (spoken of in the

sentence 'Upāmshuyājamantarā yajati').—It may be that this sentence speaks of sacrifice in general with a particular name ('Upāmshuyāja'); but even so, we could not have any idea of a distinct sacrifice, inasmuch as its material or deity is not mentioned.—'In that case, the name Upāmshuyaja would not be able to signify the batch of the sacrifices spoken of in the second set of sentences'.—The term 'Upāmshuyāja' may be so incapable, but the word 'yajati' in the sentence would be expressive of those sacrifices; and under the circumstances, there would be nothing objectionable in regarding the word 'Upāmshuyāja' also as a reference to those sacrifices.'

SŪTRA (10).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN FACT, THE SENTENCE MUST BE AN INJUNCTION,
AS THERE ARE NO OTHER SACRIFICES MENTIONED IN THE

Bhāsya.

The sentence 'Upāmshuyājam yajati' should be taken as speaking of a distinct sacrifice: -why? -because there are no other sacrifices mentioned in the context; and when there are no other sacrifices mentioned in the context, the batch of which would the sentence in question refer to ?-" We have just pointed out that there are the sacrifices with Visnu. Prajāpati and Agni-Soma as deities which are spoken of in the context."-Certainly there are no such sacrifices: the sentences you speak of- Visnurupāmshu yastavyah' and the rest,-are not injunctions, they are only Arthavadas (commendatory declarations) .- "How so?"-Because in the same context we have another injunction, in the form of the sentence 'Upāmshuyājamantarā vaiati', which enjoins a sacrifice: in the circumstances, if the other sentences were also treated as Injunctions, there would be a syntactical split (there being several injunctions in a set of texts which practically form 'one sentence').-Then again, what those sentences express is the connection of the sacrifice with Visnu and other deities, not an Injunction .- "In the case of the sentence 'Upāmshuyajamantarā yajati' also, what is expressed is the connection of the 'interval' ('antarāla', as the time)" .- True; but in this sentence the sacrifice itself is enjoined as connected with the qualifications 'upāmshu' (the 'interval' and the rest) .--And as the whole set of the sentences forms a single 'sentence', more than one thing could not be enjoined by it .- "How so?"-The whole set of sentences, beginning with 'Jāmi vā ētat vainasva krivatē' and ending with the term 'ajāmitvāya'; form 'one sentence';-in the middle of this one (compound) sentence, we have the sentences speaking of Vienu, Prajāpati and Agni-Soma; -so that what is connected with these cannot be treated as a separate sentence; -hence it follows that these sentences-'Visnurupāmshu yaştavyah' and the rest, are not injunctions; -they are only commendatory declarations.—"What is the meaning of this commendatory declaration?" -It is in this way-it has been declared that if the two cake-offerings-to Agni and to Agni-Soma-are made without any interval between them, it involves the flaw of 'Jāmi', -with a view to remedy this flaw, it has been enjoined that 'the Upāmshuyāja should be performed in the interval';—but in what manner would the flaw be remedied by this '—When the Upāmshuyāja is performed, we know that in that performance, offerings are made to Viṣṇu, to Prajāpati or Agni-Soma; and as all this offering would come in between the two cake-offerings, it implies the cessation of the flaw of 'Jāmi' 'that is meant to be declared in the commendatory declaration; and to this end, the connection with Viṣṇu and other deities (which has been already enjoined by the injunction of the Upāmshu-Yāja) is reiterated in the declaration.—There is no use for the mention of the term 'antarā' ('in between '—in the sentence 'Upāmshuyājamantarā yajati) except that the sacrifice is enjoined (as to be performed in between the two cake-offerings).

"How is it to be known that offerings have to be made to Viṣṇu and the other deities,—when, as you say, the sentences 'Viṣṇurupāmshu yaṣtavyaḥ, etc.' speak of Viṣṇu and the other deities—who may or may not be those to whom offerings have to be made,—simply for the purpose of eulogising the Upāmshuyāṇa?"

To this some people make the reply that the offerings (to Viṣṇu and others) are already recognised as enjoined;—how?—by injunctive texts in other rescensional texts.—

But even though the offerings be not already recognised as enjoined,—yet on the basis of the common character of 'Upāmshu' (silence), the mention of Prajāpati as well as of Viṣnu would be a reference to what has already been enjoined (in the sentence 'Upāmshuyājamantarā yajati');—that is to say, Viṣnu and Prajāpati are possessed of the common character of 'silence' ('upāmshu'); it is for this reason that at a sacrificial performance whatever is done in honour of Prajāpati is done in silence; so that by describing those facts and by the injunction of indicative Mantras, Viṣnu also (who has the character of silence), even though not already recognised as enjoined, would be referred to as if already so recognised.—As regards the third deity, Agni-Soma, the text enjoining that deity is as follows:—'Etāvabrūyātām agnī-somāvājyasyaiva tāvupāmshu paurņamāsyām yajan'.—

From all this it follows that the sacrifice (spoken of in the sentence 'Upāmshuyājamantarā yajati') is an entirely distinct one.

SŪTRA (11).

From the mention of the qualification (we recognise the particular sacrifice).

Bhāşya,

It has been urged (by the Pūrvapakṣin) that it is not known which sacrifice it is that is called 'Upānshuyāja'.—Our answer to this is that the sacrifice so called is that one of which the qualification (silence, Upānshu) has been mentioned in the sentence 'Upānshu paurnamāṣyām yajam' (which, mentioning the Paurnamāṣi as the day of the sacrifice qualified by the qualification of upānshu, indicates that sacrifice to be one that is

performed on the Paurnamāṣi).—Hence the objection has no force against the Siddhānta.

SŪTRA (12).

Also because [the Upāmshuyāja sacrifice has been] spoken of as if it were' [the principal limb of the Sacrifice].

Bhāsya.

When a sacrifice is spoken of 'as if it were' a principal act, it strengthens the notion that it is a principal act; just as when a person's name is written 'as if he were' the most important person, it gives rise to the notion that he is actually the most important person. [The Upāṇshuyājā has been spoken of as 'Hṛdayaṇnuyāṇshuyājāh', where it is spoken of as the Heart, i.e. as if it were the most important part of the sacrifice, which also indicates that it is a distinct sacrifice] and hence it cannot be a collective name [of the batch of three sacrifices mentioned in the second set of sentences].

ADHIKARANA (5): ['Aghāra' and 'Agnihotra' are distinct independent acts: Second exception to Adhikarana (3)].

SŪTRA (13).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" THE 'ĀGHĀRA' AND 'ĀGNIHOTRA' (ARE NOT INDEPENDENT ACTS), AS THEY HAVE NO FORM (ACCESSORY DETAILS) OF THEIR OWN."

Bhāşya.

(A) There is the text 'Aghāramāghārayati' (T.S. 2. 5. 11. 6),—and then the texts 'Ūrdhvamāghārayati', Santatam āghārayati', (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 11. 7), Rjumāghārayati' (Ibid.), and so on.—(B) Similarly, there is the text 'Agnihotram juhoti',—and then the texts 'Dadhmā juhoti', 'Payasā juhoti' and so on.—Now there arises the question: (A) Are the Āghāras enjoined by the sentences 'Ūrdhvamāghārayati', etc., and these same are collectively referred to in the sentence 'Āghāramāghārayati'? Or is this latter sentence injunctive of a distinct and independent Āghāra?—(B) Similarly, are the Homas enjoined by the sentences 'Dadhnā juhoti', etc., and these same are collectively referred to in the sentence 'Agnihotram juhoti'? Or is this latter sentence injunctive of a distinct and independent Homa?

On this question we have the following Pūrapakṣa—"The two sentences ('Āgharamāghārayati' and 'Agminotram juhoti') are not injunctive of independent acts;—why ?—because 'they have no form of their own'; i.e. the acts spoken of in these two sentences have no forms other than those of the 'Āghāra' and 'Homa' spoken of in the other two sets of sentences,—on the basis of which different forms the acts could be regarded as different from those. Hence it follows that they contain mere references to the acts already enjoined by the other sentences in the context."

SŪTRA (14).

[Purvapaksa (continued)]—"Also because of the application of the names."

Bhāṣya.

"The names also are applied, in such expressions as 'Agnihotram nāma homam juhoti', 'Āgharasanjhakam karma karoti', where the two acts of Homa and Āghāra are predicated as qualified by the names 'Agnihotra' and 'Āghāra';—and it is not known which particular act is called 'Aghāra', and which is called 'Agnihotra'.—'But it is well known that Āghara is the act of Pouring, and Homa is the act of offering into fire'.—If what are enjoined in the sentences is the act of Pouring in general and the act of offering into fire in general, then these two acts being already known, their mention in the sentences in question could only be by way of reference.—If

on the other hand, the two names (' Aghara' and ' Agnihotra') are not meant to be applied in their literal (etymological) sense,—even then the two acts of Aghāra and Homa could not be regarded as mentioned only in their general forms, because a name is always applicable to a particular individual (not a general) entity; and yet we perceive no particular features. For these reasons, the two sentences in question ('Aghārmāghārayati' and 'Agnihotram juhoti') could not be regarded as injunctions of a distinct Aghāra and a distinct Homa.—Further, how could an action (Homa) be spoken of by means of a word expressive of the means of accomplishment ('Agnihotram') ?-In fact that means of accomplishment which is 'the most desired' is spoken of by means of a word with the Accusative ending, and the action is spoken of by means of a word with a conjugational ending. In case the two sentences are taken as mere references (collectively to the acts enjoined in the other sentences), the actions taken collectively as one composite whole would be something different from each of the component actions; and this composite whole could be treated as 'the most desired' means of accomplishment (and hence capable of being spoken of by a word with the Accusative ending).

SŪTRA (15).

[PÜRVAPAKȘA (concluded)]—"ALSO BECAUSE IT IS NOT RELATED TO THE CONTEXT."

Bhāṣya.

"There is no material or Deity in the context which could be connected with the Aghāra (as a distinct sacrifice), and which could impart a form to that sacrifice.—For this reason also the terms 'āghāra' and 'agnihotra' must be treated as standing for the sacrifices taken collectively."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY ARE INJUNCTIONS; BECAUSE THE WORDS SIGNEY ACTUAL PERFORMANCE; AND THE REPETITION OF THE WORDS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING THE ACCESSORY DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the two terms 'Aghāra' and 'Agnihotra' should be treated as words standing for the sacrifices already enjoined taken collectively; they should be treated as Injunctions.—Why?—Because the words 'aghārangata' (in the sentence 'aghāramāghārangata') and 'juhota' (in the sentence 'agnihotram juhota') mean that the acts of Aghāra (Pouring) and Homa (Offering into Fire) are to be performed;—hence we conclude that two distinct acts are enjoined (by the sentences in question).—The terms 'āghāra' and 'agnihotra' are well-known to be expressive, respectively, of the two actions in general, of Pouring and Offering into Fire; and they are not words whose meanings are not known;

the two sacrifices (of Aghāra and Agniholra) will thus have their forms duly determined, and enjoined in those forms.

It has been argued above that-"the sacrifices are really enjoined in the sentences, 'Urdhvamāghārayati', 'Dadhnā juhoti' and the rest, which sacrifices are only referred to in the two sentences ' Aghāramāahāravati' and 'Agnihotram juhoti'".-But in reality, it is not so; the sentences 'Urdhvamāghārayati' and 'Dadhnā juhoti' and the rest are not capable of enjoining the acts of Aghara and Agnihotra: because the sentences do not convey the notions that 'the aghara should be performed' and that 'the Agnihotra should be performed'; what the sentence 'Urdhvamāghārayati' signifies is that 'the connection between urdhvata (uprightness), and aghara should be brought about',-and what the sentence 'Dadhnā iuhoti' signifies is that the connection between the Dadhi and the Homa should be brought about':-thus then, the sacrifices of Aghara and Agnihotra not being such as are already enjoined by the other sentences, the two sentences in question cannot be regarded as mere references to something already enjoined .- "When, as you say, the sentence 'Urdhvamāghārayati' enjoins the connection of the Aghāra with Urdhvatā,—and the sentence 'Dadhnā juhoti' enjoins the connection between the Homa and the Dadhi-the Aghāra and the Homa would naturally come in."-Not so; because the connection (of the Aghara with the Urdhvata, or of the Homa with the Dadhi) could be possible only when the injunction of the acts (Aghara and Homa) is already there; hence the acts of Aghara and Homa cannot be regarded as coming in by mere implication. It follows from this that these are distinct acts by themselves.

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, what the terms ' $\bar{a}gh\bar{a}rayati$ ' and 'juhoti' directly signify is the operation on (performance of) the $\bar{A}gh\bar{a}ra$ and the $Homa_r$ —not the connection of the $\bar{U}rdhvat\bar{a}$ and the Dadhi."

True; the said connection is not directly signified; but the signification of the operation would be assumed 'in proximity' (to the Injunction), 'for the purpose of indicating the accessory details (qualifications).'

"But the Shruti (a Direct Assertion) could not signify the operation of a thing other than what is mentioned by itself."

This is quite true; but it could very well signify the operation of something spoken of by itself; and this something would be qualified by the qualifying word; and there would thus be a recognition of the qualified thing.

"That may be; the qualifying word might qualify the thing spoken of by the sentence; but the operation in question is not recognized as subsisting in the qualification.—[That is, so long as the qualification is not directly laid down, the Agent could not engage himself in it; so that, even if he would perform the particular sacrifice without taking notice of the qualification, he would feel that he had done his duty.—Tantravārtika— Trans., p. 690.]"

What would happen, even if it were so? Even though the qualification would be inoperative, the meaning of the word would be definitely known.

"In this case, what would be the purpose served by the proximity of the qualifying word?"

It may not serve any purpose at all.

"How can (a word of) the Veda be useless?"

In cases where it serves a purpose, it cannot be useless; but when it does not serve a useful purpose, what else could be said (except that it is useless)?—[It is the opponent's reasoning that makes the word useless, by making the qualifying word inoperative; according to our reasoning it does serve a distinctly useful purpose; so that it cannot be useless.—Tantrawartika—Trans., p. 691.]

"In that case, the necessary qualification could be obtained through Syntactical Connection; it is only when there is Direct Assertion (by the words) that no assumption can be made on the basis of Syntactical Connection.—[That is, even though the injunction of the qualified operation is a direct one, yet, in the way you put it, it would come to rest upon Syntactical Connection.—Tantravartika—Trans., p. 691.]"

That is true; but the said assumption could be made when the meaning of the Direct Assertion would not be intended to be conveyed.

"Why should there be no intention to convey the idea in the present case?"

Because the word speaking of the qualification is not a wrong reading,—and because the act spoken of by the text itself is one that has been already enjoined by another text.

Thus it becomes established that the repetition (of the mention of *Homa*) in such texts as '*Dadhnā juhoti*' serves the purpose of indicating the qualifying (accessory) details; that is, the use of the term '*juhoti*' is a reference (to the *Homa* enjoined elsewhere) for the purpose of connecting that Homa with qualifying accessory details like *Dadhi*).

"If the term 'jūhoti' (contained in the sentence ' $Dadhn\bar{a}$ juhoti') is a reference, then by what is the accessory detail enjoined?"

Please do not say that we hold it to be enjoined by the term 'dadhi'—
[What is meant is that in the term 'juhoth' as appearing in the sentence 'Dadhnā juhoth', the conjugational affix serves the purpose of enjoining the material, Dadhi, mentioned by the word 'dadhnā', and it is only the verbal root that contains the reference to the Homa enjoined elsewhere;—so that there is no difficulty about the injunction of the accessory detail, Dadhi.—Trans. pp. 691-692].

"But we have just explained that the operation of the accessory (qualifying) detail is understood to be got at through Syntactical Connection."

True, that is so; but unless the thing has been actually enjoined, how can it be understood (through anything)? In fact, if an unenjoined thing were to be cognised, there could be no means of right cognition by which that cognition could be brought about; and in the absence of such a means of right cognition, the cognition could only be regarded as an illusion.

Under the circumstances, the term 'jukots' (in the sentence 'Dadhnā juhots'), as also the term 'āghārayats' (in the sentence 'Ūrdhvamāghārayats') must be injunctive (of the accessory detail).

"What is it then that signifies the reference (to the sacrifice enjoined elsewhere)?"

This reference is signified by the verbal root (in 'juhoti' and 'āghārauati').

"If these terms ('juhoti' and 'āghārayati') are injunctive, then,—inasmuch as what they express (i.e. the acts of Homa and Ajhāra) has been already enjoined (by the sentences 'Agnihotram juhoti' and 'Aghāramāghārayati'—according to the Sādāhānta),—why should they be repeated?"

The words are repeated for the purpose of enjoining what is expressed by the whole sentence; so that there is nothing incongruous.

From all this it follows that the two sentences ('Agnihotram juhoti' and 'Aghāramāghārayati') are injunctions of distinct and independent acts.

It has been argued (by the opponent) that there are no materials or Deity mentioned in connection with any such distinct act as 'Aghāra'.— But what is the need for any such material and Deity being mentioned, when the form of the act (sacrifice) is already fully recognised on the basis of the name signifying what is well-known?—Further,—[it is not true that no material and Deity are mentioned in connection with the Aghāra sacrifice]—we actually find the Butter (Afya) mentioned as the material for this sacrifice, in the text 'Chaturgṛhītam vā ētadabhūt tasyāghāramāghāryā', and its Deity Indra is indicated by the mantra laid down in the following text—'Indra ūrdhvodhvaro divi spṛshatu mahato yajño yajñapatē indravān svāhā-ityāghāramāghārayati' (Gf. Taitti. Sam. l. 1. 12. 1); the sacrifice can be 'indravān' (as mentioned in this mantra) only if it has Indra for its deity; so that if this mentions the deity for the Āghāra sacrifice, then this sacrifice becomes duly complete in all its details.

For these reasons it becomes established that the two sentences in question are injunctive of two distinct and independent acts, and do not speak of the two groups of sacrifices (enjoined in the other sentences).

[The subject-matter of this Adhikarana (5) cannot be regarded as already included in the foregoing Adhikarana, (4); because acts of Aghara and Hema as spoken of in the sentences, 'Ūrdhvamāghārayati' and Dadhā-juhoti', a precisely in the same form in which they are presented by the two sentences 'Āghāramāghārayati' and 'Agnihotram juhoti'; while in the preceding Adhikarana, the word speaking of the sacrifice in one sentence was 'upamhhuyāja' and in the other 'yastavyah'; further, in the previous Adhikarana, the injunction of the deity Vişnu in the sentence 'Viṣnurupāmhhu yastavyah' completely over-shadows the notice of the 'Bringing about' of the Sacrifice; while there is no over-shadowing in the present Adhikarana—in the present Adhikarana the several sentences are not capable of being construct as 'one sentence', as in the preceding Adhikarana;—lastly, the sentences in the present Adhikarana are not regarded by either party to be purely commendatory declarations, as those of the preceding Adhikarana

[Adhikarana (6):—The 'Pashu' and the 'Soma' are distinct and independent Acts.]

(SŪTRA 17).

AS THERE IS MENTION OF THE MATERIAL, (THE SENTENCES
MUST BE) INJUNCTIONS OF THE 'PASHU' AND 'SOMA'
SACRIFICES;—BECAUSE THE MENTION OF THE MERE
MATERIAL IN THE CONTEXT WOULD BE USELESS,
SPECIALLY AS THE WORDS COULD NOT SERVE
THE PURPOSE OF LAYING DOWN NECESSARY
DETAILS

Bhāşya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma we find the text—(A) 'Yo diksito yadaynisomiyam pashumālabhatē'—('The initiated sacrificer kills the animal dedicated to Agni-Soma',) (Taitti. Sain. 6. 1. 11. 6)—and then it goes on, 'Hrdayasyāgre'vadyati, atha jihvāyā, atha vakṣasab' ('He cuts out the heart first, then the neck, then the chest') (Taitti. Sain. 6. 3. 10. 4);—similarly there is the text (B)—'Somēna yajēta' ('Sacrifices with Soma'); then it goes on, 'Aindruvāyavam grhņāti, maitrāvarumum grhņāti, āšhvinam grhņāti' and so on ('He takes up the cup dedicated to Indra-vāyu, then the one dedicated to Mitra-Varuna, then the one dedicated to Mitra-Varuna, then the one dedicated to the Ashvins').

In regard to these two sets of texts, there arises the question—(A) Is the word 'alabhatē' ('kills') only a reference to the group of acts expressed by the word 'avadyati'? Or is it injunctive of a distinct and independent act? (B) Similarly, is the word 'yajēta' only a reference to the group of acts expressed by the word 'grļnāti'? Or is it injunctive of a distinct and independent act?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa-

"Both these words are references to the two group of acts;—why?—Because the two acts that may be thought of as being enjoined by these two words are already made known (enjoined) by the two words 'avadyati' and 'grhnāti';—and what has been already made known cannot be enjoined again.—The term 'pashu' ('animal') [in the text (A)] is a reference to the 'heart' and other limbs (mentioned in the sentences 'Hrdayasyrēvadyati', etc.);—and the term 'Soma' [in the text (B)] is a reference to the Soma-juice (in the 'cups', mentioned in the sentence 'Aindravāyavam grhnāti, etc.)—Consequently, the root 'gaj', 'to sacrifice', in the sentence 'Somēna vajēta' (B) is a reference, made for the purpose of connecting the 'sacrifice' with the result (Heaven) by such sentences as 'Yajēta svargatāmah' ('one desiring heaven should sacrifice'); and similarly the root 'ālabha', 'to kill', is a reference, made for the purpose of connecting the 'killing' with the deity Anni-Soma.

Further, that the several 'holdings' (of the cups, spoken of in the sentences 'Aindraväyavam grhnāti', etc.) form one group of acts is clearly shown by the text 'Dashatānadhvaryuh prātaḥsavanā grahān grḥnāti' ('At the morning extraction, the Adhvaryu holds these ten cups'); the order of sequence also among these 'holdings' is shown by the texts—'Ashvino dashamo grḥnatā', and 'Trūyo hūyatā'.

"Then again, if the two distinct and independent acts were enjoined (by the two verbs 'alabhate' and 'yajeta'), then, in that case, the terms 'aindravāyavam', 'maitrāvarunam' and 'āshvinam' could only be taken as injunctive of deities; and the several deities, being thus enjoined in relation to a single sacrifice, would have to be regarded as so many optional alternatives; just as in the case of the text 'Khādirē badhnāti, pālāshē badhnāti, rohitakē badhnāti', [the three woods, Khadira, Palāsha, and Rohita, having been enjoined in relation to the single act of Tying, have been regarded as three optional alternatives).-If those deities were so many optional alternatives, then the mention of the order of sequence among them, (as shown in the texts 'Ashvino dashamo arhvate, etc.'), as also the mention of them as forming one group (as in the text ' Dashaitānadhvaryuh prātahsavanē grahān grhnāti'). would have no sense. On the other hand, if the root 'yaji' (to sacrifice, in the text 'Somena yajeta', were treated as speaking of the group of acts (of holding the cup dedicated to Indra-Vavu, and that dedicated to Mitra-Varuna, and that dedicated to the Ashvins),—then all this would be quite applicable.—From all this it follows that the terms 'ālabhatē' and 'yajatë' must be taken as speaking of the two groups of acts."

On this Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Sīddhānta—The two texts are injunctions of the two distinct sacrifices, 'Pashu' and 'Soma';—why?—The term 'soma' is known to be expressive of the milky-creper, not of the juice (as held by the Pūrvapakṣin); and the word 'Soma' denotes the Class, not the Individual.—Similarly the term 'pashu' is used by people as expressing a particular object with horns, tail, hair, four feet,—and this also denotes the Class.—Now, there are no sacrifices enjoined in the context at which any such class of Material (not any individual) is to be used;—and it is only if there were such sacrifices that they could be referred to as groups by the words 'Pashu' and 'Soma'.

"The Heart and other limbs are parts of the Pashu (Animal); and it is these limbs that would be referred to by the term 'pashu', for the purpose of connecting them with the deity Agni-Soma."

That cannot be; all that the sentence means is that the 'Pashu becomes dedicated to Agni-Soma', not that 'the Heart and other limbs are Pashu'. If the term 'pashu' be taken in its ordinary sense of the animal, then the word retains its primary significance; if, on the other hand, it is taken in the sense of the Heart and other limbs, then the word becomes secondary (indirect) in its significance of the parts of the animal's body.—Similarly, the term 'soma' could be a reference only if it were taken in the secondary (indirect) sense of the juice of Soma.—From all this, it follows that the texts in question are injunctions of distinct acts, and not mere references.

It might be argued that—"the text 'Somēna yajēta' may be taken as

enjoining the Soma-creeper in relation to the sacrifices to Indra-Vāyu and other deities (which sacrifices are enjoined in the other sentences 'Aindra-vāyawam orhnāti', etc.)''.

Our answer to this is that this cannot be; because the creeper could be recognised as related to the deities Indra-Vāyu only through Syntactical Connection; while it is by Direct Assertion that the juice is recognised as related to Indra-Vāyu. Under the circumstances, if the term 'Soma' (in the text 'Somāna yaṣēta') were expressive of a material, then,—even though the other sacrifices, Aindravāyava and the rest, would be there as mentioned in the Context,—it (the word 'soma') would be incapable of either enjoining, or referring to, a material for those sacrifices [as the material for these is already directly asserted to be the Soma-juice]; so that the word would be entirely useless.

From all this it follows that the texts in question enjoin distinct acts, and they do not refer to the sacrifices mentioned in the Context.

SŪTRA (18).

SIGNIFYING PREPARATORY ACTS, THE SENTENCES CANNOT BE INJUNCTIVE.

Bhāsya.

The Siddhanta view as propounded just now has been that, even though there are other sacrifices enjoined in the contexts (by the sentences 'Hrdayasyāgrēvadyati, etc.', and by the sentences 'Aindravāyavam grhnāti, etc.'), yet these are not the sacrifices that are referred to collectively by the words 'Pashu' and 'Soma'.—The position taken up in the present Sūtra is that there are no other sacrifices enjoined in the contexts. Why ?-Because 'signifying preparatory acts, the sentences cannot be injunctive'; that is, the sentences 'Aindravayavam, etc.' and the rest do not enjoin sacrifices at all: the act of 'grahana', 'taking up' (spoken of by the word 'grhnāti', in the sentence 'Aindravāyavam grhnāti'), stands for mere preparation, which serves a visible purpose (of getting the 'cup' ready); after this 'preparation', the mention of the deity (Indra-Vāuu) would be for a transcendental purpose; so that what the sentence 'Aindravayavam grhnati' means is that 'the cup is prepared and dedicated to Indra-Vāyu'; -and as this 'dedication' would not be possible without the act of sacrifice, this act of sacrifice would be assumed (on the basis of the 'apparent inconsistency' of the 'dedication'); [such is the roundabout manner in which the sentence Aindravāyavam gṛḥṇāti 'could be taken as indicating the act of sacrifice]; -this act of sacrifice, however, at which the said 'dedication' could be made, is already directly enjoined in the other sentence ('Somēna yajēta');-hence there could be no justification for taking the sentences 'Aindravayavam grhnāti' and the rest as injunctive of a sacrifice. Thus then, there being no other sacrifices enjoined in the context, the root 'yaji' (in the word 'yajēta' in the sentence 'Somēna yajēta') cannot be taken as referring to any group of sacrifices.

Similarly with the root 'ālabh' (in the verb 'ālabhēta' in the sentence 'Agnīşomīyam pashumālabhēta').

SUTRA (19).

BECAUSE OF THE DIVERSITY OF DEITIES, THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION OF THE ACT (OF SACRIFICE); AS THE MENTION OF THE DIVERSE

MATERIALS WOULD BE OTHERWISE MEANINGLESS, THERE SHOULD BE MULTIPLICITY (OF THE ACT OF 'GRAHANA', 'HOLDING'), SPECIALLY

BECAUSE THE ACT (OF GRAHANA)

IS SUBSERVIENT TO THE

MATERIAL.

Bhāsua.

The discussion that we had so far in regard to the 'Pashu' sacrifice shall be resumed under Discourse X. It is in connection with the 'Soma' sacrifice alone that we continue the discussion now

It has been argued by the Pürvapaksin that in regard to the acts of grahana (Holding), there are texts mentioning an 'order of sequence' among them (e.g. 'Ashvino dashamo arhyate'), as also those speaking of them as a 'group' (e.g. 'Dashaitānadhvaryuh prātahsavanē grahān grhņāti'); -how are these two facts to be accounted for ?

As regards this argument, the fact of the matter is that when Indra-Väyu and the other deities are spoken of (in the sentences ' Aindraväyavam grhņāti' etc.), it is not meant that 'a sacrifice is to be offered to Indra-Vāyu' or 'a sacrifice is to be offered to Mitra-Varuna'. If such were the direct meaning of the sentences, then alone could these deities be assumed to be the deities of sacrifices; and in that case the sense of the injunction contained in the sentence would be that the sacrifice is to be accomplished with the Deity alone (without any material, etc.) [which is absurd]. On the other hand, if the deities are taken as enjoined in connection with the preparatory act of 'grahana' (Holding), with a view to some transcendental result, then the 'dedication' to Indra-Väyu would be something distinct from the 'dedication' to Mitra-Varuna; and this 'dedication' in each case would bring about a transcendental result distinct from the transcendental result brought about by the said Holding itself. So on with the other Holdings also. And thus it is that the several Holdings are spoken of collectively as a group (on the ground that the several transcendental results brought about by them go together to help the final transcendental result of the Soma sacrifice).

[Next as regards the 'order of sequence'] the quantity of Soma-creeper to be used at this sacrifice is 'ten handfuls', all of which is kept in several definite-sized vessels opening upwards and six inches (one Prādesha) in height, and pounded and mixed with water in several definite-sized jars; all this Soma prepared in this fashion could not be 'held' in the hand (in Cups. except by a small quantity being taken up and kept in each Cup). [Hence these 'holdings' must be many and distinct.] Even if it were possible to 'hold' all this (by a single act of Holding), the right course would be to 'hold' it by parts, as otherwise, the performance would run counter to the directive text of the performance whereby the several enjoined deities have to be treated as optional alternatives; for, if the whole of the Soma were

'held' once only, then what is dedicated to Indra-Vāyu would be the same that is dedicated to Mitra-Varuna; and this would be absurd .- Hence, in view of the 'dedication' (to each deity) being distinct, the Soma meant for each separate deity must be kept separately; and this could not be done by a single act of Holding. Further, unless there is a sacrifice to be offered to a Deity, there can be no 'dedication' of a material to deities; hence it follows that sacrifices should be offered to all those deities to whom the material has been 'dedicated'; -and when these sacrifices are offered to these deities, thereby becomes accomplished the sacrifice that has been directly enjoined in the text 'Juotistomena vajeta', which thus needs no otherdeities. This Soma-sacrifice (Jyotistoma) has been enjoined as to be performed with the entire 'handful' (of Soma-creepers); -- and this is possible only if the act of 'Holding' is repeated; -it is only then that it becomes complete in all its details. It is for this reason that the sacrifice has to be repeated; as unless it is repeated, it cannot become fully equipped with all the deities (mentioned) and the whole (handful) of the Soma .- And when the action is repeated, it is only natural that there should be an order of sequence among the several acts and they should be spoken of collectively as forming a group (called the 'Soma' or 'Jyotistoma'); so that the mention of these in the texts is only natural.

SŪTRA (20).

THE PREPARATORY ACT CANNOT BE DIVERSE; BECAUSE THE MATERIAL,
WHICH SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF SOMETHING ELSE, OCCUPIES
ONLY A SECONDARY POSITION.

Bhāsya.

It has been argued by the Pūrvapaksin that—"in the case of the texts:

'Khādīrē badhnāti', 'Pādīshē badhnāti', and 'Rohitakē badhnāti', the three woods, Khadīra, Padīsha and Rohita, are treated as optional alternatives in the preparatory act of the 'Tying'; and similarly in the case in question the several deities (Indra-Vāgu, Mitra-Varuna, Ashvins) could be treated as optional alternatives."—But this cannot be right, because in the case eited, the Khadīra and other woods are found to be directly enjoined for the purpose of accomplishing the 'preparation'; hence in the case in question also, if the several deities of the 'Holding'—Indra-Vāgu and the rest,—had been directly enjoined for the purpose of accomplishing the sacrifice,—then alone could option be admitted. As a matter of fact, however, they are not found to be directly enjoined for the purpose of accomplishing the sacrifice, then could be be taken together (as forming one group).

[There is some difference in the interpretation of the Sütras in this Adhi-karana, as to which embodies the Pūrvapaksa and which the Siddhānta;—for which see Tantravārvika—Trans., p. 709.]

[The purpose served by the Adhikarana is that, at the Ectypal Sacrifices of which the Jyotistoma is the Archetype, the details have to be performed in relation to a single cup,—and that too only once,—according to the Pūrvapakṣa; while according to the Siddhānta, all the details have to be performed exactly as at the Archetypal Sacrifice.]

Adhikarana (7): Actions differentiated by Number. SÜTRA (21).

Inasmuch as it is based upon separateness, Number should be a Differentiator among Actions.

Bhāşya.

[Differentiation among acts on the basis of different words and on the basis of the Repetition of the same word having been disposed of,—along with exceptions—we now proceed to discuss the differentiation of actions by Number.]

The Vājapēya sacrifice has been enjoined in the sentence 'Vājapēyēna svārājyakāmo yajēta'; at this sacrifice there are seventeen animals consecrated to Prajāpati, as mentioned in the text—'Saptadasha prājāpatyān pashūnalabhatē, saptadasho vai prajāpatih prajāpaterāptyai shyāmāstuparā ēkarāpa bhavanti, ēvamēva hi prajāpatih samrādhyai'. (Taitti. Brā. 1. 3. 4. 3.)

Now, in regard to this, there arises the question—Does this passage speak of seventeen distinct acts? Or of only one act at which the seventeen animals come in as an accessory detail?

On this question, we have the following Pārvapakṣa—"There is only one action;—why?—because, when the question arises as to whether the seventeen animals are dedicated to Prajāpati, is it for the accomplishing of a single sacrifice or several sacrifices?—the most reasonable view to take is that they are dedicated for the purpose of accomplishing a single act. When a man dedicates seventeen animals, he dedicates one animal also;—when one animal has been dedicated (and the act of sacrifice accomplished through that dedication), the dedication of all the seventeen animals becomes accomplished (as part of that same first sacrifice);—wherefore then should there be any assumption of the second and subsequent sacrifices? In this way there would be need assuming a fewer transcendental results (as following from the single sacrifice, than the large number that it would be necessary to assume if there were seventeen sacrifices).—From all this it follows that a single act of sacrifice is accomplished by means of the seventeen snimals."

In answer to the above we have the following Siddhānta—There should be difference among actions due to number, because the number seventeen is based upon the separateness of the actions; that is, there is 'separateness' among the animals only when there are several actions,—not if there is a single action.—Why !—The Injunction lays it down that the sacrifice in question is to be accomplished by means of eleven offerings (made out of the eleven pieces cut out of the body of the dedicated animal);—all these offerings are got out of the body of a single animal;—under the circumstances, the killing of the other sixteen animals (beginning with the second) could not be for the purpose of obtaining the pieces to be offered;—so that the animals that would be killed after the killing of the first animal would be killed only for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result;—and in that case, as the bodies of these other animals would not be satually offered to Prajāpata, they would not be 'prājāpatya' ('dedicated to

Prajāpati');—and this would be incompatible with the fact that the Vedic text speaks of them as 'prājāpatya'.—Thus then, it would be impossible for the number seventeen—which is based upon the separateness of so many distinct things,—to rest in a single animal (offered at a single sacrifice);—on the other hand, if there are several sacrifices, there would be need for several sets of cuttings for offering; so that for the seventeen sacrifices, it would be necessary to get together seventeen animals; and it is only thus that the mention of the number 'seventeen' would be reconciled.—For all these reasons, the number of sacrifices (mentioned in the text in question) must be seventeen.

Objection—"Even when there is a single sacrifice, the sacrificing could be done by means of the seventeen sets of cuttings (out of the bodies of the seventeen animals),—on the basis of the direct declaration (contained in the text)".

Reply-That cannot be; what is directly asserted is the number of the animals killed, -not the number of sets of cuttings; and what are the means of accomplishing the sacrifice are the cuttings as the sacrificial material.not the class 'animal'; as what this class 'animal' has done at the archetypal sacrifice (Jyotistoma) is that it helped the primary act by qualifying the individual animal out of which the cuttings were obtained; so that at the ectypal sacrifice also what it will do is to help the primary act by qualifying the individual animal out of which the cuttings would be obtained .-Now. what the number 'seventeen' applies to is the Animal, not the sets of cuttings; so that for the purpose of obtaining one set of cuttings, it becomes necessary to kill one animal; and in this way the number 'seventeen' could not be applicable to the cuttings.—This would be the only explanation possible.-If then the animals had been spoken of as 'seventeen' in reference to their horns, or their complexions, or their shapes, -such as whiteblack, red,-then any one of these alone would be taken up (for killing, for the purpose of obtaining the cuttings); -or, if it were in reference to such division as that into 'the hornless', 'the two-horned' and 'the one-horned', then also any one of these alone would be taken up. In the text under consideration, however, we find that all the animals are spoken of as 'black, hornless and of one shape' ('shyāmāstūparā ēkarūpāh');—and the killing of all the seventeen animals of this same kind (for the purpose of obtaining the cuttings out of the bodies of all the seventeen) would be possible (and necessary) only when there are several (i.e. seventeen) sacrifices,-and not when there is a single sacrifice (at which a single set of cuttings would be used, for which the body of only one animal would be required).

From all this it follows that there are seventeen sacrifices.

The purpose served by this Adhikarana is that,—according to the Pūrvapakṣa, if a single animal were lost or found defective, the act (of killing) performed over the entire batch of animals would have to be repeated, each one of whom would be killed after the other,—the whole act in this case being conducive to a transcendental result;—while according to the Siddhānta, it is only one animal over which the act would have to be repeated; because when the seventeen sacrifices are distinct, one would not need the animal used at the other sacrifice.

ADHIKARANA (8): Actions differentiated by Name.

SÜTRA (22).

THE NAME ALSO (DIFFERENTIATES ACTIONS), AS IT OCCURS IN THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTIONS.

Bhāsya.

In regard to the text * Athaisa jyolirathaisa vishvajyotirathaisa sarvajyotih,' there arises the question—Is it the single sacrifice Jyotistoma that is
referred to here by the (three) names (1. Jyotih, 2. Vishvajyotih, and
3. Sarvajyotih) for the purpose of enjoining, in connection with it, such
accessories as 'the gift of a thousand' and so forth? Or do these names
lay down three distinct actions, the details regarding which are going to be
mentioned later on?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapaksa:—"The text in question should be taken as laying down the accessories of the principal sacrifice spoken of in the context (i.e. the Jyotisloma); as it is only thus that the connection of the context is maintained.—'But all these accessories would be taken, on the strength of Syntactical Connection, as enjoined in connection with the sacrifices named Jyotih, Vishvajyotih, and Sarvajyotih'.—That does not affect our position; because all these names denote the Jyotisloma sacrifice itself. That is, (a) the term 'jyotih' mentions the initial term in the compound 'jyotisloma'; as regards the terms (b) 'Vishvajyotih' and (c) 'Sarvajyotih', what is meant is that all ('sarva' and 'vishva') 'jyotis', Trivrt and the rest, which are spoken of in the supplementary texts, belong to this Jyotisloma sacrifice, and on that account, the Jyotisloma is called 'Vishva-jyotih' and 'Sarvajyotih' (i.e. 'having all the Jyotis'). [Thus then, all the Internames stand for the Jyotistoma sacrifice itselfi."

In answer to this Pürvapaksa we have the following Siddhanta:-The three names, Jyotih, Vishvajyotih and Sarvajyotih are differentiators of actions, because these are found mentioned in the originative injunction; and they do not merely repeat the names of sacrifices mentioned before; hence the sentence 'Athaisa jyotih' should be taken as injunctive of a new distinct act (not already enjoined). If it were a mere reference (to the Jyotistoma), it would not be conducive to any distinct activity, and as such would be useless (superfluous). Further, if the reference were regarded as being for the purpose of laying down the further accessory detail (of the gift of a thousand), in regard to the sacrifice of the Context (i.e. Jyotistoma), -then there would be an option (between the accessory details previously laid down and those laid down through the said reference); which would mean that one of the two accessories would be rejected at the performance where the other would be employed [and the rejection of what has been enjoined is most improper] .- Further, the terms 'Jyotih', 'Vishvajyotih' and 'Sarvajyotih' do not denote the Lyotistoma; in fact they stand for a totally distinct set of sacrifices. Merely because one part of the name is common to the two acts, it does not follow that one subserves the purposes of the other; for instance, the term 'shālā' denoting House,—the term 'mālā' also could not be regarded as denoting the House, simply on the ground of the similarity of the syllable 'lā' which is present in both the terms, 'shālā' and 'mālā'.

It has been argued (by the Pūrvapakṣin) that "the term 'Jyotiḥ' (which is one of the terms in question) mentions the initial term in the compound 'Jyotiṣtoma'."—But (if, 'jyotiḥ' stood for the Jyotiṣtoma), the sentence 'Athaiṣa jyotiḥ' could be construed with the term 'Jyotiṣtoma' (contained in a totally different sentence) only indirectly on the strength of the Context;—this would set aside the natural and direct syntactical connection of the sentence with the term 'Jyotiḥ'; and this would be most unreasonable, as Syntactical Connection is more powerful than Context.

It might be urged that "the term 'Jyotih' might apply to a distinct sacrifice, through its etymological sense of illuminating or effulgence,—but the other two terms 'Vishvajyotih' and 'Sarvajyotih', which are connotative of all (or entirety), must stand for the Trivyt and other Jyotis (which are present in their entirety in the Jyotistoma sacrifice)."

That cannot be, we reply; because the term 'Juotih' is not known to be connotative of the Trivrt and the rest; so that by arguing as he has done the Opponent goes against well-recognised usage.-It has been urged that "the fact of the term 'Jyotih' signifying the Trivit is indicated by the supplementary texts."-But that in a sentence a certain term is used in the sense of something spoken of in the same sentence is understood on the basis of a means of cognition other than Verbal: so that where there is no such other means of cognition, indicative of the fact, the term cannot be taken as used in that sense. For instance, in the case of the sentence 'simho dēvadattah' ('Dēvadatta is a lion'), that the term 'sīmha' ('lion') stands for Devadatta is indicated by a means of cognition other than this sentence itself; but this other means of cognition is not available in the case of the sentence 'simhamālabhēta' ('one should kill the lion) [hence in this case the term 'simha' is not taken as standing for Devadatta].-From all this it follows that the terms 'Vishvājyotih' and 'Sarvajyotih' do not denote the Jyotistoma; and if the Jyotistoma is not spoken of by means of these words, all the three terms must be taken as standing for entirely different sacrifices.

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Adhikarana (9): Actions differentiated by difference of deities.

SŪTRA (23).

WHEN A WORD DENOTING A MATERIAL IS RELATED (TO A WORD DE-NOTING A DEITY) OTHER THAN THE ONE THAT HAS GONE BEFORE [IT BECOMES A DIFFERENTIATOR OF ACTIONS], BECAUSE THE TWO SENTENCES ARE EQUAL.

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Vaishvadēva section of the Chāturmāsya sacrifice, we have the text—(a) 'Taptē payasi dadhyānayati sā vaishvadēvī āmiksā;

(b) Bājibhyo bājinam' ['When curd is put into hot milk, the milk turns into (1) curdled solids called 'āmiksā, which is offered to the Vishvēdēvas, and

(2) the liquid, skimmed milk, which is offered to the Bājins'] [cf. Maitrā. Sam. 1, 10, 11.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the second sentence (b) lay down a fresh material, Bājina, curd-water, for the act which has been enjoined in the first sentence (a) as having the āmikṣā, curdled pieces, for its material? Or the act with the curd-water for its material is distinct from that with the curdled pieces?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapaksa:—"The second sentence (b) lays down a fresh material for the sacrifice enjoined in the first sentence (a).—Why?—Because 'bāja', like 'āmiksā', standing for food, the term 'bājin' (the basis of 'bājibhyaḥ') stands for the Vishvēdēvas; so that the second sentence refers—by the word 'bājibhyaḥ'—to the Vishvēdēvas, and enjoins, with reference to those deities, a fresh material in the shape of the Bājina, curd-water; so that both the materials,—āmikṣā, curdled pieces, and Bājina, curd-water—are to be offered to the same deity, Vishvēdēvas. Thus the Bājina, curd-water, is enjoined in connection with the same act that has been laid down in the preceding sentence. Just as, the act of the Agnihotra having been enjoined in the first sentence, the subsequent sences, 'Dadhnā juhoti' and 'Payasā juhoti' (cf. Tai. Brā. 2. 1. 5. 4), lay down fresh materials for that same act."

In answer to this Pārvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—When a word denoting a material is related to a word denoting a deity other than the one that has gone before, it should enjoin a distinct act; because, in that case, the two sentences are equal; i.e. both are equally injunctive of distinct and independent acts.

"But in the texts quoted, where is there a word denoting a deity other than the one that has gone before,—when, as just pointed out by us, the term 'Bājina' refers to (and stands for) the Vishvēdēvas themselves?"

Our answer to this is as follows—According to the explanation suggested, it would come to this that the deific character of the Vishvēdēvas is indi-

cated in one case (the first sentence), by Direct Assertion, and in the other (the second sentence) by Syntactical Connection; i.e. it is by 'direct assertion' when it is expressed by the nominal affix (as in the term 'vaishvadēvī'), and it is by 'syntactical connection' when it is expressed by the Dative ending (as in the term 'bājibhyah'); -when the deific character is indicated by Direct Assertion, the Vishvēdēvas are syntactically construed with Amīksā (curdled pieces),-and when the deific character is indicated by the Dative ending, it is syntactically construed with Bājina (curd-water); -further, in the former case the deific character is indicated by Direct Assertion, and the connection of the particular material (curdled pieces) is indicated by Syntactical Connection, while in the latter case, both are indicated by Syntactical Connection. Thus then, in regard to the deific character, there is conflict between Direct Assertion and Syntactical Connection ;-and in cases of such conflict, Direct Assertion is more powerful than Syntactical Connection. All this leads to the conclusion that the first sentence. which speaks of the Amiksa, clearly establishes the fact of the Vishvēdēvas being the Deity, and that this is not done by the second sentence, which speaks of the Bājina; from which it follows that this latter material Bājina is related to some word expressive of the Deity, other than the one mentioned in the preceding sentence; which proves that the act mentioned in the second sentence is distinct from that mentioned in the first sentence.

SŪTRA (24).

WHEN, HOWEVER, THE WORD MENTIONING THE ACT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A WORD DENOTING A MATERIAL, THE ACCESSORY MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PER-TAINING TO THAT SAME ACT.

Bhãsya.

[It has been argued (by the Pūrvapakṣin) that—"Just as the act having been enjoined in the sentence 'Agnihotarm juhoti', the subsequent sentences, Dadhnā juhoti' and 'Payasā juhoti', are injunctive of materials for that same act,—so also in the present case the act being mentioned in the first sentence, the second sentence will be injunctive of a material for that same act]".—Our answer to this is that it is only right that in the case otted (of Agnihotra), the subsequent sentences should be taken as injunctive of materials for the same act; as in that case the act mentioned in the first sentence is not connected with any material not mentioned in the Context,—while the material mentioned in the second sentence is connected with the Sacrifice mentioned in the context (by the first sentence).—Hence the two cases are not analogous.

Or, this Sūtra (24) may be taken as a separate Adhikarana by itself, as follows.—

Adhikarana (10): Exception to Adhikarana (9). SŪTRA (24).

WHEN HOWEVER THE WORD MENTIONING THE ACT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A WORD DENOTING A MATERIAL, THE ACCESSORY MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THAT SAME ACT.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

Pūrvapakṣa—"Such sentences as 'Dadhnā juhoti', 'Payasā juhoti' and the like are to be taken as enjoining distinct acts; as otherwise they would have to be taken as laying down so many optional materials (for the same act)."

Siddhānta—It is clear from the words of the texts that there is a single act of the Agnihotra,—and not different acts; and it is in regard to the same act that the sentences in question lay down diverse materials; among which an option has to be admitted, as clearly justified by the texts themselves.

[The Tantravārtika does not take this as a separate Adhikarana.]

ADHIKARANA (11): The mention of certain materials serves the useful purpose—even in connection with the same Act of indicating different results.

SŪTRA (25).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF A (DISTINCT) RESULT,
THERE WOULD BE A (DISTINCT) ACT (LAID DOWN BY THE SENTENCE);
SPECIALLY AS A RESULT IS ALWAYS CONNECTED WITH A
DEFINITE ACTION".

Bhāṣya.

[Two conclusions have been previously arrived at:—(1) If the originative Injunction of a sacrifice mention no*accessory detail, the accessory mentioned in a supplementary sentence becomes connected with that sacrifice;—and (2) if the originative Injunction of a sacrifice mention an accessory, any other accessory mentioned in the same context must be connected with some other sacrifice.—There are cases however where the originative Injunction mentions no accessory detail, while the supplementary sentence mentions, not one, but several kinds of accessory details; and it is one of these cases that is going to be considered now,—Tantra-tārītika—Trans., p. 752.

With reference to the Agnihotra (which is enjoined by the simple Injunction 'Agnihotram juhoti'), we have the texts 'Dadhnēndriyakāmasya juhuyāt' ['If one is desirous of acquiring sense-efficiency, one should pour into fire libations of Dadhi'], and so forth. (Tai. Brā. 2. 1. 5. 6.)

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the offering of the libations of Dadhi an offering different from the offering made at the Agni-hotra? Or is the result (sense-efficiency) meant to follow from the material Dadhi (offered at the Agnihotra itself)?

The Pūrvapaksa on this question is as follows:-

"The offering (Homa) in question is distinct (from the offering made at the Agnihotra);—why?—because a distinct result is mentioned; that is to say, we find a distinct result mentioned, and a result can follow only from an act.—'When you lay down the general proposition that 'a result can follow only from an act', do you refer to such visible (ordinary) results following from acts as grains from Agricultural Operations [and from that infer the same in the case of the act of offerings]?'—Our answer to this is—No; what we have asserted does not follow from the analogy of visible results (such as grains, etc.). Because if what is seen were to be the sole basis of our knowledge of results from acts,—then, such results are seen only in the case of acts like Agricultural Operations, not in the case of acts like offering into fire [so that there could be no cognition of any results following from these latter].—If it be meant that 'the result having been seen to follow in the case of the Agricultural Operations, it would be concluded that similar

results follow from other things also',-in that case, a result would be likely to follow from a material substance also.—If it be meant that—'What is asserted is that a result follows from every act that is similar to Agricultural Operations-and what is similar to Agricultural Operations is the offering into fire, because it is an act (like the said operations), and not the material substance, which is not similar to Agricultural Operations',-then our answer is that the offering into fire also is not similar to Agricultural Operations, because the offering into fire is accomplished by means of such things as the Mantra, the Deity and other accessories, while Agricultural Operations are carried on by means of such things as the plough and other implements: and further, the offering into fire is of the nature of giving, while Agricultural Operations are of the nature of tilling (the ground) .- 'But we base our assertion on some sort of similarity (not absolute analogy) '.-Well, some sort of similarity (to Agricultural Operations) there is in a material substance also, which latter, like the operations, is an entity and is ephemeral and so on .- 'But seeing that there is another thing (the offering into fire for instance) which bears a greater degree of similarity (to Agricultural Operations) than that borne by the material substance, we assert that the material substance is not similar (to the operations)' .- In that case, there are other acts with visible results which bear a greater degree of similarity to Agricultural Operations than that borne by the offering into fire [because this offering leads to invisible results, while the other acts, like Agricultural Operations, lead to visible results], and hence the offering into fire also should be regarded as not similar to Agricultural Operations. Nor is there any such well-established law as that whatever is seen in one thing should be regarded as present, even though not actually seen to be so, in every thing that is similar to the former thing. As a matter of fact, when a certain thing has been found to be a cause, in connection with a well-known object. (i.e. with that which is cited as the Instance in connection with the Inference),-if that same thing happen to be cognised as the cause in connection with what is going to be proved, then, in that case, that thing proves this conclusion; and if it is not cognised as the cause in connection with this latter, then, it cannot prove that conclusion, even though it be similar to the said Instance. Consequently even when a thing is similar to the Instance, it has to be examined whether or not it proves the desired conclusion .-

"—[The reasoning may be put thus]—Whatever is an act is always found to lead to a result,—the offering into fire also is an act,—hence this offering also must lead to a result.—If this reasoning be right] then, on the cessation of the Act, the material substances and their various combinations are found to bring about a result in the shape of another substance,—and from this the material substances also might be regarded as leading to a result.

"Further, no invisible (transcendental) result is found to follow from the Agricultural Operations,—and as the act of offering into fire is similar to the Agricultural Operations, that offering also could not bring about an invisible (transcendental) result.—Or, on the ground of its similarity to the Agricultural Operations, the act of offering also might bring about results in the shape of grains (which are the result brought about by Agricultural Operations),—and not any such result as sense-efficiency.—

"Thus then the conclusion is that in matters like those we are considering, it is not true that what is not seen is proved by what is seen.

"—'How then is it that a result can follow only from an act (as asserted by the Pūrvapakṣin, Text, p. 158, line 16)?'

"Our answer is that the fact that a result follows is known only from words (of the Veda); hence a result can be held to follow only from that from which it is declared, by the word, to follow;—that the result follows from the act of offering into fire we learn from Direct Assertion (of the Vedic text),—while the fact that it follows from the material Dadhi is learnt from the Syntactical Connection (of the term 'Dadhaā' in the sentence 'Dadhaā' indriyakāmasya juhuyāt');—and Direct Assertion is always stronger than Syntactical Connection.—Hence we conclude that the result (sense-efficiency) follows from the act of offering into fire,—which alone is the reasonable view,—and the other view, that it follows from the material, Dadhi, is unreasonable.

"Then again, the Dadhi is incapable of doing both,-bringing about the result (sense-efficiency) and accomplishing the act of Offering into Fire. -It might be like the washing of the blanket (with the Feet)-this washing does both, it cleanses the blanket and also removes dust from the feet.'-We do not say that one thing has not the capacity to serve two purposes: what we do say is that a single sentence cannot express the two ideas—(1) that the Dadhi is accessory to the accomplishment of the Result and (2) that the Dadhi is accessory to the accomplishment of the act of Offering into Fire; that is, if the sentence declares that 'the result is to be brought about by means of the Dadhi', then it cannot declare that 'the act of Offering into Fire is to be accomplished by means of Dadhi'; or if it declares that 'the act of Offering into Fire is to be brought about by means of Dadhi', then it cannot declare that 'the result is to be brought about by means of Dadhi'; if it were to declare both, then there would be two sentences-a syntactical split; while as a matter of fact, we find a single sentence.-From all this the conclusion is that the result does not follow from the accessory, Dadhi, and that the Offering into the Fire of Dadhi is an act distinct from the Offering into Fire that is done in the Agnihotra."

SÜTRA (26).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—BUT INASMUCH AS THE TWO SENTENCES ARE NOT EXACTLY ALIKE, IT (THE SECOND SENTENCE) SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN AN ACCESSORY FOR THE SACRIFICE (MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE).

Bhāṣya.

The pr-ticle 'tu', 'but', sets aside the Pūrvapaķsa.—What the second sentence ('Dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt') does is, not to lay down a distinct set, but only to declare that a certain result follows from the use of a certain material.—Why !—Because the two sentences are 'not akke':

that is, in the sentence 'Agnihotram juhujāt saurgakāmah', we have a result, Heaven, mentioned along with an act (Offering into Fire),—the meaning of the sentence being 'one desiring Heaven should bring it about by means of the act of Offering into Fire'; while in the sentence 'Dadhnā indriya-kāmasya juhuyāt', we have a result mentioned along with a material; this latter sentence does not convey the idea that 'the act of Offering into Fire' is to be done for the purpose of bringing about efficient sense-organs'; the idea that it does convey is that 'the act of Offering into Fire should be done with Dadhi, when it is done for one desiring sense-efficiency'; so that what it lays down is the connection of the act of Offering into Fire with the Dadhi, for the purpose of bringing about sense-efficiency;—it does not lay down the performance of the act of Offering into Fire itself; the sense being that 'if a man is desirous of efficient sense-organs, he should perform the act of Offering into Fire with Dadhi'.

Question.—"Which is the term in the text that signifies the effort (activity) of the Agent?"

Answer.—The word 'juhuyāt' is that term.

"It is by Direct Assertion that this word 'juhuyāt' signifies the Agent's activity as connected with the act of Offering into Fire, while it is by Syntactical Connection that it signifies its connection with Dadhi;—and Syntactical Connection cannot set aside Direct Assertion. Nor will it be right to say that there would be no incongruity in the sentence signifying both the connections simultaneously;—as that would involve a syntactical split."

Our answer to this is as follows:—Those who accept your view would set aside the entire Direct Assertion; while in our view, what would be set aside would be only what is denoted by the verbal root in the word 'juhn-yāt': in your own view on the other hand, the entire word 'dadhnā' would be set aside, and yet this word has been used by persons who never commit a mistake; nor is it a mad man's song:—as has been explained under Sūtra 1. 2. 8—'The convention of long-established tradition is equally present'.—For this reason it is not right to take the result as mentioned in connection with a distinct act. The other interpretation, on the other hand, whereby the result is taken as mentioned in connection with the material, dadhi, does not render the text incongruous in any way. Because the verb 'juhnyāt' is actually used for the laying down of the connection between the 'dadhi' and the 'desire for sense-efficiency'.

Objection.—"Even though all this may be signified, yet it is not mere activity (doing in general) that is understood; in fact, no purpose would be served by the signification of mere activity; what is understood must be something connected with the act of Offering into Fire; so that the incongruity pointed out still remains."

Not so, we reply; for what is understood as connected with the act of offering into Fire is also activity (doing), with only this difference that it is activity connected with the act of offering into Fire; this however is not incompatible with the fact that the word denotes activity; the sense of the whole sentence being that 'if a man is desirous of sense-efficiency, his activity in connection with the act of Offering into the Fire should be connected with Dath'.

"Even so, the same incongruity remains,—that the result is spoken of as along with the act of Offering into Fire."

Our answer is that the force of the word "juhuyāt' is such that it signifies the activity qualified by (connected with) the act of Offering into Fire; but in this the act of Offering into Fire is not enjoined as the means of accomplishing (any result); in fact, the Activity as something to be accomplished is connoted by the sentence as the substratum for (the operation of) the Dadhi. It is for this reason that the Vrtikāra has declared as follows—
'The material as resting in the act of Offering into Fire would accomplish the result; just as the king's officer performs the king's work as subsisting on the king.'

Thus it is that the result follows from the Dadhi; and the sense of the sentence is that 'the man desirous of sense-efficiency should bring about that efficiency by means of Dadhi'.

"But in what way is this to be done?"

In the manner of the entire procedure of the Agnihotra.

"How do you get at this?"

(a) Dadhi as a means of accomplishing the result stands in need of the indication of the manner and method in which this is to be done,—(b) the method that is in close proximity to the mention of the Dadhi is that detailed in the procedure of the Agnitotra,—(c) the sentence contains the term denoting the act of Offering into Fire (i.e. the root 'hū' with the sign of the Injunctive);—yet this same word is not injunctive, being, as it is, only a reference to the same act of Offering into Fire (as enjoined in another text).—It cannot be said that there is no other word injunctive of the act of Offering into Fire.—From all this it follows that what is mentioned in the sentence 'Dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyūt' is not a distinct act; hence the Result follows from the (use of the) Dadhi (at the act of Offering into Fire which is enjoined by the sentence 'Agnihotram juhoti'),

Or (the other explanation is that) as special significance is meant to be attached to the term 'Dadhi', the connection between Dadhi and the act of Offering into Fire is enjoined by the sentence ('Dadhiā, etc.');—hence the Result would follow from the Dadhi as connected with the act of Offering into Fire.

ADHIKARANA (12): The Vāravantīya, etc. are distinct acts: Exception to the foregoing Adhikarana.

SŪTRA (27).

WHERE THE SENTENCES ARE ALIKE, (THE MENTION OF THE RESULT)
MUST BE CONNECTED WITH A DISTINCT ACTION.

Bhāṣya.

We have the text—(a) 'Trivrdagnistut agnistomah, tasya väyavyäsu ikavimshamagnistoma säma krivä brahmavarchasakämo yajita', [and in continuation of this Agnistut sacrifice, we have the sentence 'Väravantiya magnistoma säma käryam'', which prescribes an accessory in the shape of the Väravantiya];—then comes the text (b) 'Ētasyaiva revatīsu väravantīyamagnistoma säma krivā pashukāmo hyštēna yajēta'. [The difference between (a) and (b) is that while the result mentioned in the former is Brahmavarchasa, Brahmic glory, that spoken of in the latter is pashu, Cattle].

[Agnistoma or Jyotistoma is the Archetype of all Soma-sacrifices; one of the minor Soma-sacrifices is the one-day sacrifice called 'Agnistut', which is also called 'trivrt', 'trifold', because the Trivrt-stoma hymn is sung at it; being of the nature of the Agnistoma, which is one of the seven stages of the Agnistoma sacrifice, it is also called by the name 'agnistoma'. During the performance of the Archetype itself,—at the third extraction, they sing the Yajñāyajñiya Sāman, which Saman, by reason of the Agnistoma sacrifice being completed thereby, is also called the 'Agnistoma Saman'; -this Saman being sung in connection with the Agneyi Rk-verses beginning with the words 'Yajñāyajñā vā agnayah'.-But at the Ectype, i.e. the Agnistut, if the Agent is desirous of Brahmic glory, the Agnistoma-saman is sung in connection with the Vayavi Rk-verses,—this Saman having twenty-one stomas, as at the Archetypal sacrifice. This is what is laid down in the first sentence (a). - If, however, the Agent desires to obtain Cattle, instead of Brahmic glory, the Saman to be sung is the Varavantiya, and that is sung in connection with the Revati-verses, beginning with 'Revatirnah'. This is what is laid down in the second sentence (b).]

In regard to these sentences (a) and (b), there arises the question—
Does the second sentence speak of the cattle as the result following from the
special accessory, Vāravantīya, appearing in connection with the same act
of the Agnistut-Agnistoma that has been enjoined in the first sentence,—and
hence the words 'štēna yajēta' of the second sentence is only a reference (to
the same act of sacrifice which has been spoken of by the same words in the
first sentence)? Or do the words 'štēna yajēta' in the second sentence lay
down a distinct and independent sacrifice?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—"The second sentence does not lay down a distinct sacrifice; it only mentions a particular result following from a particular accessory (used at the same sacrifice that has been laid down in the first sentence).—Why?—The phrase 'čtēna yajēta' (as occurring in the second sentence) only mentions what is already

known, and not anything not already known; and for that reason, it cannot be a new Injunction. What the second sentence declares is that 'if the Agent desires Cattle, he should perform the scriftce, adopting the Vāravantīya Sāman',—and it does not mean that 'one should perform the sacrifice—by, doing what 'b adopting the Vāravantīya-sāman',—Then again, the phrase 'ôtasyaiva' (in the second sentence, which phrase means 'of this same') clearly shows that what follows is not a different sacrifice.—From all this we conclude that all that the second sentence declares is that a particular result (Cattle) follows from the use of a particular accessory (Vāravantīya)."

In answer to this Pūrvapaksa, we have the following Siddhanta:-

In a case where distinct sentences like those under consideration 'are alike, the mention of the result must be connected with a distinct action. What the second sentence says is 'Etasyaiva reveitifsu vāravantīyam krtvā' ('At this, having adopted the Vāravantīya on the Rēvatī verses');—as a matter of fact however, 'at this'—at the sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence,—there are no Rēvatī verses on which the Vāravantīya could be adopted. So that if the second sentence were to be taken as referring to the same act as that mentioned in the first sentence, it would have to mean that 'the Rēvatī verses are to be used,—and in connection with these, the Vāravantīya Sāman has to be sung'; and this would involve a syntactical split [and make the term 'ētasya' wholly redundant—says the Tantravārtīka—Trans, p. 784].

The Pārvapakṣin may suggest the following interpretation—"What the second sentence means is this—'Having brought into the sacrifice, the Rēauīs verses and having sung the Vāravantīya on them,—one should perform that sacrifice'; so that that part of the sentence which speaks of the performance of the sacrifice is only a reference to the sacrifice laid down in the first sentence [and the part speaking of the introduction of the Rēauīs verses and the singing of the Vāravantīya on them is an injunction of these (new) accessories]."

But in that case, [the Vāravantiya-sāman being connected with both sets of verses], it could not be regarded as the Agnistoma sāman.

"But even so, the Vāravantīya would come in for accomplishing that purpose which (in the former sacrifice) is served by the Agnistoma-Sāman [so that the name 'Agnistoma-sāman' would still continue to be applicable]."

In that case, the term 'ētasya' would lose its significance (be wholly redundant); and if significance were to be attached to both (i.e. the Vāravantīya and the pronoun 'ētasya'), then there would be syntactical solit.

From all this it follows that what is spoken of in the second sentence is an act distinct from the sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence.

Question.—"Even when the second sentence is taken as speaking of a distinct act, how is the syntactical connection avoided?"

Answer.—The meaning of the sentence is that—'One desirous of cattle should perform the sacrifice after singing the Vāravantīya-Sāman over the Rēvatī-verses'; and what is here enjoined is a new sacrifice along with all

these qualifications; so that the sentence 'expresses a single idea' (and serves a single purpose), and it is also such that, 'on being separated, the words are found to be wanting';—and thus (all the conditions of 'one sentence' laid down in 2. 1. 46 being fulfilled), syntactical unity is maintained.

"As a matter of fact, even under this construction, the sentence conveys two distinct ideas—(1) 'The new sacrifice should be performed' and (2) 'the new Sāman, Vāravantīya, should be sung over the Rēvatī-verses'."

It is not so, we reply. What is enjoined is the sacrifice which has for its accessory the Rēvatī-verses over which the Vāravantīya Sāman has been sung,—not the singing of the Vāravantīya; the singing of the Vāravantīya or the Rēvatī-verses would be done as a matter of course (when the said qualified sacrifice is performed), and certainly it is something that is capable of being done.

Objection.—"In this way, the connection of the Rēvatī verses with the Vāravantīya would not be something enjoined; so that it would be possible to have other Sāmans sung over those verses, and it would be possible also to sing the Vāravantīya over other verses."

This does not affect our case. The term 'kṛtvā' ('having done') in the sentence denotes the said connection as duly accomplished for the purpose of the sacrifice; so that the said connection becomes understood; the term 'kṛtvā', 'having done', is capable of signifying both, the accomplishment as well as the connection of the past time; just as in the sentence 'shonamā-naya', where both the horse and the red colour are enjoined (by the single word 'shona') for one who is to 'bring in' the horse, and yet this causes no syntactical split,—similarly would it be in the case in question also.

"Even so, however, there are several things that come to be spoken of in the sentence—viz: (1) the Rēvati-verses, (2) the Vāravantīya-Sāman, (3) the connection between (1) and (2), (4) the sacrifice, and (5) the desire for cattle."

This does not affect our position. Several things are spoken of, but what is enjoined is only one, the qualified sacrifice.

"As a matter of fact, the Rivali-verses also are enjoined, as also the Vāravantīya Sāman. If these were not enjoined, then the sacrifice could not be enjoined as qualified by these two; because it is not possible to enjoin the qualified without enjoining the qualification. Thus then, there being several objects of injunction, there is no 'singleness of idea' (conveyed by the sentence in question) [and hence the sentence cannot be regarded as a syntactical unit.]"

The answer to this is as follows:—The term 'artha' (in the definition of 'one sentence' under Sūtra 2. 1. 46) stands for purpose, and the definition of 'one sentence' thus comes to be that 'when a number of words accomplish a single purpose, they constitute one sentence (a syntactical unit)'. Now, in the sentence in question the purpose accomplished is not more than one; i.e. there are not several words injunctive of several desired things; the term 'rēvatīṣu', for instance, is not injunctive of the Rēvatī-verses only;—if we take the two terms 'rēvatīṣu vāravantīṣam', together,—then also, the term 'vāravantīṣua', taking the Accusatīve ending, does not signify the desired connection (between the Rēvatī verses and the Vāravantīṣua

Sāman):—as the meaning of the noun remains the same, the term 'krtva' also, signifying only doing or bringing about, does not tend to indicate connection only; of the two words 'revatisu'-'varavantiyam', so far as the term 'vāravantīva', which appears with the Accusative ending, is concerned, it does not signify the intended connection; as it signifies nothing more than what is denoted by the basic noun itself ;-then, as regards the word 'krtva', the root 'kr' does not tend to signify mere connection; what it signifies is the connection that subserves the purposes of something else (the sacrifice); -the sacrifice (denoted by the root in 'uajēta') as qualified by this connection, however, does not subserve the purposes of any other thing. Thus then, all these things, expressed by the words of the sentence in question, serve only one single purpose; and hence the whole forms 'one sentence' (a syntactical unit).-On the other hand, if the result spoken of in the sentence (cattle) were taken as following from the use of the particular accessory, the ideas expressed by the sentence would be-(a) that 'the Varayantiya-Saman is to be for the purpose that is served by the Agnistoma-Saman', and (b) that 'the name of this is Agnistoma-Sāman'.—and this would involve a clear syntactical split.

Says the Opponent—"What is enjoined by the sentence is the sacrifice qualified by the several qualifications. Rēvatī and the rest, as subsidiary to the Agniștut sacrifice (mentioned in the first sentence).—[The meaning is that 'Having sung the Vāravantīya over the Rēvatī verses, one should perform this sacrifice as subsidiary to the previously-mentioned Agniștut"; the advantages attendant upon this interpretation would be (1) that there would be no rejection of what is indicated by the context, and (2) that the use of the word 'člasya' would serve the useful purpose of pointing to that Agniștut sacrifice which is mentioned in the Context.—Tantovārtika—Trans., p. 788,1"

Even so, the connection of the term 'pashukāmaḥ' ('desirous of cattle') would bring about syntactical split.—[The explanation suggested makes this term 'pashukāmah' entirely irrelevant; if, to avoid this, it is taken in and included in the construction, then there comes about a syntactical split; because a single sentence cannot, at one and the same time, enjoin a sacrifice and also a result.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 788.]

"The construction may be presented as follows—one desiring cattle should perform the sacrifice by means of the *Vāravanīiya* sung over the *Rēvatī* verses'. [Thus the syntactical split would be avoided.]"

This is not possible; for (if the sacrifice laid down in this second sentence thus explained were the same as the Agnistut sacrifice laid down in the first sentence, then)—inasmuch as the first sentence has laid down the Agnistoma-Sūman, in connection with that sacrifice, as sung over the Yāyavi verses,—if, in accordance with the second sentence, the same Agnistoma-Sūman were sung over the Rāvuti verses, that would cause a flaw in the sacrifice, due to its being deprived of the previously-mentioned basis for the Sūman (in the shape of the Vāyavi verses).

"But it has just been said by you that it is possible for the Vāravantēya to be sung over the Rēvatī verses [and this is all that our explanation , involves]."

It is certainly possible, if there is an injunction to that effect; unless there is a declaration to that effect, the Rēvatī verses do not become taken in merely by the taking up of the Vāravantīva.

"There would be an injunction to that effect in the form—'One desiring cattle should accomplish the Vāravantīya on the Rēvatī verses, and then he should offer the sacrifice,'—this 'sacrifice' being a reference to the sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence."

In case there is an injunction of connecting the Vāravantīya with the Rēvatī verses, this itself becomes a distinct act; and the injunction cannot in that case be taken as that of an accessory of the Agnistut mentioned in the first sentence.

"The clause 'then he should offer the sacrifice' being a reference to the Agnishut sacrifice, it would be manifest that between the two (i.e. the Agnishut sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence, and the connection mentioned in the second sentence) there is a relationship which makes the latter a subsidiary to the former."

That is not possible; if the said connection (between the Vāravantiya and the Rēvatī) were merely subsidiary to the sacrifice (Agnistut), then it could have no connection with the 'desire for cattle'; for if both the connections were meant to be predicated, then there would be syntactical split.

"But the connection with the sacrifice would be only by way of reference, and the fact of this connection being subsidiary to the sacrifice would be indicated by the Context."

This also is not possible; as Syntactical Connection is more powerful than Context.

For these reasons what is mentioned in the second sentence must be a distinct act,—this being either the singing of the Vāravantīya over the Rēvatī verses as qualified by (i.e. in connection with) a scorifice, or a sacrifice qualified by the said singing of the Vāravantīya over the Rēvatī verses.—As regards the connection between this 'sacrifice' and the 'desire for cattle', we find its injunction in the form of the affix appearing at the end of the root 'yapi' (in 'yapēta'), while we find nothing in the sentence that could be directly injunctive of the connection between the Rēvatī and the Vāravantīya. Hence it becomes established that the second sentence enjoins, for the person desiring cattle, the sacrifice as qualified by all the qualifications mentioned in the sentence.

"If this qualified sacrifice is what is enjoined, then, how does this Vāravantīya sung over the Rēvatī verses become Agnistoma-Sāman (as mentioned in the second sentence itself)?"

On the strength of the declaration itself, it would be so, because of its serving the same purpose as the Agnisjoma-Säman. What is there that cannot be done by a direct declaration (of the Veda)? In fact no burden is too heavy for a direct declaration.

As regards the argument that the pronoun 'stasya' (in the second sentence) [is a clear reference to the sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence, to which therefore the second sentence should be taken as a reference],—our answer is that a sentence is always dependent upon what is immediately before or after it; so that there would be no incongruity in the word

'Étasya' ('this') being taken in the indirect (figurative sense) of 'Étad-dharmakasya' ('that which has this character') [and the Vāravantīya Sāman sung over the Rēvatī verses is certainly something that has the same character as the Amistoma-Sāman].

From this it follows that the second sentence should be taken, not as mentioning a result following from the use of a certain accessory, but as laying down a distinct sacrifice with such characteristics as those mentioned in the sentence. Thus it becomes established that where the sentences are able, the result is connected with a distinct aution.

ADHIKABANA (13): The 'Saubhara' and the 'Nidhana' both lead to the same Result: Exception to the foregoing Adhikarana.

SŪTRA (28).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA].—"BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF THE HUMAN AGENT,
THERE MUST BE A RESULT IN CONNECTION WITH THE
'SAUBHARA' AND ALSO ONE IN CONNECTION WITH
THE 'NIDHANA'"

Bhāṣya.

We have the text (a) 'Yo vṛṣṭkāmo yoʻnnādyakāmo yah svaryakāmah as saubharēna stuvīta, sarvē vai kānāh saubharē ¡Tāndya. M.B. 8. 8. 18, 20] ('One who desires rain, one who desires food, one who desires Heaven should sing the Saubhara Sāman, as all desires are centred in the Saubhara'); following on this we have the sentence, (b) 'Hṣṣṭti vṛṣṭṭkāmāya nidhanam kuryāt, ūrgityannādyakāmāya, ū—iti svargakāmāya' [Tān. M.B. 8. 8. 19] ('For one desiring rain, the syllable hīṣ should be used as the Nidhana, for one desiring food, the syllable ūrk and for one desiring Heaven, the syllable ū').—
['Saubhara' is the name of a particular Sāma-chant; and 'Nidhana' is the last of the five or seven parts of a Sāma-chant; the syllables 'hīṣ', 'ūrk' and 'ā' are some of those that are used as Nidhana' in various Sāma-chants.]—

In connection with these texts the question to be considered is-Is Saubhara the means of obtaining rain, and the Nidhana 'his' another means of obtaining rain? Or the Saubhara alone is the means of obtaining rain, and the syllable 'his' is to be used as the Nidhana of the Saubhara when this latter is employed as the means of obtaining rain? Similarly when the Saubhara is employed as the means of obtaining food, the syllable 'ūrk' is to be used as its Nidhana, -and when the Saubhara is employed as the means of obtaining Heaven, the syllable 'u' is used as its Nidhana? The same consideration applies to all these three cases.—[In connection with these two sets of texts, we proceed to consider the following question-Does the Saubhara mentioned in the first sentence bring about its result by itself, independently of the Nidhanas 'his' and the rest mentioned in the second sentence, which latter bring about distinct results of their own, apart from that brought about by the Saubhara? Or the Nidhanas, 'His' and the rest, have been laid down as the instruments which, when used in connection with the same aforesaid Saubhara, help this latter in bringing about its results ?- Tantravārtika-Trans., p. 793.]-

"How can the sentence convey the idea that there is a distinct result following from the Nidhana? And in what manner does the text serve the purpose of restricting the particular Nidhana to be used (with the Saubhana, for the purpose of bringing about a particular result)?"

If the second sentence is construed as meaning that 'the Nidhana His is to be used for the man desiring rain' (Histit vṛṣtikāmāya kuryāt'),—then it means that a distinct result follows from the particular Nidhana. On the other hand, if the construction is—'Histit nidhanam kūryāt', 'the syllable His is to be used as the Nidhana', then the text serves the purpose of restricting the particular Nidhana to be used (in connection with the Saubhara);—and in this latter case, the term 'vṛṣtikāmāya' (in the second sentence) is treated as a qualification of the Saubhara, and it has no connection with the Nidhana 'His'.

[Though the question here propounded has no bearing on the subject-matter of the Adhyaua, which is Difference among Actions, -vet it has been introduced here as connected with that subject; or it may be that, like Difference among actions, Difference among the Results of actions also forms the subject-matter of the Adhyāya .-Further, the question here propounded affects the actual performance of the action concerned: At the time that the Saubhara has been commenced for one who desires Rain,-(a) would the last two nidhanas 'ūrk' and 'ū' be used at the time along with the His, for the purpose of obtaining the other two results (food and Heaven),-and (b) a difference is to be made between the two desires of rain, one to be fulfilled by the Saubhara and the other to be fulfilled by the Nidhana 'His', as would have to be made if a distinct result follows from the Nidhana separate from similar results spoken of in the first sentence as following from the Saubhara itself? (c) Or does the second sentence only serve the purpose of restricting the particular Nidhana for the same Saubhara as leading to the result mentioned, -so that when one commences the Saubhara for the purpose of obtaining rain he should use the nidhana 'His' only, the rain mentioned in the second sentence, in this case being the same as that mentioned in the first sentence ?- From the way that the Bhāsya has explained it, the question becomes a verbal one-Are the terms 'his', 'urk' and 'u' connected directly with the terms 'desiring rain', 'desiring food' and 'desiring Heaven', -or with the term 'nidhana' only !-Tantravārtika-Translation, pp. 793-794.1

On the question as propounded above, we have the following Pūrvapaksa: - "In connection with the 'Saubhara' and the 'Nidhana', there is a distinct result; -why ?-because of the mention of the human agent; i.e. we find the human effort mentioned in the second sentence by means of the term 'kuryāt' ('should use'). If the connection intended were that between 'desire for rain' and the nidhana 'hīs', then alone would such mention of human effort have any sense; not if the connection intended were that between the Saubhara and that Nidhana; as in the latter case, the idea that 'the Saubhara should be sung along with all its accompaniments (in the shape of Nidhana, etc.)' would be already obtained from the injunctive text itself, which lays down the singing of the Saubhara-Sāman.-Thus, from the mention of human effort by the term 'kuryāt', we conclude that that view of the question is the correct one under which the 'human effort' mentioned is fruitful; and as a matter of fact, it is fruitful only if a distinct result follows the Nidhana. Hence the conclusion is that there is one result following from the Saubhara itself, and a second result follows separately from the Nidhana.

"Or, the 'mention of the human agent' spoken of in the Sütra may be that which appears in the term 'vṛṣṭikāmāya', ('for one desiring Heaven'); it is

the man desiring rain who is spoken of by the term 'wysikāma',—and this mention of the human agent in the Shruti text is capable of serving the purpose of urging the man to the particular activity, only under the Pūrvapakṣa view (that a distinct result follows from the Nidhana);—under the other view, on the other hand, the term 'wysikāma', which denotes the human agent, will have to be taken in the figurative sense, as indicating the Saubhara; and this would involve a recourse to indirect (figurative) Indication. And as between Direct Assertion and Indirect Indication, it is Direct Assertion, not Indirect Indication, that is logical. Hence we conclude that a second result follows from the Nidhana; and in this way there would be a larger volume of the result, in the shape of rain [one supply of rain coming from the Saubhara and a second supply from the Nidhana]; so that a distinct result must be regarded as following from the Nidhana;

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHANTA]—BUT INASMUCH AS ALL THE RESULTS MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE ARE THE SAME AS THOSE MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE,—THE MENTION OF THE RESULT SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE SAUBHARA; AND THE REPETITION OF THE WORDS SERVES THE PURPOSE OF RESTRICTING THE NIDHANAS.

Bhāṣya.

The particle 'vā', 'but', sets aside the Pārvapakṣa.—The view that has been set forth above, that a separate result follows from the Nidhana, is not right. The second sentence is not to be construed as 'vṛṣtikāmāya hiṣtit kuryāt' ('one should use the Nidhana Hīṣ for one desiring rain'),—but as 'hiṣṭit nidhanam saubharaṣyā' ('Hīṣ is the nidhana for the Saubhara'),—If the 'hiṣ' were connected with the term 'desiring rain', we could not get the idea that 'the Nidhana should be used' ('nidhanam kuryāt'); so that the Nidhana 'Hīṣ' would not be used at all. If the 'Hīṣ' were connected with both ('desiring heaven' and 'should be used'), then there would be a syntactical split; which would imply that the term 'nidhana' has been wrongly put in the text; but it has been already pointed that texts like those we are dealing with cannot be held to be 'wrong'. Hence the 'Hīṣ' cannot be connected with the term 'desiring rain'; so that the result spoken of cannot be regarded as a separate one following from the Nidhana by itself.

"How do you avoid the syntactical split by connecting His with the Nidhana?"

Our answer is as follows:—For the purpose of obtaining rain we have the Saubhara already (enjoined in the first sentence);—that there should be a Nidhana to the Saubhara is also well known;—so that all that is enjoined, in this case, by the second sentence, is that 'Hig is the particular Nidhana to be used in connection with the Saubhara (when it is sung for the purpose of obtaining rain)'; and in this there is no syntactical split. From this it follows that the second sentence serves to restrict the particular Nidhana to be used (in a particular case).

Similarly in the case of the other two Nidhanas—ūrk and ū—(spoken of in the second sentence). Inasmuch as the Saubhara as a whole is capable of bringing about all the results in the shape of Food, Rain and Heaven, it is possible to differentiate the Saubhara in particular cases by means of words expressive of these results [and this is what is done in the second sentence].

"But why should this differentiation be done?"

The repetition (involved in this differentiation) serves the purpose of restricting,—i.e. of specifying the particular Nidhana to be used in a particular case, for the purpose of obtaining a particular result.

[Kumārila has criticised the above presentation of the Adhikarana and has proposed a different presentation, though the Siddhānta remains practically the same—viz., that 'the previous sentence having spoken of certain results as following from the Saubhara as a whole, what the second sentence does is to restrict the particular Nidhanas of the Saubhara with reference to each one of the results mentioned before, so that the mention of the results in the second sentence is only a reference to that in the first sentence.—See Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 796–802.

Kumārila also adds a supplementary Adhikaraņa leading to the conclusion that 'the Saubhara Sāman to be employed for the purpose of obtaining rain and the other results must belong to that particular Vedic Recension in which the Sāman appears with those Nidhanas.—See Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 803.]

End of Pada ii of Discourse II.

DISCOURSE II.

PĀDA III.

Adhikarana (1): The G r a h \bar{a} g r a t \bar{a} is subsidiary to the J y o t i s t o m a, and not a distinct Act.

SŪTRA (1).

[Purvapaksa]—" In reality an accessory, mentioned in connection with a sacrifice, should make it a distinct act; because the connection is with the entire sacrifice."

Bhāsya.

The Jyotistoma is a sacrifice, enjoined in the text (a) 'Jyotistomēna starqukāmo yaṭēta' ('One desiring Heaven should offer the Jyotistomā Sacrifice'). In reference to that same sacrifice, we find the text—(b) 'Yadi rathantarasāmā somah syāt uindravāyuvāgrān grahān grāhīyūt; yadi brhatsāmā, shukrāgrān; Yadi jagatsāmā, āgrayaṇāgrān' ('If the Soma is one at which the Rathantara-Sāman is sung, then the cups to be offered first should be those dedicated to Indra-Vāyu; if it is one at which the Bṛhat-Sāman is sung, then the cups dedicated to Shukra; if it is one at which the Jagat-Sāman is sung, then the cups dedicated to Agrayaṇa').

In regard to these, there arises the question—Is the first offering of the particular cups (grahāgratā) enjoined as part of the Jyotistoma? Or as part of the two distinct acts named 'Rathantarasāmā' and 'Bṛhatsāmā'?—If the names 'Rathantarasāmā' and 'Bṛhatsāmā' stand for the Jyotistoma, then the accessory detail in the shape of the First-offering of the Cups should appertain to that same sacrifice; if the two names do not stand for the Jyotistoma, then it should appertain to other acts.

The idea that presents itself first of all is that the particular accessory detail appertains to the *Jyotistoma*, because the *Context* is of this sacrifice.

As against this, we have the following Pūrvapaksa:-

"Gunastu kratusamyogāt, etc. In reality, an accessory mentioned, etc. (Sūtra).—The particle 'tu', 'in reality', sets aside the first idea.—It is not true that the accessory detail appertains to the Jyotisjoma;—why?—because mentioned in connection with a sacrifice.—'To what then does it appertain?'—It appertains to a distinct act.—'But words like Rathantarasimā and Bṛhatsāmā are always expressive of the Jyotisjoma'.—Certainly not, we say; the names could be taken as standing for the Jyotisjoma, if the connection (of the particular Sāman, Rathantara) were not with the entire sacrifice; the connection, however, is with the entire sacrifice [hence the name cannot stand for the Jyotisjoma].—'How do you know that the connection is with the entire sacrifice?'—Well, how do you know that it is not with the entire sacrifice?'—'If the presence of the Rathantara or the Bṛhat were the sole reason for the adepting of a particular First-offering, then the connection

could not be with the entire sacrifice; that is to say, if the First-offering is that of the cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu, by reason of the Sūman sung being Rathantara,—or if the First-offering is that of the cup dedicated to Shukra by reason of the Sāman sung being Bṛhat, then [as the connection of the particular Sāman would not be with the entire sacrifice], the two sentences in question (Yadi rathantarašmā, etc.) should be taken as laying down accessories for the Jyolistoma'.—But, if the presence of the Rathantara Sāman, or the presence of the Bṛhat Sāman, were not the sole reason (for the adopting of any particular First-offering), then the connection would be with the entire sacrifice [and in that case, the accessory in question cannot be taken as appertaining to the Jyolistoma].

"Now, what is the meaning of the term 'rathantarasāmā' (as occurring in the sentence 'Yadi rathantarasāmā somah syāt, etc.') ?--Its meaning is 'if the Rathantara Saman forms the distinguishing feature of the Act',- 'How do you get at this meaning?'-We get at it from the implications of the compound. As a matter of fact, there is compounding of only such terms as have the requisite capacity, and this capacity is there when there is the relationship of qualification and qualified (between the terms),-and one thing is called the 'qualification' of another when it is peculiar to this latter (when alone it can serve to qualify or differentiate it). So that, in the case in question, the meaning of the sentence comes to be this-'If Rathantara is the only Saman sung and no other, -or if the Brhat is the only Saman sung, and no other (then, the First-offering is to be of the Indra-Vayu Cup, or the Shukra Cup)':--at the Juotistoma sacrifice, however, there are many Samans sung, such as the Gäyatra and the rest (and not the Rathantara only, or the Brhat only); -- for this reason the two words 'Rathantarasāmā and 'Brhatsāmā' cannot stand for the Jyotistoma. So that, even though through Context, the second set of sentences would appear to be laying down accessories for the Juotistoma, vet, this implication of the Context is set aside by the more authoritative indication of Syntactical Connection, which connects the accessories with the Rathantarasama and the Brhatsama (which are acts entirely distinct from Juotistoma).

"-'But', says the Opponent, 'just as the Jyotistoma cannot be called Rathantarasāmā, so also there is no such act as could be called Rathāntarasāmā (by reason of the Rathantara being the only Sāman sung at it)' .- On the strength of the sentence in question-Yadi rathantarasāmā somah syāt-itself, we shall assume a distinct act at which Rathantara would be the only Saman sung .- 'This sentence does not contain an Injunctive word (which could be taken as enjoining the said distinct act).'-Our answer is that there is such a word, in 'syāt'.--'This word syāt cannot enjoin anything, for the simple reason that it is accompanied by the conditional yadi (if, which is incompatible with an Injunction); and words so accompanied by if are found to be expressive of conditions for the existing state of things, and never to be injunctive'.-Our answer to this is as follows:-The whole sentence containing the conditional 'yadi' ('if')- 'Yadi rathantarasāmā somah syāt'-contains the subordinate sentence 'rathantarasāmā somah syāt'; -- and the meaning of this subordinate sentence must be different from that of the whole sentence with the conditional 'yadi'; so that, while the sentence with the conditional 'yadi' may not be able to enjoin an act, the subordinate sentence could certainly enjoin it. Further, the mere mention of the presence of the Rathantara-Sāman or the Bṛhat-Sāman as conditions for certain things,—even though actually found in the text,—could not serve any useful purpose; from which it follows that the connection of the conditional 'yadi' ('it') is not meant to be significant: and when no significance attaches to this conditional 'yadi', then the sentence practically contains only two terms, 'rathantarasāma-somah syāt' ('three should be—Soma with the Rathantarasāma'), and as such it would be perfectly able to enjoin the sacrifice at which Rathantara is the sāman sung, the term 'yadi' ('it') being superfluous (no significance attaching to it).

"Or, (even retaining the word 'if'), the word 'rochēta' ('one so wishes') may be supplied after 'yadi' ('if'). For instance, we have such expressions as 'one should eat Sastika grain with milk ;--if he eats Shali, he should mix curd with it', where the latter sentence, though containing 'if'. is taken as enjoining the eating of Shall; in the same manner in the case in question, the act would be taken as enjoined by the sentence ' yadi rathantarasamā somah syāt aindravāyavāgrān grahān grhnīyāt' (even though it contains the conditional 'yadi'),--- In what way does the expression quoted enjoin the eating of Shall' !-- We get at the injunction by transposing the phrases and construing the sentence as 'if one desires to mix curd with his food, he should eat Shāli'.- '[You construe the sentence as Yadi dadhyupasinchanamichchhet). But in the sentence you have quoted ('Yadi shalin bhuñjita tat dadhyupasinchët), the conditional Lin-ending appears with the root sincha (to mix), not with the root ichchha (as you put it in your explanation)'.-The fact of the matter is that, appearing along with the root sincha, the Lin-ending indicates the sense of desire; so that we take that ending in the sense of having a desire.—Thus then, in the case in question also, the sentence ' Yadi rathantarasāmā somah syāt aindravāyavāgran grahan grhnivat' is to be construed as 'if one desires to make the Firstoffering of the Indra-Vayu Cups, he should perform the sacrifice where Rathantara is the only Saman sung' .- 'If the sentence is construed thus. then what is got at is mere desire, not the injunction of a particular Firstoffering' .- Just as in the ordinary expression quoted above, when we construe it to mean 'if one desires to mix curd with his food, he should eat Shali', the mention of the mixing of curd as construed with the 'eating of Shāli' provides the injunction that 'one should eat Shāli mixed with curd', -so in the case in question also, the mention of the particular First-offering (Aindravāyava for instance) when construed along with the performance of the act where Rathantara is sung, provides the injunction of the sacrifice where Rathantara is sung as qualified by that particular First-offering.

"Or again, the injunctive affix Lin may be taken as laying down a cause and effect; the meaning being that 'the Rathantara-sāmā Soma (the sacrifice at which Rathantara is sung) should be made the cause of the First-offering being made of the Indra-Vāyu Cup'.

"Thus the conclusion is that, as the connection mentioned is with the entire sacrifice, the accessory should make it a distinct act; it is only thus that the said connection with the entire sacrifice would serve a useful purpose.

"Further, in every case, what goes before is the cause, and what comes later is the effect;—why so?—because the effect can come into existence only when the cause is already there, not when the cause is not there;—and what is yet to come is not in existence;—in the case in question, the Rathantarasāmā (the act at which Rathāntara is the only sāman sung) is yet to come; how then could it be the cause (or condition) of the particular First-offering [as would be the meaning of the sentence if taken in any way other than the one just suggested by us]?

"Lastly, there is no doubt regarding the Jagatsāmā [which is mentioned in the last of the three sentences quoted as (b)] being a distinct act by itself (apart from the Jyotistoma); and from the analogy of this, the other two acts mentioned in the other two sentences (Rathāntarasāmā and Bṛhat-sāmā) should also be taken as distinct acts.

"From all this it follows that the sentences in question should not be taken as laying down accessories for the *Jyotisjoma*."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT THE SAME SACRIFICE HAVING DIVERSE CHARAC-TERISTICS, EACH OF THESE COULD BE SPOKEN OF FOR A DEFINITE PURPOSE,—THE SACRIFICE ITSELF BEING ONE ONLY, THE SECOND SENTENCE BEING SUBORDINATE (TO THE FIRST).

Bhāsya.

The particle 'tu', 'but', serves to reject the view just set forth. What has been said-that a distinct sacrifice is mentioned in the sentence in question-is not right,-" What then is the right view?"-The right view is that the particular First-offering appertains to the Jyotistoma itself ;-why? -Because of the force of the Context .- But we have already pointed out that "on the strength of Syntactical Connection, the First-offering should be taken as appertaining to the distinct sacrifices, called Rathantara-sama and Brhatsāmā [and Syntactical Connection is stronger than Context]."-This argument has been already refuted—by the assertion that it is the Jyotistoma itself which is called 'Rathantarasāmā' and 'Brhatsāmā'.--" But this view has been refuted, in its turn, by the fact that several Samans are sung at the Justistoma, which therefore could not be characterised as having the Rathantarasama or as having the Brhatsama."-Our answer to this is that the said characterisation should be possible, on the ground that the Rathantara and the Brhat are two Samans between whom there is option at the Jyotistoma itself; so that of the Jyotistoma there can be one performance where the Rathantara is not sung at all, and there may be also a performance where the Rathantara is sung; and in this latter case, the Rathantara, being peculiar to the performance, could serve to characterise the Jyotistoma. Thus then it is the Jyotistoma itself which is called 'Rathantarasāmā' and · Brhatsama .

The Purvapakein has argued that "the cause should come first, then the effect."—But there is no such hard and fast rule; as a matter of fact,

something yet to come also serves as a cause; for instance, the rain that is expected to come becomes the cause (instigation) of such acts as tilling the fields and building of houses. Further, what has been said may be true of visible causes and effects; what however we are considering is a cause mentioned in a verbal text; and what is so mentioned has to be taken just as it is mentioned.—Then again the Lin-affix in the word 'syāt' also can refer to all the three points of time, past, present and future. So that what is yet to come may also serve as a cause.

Another argument put forward by the Pūrvapakṣin is that "the Jagatsămā being accepted by all parties to be a distinct act, the Rathantarasāmā
also, being similar to it, should be regarded as a distinct act."—But the
Jagatsāmā is accepted to be a distinct act, because it cannot be regarded as
anything else; while in the case of the Rathantarasāmā and the Bṛhatsāmā,
they are found capable of being taken as names of the Jyotistoma itself; and
hence these cannot be regarded as distinct acts (other than the Jyotistoma).

Adhikarana (2): The Avēṣṭi is a distinct sacrifice. SŪTRA (3).

In regard to the Avesti, what is asserted is the injunction of the sacrifice itself: because of the connection of the (previously enjoined Rājasūya) sacrifice (with the Kṣattriya only).

Bhāsya.

There is the Rājasūya sacrifice enjoined in the text—'Rājā rājasūyāna swārājyakāmo yajāta' ['The Rājā desiring self-sovereignty should perform the Rājasūya sacrifice']; in the same context is mentioned the sacrifice named 'Avēsti' in the text, 'Agnēyo'sṭākapālo hiranjam dakṣiṇā' ['The cake dedicated to Agni is to be baked on eight pans; Gold is the sacrificial fee'] and so forth;—in reference to this latter, we meet with the further injunction—'Yadi brāhmaṇo yajēta bārhaspatyam madhyē nidhāya āhutīmāhutīm hutuā'bhighā-rayāt; yadā rājanya aindram; yadī vaishyo vaishvadēvam' ['If the Brāhmaṇa is sacrificing, the Cooked Rice for Bṛhaspati is to be placed in the middle, clarified butter poured over it after every oblation; if the Kṣattriya, the cake for Indra; if the Vaishya, the Cooked Rice for the Vishyādēvas'].

In regard to these latter texts there arises the question—Do they speak of the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya with a view to laying down the conditions under which the details mentioned in the sentence (Bārhaspatya, Aindra and Vaishvadēva) are to be adopted at the Rājasūya, to the performance of which the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya are all entitled? Or is the Avēṣṭi a distinct sacrifice prescribed for the Brāhmana, the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya?

On what grounds could the text be taken as laying down the said conditions? And on what grounds could it be taken as laying down a distinct sacrifice?

· If the term ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' (as occurring in the first injunction of the $R\bar{a}jas\bar{u}ya$) could be made, somehow or other, applicable to the $Br\bar{a}hmana$ and the Vaishya, then the sentences in question would be taken as laying down the conditions;—if, on the other hand, the term ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' applies to the Ksattriya only, then the sentences in question would be taken as injunctive of distinct sacrifices (for the Brāhmaṇa and the rest).

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:-

"The sentences lay down conditions under which the details mentioned are to be adopted; and for this purpose we put forward the following explanation:—The term 'rājā' is to be taken in its etymological sense; i.e. one whose function is rājya, kingship or ruling' is the Rājā (Ruler).— 'What is the function of the Ruler?'—The people of Āryāvaria (North India) use the word 'rājā' in the sense of one who protects the country and

the city (and relieves them of all criminals—adds the Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 818);—the learned also explain the term 'rājya', 'kingship' as the functions of the king;—hence we think that one who performs the functions of the king is the Rājā, King.—For instance, if people did not know any man of the name of 'Udamegha', and yet knew his son by the name 'Audamēghi' (which etymologically is equivalent to 'the son of Udamegha'),—then they would be in a position to assume that 'the father of Audamēghi is Udamegha';—in the same manner, if people do not know the meaning of the term 'rājam',—and yet they know that rājya is the name of the functions of the Rājā,—they assume that 'the person connected with (performing) Rājya (kingly functions) is Rājā'.

"Objection.—'But the people of the Andhra country apply the term 'rājā' to every Kṣatiriya, even if he does not perform the functions of protecting the country and the city.'

"Answer .- We do not say that people do not use the term in that sense; what we mean is that the connotation of the term 'rajan' being based upon certain definite functions (viz. the functions of rajya, kingship), the term may also be used on the basis of those functions; and in fact, people actually apply the term 'rajan' even to a non-Ksattriya who performs the said functions (of the king).—Thus then, such use of the term (in the sense of any one, Ksattriya or non-Ksattriya, who performs the functions of the king) being possible [and hence the Brahmana, the Ksattriya and the Vaishya being all equally entitled to the performance of the Rajasuya sacrifice -- the sentence in question should be taken as laying down certain details in connection with the same Rajasuya sacrifice itself,—as is indicated by the Context and also by the presence of the term 'yadi' ('if', with which the sentence starts, which indicates the fact that what follows is an adjunct to the sentence that has gone before); -and it should not be taken as laying down a totally different act for the Brahmana and the Vaishya.

"Or (we may put the case as follows):—That usage which is limited to a few people, and is not current among all persons, should be rejected as unreliable (wrong) if it is in conflict with such usage as is current among all men; in fact people accept only such usage as is current among all men.—Then again, such ordinary usages as are not rejected by anyone are always more reliable than those that are rejected; for instance, the usage current among the people of \$\hat{Aryāwara}\$ who are leurned in the matter of words and their meanings, who make use of words and also perform actions,—is always better than that of the \$Mechchhas\$ and that of persons residing in the lands of the low people (antya-janapada).—[And the use of the term 'rājan' in the sense of \$King\$ in general, anyone who performs the king's functions, is current among all men; while it is the \$Andhras\$ alone who restrict it to persons belonging to the \$Ksattriya\$ caste, irrespective of the fact of the man performing or not performing the functions of the king.]

"From all this we conclude (a) that the term 'rājan' is to be taken in its etymological sense (of anyone who performs the functions of the king), -(b) that the mention in the second sentence of the Brāhmaṇa and the others is for the purpose of laying down the conditions (under which certain details have to be employed),—(c) that the second sentence lays down these details in connection with the same $R\bar{a}jas\bar{u}ya$ secrifice (which has been enjoined in the sentence ' $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ $r\bar{u}jas\bar{u}y\bar{v}as$ $sv\bar{u}r\bar{u}jyak\bar{u}mo$, ctc.')—and (d) that the sentence does not lay down a distinct secrifice."

In answer to the above $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$, we have the following $Siddh\bar{u}nta$ —In regard to the $Av\bar{v}sti$ what is asserted,—in reference to the $Br\bar{u}hmana$ and the rest—is the injunction of the sacrifice,—i.e. it serves to enjoin the $Av\bar{v}sti$ -sacrifice for the Br $\bar{u}hmana$, etc.;—why?—because the $Br\bar{u}hmana$ and the Vaishya have not been mentioned in the Context at all.—"How do you say that these have not been mentioned?"—Because the $R\bar{u}jas\bar{u}ya$ sacrifice (which is the sacrifice enjoined in the Context) has been enjoined for the Ksattriya only, by the sentence ' $R\bar{u}ja$ r $ujasty\bar{u}na$ yaujasta'.

"But it has been pointed out that the term 'rājā' (used in this injunction) is to be taken in its etymological sense (so as to include men of all the three castes who perform the functions of the king)."

This is not right; as the word ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' really denotes the particular caste (Ksattriya).

"It has been explained above that it is not right to take the sentence (beginning with 'yadi') as laying down a distinct sacrifice,—because (a) the term ' $r\bar{u}jan$ ' denotes both (the Ksattriya as well as the non-Ksattriya, performing the functions of the king),—(b) because the sentence opens with the term 'yadi' ('if'),—and (c) because of the indications of the Context."

Our answer to this is as follows:-We do not accept the statement that the term 'rājan' denotes both; -why !-If the term 'rājan' signifies the caste (Ksattriva), then the term 'raiva' would stand for the function of protecting the country, this being the function of the Ksattriya caste; so that there would be no incompatibility with the usage of the people of the Āryāvarta (under which usage the Rājā is one who performs the function of protecting the people). If, on the other hand,—the term 'rajua' were eternally connected with (i.e. if its connotation always consisted in) the function of protecting, then one who performs that function would be spoken of by the term 'rajan', and this term, in this sense, would apply to the Ksattriya-caste; -- and this would be quite compatible with the usage of the Andhras. Thus on the strength of usage, it has to be admitted that both the terms-'rajan' and 'rajya'-need not be eternally connected with the connotations respectively of 'the Ksattriya caste' and 'the kingly function' [i.e. only one of the two terms need be taken as so eternally connected with its connotation, and the other term will have its connotation determined by that connotation].

[The two words ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ and ' $r\bar{a}jya$ ' could not have their connotations wholly in-dependent of one another; the fact is that when one of them has its connotation fixed by convention, that of the other follows from it. That is to say, when the word ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' has been known, by convention, as signifying the Keattriya caste, then the connotation of the term ' $r\bar{a}ja$ ',—explained as 'the function of the $K\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ '—comes to be based upon that of the term ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ '; and so long as this is possible, it is not right to assume an independent connotative potency for this latter word; as even without such an independent connotative potency, there would be nothing incompatible with the usage of the people of $\bar{A}ry\bar{a}varta$, who apply the term ' $r\bar{a}jya$ ' to the 'kingly function of protecting the people' II,

conversely, it be held that the term ' $r\bar{a}j\mu a$ ' itself has its connotation of the 'function of protecting the people' fixed by convention, before that of the term ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' is known,—then too, the term ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' would, as based on the term ' $r\bar{a}j\mu a$ ', come to be applied to the performer of that function, and it would not be necessary to assume an independent connotative potency in the word ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ '; and as such there would be nothing incongruous in the usage of the Draudias (wrongly attributed by the $Bh\bar{a}sya$, to the Andhras) who apply the word ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' to any and every $K_{sattriya}$ who is capable of performing the function of protecting the people.—Tantravaritia —Trans, y = 824-835.]

"How then is it to be decided (which is the word that has an in-

dependent eternal connotative potency)?"

The decisive fact is that the term ' $r\bar{a}jya$ ' denotes the function of protecting, which function belongs to the person belonging to the caste ' $R\bar{a}jan$ ' (Kṣattriya).—Writers on grammar have laid down the affix ' $sya\bar{n}$ ' (which we find in the term ' $r\bar{a}jya$ ') as denoting 'the function of the person spoken of, i.e. the ' $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' [see Pāṇini, 5. 1. 124];—and they do not countenance the expounding of the term ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' as 'the performer of the functions of $r\bar{a}jya$ ' (' $r\bar{a}jyaaya$ kārtā $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ '), which would involve either the deletion of the syllable 'ya' (present in the term ' $r\bar{a}jya$ '), or the transformation of the basic noun (' $r\bar{a}jya$ ') itself (into the form ' $r\bar{a}ja$ ').

"As a matter of fact, any one who performs the function of protecting the country is spoken of by the people by the name Rājā [and not only one

belonging to the Ksattriya caste.]"

Our answer to this is as follows:-It is on the basis of the etymology of the word that people apply the name so:-the term 'rajua' is well known as signifying the function of protecting; and as we have explained above. this signification of the function of protecting by the term 'rajya' is based upon its being derived from the term 'rājan' (the term being etymologically explained as 'rāinah karma rāiyam'); so that it is the term 'rāian' (and its connotation) which is the basis of the above-mentioned recognised signification (of the term 'rajya'); so that the use of the term 'rajya' is dependent upon its derivation from the term 'rājan' (and its connotation of the function of protecting the country); and as for the application of the name 'rājā' to the Brāhmana and other non-Ksattriyas, this is a figurative use of the term based upon the presence, in these non-Ksattriyas, of 'rājya' (i.e. the function of protecting the people), which rests primarily with the Kşattriya caste alone. That this usage should be regarded as only secondary or figurative is shown by the fact that grammarians do not countenance the explanation of the term 'raja' as one who performs the functions of kingship.—[The word 'rājya' is explained by its connection with the Rājā, and then the presence of this raiva (kingly functions) in the Brahmana, etc. makes the term ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' indirectly applicable to these latter castes also; but it is so applicable only indirectly, figuratively; and a figurative use of the word cannot affect the Siddhanta that the term 'raja' stands for the Kṣatiriya caste. It must be admitted therefore that the term 'rājā' is applied to the Brahmana and other non-Ksattriyas only in consideration of the fact of these latter being the proxy of the Ksattriya in the performance of the latter's legitimate function of protecting the people.—Tantravārtika— Trans., p. 826.1

It has been argued above that "through inference we get at the notion that the $R\ddot{a}j\ddot{a}$ is so called because he is the performer of the kingly functions $(r\ddot{a}jya)$, just as we get at the notion that $Udam\bar{e}gha$ is the father of $Audam\bar{e}gha$."

Our answer to this is as follows:—Actual usage is more authoritative than inference; that 'the Rājā is the performer of Rājya' we get at through inference, but in actual usage we find people using the word 'rājā' in the sense of the Kṣattriya caste.—Then again, the etymology also of the term 'rājā' as 'rājyasya kartā' (performer of kingly functions) can be got at through inference, while the etymology of the term 'rājya' as 'rājyasya kartā' (performer of kingly functions) can be got at through inference, while the etymology of the term 'rājya' as 'rājyāsk karma' (king's function) is actually laid down in the grammatical scriptures. People who would base the etymology upon inference would, on the strength of that inference, have to infer the grammatical scripture (countenancing that etymology), while those who depend directly upon the scripture actually see the grammatical rule itself. Thus under the circumstances, the direct scripture would be distinctly more authoritative.

Objection—"As a matter of fact, people apply the name ' $r\bar{a}jan$ ' to any one who performs $r\bar{a}jya$ (functions of the king); they do not apply the term ' $r\bar{a}jya$ ' to the function performed by the $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ (king);—from which it follows that the use of the term ' $r\bar{a}jan$ ' is dependent upon the connection of $r\bar{a}jya$ (kingly functions), and that the use of the term ' $r\bar{a}jya$ ' is not dependent upon the connection of $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$."

We do not say that we regard the connection of the $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ as the basis of the use of the term ' $r\bar{a}jya$ '; what we hold is that the use of the term ' $r\bar{a}jya$ ' is based upon the grammatical scriptures; and scripture is always more authoritative than usage, as usage could only be made a ground for the inference of a scripture [and a directly perceived scripture is more authoritative than an inferred one].

Then again, the premise that 'the use of the term $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ is dependent upon the connection of $R\bar{a}jya$ (kingly functions)' is not true; as it has been asserted above that the $\bar{A}ndhras$ apply the name ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ ' even to a person who is not performing the function of protecting the country.

The premise that "the use of the term is dependent upon the connection of the Rājā" is also not true; as every function of the king—such as locomotion or winking, for instance—is not called Rājya."

We would be open to this taunt if we said that the use of the term is dependent upon usage;—but what we say is that the basis for the use of the term lies in the grammatical scripture; so that we regard all those functions to be ' $r\bar{a}jya$ ' which belong to a person of the Kṣattriya ($r\bar{a}jan$) caste,—i.e. every act that is marked out as pertaining specifically to the Kṣattriya caste.

As for the argument that—"the $\bar{A}ndhras$ also do regard a person as $'r\bar{a}j\bar{a}'$ on the basis of his connection with $r\bar{a}jya$ [i.e. they also do not deny some sort of connection between the name ' $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}'$ and the performing of the $r\bar{a}jya$]",—this has already been refuted by the argument that usage is weaker than (grammatical) scripture.

Lastly, as regards the argument that in the matter of usage, the usage of the inhabitants of Aryāvarta is more reliable than that of others,—our

answer is that in the matter of the usage of words, all usage is equally authoritative,—as has been already explained (under the *Smytipāda*, 1. 3. 9 and 1. 3. 10).

From all this it follows that the use of the term 'rājān' is based upon the caste (Kṣattriya);—and hence, on account of the connection of the previously enjoined sacrifice of the Rājasūya with the Kṣattriya only, the sentence that speaks of the Avēṣṭi must be an injunction of an independent sacrifice (for non-Kṣattriyas).

ADHIKARANA (3): The 'Ādhāna', Fire-laying, is enjoined as an independent act.

SŪTRA (4).,

THE FIRE-LAYING (SHOULD BE TAKEN TO BE ENJOINED AS AN INDEPENDENT ACT); BECAUSE IT DOES NOT FORM AN INTEGRAL PART OF ALL (SACRIFICES).

Bhāṣya.

We have the text—'Vasantë brāhmano'gninādadhita, grismē rājanyah, sharadi vaishyah' ['The Brāhmana should lay the Fires during spring, the Kaattriya during summer, the Vaishya during autumn']. (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 2. 6-7.)

In regard to this there arises the question—Does the mention of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes serve the purpose of laying down the conditions (for the selection of a particular season, as the time for the act of Firelaying which itself has already been enjoined elsewhere)—the meaning being that 'if the Brāhmaṇa does the Fire-laying, he should do it during the spring,—if the Kaattriya does it, he should do it in the summer,—if the Vaishya does it, he should do it in the autumn':—Or does the sentence actually enjoin the act of Fire-laying itself for the Brāhmana and others?

Question:—On what grounds could the sentence be taken as laying down conditions? and on what grounds could it be taken as an injunction of Fire-laying?

Answer:—If the two words 'brāhmaṇaḥ' and 'vasantē' are construed as syntactically connected, then the mention of the Brāhmaṇa must be taken as laying down a condition. If, on the other hand, the word 'brāhmaṇaḥ' is construed as correlated with 'ādadhīta', then the sentence must be an injunction of Fire-laying for the Brāhmaṇa. So also in regard to the Ksattriya and the Vaishya.

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:-

"The sentence in question serves the purpose of laying down conditions (for the choice of the seasons);—why?—because the words of the text are similar to conditional phrases.—'In what way are the words similar to conditional phrases [when we have no such conditional terms as if and the like]?'—The various castes, Brāhmaṇa and the rest, have been mentioned along with the various seasons, spring and the rest; and it is this fact (of the caste and the season being related as the condition and the conditioned), which, not otherwise known, is made known by the sentence in question. [That is to say, the injunctive potency of the sentence having been used up in laying down the relationship between the caste and the season, it could not serve to enjoin the act of Fire-laying itself; so that they could be taken only as laying down the conditions that would be indicated by the aforesaid relationship between the caste and the season.—Tantravārtika—Trans.

p. 834].- But the Brahmana and the rest are mentioned along with the verb to law also (ādadhīta) [so that the sentence could be taken as enjoining the act of Fire-laying qualified by the spring, for the Brahmana, and so forth. -Tantravārtika-Trans., p. 8241.'-True: they are so mentioned together: but the relationship of the Brahmana and other castes with the act of Fire-laying is not unknown; [i.e. the fact that Fire-laying should be done by the Brāhmana and others being already known from other sources, it could not form the object of an injunction contained in the sentence under consideration].- 'From what source is it already known as enjoined?' -It is known from the Vedic texts speaking of certain desirable results.-'What are those Vedic texts speaking of certain desirable results?'-They are, 'Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmah', 'Darshapūrnamāsābhyām svargakāmo uaiēta' and so forth.—'In what way is the act of Fire-laying got at as enjoined by these texts?'-By implication; that is to say, what the texts mean is that 'one should act in such a manner as to accomplish the Agnihotra', 'one should act in such a manner as to accomplish the Darshapūrnamāsa'; -- now as a matter of fact, none of these acts can be accomplished without the fires-Garhapatya, Ahavaniya, Anvaharya-pachana and the rest; there are declarations also to this effect; such as-'When one offers a libation into the Ahavaniya Fire, his desired object becomes accomplished' (Tai. Brā. 1, 1, 10, 5-6):-thus by implication it becomes known that the Ahavaniya and other Fires should be brought about,and these Fires cannot be brought about except by the act of Fire-laying;hence it follows that this act of Fire-laying also should be performed.—'By whom is this act to be done?'-By the person who entertains the desires spoken of in the texts; and these texts are applicable in common to all the castes, Brāhmana and the rest. It is thus that the connection of all these castes with the act of Fire-laying is already known (as enjoined).-Further, if the Brahmana and other castes were construed as related to both (the act of Fire-laying and the spring and other seasons), -then there would be syntactical split; as in that case the object enjoined (and predicated) would not be one only.-From all this we conclude that the texts in question lay down the conditions (for the choice of the seasons)."

In answer to this Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—The Fire-laying should be taken to be enjoined as an independent action, because it does not form an integral part of all sacrifices (Sū.); i.e. the sentences in question should be regarded as injunctive of Fire-laying;—why!—because from among the several means of knowledge available—in the shape of Direct Assertion, Indication, Syntactical Connection, Context, Position and Name,—there is not one which indicates that the act of Fire-laying is an integral part of all sacrifices; what forms part of all sacrifices is the Fire, and the Fire-laying comes in only with the Fire.—What if it is so?"—If it is so, then it is the Fires—not the Fire-laying—that come in as enjoined by the Vedic texts speaking of desirable results.—"But the Fire-laying is not the only means of getting the Fires;"—Our answer to this is that Fire-laying is not the only means of getting the Fires; just as for the obtaining of other substances there are many such means as Purchase and the like, so there are for the obtaining of the Fires also; and it is not necessary to obtain it by

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producing (it in the manner laid down in connection with the Fire-laving rite). So that while in one case the Fire-laving would come in for the obtaining of Fire, in another case it would not come in (when Fire would be obtained by other means). In that case where the Fire-laving does not come in (for the obtaining of Fire), the performance of the Fire-laying by the Brāhmana and others would come in (by virtue of the sentences in question); so that when the meaning of the sentence 'Brāhmano'gnīnādadhīta' is that 'the Brāhmana should lay the Fires for his own purposes', then alone, not otherwise do the Ahavaniva and other Fires come to be laid for the purposes of the Agent himself: and under the circumstances, it would follow that the Agnihotra and other rites should not be performed with the help of any such Fire as is produced artificially or obtained by begging; and it is concluded that it is only the non-artificial (natural) Fire that helps in the performance of the said rites.—"But how is it known that the act of Fire-laying is for the purposes of the Agent himself?"-It is so understood from the fact that the Atmanepada ending in the verb 'ādadhīta' clearly indicates the fact of the result of the action (of Ādhāna, Fire-laying) accruing to the Agent. If the sentence containing this word 'ādadhīta' were not there, and we depended entirely upon the Vedic texts speaking of desirable results, the result of the act of Fire-laning would not necessarily accrue to the Agent who had performed this act; [in that case the injunction of the Fire-laying would have to be inferred from the said Vedic texts, and as such an injunction would not necessarily contain the Atmanepada ending which could indicate the fact of the result accruing to the Agent only].

Further, as a matter of fact, so long as we have Vedic texts in the shape of the sentences in question directly laying down the Fire-laying, those Vedic texts which only speak of certain desirable results cannot justify the assumption of any other text laying down the same act; in fact any such assumed texts would only be repetitions of the texts that directly lay down the Fire-laying.

If there had been no such Vedic texts injunctive of Fire-laying, then, in that case,—if the Vedic texts speaking of certain desirable results did not imply the injunction of the Fire-laying, they would declare the Agnihowa and other rites to be incapable of being performed (as these cannot be performed without the properly laid fires, and ex hypothesi, there would be no such fires as there would be no Fire-laying); for this reason therefore it would be necessary for the Vedic texts speaking of desirable results to imply the injunction of the Fire-laying. When, however, we have Vedic texts (like those in question) directly laying down the Fire-laying, those Vedic texts (that speak of desirable results, coming after the said texts (directly laying down Fire-laying), would naturally be taken as applying to those persons for whom the Fire-laying has been already laid down [specially when the texts speaking of desirable results following from sacrifices—such as 'Agnihotram jahugat svargakāmah', lay down such acts as can be performed by those only who have done the Fire-laying in the proper manner].

[With a view to setting aside all the arguments that the Siddhantin has put forward in support of the contention that the sentences in question have

to be taken as injunctive of the act of Fire-laying, as apart from those sentences in question, there would be no Fire-laying, and without properly laid Fires, there would be no sacrificial acts performed,—the Pūrvapaksin puts forward the following arguments -" As a matter of fact we have a direct Injunction of the act of Fire-laying (apart from the sentences in question),in the shape of the text-' Evam sapatnam bhrātrvyam avarti sahatē ya ēvamvidvān agnimādhattē'; and when the act of Fire-laying has been enjoined by this text, the sentences in question (' Vasantē, etc.') speaking of the Brāhmana and others should be taken as laving down the conditions (for the choosing of particular seasons for that act).-It might be argued that 'the text just quoted contains only a reiteration (not the injunction) of the act of Five-laying, for the purpose of laying down the details of the performance'.-But that cannot be so, we reply; as this sentence is entirely distinct from the sentence that lavs down the details of performance; the meaning of the sentence 'agnimadhattë' ('lays the Fires') is quite different from the meaning of the sentence 'Apa upasrjati', etc. ('Heats water', etc.) (which lays down the details of the performance of that Fire-laying). It is only when two sentences express a single idea (or serve a single purpose) that they are regarded as 'one sentence'; in the case in question as the ideas they express (or the purposes they serve) are totally distinct, the sentences also must be taken as distinct."

Our reply to this argument is as follows:—When the text in question—
'Vasantē brāhmano'gnīnādadhīta'—is there (as injunctive of Fire-laying), any
other text reiterating the same cannot be taken as injunctive (of that act).
As for the heating of water, this is actually enjoined (in the sentence 'Apa
upasrjati'); so that this being the only thing enjoined, there are not two
purposes [served by the two sentences (a) 'evam sapatnam...ādhattē' and
(b) 'apa upasrjati'].

"It is this sentence—'Ya svam, etc.'—which is really injunctive of the act of Fire-laying, and it is the sentence 'Vasants brāhmano, etc.' which contains its reiteration for the purpose of laying down the details (in the shape of the Season, etc.)."

That cannot be, we reply. In fact the text containing the mention of the Brahmana, etc.-i.e. the text ' Vasante brahmano, etc.'-comes first, and the other, coming later, must be only a reiteration :-- why so ?-- because the former does the enjoining directly by the word 'ādadhīta,' where we find the injunctive 'Lin' affix actually present; while all that the other sentence says is that 'the act of Fire-laying is praiseworthy (as destructive of the enemy)' :and this 'praiseworthiness' of the act of Fire-laying we readily admit. Thus what we assert is that the text injunctive of Fire-laying is the sentence 'Vasantë brahmano'aninadadhita': and this view of ours is not shaken by the declaration of praiseworthiness in the other sentence; as it is quite reasonable to assert that one sentence praises what has been enjoined by another.-Our view would be shaken only if it were held that the other sentence-' Ya evam, etc.' is injunctive of the act of Fire-laying.-Why?-Because in that case this sentence would contain an injunction of something not already known; and as a mere eulogistic declaration could not speak of anything not already knewn, the implication of this would be that the injunctive affix 'lin' (in the word 'ādadhīdā' as contained in the sentence 'Vasantā brāhmano, etc.') does not enjoin anything not already known; and this would be incompatible with the very nature of the word whose sole function is the enjoining of something not already known! On the other hand, if the act is enjoined by the injunctive affix 'lin', there would be nothing incompatible in the other sentence praising that act; because it is always possible for one sentence to praise what has been enjoined by another.— Lastly, when the injunctive does the enjoining, it is by Direct Assertion, while the praise is got at only through the sentence (Syntactical Connection) ('Yā ēvam, etc.') [on the strength of which, this injunction of Fire-laying could only be inferred]; and Direct Assertion is more authoritative than Suntactical Connection.

Says the Opponent—"The other text 'Brāhmano'gnīnādadhīta' also is a sentence (just like the text 'Ya ēvam, etc.') [so that in your case also, it is only through Syntactical Connection that the injunction contained in the word 'ādadhīta' is connected with the rest of the sentence!"

Our answer to this is as follows—In the case of the sentence 'Vasantē brāhnaņo, etc.', when it enjoins the Fire-laying, it enjoins something directly expressed by the same word [i.e. the ādhāna, Fire-laying, is expressed by the word 'ādadhāta' which also does the enjoining], in relation to the Brāhmaṇa and others; while the other sentence—'Ya evanwidvān... sahatē'—the Praise is not expressed by the same word as the act that it praises [the act praised is expressed by the word 'ādhattē', while the Praise is expressed by the other words in the sentence].

Objection—"According to your view, the single sentence would contain the injunction of several accessory details (the Fire-laying, the Brāhmaṇa performer, and sprɨmg as the time)."

That does not touch our position; it has already been explained that in the case of a sentence which is not primarily injunctive of accessory details, it is possible to have several details laid down,—under the Sūtra. 'The action as well as its accessories should be taken as enjoined, as they are not divorced in the injunctive word,—specially when they have not been enjoined by another text.' (1. 4. 9.)

From all this it becomes established that the sentence mentioning the Brāhmaṇa, etc. is injunctive of the act of Fire-laying, and the other sentence only reiterates the act of Fire-laying for the purpose of introducing the details of the performance of that act.

It has been argued above that the injunction of several accessories by a single sentence would involve a syntactical split. But there would be a syntactical split only if the sentence were taken as enjoining (1) the Fire-laying as qualified by one accessory (the Brāhmana performer) and (2) the Fire-laying as qualified by the other accessory (the spring-time); as a matter of fact, the sentence (according to us) would enjoin the single act of Fire-laying as qualified by the two qualifications (Performing Agent and Time of Performance); so that there would be no syntactical split.

It becomes established by all this that the sentences in question are injunctive of the act of Fire-laying to be done by the Brāhmans and other castes.

Adhikarana (4): The 'Dākṣāyaṇa' and the rest are Accessories, not distinct Acts.

SŪTRA (5).

[PURVAPAKSA]—"THE TEXTS BELATING TO THE 'AYANAS' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INJUNCTIONS OF DISTINCT ACTS;—(a) BECAUSE PARTICULAR NAMES ARE ATTACHED TO THEM."

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Darsha-pūrņamāsa, we find the text—'Dākṣāya-nayajāāna yajēta prajākāmaḥ, sākamprashāpyēna yajēta pashukāmaḥ, sakamprashāpyēna yajēta pashukāmaḥ, saharmayajāāna yajētānnādyakāmah' ['One desirous of offspring should perform the Dākṣāyana-sacrifice; one desirous of cattle should perform the Sākamprashāpya-sacrifice; one desirous of food should perform the Sankra-ma-sacrifice'] (See Taitti-Sain. 2. 5. 4. 3).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Do these sentences speak of particular results following from the adoption of particular accessories at the Darsha-pūrnamāsa sacrifice? Or are the acts mentioned distinct and independent sacrifices?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapaksa:—"They are distinct sacrifices;—why?—because particular names are attached to them. Though the Context and the use of the same root 'yaji' (to sacrifice) indicate that it is the same sacrifice that has been previously enjoined,—yet, inasmuch as that sacrifice does not bear the names mentioned in the sentences in question, it follows that these sentences lay down distinct sacrifices."

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA continued]—" (b) also because no accessory is mentioned, the sentence must be taken as the injunction of an act."

Bhäsya.

"We do not find in the sentence the mention of any accessory which could be regarded as enjoined by it; under the circumstances, if the sentence does not enjoin a distinct act, it is useless.—Further, if an accessory had been mentioned in the sentence, then we could understand that there is some connection between the sacrifice and that Accessory; and in that case the employment of this Accessory could be taken as enjoined by the sentence;—as a matter of fact, however, no Accessory is mentioned in the sentence, which mentions the sacrifice only; so that it is this sacrifice alone which could be taken as enjoined by the sentence."

SŪTRA (7).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA concluded]—"(c) ALSO BECAUSE THE SENTENCE IS COMPLETE WITH THE MENTION OF THE RESULT."

Bhāsya.

"For the following reason also the sentence should be taken as enjoining a distinct act—How?—Because the sentence is complete with the mention of the result—'Prajākāmo yajēta' ('Desiring offspring one should perform the sacrifice'); where the sacrifice is laid down as the means of obtaining offspring; and if it is so laid down, it must be a distinct act."

SŪTRA (8).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—IN REALITY, THE ACT SPOKEN OF IN THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE A MODIFICATION (OF THE PREVIOUSLY-MENTIONED SACRIFICE); BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT.

Bhāsya.

The actions like the Dākṣāyaṇa and others mentioned in the sentence should be regarded as falling within the purview of the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa itself; as it is only this view that would be in keeping with the Context.

SÜTRA (9).

Also because we find texts indicative (of the same).

Bhāṣya.

The above view is supported also by indicative texts,-such as- 'Trimshatam varsani darsha-purnamāsābhyām yajēta : yadi dāksāyanayājī syāt atho api panchadashaiva varsāni yajēta, atra hi eva sā sampadyatē; dvē hi paurnamāsyau yajēta dvē amāvāsyē, atra hi eva khalu sā sampad bhavati.' ['One should perform the Darshapurnamasa for thirty years; if he is a performer of the Daksavana he should perform it for fifteen years only: even thus does it become accomplished; as the Daksayana contains two Paurnamasa and two Darsha sacrifices; thus is accomplishment attained in fifteen years']. -There would be some purpose in accomplishing the 'thirty' in the manner indicated, only if the Daksayana were the same as the Darshapurnamasa; then alone would there be some possibility of the said accomplishment. For this reason also the act spoken of in the sentence in question cannot be regarded as distinct.— This completion of the thirty years' course of the Darshapurnamāsa by the performance of the Dāksāyana for fifteen years distinctly indicates the non-difference of the Daksayana from the Darshapurnamasa. Such completion could not be possible if the two were entirely different. The text cannot be taken to mean that the course of the Darshapurnamasa itself is reduced to one of fifteen years in the case of the performer being one who has performed the Daksayana sacrifice. Because the course of one sacrifice could not be reduced by the performance of a totally different sacrifice. Nor would there be any justification, in this case, for the explanation that the fact of two Darshas and two Paurnamasas are performed in course

of the Dākṣāyaṇa serves to reduce the course from thirty to fifteen years— Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 842.]

SŪTRA (10).

The name attached to the act (' $D\bar{a}ks\bar{a}vana$ ') is due to the peculiarity of the accessory detail.

Bhāsya.

It has been argued (under Sūtra 5) that "the acts should be distinct, because particular names are attached to them";—but the act spoken of by the name 'dākṣāyaṇa' would be treated as a distinct act only if the name could not, in any way, be made to be applicable to the Darshapūrṇamāaa;—as a matter of fact, however, the name is capable of being applied to this latter, on the basis of the presence, in that sacrifice, of 'āvṛti:', Repetition as an accessory detail; the term 'ayana' (in the name 'dākṣāyaṇa') connotes repetition,—and 'dākṣa' is that which pertains to Dakṣa;—hence the term 'dākṣāyaṇa' denotes the repetition of that which pertains to Dakṣa.—"But who is 'Dakṣa'?"—The man (sacrificer or priest) who is quick and expert [so expert that he completes the thirty-years' course of the Darsha-Pūrṇa-māsa in fifteen years only;—and as this is done by repeating the Darsha and the Pūrṇamāsa; the term 'dākṣāyaṇa' stands for the repeated performance of the Darshapūrṇamāsa by the expert sacrificer and priests; and as such the name is applicable to the Dārshapūrṇamāsa sacrifice itself.]

Similarly with the name 'sākamprasthāpya'; it is based upon the presence of an accessory detail [in the shape of the 'sākam-prasthāna', i.e. the material whose 'prasthāna', proceeding (to the place of Homa), is done 'sākam', along with, the smaller vessels, without slicing off the sānnāyya] at the Darshapurnamāsa itself.

Similarly in the case of the other names also.

Thus then, in so far as the names ('dākṣāyaṇa' and the rest) are capable of connoting the presence of certain accessory details at the Darsha-pārṇamāsa itself, why should the sacrifice, which is cognised as that same, be regarded as a different one? Why too should it be repugnant to the Context if the terms are taken as standing for the Darshapārṇamāsa itself?

SUTRA (11).

THERE IS NOTHING PECULIAR IN THE COMPLETION (OF THE SENTENCE WITH THE MENTION OF THE RESULT).

Bhāşya.

As regards the argument urged (in Sū. 7) that "the sentence is quite complete with the mention of the result, hence it enjoins a distinct scarifice for one who is desirous of offering and other results",—our answer is that it is not so; as there is nothing peculiar in the completion of the sentence with the mention of the result; that is to say, on this point (of being complete with the mention of the result), the sentence under discussion does not differ from several other sentences which have been accepted, beyond doubt,

to be injunctive of results following from certain accessory details,—such sentences, for instance, as 'II one is desirous of acquiring sense-efficiency, one should make the offering of curd' (cf. Tai. Brā. 2. 1. 5. 6)—which have, on that account, been definitely recognised as mentioning results following from the accessories concerned;—because in the sentence in question, also, what is spoken of is the result (offspring) following from the adoption of the accessory detail (in the shape of the Repetition denoted by the name 'Dākṣāyaṇa').

Objection—"Why cannot the sentence be construed to mean that 'one should perform the sacrifice for one desirous of offspring' [this sacrifice being quite distinct from the Darshapūrnamāsa]?"

Answer—In that case, how could the Repeated Sacrifice (which is what is connoted by the name 'däkṣāyaṇa') be performed for the man desiring offspring? What the name 'repeated sacrifice' indicates as to be performed is the repetition of the same sacrifice, not a distinct sacrifice.

From all this we conclude that what the sentence in question mentions is the result following from the adoption of a certain accessory, and it does not enjoin a distinct sacrifice.

Similarly with the Sākamprasthāpya sacrifice and the Sankrama sacrifice.

Adhikarana (5): Sacrifices spoken of along with distinct Materials and Deities are distinct.

SŪTRA (12).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA A]—"IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A PREPARATORY
RITE, NOT OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY SACRIFICE:

SPECIALLY AS THERE IS NO CONNOTING OF AN ACT."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the texts—(a) 'Vāyavyam shvētumālabhēta bhūtikāmah' ['One desiring prosperity should touch the white (goat) dedicated to Vāyu'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 1. 1. 1), (b) 'Sauryam charum nīrvapēt brahmavarchasakāmah ['One desiring Brahmic glory should offer the cooked rice dedicated to Sūrya'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 3. 2. 3);—and in connection with the Darsha-pūrnamāsa, we find the texts—(a) 'Iṣāmālabhēta' ['One should touch the cart-pole'], and (b) Chaturo muṣṣīr-mirvapati' ['He offers four handfuls']. [Wherein also we find the two acts of Touching and Offering, but enjoined in connection with the Cart-pole and the Four Handfuls respectively.]

In regard to (a) and (b) above, there arises the question (A)—Does the mention of the $\bar{a}lambha$ (Touching) enjoin an accessory detail (viz. the $shv\bar{v}lambha$ (Touching) enjoin an accessory detail (viz. the $shv\bar{v}lambha$ connection with the Touching that is done at the primary sacrifice, Darsha-pūmamāa itself (in connection with the cart-pole),—and the mention of the $nirv\bar{s}pa$ (Offering) enjoins an accessory detail (viz. dedication to $S\bar{u}rya$) in connection with the Offering done at the Darsha-pūmamāsa itself (in connection with the Four Handfuls)? Or is each of these two acts meant to be distinct and independent?—(B)—In case, these declarations are independent of the Primary Sacrifice (and they lay down distinct acts)—are the two acts precisely and merely those that are mentioned in the texts (i.s. mer Touching and mere Offering)? Or are they meant to be accompanied by the act of *acrificing* in both cases?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapaksa (A)—"The two texts are injunctive of accessory details in reference to the Touching and Offering done at the Primary Sacrifice of the Darsha-pūrnamāsa;—why?—because they contain no word denoting the act of sacrifice;—i.e. in the texts there is no word injunctive of any act.—"But there are the words ālabhāta (which denotes the act of touching) and nirvapāt (which denotes the act of offering)."—These words are not injunctive; that word alone is injunctive which speaks of what is not already known; while what is expressed by these two words,—viz. that 'the Touching should be done' and 'the Offering should be done'—is not anything that is not already known. For this reason, these words should be regarded as only reiterative (of something already enjoined elsewhere).—"But why should they reiterate it?"—The reiteration is done for the purpose (a) of enjoining the 'shwēla' in

reference to the *Touching* and (b) of enjoining the 'Cooked Rice' in reference to the Offering.—From this it follows that the *Touching* and the Offering mentioned in the texts are not distinct from those forming part of the primary (Darsha-pūrnamāsa); and that the texts only enjoin accessory details in connection with those acts as occurring in the Primary Sacrifice itself."

SŪTRA (13). ·

[PÜRVAPAKŞA B]—"THE ACTS SHOULD BE REGARDED (AS DISTINCT AND) AS CONSISTING IN JUST WHAT IS EXPRESSLY MENTIONED IN THE TEXT; AS EVERY ACT IS BASED UPON THE DIRECT VEDIC TEXT."

Bhāsya.

[In reply to the above Pūrvapakṣa (A) we have the arguments set forth here, which go to support the view that the acts are distinct and independent;—so far what is set forth in the present Sūtra 13 would be in keeping with the Siddhānta; but it goes on to add that these acts are just those mentioned in the texts—i.e. mere Touching and mere Offering—without any connection with the act of sacrificing. As this is not in teeping with the Siddhānta view, this Sūtra is taken as embodying the second Pūrvapakṣa (B).]

"It is not correct to say that the texts in question only lay down accessory details in connection with the Touching and Offering done at the Primary Sacrifice; -in fact, they enjoin a distinct Touching and a distinct Offering.-If the Touching and the Offering were enjoined (by the sentence in question), then these acts could not be those that have been enjoined in connection with the Primary Sacrifice.-If they were not enjoined (by the second sentence), then, these acts would be the same as those enjoined in connection with the Primary Sacrifice, and they would have to be taken as only indicated in the sentence in question, as the acts of Touching and Offering that have to be done; -and having indicated those acts, the Shvēta and the Cooked Rice would have to be taken as enjoined in reference to those acts so indicated ;-and they would be thus enjoined for the person 'desiring prosperity' and the person 'desiring Brahmic glory'; so that two factors—the accessory Shvēta and the Prosperity as the result, or the accessory Cooked Rice and Brahmic glory as the Result-would have to be taken as enjoined by the sentences in question; and this would involve a syntactical split.—Or, (there would be another difficulty)—the only word in these sentences, which could be injunctive would be taken up by the indicating; so that, there being no injunctive word left, even a single factor could not be enjoined .- The same word may do the indicating (the act of Touching already enjoined) and also enjoining (of the Shvēta).'-No such joint enjoining and indicating is possible.—'In the same term (ālabhēta) what is denoted by the verbal root would be a reiteration, or reference to, the Touching already known and what is denoted by the affix would be the injunction (of the accessory), -the meaning of the sentence being that the act of Touching already known should have the Shveta for its accessory (i.e. it should be done to the Shvēta).'-Even so, the indication (or reference) would not (necessarily) be that of the Touching enjoined in connection with the Primary Sacrifice: as the act of Touching is known also as done in ordinary life (and not necessarily as that which is done at the Darsha-pūrnamāsa). If it were the connotation of the 'Lin' affix that were reiterated (or referred to), then this reiteration could be that of the accessory connected with the Primary Sacrifice: as this accessory is one that has to be brought up at the performance, and not one that exists in the ordinary world .- Thus it is not possible for the sentences to be taken as mere reiteration of the Touching or Offering enjoined in connection with the Primary Sacrifice. - For these reasons we conclude that the acts should be performed as distinct, and just in that form in which they are expressly mentioned in the text-i.e. mere 'Touching', or mere 'Offering'-as every act is based upon the direct Vedic text: every religious act is only such as is mentioned in the Vedic text: as has been made clear under Sütra 1. 1. 2.—Thus it follows that the sentences in question lay down distinct acts of Touching and Offering (without any connection with any sacrifice)."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT IS THE ACT OF 'SACRIFICE' THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINED; AS THE CONNECTION OF THE MATERIAL, THE RESULT AND THE PARTAKER (IS EXPRESSED IN THE SENTENCE), AND THESE ARE RELATED TO AN ACT.

Bhāşya.

It has been asserted by the Purvapaksin (B) that the two sentences in question are not injunctive of accessories for the acts (of Touching and Offering) enjoined in connection with the Primary "Sacrifice."-This we accept. But the other assertion-that "they enjoin mere touching, or mere Offering (independently of any act of sacrifice)".--we repudiate: because what are enjoined are these acts accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice' .-Why ?-Because of the connection of the Material, the Result and the Partaker ;-i.e. on account of the sentences expressing the connection between the Material and the Deity (Partaker of the Material offered); what is actually enjoined in the sentences is the connection between the Material and the Deity, for the person desiring prosperity and for the person desiring Brahmic glory.—How so ?—The sentence does not say simply that 'one shall touch the shvēta'; if this were all that was meant, then the connection expressed would be that between the Shvēta and the Touching; but what is actually said is that 'one should touch the Vāyavya shvēta'; so that what is enjoined is the connection between the Shvēta and Vāyavya; just as in the sentence 'Weave the cloth' what is enjoined is the connection between the cloth and the weaving, and in the sentence 'Weave a long piece of cloth'. what is enjoined is the length of the woven cloth-as is made clear by the presence of the word 'long'; -in the same manner, in the case in question, because the sentences contain the words 'Vāvavva' and 'Saurva' (which mean 'dedicated to Vayu' and 'dedicated to Surva'), it follows that what

is enjoined by the sentences is the connection between the Material (Shvēta or Cooked Rice) and the Deity (Vāyu or Sārya). If this were not so, then the implication would be that the presence of the names of the deities is a wrong reading of the texts.

Objection—"But even so, there would be syntactical split; as the meaning of the sentence would be—'one should make the Shvēta vāyavya (dedicated to $V\bar{a}yu$)—and he should touch it'."

Not so, we reply; it would not be too great a burden for the injunctive word 'ālabhēta' ('should touch') to signify the agent's activity in regard to the connecting of the Material and the Deity, as qualified by the further idea that it should be touched; it is by Direct Assertion itself that the Agent's activity as thus qualified is declared, -it is only the connection between the Material and the Deity that is expressed by Suntactical Connection: -so that (in this interpretation) there is no need for two sentences (and Syntactical Connections) [so that there is no possibility of any syntactical split] .-- [To take an instance from ordinary usage -In the case of the sentence 'Yoke the red horse' .-- when it is taken as enjoining an accessory, and two accessories are taken as enjoined, then there is need for two sentences; -when however all that is said is 'Bring the Red', there is injunction of two accessories even by the sentence itself taken as enjoining an accessory, as the qualified sentence (animal) is spoken of by Direct Assertion itself; on this account this burden is not too great for the single sentence.-It is exactly the same in the case in question also.—The sentence in question. under this interpretation, would be 'expressing a single idea' (or 'serving a single purpose'), as what would be expressed by it is the connection or relationship as qualified by several words; -furthermore, if the words of the sentence are separated from one another, they become 'wanting' (incomplete):-so that both the conditions of 'one sentence' are fulfilled.

Without a sacrifice, however, it is not possible for a material to be 'dedicated' to a Deity; so that this connection (of the sacrifice) also has to come in.—From all this it follows that what are enjoined are the two acts of Touching and Offering accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice'.

SŪTRA (15).

Also because we find indicative texts.

Bhāsya.

The view above set forth is supported by indicative texts: In reference to the injunction 'Somāraudram charumiraupē' ('one should offer cooked rice dedicated to Soma-Rudra'), (Taitti. Sain. 2. 2. 10. 1), we have the sentence 'Parishrtē yājayē' ('The sacrifice should be performed after the rice has been properly cooked') (Taitti. Sain. 2. 2. 10. 2), where we have the injunction of proper cooking; and here we find the act of 'Offering' mentioned in the first sentence 'Somāraudram, etc.' referred to in the second sentence by means of the root 'yāji' ('to sacrifice') as contained in the word 'yājayēt'; and this would be justifiable only if, in the sentences in question the two acts were taken to be enjoined as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice' [and on that analogy the 'offering' spoken of in

'Somarudram', etc., also were taken as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice'].

—If, on the other hand, the sentences were taken as laying down an accessory in connection with the Primary Sacrifice (as in Pūrvapakṣa A)—or as laying down just what is expressed by the words (as in Pūrvapakṣa B)—then it could not be possible to speak of (refer to) the act of 'Offering' by means of the word 'yājayēt'. From this we conclude that the acts enjoined by the sentences in question are as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice'.

[In the preceding Adhikarana we considered the question as to the sentence being an Injunction or a mere Reiteration of, or Reference to, a previously-enjoined act:—while in the present Adhikarana we have dealt with a case where the Injunctive character being admitted, the question discussed is as to the nature of the act enjoined.—Tantravārtika.—Trans. p. 551.1

Adhikarana (6): The 'Touching' of the Calf is a Preparatory Act.

SŪTRA (16).

IN A DOUBTFUL CASE [THE CORRECT CONCLUSION IS DERIVED]
FROM THE PERCEPTION OF SIMILARITY.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[A preliminary objection is raised]—"What is the illustrative text here? We do not find it mentioned here in the Sūtra, as we did in the case of the Sūtra 'Aveştau yajňasamyogāt, etc.' (2. 3. 3) [where the text mentioning the Avēşti is clearly indicated]; nor does the Sūtra declare what is meant to be proved, as is done in Sū. 2. 3. 5 [where what is meant to be proved is clearly stated as that 'the Dūksāyana is a distinct act'];—all that the present Sūtra does is to mention 'the perception of similarity in a doubtful case' as a reason; and we do not know for what (conclusion) this is a reason. The subject-matter of the context (of the Sūtra) is 'action accompanied by a sacrifice' (spoken of in the Sūdhānāu-Sūtra, 2. 3. 14, of the foregoing Adhikarana); but we do not find anything that could connect the present Sūtra with that act;—so that this Sūtra appears to convey no meaning, and as such is useless."

Answer—It is necessary to explain what is the proposition meant to be established here—and what is the 'doubt' referred to in the Sätra. In fact, we know the Proposition and the Doubt from the words of the Vṛttikāra: This revered Teacher has cited the text—' Vatsamālabhēta, vatsamikāntā hi pashavah' ['One should touch the calf; animals are very fond of their calves']; (see Taitti. Sam. 2.1.4.8) and has propounded, in connection with this text, the Doubt—Does the root 'ālabh' (to touch, occurring in the word 'ālabhēta') signify the act of Touching as accompanied by the act of sacrifice'? Or does it signify mere 'Touching'?—The text cited here is most suitable, and so also is the question propounded.

In connection with this question, the same Teacher has set forth the Pürvapaksa that "the root does signify the Touching as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice.'"

The present Sūtra provides a counter-instance (exception) to what has gone before in the foregoing Adhikarana. Though, in reality, there is not much useful purpose served by the propounding of the present Pūrvanaksa (and its refutation), yet as there are varying degrees of intelligence among men, there may be some people of dull intellect who might be led to draw

conclusions from premises based on mere analogy; -such for instance, on the hasis of the fact that a man stung by a mildly poisonous scorpion does not die, one might conclude that 'in no case of scorpion-bite should any careful medication be resorted to' [similarly, as in the foregoing Adhikarana, so in the present instance also, the word in question must be taken as signifying the Touching accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice'],-and such conclusions have to be set aside (shown to be wrong). It is for the purpose of setting aside such a conclusion that the Teacher has propounded as the present Pūrvapaksa the view that some people might hold, that-" in the foregoing Adhikarana it was found that the Touching spoken of in connection with an animate object was accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice,'-and in the present case also we find that the Touching is spoken of in connection with an animate object,-hence this also should be taken as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice.'-Or (the Pūrvapaksa may be stated in the form that) "in the foregoing adhikarana we found the root ' to touch' signifying Touching accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice,'-and it is that same which is referred to or reiterated in the text cited here, for the purpose of laving down the 'calf' (as the animal to be touched, in place of the shvēta in connection with which we had the touching in the foregoing adhikarana). The advantage in stating the Pūrvapaksa in this latter form is that no fresh result has to be assumed fin connection with the present adhikarana, as the connection with the result mentioned in the foregoing adhikarana-viz: Prosperity-continues to be maintained in the present adhikarana also.1"

In answer to this Pūrvapaksa, we have the following Siddhanta:-In a doubtful case,-like the one just propounded,-what is enjoined is mere Touching as a preparatory act: - why so !- because of the perception of That is, there are other sanctificatory or preparatory acts described, along with which is mentioned the act in question also :- and definite conclusions are actually derived from similarity also; for instance, what is written down as if it were the 'foremost thing' is actually recognised as the 'foremost thing' .- "The perception of similarity is a mere indicative; how can it establish any conclusion?"-Our answer is that this is just what has got to be explained in the present Adhikarana, -how a conclusion can be established on the basis of the perception of similarity.- "But how can the perception of similarity act as a valid reason (leading to a conclusion)?"-It can do so, when the conclusion concerned is a reasonable one .-"What is the reasonableness of the conclusion in the present instance?"-The fact that makes the conclusion reasonable is that, in the text we are dealing with, there is not (as there was in the text dealt with under the foregoing Adhikarana) any expression speaking of the connection of a deity; which shows that the act spoken of cannot be of the nature of a sacrifice (in which the connection of a deity is essential); —and the fact that shows the reasonableness of the conclusion is that the act in question serves a visible purpose,-the touching of the calf will make the cow yield more milk.—Thus the conclusion being one that is found to be reasonable, the ' perception of similarity' becomes indicative (confirmatory) of it.—Hence the conclusion is that the text speaks of mere Touching and that as a preparatory act.

SŪTRA (17).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CONNECTION WITH THE COMMENDATORY DECLARATION.

Bhāsya.

In continuation of the sentence speaking of the act of 'touching' the calf, we find the commendatory declaration that 'animals are very fond of their calves';—the sense of the two sentences being that 'Because animals are very fond of their calves, therefore the calf should be touched.—Now all this declaration would have some sense only if the Touching were done for the purpose of making the cow yield more milk; if the Touching were meant to be done for the purpose of killing (for being offered in sacrifice), then there could be no connection with the commendatory declaration. [The fact of animals being fond of their calves could never be a reason for killing the calf].—For this reason also it becomes established that what is spoken of is mere Touching, and that as a preparatory act.

ADHIKARANA (7): The Boiled Nīvāra Rice is for the purpose of being deposited.

SÜTRA (18).

As connected with the word denoting an Action, the thing should be taken as being for the purpose of that action; specially as such is the sense of the Direct Assertion.

Bhāşya.

[The Adhikarana before the last has dealt with the two acts of Touching and Offering;—the foregoing Adhikarana has dealt with a counter-instance to that Adhikarana, in relation to the act of Touching; in the present Adhikarana we have the counter-instance to it, in relation to the act of Preparing. The present case cannot be covered by one just dealt with, as here we find some sort of a connection with a deity in the shape of Brhaspati, while there was no Deity concerned in the foregoing Adhikarana.]

In connection with Agni-sacrifice, there is the text 'Naivārashcharu-rbhavati' ['the cooked rice is of Nivāra corn']; and following upon this is the text—'Yadēnancharumupadadhāti' ['He deposits this cooked rice'].

In regard to this, there arises the question.—Is the cooked rice for the purpose of being used at the sacrifice, and is it only what is left over after the sacrifice that is to be deposited? Or is the cooked rice got ready only for being deposited?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:-

"The Cooked Rice is for being offered at the sacrifice; the well-known use for cooked rice is that of being offered at sacrifices, not of being deposited.—It might be argued that 'though the well-known use of cooked rice is that of being offered at sacrifices, yet,—as the sentence contains no word signifying a deity, nor any word expressive of the act of sacrifice, it follows that the cooked rice spoken of in the text in question cannot be for the purpose of being offered at a sacrifice'.—Our answer to this is that towards the end of the text quoted we find the sentence 'Brhaspatērvā ēt-adannam yannivārāh' ['The Nivāra-corn is the food of Brhaspati']; this mention of the deity could be construed along with the sentence in question; so that the two sentences together would convey the idea that 'the Nīvāra of which Brhaspati is the Deity should be deposited'; and this would mean that the cooked Nīvāra-rice is meant for the purpose of being offered at the sacrifice (to Brhaspati)."

In answer to this, we have the following Siddhanta:-

As connected with the word denoting an action,—i.e. the word 'upa-dadhāti', 'deposited'—the thing should be taken as being for the purpose of that action,—i.e. for the purpose of being deposited. The connection of the 'cooked rice' with the action of being 'deposited' is direct, perceptible;

while its connection with the sentence speaking of the Deity (Bṛhaspati) is indirect, only inferable;—since the assertion in the form 'he deposits the cooked rice' is direct and actually present in the Veda,—while the assertion in the form 'he deposits that of which Bṛhaspati is the Deity' is only inferable (from the connection between the text 'he deposits the cooked rice' and the subsequent sentence 'Nīvāra is the food of Bṛhaspati'). From this it follows that the whole of the cooked rice is to be 'deposited'; and out of it so 'deposited', a small quantity could be used at a sacrifice; but that would be using the thing on an occasion (and for a purpose) other than the one that is directly laid down in the Vedic text.

As for the sentence 'the Nivara corn belongs to Brhaspati', it is purely commendatory.

It has been argued above that the fact of Cooked Rice being meant for sacrifices is well-known.—But such generally recognised notions are always set aside by direct assertions of the Veda.

Thus it becomes established that the Cooked Rice is for the purpose of being 'deposited'.

Adhikarana (8): The 'Tvāṣṭra-Pātnīvata' has the 'Paryagnikarana' for its Accessory.

SŪTRA (19).

Inasmuch as the action is the same as the previous one, the qualification is of the Pātnīvata.

Bhāsya.

Following upon the injunction of the Pātnīvata appertaining to Tvastr (Kātha. Sam. 30. 1) is the text—'Paryagnikrtam pātnīvatam utsrjanti'. I'They let off the Pātnīvata animal over which the Encircling of Fire has been performed').—In regard to this there arises the question—Does the sentence lay down the letting off of the same Pātnīvata which has been enjoined before as appertaining to Tvastr, but along with Paryagnikaran as the accessory? Or does it lay down the letting off of a Pātnīvata which is totally different from what has been previously enjoined as appertaining to Tvastr?

If the sentence is construed by connecting the word 'paryagnikrtam' with the word 'uterjanti' [i.e. if the letting off of that over which Paryagnikarana has been performed be predicated of the Pātnīvata] then, the meaning would be that the letting off is to be of the same Pātnīvata which has been previously enjoined as appertaining to Tvastr (but as qualified in the stated manner); while if the word 'pātnīvatam' is connected with the word 'uterjanti', then the letting off of the Pātnīvata laid down would be distinct from the previous Pātnīvata enjoined as related to Tvastr.

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapaksa:-

"An entirely distinct act is laid down in the sentence;—why?—how could the term 'pātnivata' (in the second sentence) be taken as referring to the Pātnīvata as qualified by two qualifications—(1) of being the previously-enjoined one, appertaining to Tvasp; and (2) of being accompanied by Paryamikarama? [As such a construction would involve a syntactical split]—Further, if what is enjoined were the offering of what appertains to Tvasp;—then the qualification 'paryamikaram' could not form part of the Injunction. It is for this reason that we assert that what is enjoined by the sentence in question is that what has been made Paryamikrta has to be made Pātnīvata (i.e. offered to Patnīvat), and this constitutes an act of sacrifice."

In answer to this Pārvapāķsa, we have the following Sādāhānta:—What is enjoined is not a distinct act, it is the 'avachchheda', qualification, of the previously-enjoined action, which is referred to in the sentence by means of the word 'utgrjanti' ('let off').—"What would be the advantage' in this interpretation?"—Firstly, it will not be necessary to assume the mention of the act of 'sacrifice' (which is not actually spoken of in the sentence in question);—secondly, the term 'utgrjanti' directly laying down the act of

letting off would not be set aside by the indications of Syntactical Connection;—on the other hand, if the actenjoined were a distinct one,—and what was enjoined by the injunctive term 'uterjants' in the sentence were the fact of being made Pātnīvata,—then the verbal root in 'uterjants' would have to be taken only as reiterating and referring to the act of letting off which would be already got at by implication.—Further, the fact that the previously-enjoined act along with the Paryagnikarana is to be made Pātnīvata, being already known, could not be the object of an Injunction. For all these reasons the sentence in question should be taken as laying down the qualification of the previously-enjoined Act.

It has been argued that—"if the offering of the Tvāṣṭra (what appertains to Tvaṣṭr) were taken as enjoined, then the qualification 'Parŋaṃi-kṛtam' could not form part of the Injunction."—This however does not affect our position; because no significance attaching to the word 'pātnī-vatam', this Pātnīvata would not be qualified by any qualification; hence what the term 'pātnīvata' standing by itself does is to indirectly reiterate and refer to that Pātnīvata which appertains to Tvaṣṭṛ, which is characterised by the two qualifications; so that there would be no incongruity at all.

Thus it is established that what is laid down is the qualification of the act already previously enjoined.

Adhikarana (9): 'Adābhya' and 'Amshu' are names of the act of 'Holding'.

SŪTRA (20).

WHEN THE NAME APPEARS ALONE BY ITSELF, WITHOUT ANY MATERIAL,
IT SHOULD BE SUBSIDIARY TO THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE.

Bhāsya.

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the texts—'Ēṣa vai haviṣā haviryajatē yo'dābhyam grhīvā somāya yajatē' ['He offers the real material at sacrifice who, holding the Adābhya, sacrifices to Soma'],—and 'Parā vā ētasyāyuh prāṇa ēti yo'mshum grhṇāti' ['If one holds the Amshu, his life reaches its highest span'.] (Taitti. Sam. 3. 3. 4. 1.)

In regard to these there arises the question—Do these sentences speak of distinct sacrifices at which the said Cup-Holdings (grahapa) come in? Or do they lay down the Cup-Holdings in connection with the Jyotistoma sacrifice itself?

On this question we have the following Pūrnapakṣa:—"The sentence should be taken as speaking of an entirely different sacrifice;—why?—because of the presence of a new name ('Adābhya' or Amshu'). In course of the primary sacrifice (of the Jyotiştoma) there is no such sacrifice bearing the name ('Adābhya', or 'Amshu'); nor is there any Holding whose repetition could be made the object of injunction by the sentence in question. Consequently the sacrifice mentioned in the sentence must be a totally different one.—'But we do not find any material or Deity mentioned (of this new sacrifice)?—It does not matter if no material or Deity is mentioned: so long as there is the word 'sacrifice' 'yajātē' itself. Hence what the sentences mean is (a) that 'one should perform the sacrifice named Adābhya' and (b) that 'one should perform the sacrifice named Adābhya' and (b) that 'one should perform the sacrifice named Amshu'.'

Against this Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—When what we find is the mere name, without any mention of the material or the Deity, the sentence should be taken as laying down the repetition of particular Cup-Holdings at the Jyotistoma sacrifice itself (at which there are numerous Cup-Holdings).—"Why so?"—Because in reality the name mentioned (Adābhya or Amshu) is that of a Cup that is held, not of a sacrifice; as is clear from the fact that it is connected with the Holding directly, while with the sacrifice, it is connected only indirectly.—As regards the term 'Amshu', there is absolutely no doubt as to its being the name of a Cup that is held;—the mere difference of Cup-Holding does not make the sacrifice different.—Nor do we find any material or Deity mentioned, on the basis whereof the sentence could be taken as speaking of the Holding accompanied by the act of Sacrifice.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that "the term 'yajatē' ('sacrifices') itself is found in the sentence, and this is injunctive of the sacrifice".

But even so, no distinct and independent sacrifice could be enjoined by the said word; as it really stands for a sacrifice that has already been enjoined (by another sentence), and the sentence in question does not speak of anything which could distinguish the sacrifice here spoken of from that already enjoined elsewhere.—From this it follows that it is the previously-enjoined sacrifice of the Jyotistoma itself which is spoken of by means of the root 'yaji', 'to sacrifice' (as occurring in the word 'yajiat' in the sentence in question),—and what are enjoined by the terms 'amshu' and 'adābhya' are fresh repetitions of the Cup-Holdings at that same sacrifice (of the Jyotistoma).

Adhikarana (10): The 'Agnichayana'—' Collecting of Fire'—is a Preparatory Act.

SŪTRA (21).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE TERM 'AGNI' SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO DENOTE A SACRIFICE, BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF INDICATIVES."

Bhāşya.

There is 'Agm' enjoined in the sentence 'Ya ëvamvidvān agnim chinukë' ('He who, knowing this, collects the Agni'),—and this injunction followed by the sentences—'Athāto'gnimagnistomēnaivānuyajati, tumukthēna, tamatērātrēņa, tam sodoshinā, etc. etc.' (Cf. Taitti. Sain. 5. 5. 2. 1.)

[In connection with the term 'agni' as found in the injunction 'Agnim a knimuta'] there arises the question—Does this term 'agni' denote a sacrifice, different from the Jyotistoma and other sacrifices, which is enjoined by the verb 'chinuta'? Or does it denote a material, and the sentence enjoins an accessory (in the shape of that material) for the Jyotistoma and other sacrifices?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:-

"The word 'agni' denotes a sacrifice :- why ?-because there are indicatives present; we find an indicative that points to that conclusion, in the shape of such expressions as 'agni's stotra', 'agni's shastra', 'the six umasads of the Ami': all of which goes to show that the term 'agni' denotes that of which the 'stotra', the 'shastra' and the 'upasads' form part :- and all these form part of the sacrifice; -hence the term 'agni' should be taken as denoting a sacrifice .- 'A mere indicative does not prove anything, please point out an Injunction'.—Our answer to this is that, there is the second above)- 'Athato' gnimagnistomēnaivānuyajati',-which sentence (quoted means that 'one performs the sacrifice'; and it is this sacrifice which is specified as 'Agni': from which it follows that this sacrifice is named 'Agni'. It is only when the 'Agni' is a sacrifice that the preposition 'anu' becomes a complement of the root 'yaj' (in the word 'anuyajati'). From all this it follows that the word should be understood to denote of a sacrifice."

SŪTRA (22).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, it is the substance that is spoken of by the word; because the Injunction is for that purpose.

Bhāşya.

. In reality, it is the substance that is spoken of by the word 'agmi'.—
"Which is that substance?"—It is the burning substance, Fire, that is spoken
of; in fact, this is the well-known meaning of the word 'agmi'. The verb

'chinute' ('collects') is injunctive of the act of collecting, and it cannot denote the act of sacrifice. By collecting the Fire, one 'prepares' it, that is, places it on the alter;—the preposition 'anu' will denote sequence; the meaning being that 'one performs the Agnistoma sacrifice after the completion of the act of collecting the Fire'.

SŪTRA (23).

On account of the fact of the connection of Agni with all sacrifices, any sacrifice may be named 'Agni'; but that name would only serve to lay down the details of the sacrifice.

Bhāsya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that by reason of there being indicatives, the term 'agmi' should be regarded as denoting a sacrifice,—But this would be so only in so far as those sentences are concerned where these indicatives occur, not in all cases. The name 'Agmi', however, can be applicable to sacrifices only indirectly (figuratively),—on the basis of all sacrifices being connected with the *Five on the Altar*. Consequently all those words that appear to be denoting a sacrifice would serve the purpose of laying down the details of the sacrifice.

ADHIKARANA (11): Sacrifices like the 'Monthly Agnihotra' are distinct and independent.

SŪTRA (24).

WHEN THE CONTEXT IS DIFFERENT, THE PURPOSE MUST BE DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

[We have finished the consideration of the Differentiation of Actions by their accessories; and we have also dealt with all side-issues—as to what sort of accessory is that mentioned in a subsequent sentence which, not being applicable to the Action mentioned in the previous sentence, makes that mentioned in the subsequent sentence different from it; and what sort is that which is applicable to the previously-mentioned action, and as such does not point to a different Action.—The other five means of differentiation of actions having thus been dealt with we now proceed the cases of differentiation by Context.—Tautavārtika—Trans., p. 871.]

In connection with the Kundapāyināmayana, we find the sentences 'Māsamagnihotram juhoti, māsam darshapūrņamāsābhyām yajatē' and so forth. ['He offers the Agnihotra-oblation for a month', 'He performs the Darshapūrņamāsa for a month'.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this time 'month' enjoined here for the original (compulsory) Agnihotra, and the original Darshapūrnamāsa sacrifices? Or do the sentences enjoin acts distinct from the original Agnihotra and the original Darshapūrnamāsa?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapaksa:-

"The sentences lay down the time for the original acts (of Agnihotra and Darshapurnamasa).-Why so ?-Because the term actually used. 'māsam' ('for a month'), has clearly the form of the injunction of time.—'In what way has it the form of the injunction of time?' - The sentence speaks of '(a) performing the Agnihotra, (b) for a month'; now of these two that 'the Agnihotra should be performed ' is already known (as enjoined by the ordinary Injunction of the Agnihotra): it is only the other factor, that of its being performed 'for a month', that is not already known from any other source. Under the circumstances, the two terms 'agnihotra' and 'darshapūrnamāsa' (speaking as they do, of what is already known from other sources) could not stand for any other acts; consequently, the sentence must be taken as the injunction of the time (which is the only factor not already known from other sources) .- 'But this would set aside (and be contrary to) the indication of the Context [whereby the sentence should be the injunction of acts connected with the Kundapāyīnāmayana, which the ordinary Agnihotra and Darshapūrnamāsa are not.]'-Well, let the indications of the Context be set aside we do not mind it: Suntactical Connection is more authoritative than Context (and the view set forth above is what is got at through Syntactical Connection)."

In answer to the above, we have the following Siddhanta: - When a sentence is found in a different Context, it can speak of only that act to which the Context appertains.-" But we clearly find the sentence to be injunctive of an accessory (Time) for the Agnihotra and the Darshapūrnamāsa."-Not so, we reply .- "Why?"-Because the sentence in question occurs after the phrase 'Upasadbhishcharitva', and there are no 'Upasads' in the Agnihotra or in the Darshapūrnamāsa;—hence it is not possible for the sentence to be taken as enjoining the 'month' in connection with these sacrifices.—"The Upasads also may be taken as enjoined in connection with the Agnihotra and the Darshapurnamasa [by the whole sentence 'Upasadbhishcharitvā māsamagnihotram jūhoti, māsam darshapūrnamāsābhyām uajatē'. 1"-In that case, the sentence being (according to the Pūrvanaksa) injunctive of accessories (for the Agnihotra, etc.), would be enjoining several accessories [e.g. (1) the Upasads, (2) the sequence to the Upasads, and (3) the month : and this would involve a syntactical split.—In accordance with the Siddhanta, however, no significance would attach to the term 'agnihotra', which therefore would not qualify the act enjoined, and hence there would be no syntactical split.

[The Tantravārtika (Trans., pp. 873-879) does not accept this presentation of the Siddhānta, against which it makes the following observations:—

Such is the Siddhanta as represented by the Bhasya. But there is something to be said against this. If the two Agnihotras are taken as distinct, only because of the fact of there being otherwise a syntactical split,-then the present instance too becomes one of Differentiation of Actions by means of syntactical split (already dealt, with above), and not by that of context (which is what is really meant to be shown here). Or, again, the actions would be different on account of the impossibility of the manifold accessories mentioned in the sentence in question belonging to the original Agnihotra; and thus the necessary differentiation being done by Accessories. there would be no room for the functioning of the Difference of Context (towards that differentiation). Because even if the sentence in question had occurred in the same Context as that of the original Agnihotra, then too, it could not but have been taken as mentioning a distinct Action, because of the fact of the necessary details herein mentioned being inapplicable to the original Agnihotra.-And further, even though the reason shown in the Bhasya might, with difficulty, establish the difference between the two Agnihotras, yet it could do nothing with regard to the other sentence in question, wherein the Monthly Darsha-Pūrnamāsa are not mentioned as preceded by the Upasads. That is to say, the sentence 'Māsam darshanurnamāsābhyām' lays down only the connection of the sacrifice with the month: and as such there being no syntactical split, there would be nothing to show that the Darshap urnamasa herein mentioned is different from that mentioned before.-Thus then, the explanation of the Siddhanta, as given in the Bhasva being found to be untenable, we must explain it in the following manner:-

When the accessory, though mentioned in a separate context, is laid down in the manner of an independent injunction,—i.e. forms the predicate of the sentence,—then it can be relegated to the previous action (and should not make any difference in it); when, however, the accessory is mentioned only as an Uddžshya (not an object of injunction, but an accomplished thing, forming the subject of the sentence), then the action with reference to which it appears must be taken as different from the previous Action. In the case in question, we perceive a difference between the two Agniholras, not because of their being mentioned in separate

contexts, but because of the fact of all connection with the previous Context having been cut off. That is to say, when no idea of the original Agnihotra is present in the mind at the time that the sentence in question is met with, then the action mentioned in this latter cannot but be recognised as different from the previous Agnihotra. And as for the difference of contexts, even though it is present, it does not serve any useful purpose with regard to the differentiation; as we shall show under Sütra II -- iii -- 25 .- Thus then, in the case in question, the Month could not be taken as enjoined with reference to the Agnihotra mentioned at a great distance (in a previous sentence). Because it is not possible for any person to bring about the Month to-day for the sake of any Homa; and as the Month can never be the object of an Injunction, and must always retain the character of the anupādēya, it must be admitted that it is the Homa that is laid down with reference to the Month; and as the injunctive potency of this sentence is not in any way set aside by the former originative Injunction of the Agnihotra, the Action which has been taken as being enjoined with reference to the Month, comes to be primarily brought up by the sentence in question. As there can be no originative Injunction of that which has already been once enjoined,—we conclude the Action laid down in the sentence in question to be distinct from that laid down in the previous sentence.

If, even when the contexts are different, the former action were mentioned by a word expressive of an unaccomplished entity,—or the Bhāvunā meant to be expressed were connected with that unaccomplished entity,—then, in that case, it would be concluded that the second sentence simply brings forward the Action mentioned in the former sentence, with a view to laying it down with reference to a particular result, and in this case, there may be non-difference between the Actions. As for instance, in the case of the sentences 'Atirātrashchaturvimshah,—Prāyaniya-mahah chatvārah, Abhiplavāh saḍahāḥ', 'Prāhhhyāḥ saḍahāḥ', etc, etc., and also in the sentence 'Varun_araphāsēsvavabhṛtham yanti.—When, on the other hand, we find that the injunctiveness occurs in a distinct Context,—is connected with distinct results, etc.,—partakes of the character of the originative Injunction—and is not set saide by the more authoritative originative injunctiveness of any previous word which is far removed from it,—then, if such an injunctiveness happens to point to a difference between the actions concerned, we cannot but admit such a difference

It should be noted that the author of the Bhāṣya also has mentioned the Time, which is 'amupādēya', as the ground of differentiation; though he has referred to this Time by means of the sentence—'upasadbhishcharitvā' (and hence there is in reality not much discrepancy in the Bhāṣya either.]

Adhikarana (12): Sacrifices like the 'Āgneya' are distinct acts performed with a view to distinct results.

SŪTRA (25).

THE RESULT ALSO (IS A MEANS OF DIFFERENTIATION), WHEN MENTIONED APART FROM ACTIONS.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[All the six Means of Differentiation have been dealt with. We now proceed to show another way in which the Difference of Context operates towards differentiation; and it is not a seventh means of differentiation that is taken up now. This other way consists in the mention of something which is 'anupādēya', i.e. which cannot be brought about by human effort, and as such cannot be the object of an Injunction; among such things are—Place, Time, Occasion, Result, Object to be prepared. From among these, the case of Time has been dealt with under the foregoing Adhikarana; where the Place and Occasion also have been shown (by the Vārtika). We now proceed to deal in the present Adhikarana with the Result (and also in the Vārtika, with the Object to be prepared.)

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the texts—(a) 'Agnō-yamaştākapālam nivvapēt rukkāmaḥ' ['Desiring effulgence, one should prepare a cake baked on eight pans and dedicate it to Agni'], (cf. Taitti. Sain. 2. 2. 3. 3),—(b) 'Agnṣ̄-omɨyamēkādashakapālam nivvapēt brahmavarahasakāmaḥ' (Taitti. Sain. 2. 3. 3. 3). [Desiring Brahmic glory, one should prepare the cake baked on eleven pans and dedicate it to Agni-Soma'],—(c) 'Aindrāgna-mekādashakapālam nirvapēt prajākāmaḥ' ['Desiring offspring, one should prepare a cake baked on eleven pans and dedicate it to Indra-Agni'] (Taitti. Sain. 2. 2. 1. 1).

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these texts lay down the particular results (effulgence, Brahmic glory and offspring) in connection with the original Agnēya (Agnēyomīya and Aindrāgna) sacrifices? Or do they lay down entirely different sacrifices?

On this question, we have the following $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$:—"The sentences lay down particular results in connection with the original sacrifices;—why T —because in the $\bar{A}gn\bar{e}ya$ and other sacrifices mentioned in these texts we recognise the well-known $\bar{A}gn\bar{e}ya$ and other sacrifices (already enjoined elsewhere);—hence their mention in the sentences in question must be taken as a mere reference to those same sacrifices, for the purpose of laying down their connection with the particular results."

In answer to this Pūruspaksa, we have the following Siddhānta:—
The Result also is a means of differentiation, when it is mentioned apart from
actions. That is to say, if the sentence in question were a mere reference
(to a previously enjoined sacrifice), then it could not lay down the result; as
in that case, there would be no injunctive word in the sentence; and it is
clear that what is not enjoined cannot be the means of bringing about any
such result as 'effulgence'. In fact, if the particular result, effulgence, were

all that is enjoined, then, as every result must be evanescent,—there could be no connection between such a result and the $Agn\bar{\epsilon}ya$ and other sacrifices which are not evanescent (eternal).—Similarly with the other results ($Brahmic\ glory$ and Offepring).

From all this it follows that the sentences in question lay down sacrifices different from the original $\bar{A}yn\bar{e}ya$ and other sacrifices.

ADHIKARANA (13): The Avēsti brings about its result in the shape of food.

SŪTRA (26).

WHEN THERE IS PROXIMITY, THERE IS NO SEPARATENESS; HENCE
THE REPEATED MENTION SERVES THE PURPOSE OF
POINTING OUT ANOTHER RESULT.

Bhāşya.

[The present Adhikaraṇa is introduced by way of a counter-instance to all the foregoing Adhikaraṇa based upon non-proximity. The Result mentioned in the present Sūtra stands for all Anupādēyas—Place, Time, Occasion, etc.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 883.]

There is the Avēṣṭi sacrifice spoken of in the text—'Āgnēyo'ṣṭākapālaḥ puroḍāsho bhwath' ['The cake baked upon eight pans becomes dedicated to Agni']; and in reference to this Avēṣṭi, we have the sentence—'Etayā annādyakāmam yājayēt' ['One should make one perform this (Avēṣṭi), if he is desirous of acquiring food'].

In regard to this second sentence, there arises the question—Is the action spoken of in the sentence different from the $Av\bar{e}_{ijk}$? or is it the $Av\bar{e}_{ijk}$ itself?

On this question, the Pārvapakṣa is that it must be taken to be a distinct action, on the grounds set forth in support of the Siddhānta of the foregoing Adhikarna.

In answer to this Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—As there is proximity, the sentence should be regarded as the repeated mention of the Avēṣti itself, for the purpose of pointing out another result;—and it is not a distinct act that is mentioned.—Why?—Because there is no separateness; that is to say, the pronoun 'ātayā' ('this') cannot stand for any action other than the Avēṣti; as the pronoun 'this' must always stand for what is in close proximity to it. Hence the sentence should be taken as enjoining the same Avēṣti for one who desires to obtain food.

"What is the practical use of the present Adhikarana?"

If the action spoken of is the same as the Avēşķi, then the materials used would be the Aynēya and other cakes (enjoined in connection with the Avēşķi);—while if it is a different sacrifice, then some other material would have to be used.

ADHIKARANA (14): The repeated mention of the 'Āgnēya' is for the purpose of commendation.

SUTRA (27).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"FOR REASONS STATED, THE ĀGNĒVA SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS TO BE REPEATED."

Bhāşya.

In connection with the Darsha-pūrnamāsa, there is the Injunction (of the Agnēya) in the text 'Agnēya' stākapālo'māvāsyāyām paumamāsyānāhā-chyuto bhavati';—then comes the text 'Agnēya' stākapālo'māvāsyāyāmbhavati'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—[Do these two texts mean that] the $Agn{\tilde{e}ya}$ is to be performed twice? Or only once?

On this question we have the Pūrvapakṣa that—"For reasons stated, the Agnēya should be understood as to be repeated; (the reason being that) '[the repetition of the same word should also indicate difference among acts,]—because, if there were no difference, the repetition would be useless' (Sūtra 2.2.2)."

SŪTRA (28).

[SIDDHANTA]—THE ACTION BEING FOUND TO BE UNDIFFERENTIATED,
THERE SHOULD BE NO REPETITION OF THE SAME ACT SIMPLY
BECAUSE IT IS MENTIONED TWICE.

$Bh\bar{a}$ şya.

That the $Agn\bar{e}ya$ should be performed twice is not the right view.—Why?—Because there is no word (in the text) signifying such repetition.—"The word ' $agn\bar{e}ya$ ' itself, being repeated, should lay down the second performance."—Not so, we reply; the repetition of the word cannot convey the idea that what is expressed by it should be repeated; because when something is expressed by the word when pronounced first, it will remain the same thing even though the word be repeated a hundred times,—it will be no other.—"If the word mentioned the same thing that has been mentioned before, without any difference, then it would be useless."—Let it be useless; even so, it cannot signify anything else; in fact, it may be reasonable to regard the repetition as useless, but it can never be reasonable to take it as signifying something different (from what it has signified before).—From this we conclude that the $Agn\bar{e}ya$ is not to be performed twice.

SŪTRA (29).

OR, THE REPETITION MAY BE TAKEN AS SERVING A DIFFERENT PURPOSE.

Bhāsya.

Or, we need not regard the repetition as useless; what we mean is that it may be taken as serving the purpose of commendation.

Objection-"What would be the purpose served by this commendation? When the Agneya has already been enjoined by a previous text, which is already accompanied by a commendatory declaration, for the purpose of enjoining of what would the Veda put forward another commendatory statement? It has already been pointed out under Sūtra 1. 2. I that 'Inasmuch as the Veda is meant to serve the purpose of enjoining actions, what does not serve that purpose is useless'; so that, if there is a mere assertion, which does not serve the purpose of enjoining anything, it has to be regarded as useless. Because whether the same fact is reasserted or not, it remains just the same: just as whether a Deity is mentioned or not mentioned, it accomplishes the purposes of an accessory.—The sense of this last clause is not quite clear. The Tantravartika-Trans., p. 889, has the following interesting note-'We do not quite understand what this means; though on looking into it closely, it seems that it recalls what has gone before under the Mahēndrādhikarana, Sū. 2. 1. 18. The sense thus is that, though greatness (Mahattva) does not form an integral part of the Deity Mahēndra, yet, inasmuch as in one case mere Indra (without the epithet mahān) fulfils the functions of the Deity, the epithet mahān would be useless in an Arthavāda that would refer to the Injunction; exactly so in the case in question an independent commendation, standing by itself, would be altogether meaningless.'1"

Answer—The repetition serves a different purpose; it serves the purpose of enjoining, not the Agnēya, but, the Aindrāgna;—the meaning being—'The Agnēya offering of the cake baked on eight pans performed on the Amāvāsyā day is all right,—but it is not quite perfect when the offering is made to Agni alone,—it becomes quite perfect when it is offered to Agni accompanied by Indra,—hence the offering should be made to Indra-Agni'.

[We have found in this Pāda that there are six means of differentiating Actions. The Tantravārtika (Trans., pp. 885-886) has the following note—In another commentary (perhaps, by Bħavadāsa) only four such means have been mentioned—(1) Different words. (2) Different names, (3) Different Accessories and (4) Different Results. He has included 'Repetition' and 'Number' under 'Different Words', and 'Different Context' under 'Different Results'.—But this is open to objection. (For details of discussion see Tantruārtika.)]

DISCOURSE II.

PADA IV.

Adhikarana (1): Treating of the Life-long Agnihotra.

SŪTRA (1).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE LIFE-LONG REPETITION IS A PROPERTY OF THE ACTION,—BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT".

Bhāṣya.

In the Bahvrcha-Brühmana we find the text—'Yāvajjīvam agnihotram juhoti' ['One performs the Agnihotra as long as he lives'], 'Yāvajjīvam darshapūrnamāsābhyām yajēta' ['One should perform the Darshapūrnamāsa as long as he lives'].

In regard to this there arises the question—Is the Life-long Repetition enjoined here a property of the act? Is the life-long-ness enjoined as a property of the act, meaning that there is to be a repetition of it throughout one's life? Or is the life-long-ness enjoined as a property of the Agent, i.e. a necessary duty for him? Does the sentence lay down the life-long-ness as a property of the Act, the sense being that the Act is to be repeated as long as the man lives? Or does it lay down the life-long-ness as a property of the Agent, the sense being that the act forms his necessary duty?—

Question—"In what case would the life-long-ness be a property of the Act—and in what case would it be a property of the Agent?"

Answer—In case the term 'juhoti' ('performs') in the first sentence is a mere reference to the act of performing the Homa (enjoined elsewhere), and the life-long-ness is the object of injunction by the sentence,—the Repetition would be a property of the Act; on the other hand, if it is otherwise (i.e. if the life-long-ness is a mere reference or reiteration, and the act of performing the Homa is the object of the Injunction], then what is enjoined is a necessary duty for the Agent.

[The exact significance of this Adhikarana in general, and of the Question in particular will be clear from the following extract from the Tantravārtika—Trans, pp. 890-891.

Objection: "Whether a word expresses the property of an action or that of the Agent, is a question connected with the subject-matter of the Third Adhyāya; and hence its introduction here seems to be wholly irrelevant."—To this some people make the following reply: The treatment of the subject-matter of the Second Adhyāya itself having been finished, and the Third Adhyāya also being near at hand, there is nothing very incongruous in the introduction, at this stage, of a subject connected with the latter.—But this explanation is scarcely right. Because we have still got to consider the question of the difference or non-difference of Actions as mentioned in the various texts of the same Veda (and as such all the subjects of the Second Adhyāya have not yet been exhausted).—We must therefore explain the relevancy of the Adhikarana in the following manner: Just as the

causes of difference operate towards the differentiation of the forms of Actions, so also do they operate towards that of their performances. Hence with regard to the Agnihotra, etc., qualified as they are by the mention of 'life-long', there arises a question as to whether each of its daily performances is a distinct action in itself, or all the daily performances go to form a single Action meant to bring about a particular desirable end, and the time for whose performance is the whole of one's life? If then, the time-whole of one's life-were laid down as a property of the action, then the mere offering of the Morning and Evening libationsin accordance with the injunctions "he should offer the morning libation with the mantra 'Sūryo jyotih, etc.'," and "he should offer the evening libation with the mantra 'Agniriyotih, etc.'" would not be enough to complete the Agnihotra, till the specified time-'life-long'-expires; and hence a performance of the Agnihotra would come to be made up of many daily repetitions; just as the performance of the Jyotistoma is made up of the repetition of the same process with regard to each of the many Grahas. If, on the other hand, 'living' be taken as the occasion (or cause), with reference to which the sentence lays down the Action,-then, inasmuch as the occasion would last till the performer lasts, the Action would come to be enjoined without reference to any desirable result; and such a neglect of the performance being sinful, it would be necessary for the Man to perform it as long as he lives, either for the fulfilment of his own duty, or for the avoiding of the sin incurred by the non-performance of a necessary duty; and hence in this case, the sentence would lay down a necessary duty for the man. And in this case the occasion of the Agnihotra performance would be Morning and Evening together with the life of the agent; and hence as this occasion would present itself every day, the Action would be complete every day also; and the complete performance of the Agnihotra would be repeated each day ;-the performance of each day forming a distinct Action by itself (independently of the other days' performance).-For these reasons we must conclude that the Bhāsya has put the question in the form that it has, simply with a view to the distinctness or otherwise of the performance; as it is this that comes to be the upshot of the question put by the Bhasya.]

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapaksa:-

["The repetition is a property of the Action;—why?—because of the Context. That is to say, the significance of the Context is maintained only if we accept the interpretation that the roots 'hū' (in the first sentence) and 'yaj' (in the second sentence) are mere references to the actions (enjoined elsewhere),—and 'yāvajjīvam' ('life-long') is what is enjoined;—so that there is repetition (and all the repetitions go to form the complete Act, of the Agnihotra or the Darshapūrņamāsa).—When this is the explanation, then alone the glorification of the sacrifices, as contained in the sentence, 'Imperishable is the sacrifice called Agnihotra, as also that called Darshapūrņamāsa', would be applicable to the sacrifices, on the basis of the common factor of long time (implied by 'life-long' and 'imperishable'). For this reason there is to be repetition [and all the daily repetitions constitute a single performance of the one act of Agnihotra, and 'life-long' is a qualification of this one act—says Tantravūrtika—Trans, p. 881."]

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE PROPERTY IS OF THE AGENT; BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT SIGNIFICATION OF THE TEXT.

Bhāsya.

What we assert is that the sentence should not be taken as laying down the life-long character of the whole act (of Agnihotra or Darshapurnamāsa) as consisting of the repetitions of the performance,-and that what the sentence lavs down is the necessary duty for the Agent qualified by the property 'life-long' [i.e. the duty to be performed by the Agent as long as he lives.] Why so ?-Because of the direct signification of the text; that is, it is only thus that the sense of the text would be what is directly signified by it: any other sense would involve recourse to indirect (figurative) interpretation. -"How so?"-If the meaning were taken to be that 'one should perform the act during all the time that one is alive' .- then such performance of the Agnihotra during the whole life-time could not be accomplished except by repeating the Agnihotra which is really completed every evening;-nor could such performance of the Darshapurnamasa during the whole life-time be accomplished without repeating the acts of Darsha and Pürnamäsa which are completed on every Amāvāsvā and Pūrnamāsī respectively.-It might be argued that-" what is done during a part of the life-time may be regarded as done during the life-time."-But that is not so: as such a fact could only be got at by implication, it could not be enjoined by the word; that is, what the sentence means is that 'the act is to be completed during the time that is measured by the life-time of the performer',-and it is this that may imply the idea that 'there should be many repetitions of the act of Agnihotra'; such repetition, which would be declared as to be done, is not directly signified by either of the two verbs 'juhoti' and 'yajati'; it is got at only by indirect indication .- the words 'one should perform the Homa as long as he lives' being taken as indirectly indicating (through the context) the idea that 'the action should be repeated as long as he lives'; -and Direct Assertion is stronger than Indirect Indication.

On the other hand, if the sentence is construed in such a manner as to take the phrase 'as long as one lives' as a mere reference (to what is already known), and the verbs 'juhoti' and 'yajati' as injunctive of the acts (Agnihotra and Darshapūrṇamāsa),—then, in that case, these two words 'juhoti' and 'Aujati' retain their direct significations,—and the phrase 'as long as one lives' also would, in this case, stand for the 'being alive' of the Agent, which is what is directly expressed by it,—and not for repetition, which it can only indicate indirectly. Thus then, what is enjoined by the text is the act (of Agnihotra or Darshapūrṇamāsa) as contingent upon the 'being alive' of the man; the sense being that 'the Homa should be performed if the man is living'; so what the performance of the Act is contingent upon is the 'being alive' of the agent, and not the time (of his life);—and thus the act being contingent upon a constant factor, it is spoken of as a constant (necessary) duty; hence what is enjoined is a property of the Agent, in the shape of a necessary duty.

[In the Siddhanta the term 'yavajjivam' directly denotes the living, being

sitive, of the Agent as the condition essential for the performance of the act; and the word 'juhoti' also directly denotes the action of Homa done in the Agnihotra.—
In the Pārvapakṣa, on the other hand, the 'being alive' of the agent is made to indicate the time of his living, and the word 'juhoti' is made to indicate repetition. In this case therefore it becomes necessary to reject the direct connotation of the words 'yāvajīvam' and 'juhoti'), and accept the indirect indication of Time and Repetition; so that the Injunction, instead of being based upon Direct Signification, becomes based upon Indirect Indication.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 893.]

SŪTRA (3).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES; IF THE PROPERTY BELONGED TO THE ACTION, IT WOULD FILL UP THE WHOLE OF IT AND THE REST WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.

Bhāṣya.

The following text is indicative of the Siddhānta view—'Apī ha vā ēṣa svargāllokāchhidyatē yo darshapūrṇamāsayāji paurṇamāsimamāvāsyām vā atipātayēt' ['That performer of the Darshapūrṇamāsa becomes deprived of heaven who transgresses the Amāvāsyā and the Paurṇāmāsī days'](cf. Taitti. Sarh. 2. 2. 5. 4).—"How is this indicative of the Siddhānta view?'"—If the property belonged to the Act, then the Sacrifice once begun would be completed only after the lapse of the whole life-time of the man; so that in that case, there would be no such 'transgressing' of the time of the sacrifice as is mentioned in the sentence just quoted; so that all the rest of the sentence—where expiatory rites are laid down for such transgression—would be meaningless.

SŪTRA (4).

[There is also a text which] speaks of the completion [of the act]; if there is time left (after that completion), the Acts must be distinct.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

We find the completion of the act spoken of in such texts as 'Darshapurnamāsābhyām iṣtvā somēna yayēta' ['Having performed the Darshapurnamāsa, one should perform the Soma sacrifice']; if, after the Darshapūrnamāsa has been completed, there is time left for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice (as is mentioned in the sentence quoted), then it is clear that the two sacrifices, Darsha and Pūrnamāsa, do not require the man's whole life-time for their completion.—If on the other hand, 'being alive' is the condition for the performance of the sacrifice, then it becomes possible for the acts (Darshapūrnamāṣa and the Soma) to be distinct acts (and to be performed as such); so that the meaning of the sentence would be that 'after having completed the Darshapūrnamāṣa sacrifices, one should perform the Soma sacrifice.'

Further, there is the text—'Ahidāgnirvā ēşa yo'gnihotram juhoti na darshapūrņamāsau yajēta yā āhutibhājo dēvatāstā anudhjāyināh karoti' [· If a man who has established the fire performs the Agnihotra, but omits to perform the Darshapūrņamāsa, he makes these Deities who are entitled to

the offerings pine for them']; here we find the text speaking of the deities as 'pining for the offerings'; and this mention of the 'pining' is justifiable only if the offering that is not made is one that is compulsory (not voluntary); if an offering is not compulsory, then it is not possible for the deities to 'pine' for it; the offering can be regarded as compulsory only in accordance with the view that the sacrifice is enjoined as a necessary duty, not under the view that it is voluntary. If therefore the property in question (life-long) belonged to the Action, the Agnihotra as well as the Darshapārnamās would become voluntary acts. Hence the only correct view is that the act spoken of is a necessary duty.

Lestly, there is the text—'Jarāmaryam vā ētat satram yadagnihotram darshapārņamāsancha, jarayā ha vā ētābhyām nirmuchyati' ('The Agnihotra and the Darshapārnamāsa are imperishable, one becomes freed from the responsibility of performing these only by old age or by death'); this declaration of one becoming absolved only through old age or death is compatible only with the view that the act is compulsory; if the acts were voluntary (not compulsory), then the man could escape from their performance by simply not performing them.

SŪTRA (5).

THEN AGAIN, IF THE ACTS WERE NOT COMPULSORY, IT COULD NOT BE SO (AS DESCRIBED IN THE TEXTS).

Bhāsya.

The term 'tu' connotes cumulation; the sense is that for the following reason also we feel that the sentence lays down the property of the Agent and enjoins a compulsory duty.—If the sentence in question were taken as enjoining an accessory (i.e. time) for the acts already enjoined elsewhere. there would be only one Agnihotra offering, and that also would not be compulsory; as no other action which is mentioned as connected with a definite result [as the Agnihotra is mentioned in its original injunction 'Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmah'] is ever regarded as compulsory; and if the acts were taken as not compulsory (voluntary), that would be repugnant to what is stated in the text 'Jaramaryam va Etat satram yadaanihotram darshapurnamāsancha, jarayā vā ētābhyām nirmuchyatē mrtvunā cha.'-"Why should it be repugnant to this text?"-The declaration that one can escape from the performance of these acts only by old age or death' is justifiable only if the acts are compulsory: if they were voluntary, then one could escape from their performance by simply not performing them.

SŪTRA (6).

THEN AGAIN, THERE IS INCONGRUITY ALSO, AS BEFORE.

$Bh\bar{a}$ sya.

For the following reason we conclude that the sentence does not lay down the repetition of the previously-enjoined sacrifice, or an accessory relating to it.—Why?—Because there is incongruity; the 'incongruity'

would be that the Saurya and other sacrifices also—which are modifications of the archetypal Darshapürnamāsa—would have to be repeated as long as one lived;—and this would be a conclusion not vouchsafed by any text at all.—From this also it follows that the sentence lays down a compulsory duty.—This same compulsory character of the sacrifices is borne out by its glorification also (such as contained in the text 'Jarāmaryam, etc.').

SŪTRA (7).

Inasmuch as the property belongs to the Agent, what is spoken of as the time should be the condition (on which the performance of the act would be contingent).

Bhāsya.

If the sentence is taken as laying down a property of the Agent, and also the compulsory character of the act, then 'being alive' would be the condition,—i.e. the performance of the act would be enjoined as contingent upon the agent 'being alive'; and in that case, the act would be complete with each (daily) performance of it; and this would be in keeping with the mention of completion (spoken of in Sū. 4).

From all this it follows that what is enjoined is the property of the Agent and also the compulsory character of the Act.

Admikarana (2): If an act is mentioned in several recensional texts, it should be regarded as one and the same.

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" IF AN ACT IS MENTIONED IN DIFFERENT RECENSIONAL TEXTS, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS DIFFERENT,—BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES—(1) IN NAME, (2) IN FORM, AND

(3) IN PARTICULAR DETAILS; AND BECAUSE OF (4) REPETITION, (5) DEPRECATION, (6) INCAPACITY, (7) DECLARATION OF COMPLETION, (8) EXPIATORY RITES AND (9) PERCEPTION OF DISTINCT PURPOSES."

Bhāṣya.

[The present Adhikarana is taken up with a view to show that there are no grounds for the differentiation of actions except those already described. To this end certain other likely grounds of differentiation are put forward and rejected; and in course of this discussion it will be found that every one of these suggested grounds of differentiation is included in one or other of those already described above—Tantrovārika—Trans., p. 902].

The texts to be dealt with here are all the various Recensions of the Veda—such as Kāṭhaka; Kālāṇaka, Paippalādaka and so forth.—In this connection there arises the question—If any one Act, such as the Agnihotra, has been mentioned in one Recensional Text,—and it is again mentioned in another Recensional Text,—is this latter act different from the former? Or not different from it?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:-

"It should be taken as a different act.—Why?—(1) Because there is difference in name: one is called 'Kāṭḥaka' and the other, 'Kāṭāḥaka'; and the difference in the names makes the actions different.—'But these are names of texts (not of acts)'.—True; but what we mean is that these are names of acts also; inasmuch as they are found to be applied to, and spoken of, by means of words with the same case-endings as—the acts [when, e.g. people speak of 'Kāṭhakam agnitotram', 'Kāṭāpakam agni-hotram' and so forth].—(2) Because there is difference in form; e.g. in one Recensional Text, the Agnisomiya cake is spoken of as 'baked upon twelve pans', while in another the same is spoken of as 'baked upon twelve pans'; and when the forms are different, how can the acts be not different?—(3) Because there is difference in particular details; people belonging to the Taittiriya Recension eat on the ground while they are studying the texts dealing with the 'Kāriri's sacrifice; those belonging to

other Recensions do not do so :- similarly, while studying the 'Aqui' Section, some people fetch jarfulls of water for the Teacher, while others do not do so :- similarly while studying the 'Ashvamēdha' Section, some people fetch grass for the horse, while others do not do so: while there are vet others who perform other details. Thus in the case of persons belonging to one Recension, a sacrifice like the Ashvamedha requires at their hands help in the shape of grass for the horse and such other things,-while in the case of persons belonging to other Recensions, the sacrifice does not require that help; -now if the Ashvamedhas mentioned in the two texts were one and the same, how could it require these from one person and not from another? How too could it require any other help? Hence it follows that the Ashvamedha mentioned in one text is different from that mentioned in the other .- (4) Because (of the incongruity) of repetition; if the act mentioned in all Recensional Texts were one and the same, then the act having been already mentioned in one text, its mention in another text would be a needless repetition. This undesirable contingency does not arise if the act is different;-for this reason also the act must be different.-(5) Because there are deprecatory declarations; - persons belonging to some Recensional Texts deprecate the offering of Homa before sunrise (at the Agnihotra) in the following terms-' Prātah prātaranrtantē vadanti purodayājiuhvati ye'gnihotram, divākīrtyam adivā kīrtayantah sūryo jyotirna tadā jyotiresām' ['Those who, at the Agnihotra, offer the Homa before sunrise utter an untruth morning after morning, when they say not by day what should be said by day: Surva is not the light for them at the time'l:-while in the following terms some people deprecate the offering of Homa after sunrise- Yathā atithayē pradrutāya annamāharēyuh tādrk tat yadi uditē juhvati' ['If people make the offering of Homa after sunrise it is like bringing up food for the guest after he has departed'-Shānkhā. Brā. 2. 9: Tai. Bra. 2. 1. 2. 121:—all this would be incongruous if the act mentioned in the several recensional texts were one and the same; not so, if it were different; -for this reason also the act is different.-(6) Because of incapacity; -- people would never be able to carry out all the details that may have been laid down in all the Recensional Texts in which the particular act may have been mentioned [and it would be necessary to do this if it were the same act mentioned in all the texts]; so that in many cases it might be declared that something is being done which has not been laid down anywhere :- on the other hand, if the act were different, then it would be quite possible to gather all the information bearing upon its details (from the particular Recension where it occurs); -- for this reason also the act should be regarded as different .- (7) Because of the declaration of completion: there is a declaration of completion even when there is no completion; for instance, some people say 'our fire is complete' at a certain point, while others declare it to be complete at another point :this would not be possible if it were the same act; because at any one point, one and the same act could not be both complete and incomplete; such distinction is proper if the actions are different. For this reason also the Actions must be different.—(8) Because expiatory rites have been laid down:-some texts lay down an expiatory rite to be performed for the

neglect of the Homa before sunrise; others lay down an expiatory rite to be performed for the neglect of Homa after sunrise, as also at its prolongation (by reason of the Homa before sunrise having been neglected before sunrise and hence performed after sunrise, thereby prolonging the time of the Homa after sunrise). If the acts were the same, there could not be two kinds of 'prolongation'; if, on the other hand, the acts are distinct, the pre-sunrise Homa becomes 'prolonged' if done after sunrise, as in that case the other (the pre-sunrise) Homa also has to be done after sunrise. For this reason also the Acts must be different .- (9) Also because there is perception of distinct purposes; -for instance, (a) in one text we find the text-' Yadi purā didīksānāh...atha yadi didīksānah', which means (according to the Tantravartika) that 'if the sacrificer happens to be previously initiated, he should employ the Atiratra of the Brhatsama, as the Rathantara-Sama will have been already employed at the previous initiation, while if he does not happen to have been previously initiated, he should employ the Rathantara'; -according to this passage, there would be a possibility of the sacrificers at the Dvadashaha being found to be such as have previously performed the sacrifice (of the Jyotistoma), as also such as have not so performed the sacrifice; and this could be possible only if the Act were different; it could not be possible if the act were one and the same.-Why so?-Because in the Tāndaka we read that 'the Juotistoma is the very first of (Soma) sacrifices, and if anyone performs another (Soma) sacrifice without having performed the Jyotistoma, there would be falling into a pit, or he would die' (Tāndya-Brā. 16. 1. 2); and this necessity of the previous performance of the Juotistoma would be applicable to all cases (if the Act were one and the same); and it would not be possible to have any uninitiated sacrificer at the Dvadashaha (as every one would, according to the Tandya text, have already performed the Jyotistoma). reason also the Act must be different.—The first text speaks of the possibility of the performer at the Dvadashaha being one who has undergone a previous initiation, as also of his being one who has not undergone it; -according to the second, Tandya, text the Jyotistoma is the sacrifice that should be performed first; according to which the performer of the *Dvādashāha* or any other sacrifice must always be one who has previously performed the Juotistoma; so that it would never be possible to have a sacrificer of the Dvadashaha to be one who has not performed the Justistoma:-now if the Jyotistoma spoken of in connection with the first text were the same as the Jyotistoma spoken of in the second text, then there should not be any such uncertainty regarding previous initiation as has been mentioned in the first text; for if the Jyotistoma mentioned in all the texts are one and the same, then, according to the second text, in the case of all recensional texts, and in all cases, the first (Soma) sacrifice to be performed would always be the Jyotistoma, at which the sacrificer will have been already initiated; so that the contingency of his being uninitiated at the performance of the Dvadashaha would be impossible; as it would not be possible for the sacrificer of any other (Soma) sacrifice not to have already performed the Jyotistoma and undergone the initiation in connection with it. -Tantravārtika-Trans., p. 906.]

- (b) Another text indicative of the same conclusion from a similar reason, we have in the following—' Yat paksasammitam.....vēdisammituā minoti' (Maitra-Sam. 3. 4. 8), which mentions the two methods of measuring the Ekādashinī (a set of eleven sacrificial posts) by the 'Paksa' (Axle) and by the 'Vedi' (Altar), and deprecating and rejecting the former, favours the latter; this would be possible only if the Act were different; for if the act were one and the same, then it would not be possible to do the measuring, in one case, by the 'Vedi' at all .- Why so ?- Because the readers of one Recension declare that 'the interstices of the Sacrificial Posts should be of the measure of the aksa (axle) of the chariot' (Tai. Sam. 6. 6. 4. 1), according to which, at all performances of the act, the measuring would have to be done by the 'axle' (as herein declared); and there would be no possibility of any measuring being done either by the 'axle' or by the 'altar', so that no favouring or accepting of the measuring by the 'altar' would be possible. For this reason also the act must be different (so that at one the measuring would be done by the 'axle' and at another by the 'altar').
- (c) Another text indicative of the same conclusion is the following;—According to some recensions, we find it declared in connection with the Jyotisłoma that 'there is to be an excess of only lun verses in the chant over and above the Virāj',—while according to other recensions 'there is an excess of three over and above the Virāj'; there would thus be an incongruity if the act of Jyotisłoma spoken of in the two texts were one and the same; on the other hand, if they are two different acts, then, at one Jyotisłoma there would be 'two' and at another 'three'; for this reason also the Act must be different.
- (d) Further, in connection with the Sānasvata sacrifice, we read that 'the Purodāshins sit down [v. l. fast, 'upuwusuni' | while the Sānnāgyins hold the calves'; of these the Sānnāgyins are those who have performed previously the (Soma) sacrifice, and the Purodāshins are those who have not performed it; now the presence of both of these at the Sānasvata would be possible only if the Sānasvata sacrifice mentioned in the different recensional texts were different; for if the Sānasvata were one and the same, then (according to the Tāndya text quoted above) the Jyotisjoma will have been performed before in all cases (by all the persons concerned in the performance of the Sānasvata or any other Soma sacrifice); so that there would be no possibility of any such priests being present at the Sānasvata as have not performed a previous Soma sacrifice (i.e. Purodāshins).
- (e) Then again, in one recension we meet with the text 'Unuhawyah-niruktah, agnistomo yajño ruthantarasāmā, ashvah shyāvo daksinā' (Tandya-Brā. 18.3)',—while in another we read, 'Unuhawyah anirukkah, ukthyo yajño brhatsāmā, ashvah shvēto rukmalalāto daksinā' (which is entirely at variance with the former sentence); if the act (Unuhawya) spoken of in these texts were one and the same, then the specification of the two sāmans, Brhat and Rathantara, would be superfluous; for, according to one or the other of these two texts, the act would be accompanied either by the Brhat-Sāman or the Rathantara-Sāman, and the presence of those Sāmans would come in at the Unpahawya (even without their being mentioned in the texts quoted) as

forming part of its archetype;—on the other hand, if the two *Upahavyas* are different acts, then the one at which *Bṛhat-sāman* is used would be totally different from that at which the *Rathantara-sāman* is used; hence the specification of these in the two texts is quite right and proper.

From all this it follows that the act mentioned in one recensional text is different from the same mentioned in another recensional text."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—IN REALITY, THE ACT IS ONE ONLY, BECAUSE OF THERE BEING NO DIFFERENCE IN (1) CONNECTION, (2) FORM, (3) INJUNCTION, AND (4) NAME.

Bhāsya.

The view that "the act mentioned in one recensional text is different from the same mentioned in another recensional text" is not right; because as matter of fact, the act mentioned in all recensional and Brāhmaṇa texts is one and the same;—(1) because there is no difference in the connection of the purpose; i.e. we actually recognise the act to be the same and laid down with a view to the same purpose;—(2) the form of the act also—as consisting in the Material and the Deity—is the same;—(3) the injunction of human activity also is found to be exactly the same; and (4) there is no difference in the name.—Hence the conclusion that the act mentioned in all the recensional and other texts is one and the same.

SŪTRA (10).

[Answer to argument (1) of the Pürvapakṣa]—There could be no difference based upon name; as the names belong to the Vedas [acc. to reading 'chodaniahidhānatvāt'] ob, the names do not apply to the injunctions of acts—[acc. to reading 'acrodânābhidhā-natvāt'].

Bhāşya.

It has been argued above [(1) under Sütra 8] that "the difference of the Act is based upon the difference of the names ('Kāthaka', 'Kātāpaka' and so forth]",—this has been answered (in the Bhāṣya under the same Sūtra) by the argument that the names are those of texts (not acts);—this answer has been met (by the Pūrapakṣin, under the same Sūtra) by the argument that "the names are actually found to be applied to acts also".

Now the answer (given in the present Sūtra) to this argument of the Pūrvapaksin is as follows:—The argument propounded does not affect our position; because as a matter of fact, it is by reason of its connection with the text that the act is called 'Kāṭhaka' (or 'Kālāpaka' etc.);—and it is not that it is by reason of its connection with the act that the text is called

"Kāṭhaka' (or 'Kālāpaka' etc.).—"How is this got at?"—As a matter of fact, what we find is that when an act is connected with the text called 'Kāṭhaka', it comes to be spoken of as 'Kāṭhaka'.—"What even if this is so?"—When the Act is called 'Kāṭhaka' or 'Kālāpaka' because it is connected with the text Kāṭhaka or the text Kālāpaka,—then it is possible for one and the same act to be called 'Kāṭhaka', by reason of its connection with the text Kāṭhaka, and also to be called 'Kālāpaka' by reason of its connection with the text Kālāpaka [so that the application of these names cannot prove that the Act must be different].

SÜTRA (11).

ALL ACTS WOULD BECOME ONE ACT [IF THE ACTS WERE REGARDED AS DIFFERENT ON THE GROUND OF THE DIFFERENT NAMES 'KĀTHAKA' ETC.].

Bhāṣya.

If the act mentioned in the Kāṭhaka recension were to be regarded as different from the same act mentioned in the Kāṭāpaka recension, on the ground of these different names 'Kāṭhaka' and 'Kāṭāpaka' being applied to the act,—then all those acts would have to be regarded as one and the same to which any such single name would be applicable; i.e., all the acts that are called 'Kāṭhaka' (by reason of their being spoken of in the Kāṭhaka recension) would have to be regarded as one and the same; so that the Agnitotra, the Darshapāmamāsa and the Jyotiṣtoma,—to which the single name 'Kāṭhaka' would be applicable (on the ground of their being spoken of in that text)—would have to be regarded as one and the same act, on the ground of the one name being applicable to them all.—In reality, however, all these acts are never regarded as one and the same.

For this reason also, the act (mentioned in one text) must be treated as one and the same as that act (mentioned in another text).

SŪTRA (12).

FURTHER, THE NAME IS ONE THAT HAS BEEN COINED.

Bhāşya.

Further, the name ('Kāthaka', as applied to the act) could only be one that has been coined in modern times,—one that did not exist from before, but was applied to the particular recension only since the time of the Teacher of the name of Katha who proved himself to be an expert in the teaching of that particular recension. (See under Sütra I. 1. 30.) Under the circumstances (if the application of the name were to make the act different, then) it would come to this that the act was not different before (the appearance of that Teacher and the consequent coining of the name 'Kāthaka'), but it is different now;—which is absurd!

SŪTRA (13).

[Answer to argument (2) under Sctra 8]—Even though the Act be one and the same, it may have diverse forms.

Bhāṣya.

Even when the act is one and the same, there may be diversity in its form, if there are texts to that effect. But, if there is such difference in the form according to express texts, that does not lead us to regard the act as different when they are not actually recognised as different.

SŪTRA (14).

[Answer to Argument (3) under Sütra 8]—The Injunction regarding details pertains to the learning of the texts.

Bhāşya.

As regards the argument that "there is difference in the particular details",—these different details have been set forth with reference to the mastering of particular texts, and not with reference to the performance of the act.—"How do you know this?"—This is clear from the fact that in support of the diversity of details of the Rite, there is neither Direct Assertion (nor Indicative mark, nor Syntactical Connection, nor Context, nor Position, nor Name);—and that it is only found with reference to the study of the texts, and not to the performance of the rituals.

SŪTRA (15).

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"THE REPEATED MENTION WILL BE AS IN

Bhāsya.

In argument (4) under Sū. 8, the $P\bar{u}rvapaksin$ has declared the contingency of needless repetition as a ground for holding the Act to be different; the sense of this argument is that—" in the case of the repeated mention of the $Apa\bar{v}_sya$ in connection of the $Am\bar{u}vs_sy\bar{u}$ sacrifice (dealt with under Sū. 2. 3. 27–29), the view that the act $(\bar{A}pn\bar{v}_sya)$ should be repeated has been rejected on the ground that it would involve needless repetition of the same act; on the same ground, that it would involve needless repetition, in the present case also, the view that 'it is the same act' should be rejected".—Now this argument of the $P\bar{u}rvapaksin$ has got to be answered.—The present $S\bar{u}tra$ is to be taken as reiterating the $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$ argument.

SUTRA (16).

[Answer]—In fact, however, there is no bepetition, as there is no difference in the method of Declaration

Bhāsua.

As a matter of fact, there is no repetition at all; it is the same subject of Agnihotra that is spoken of again and again by several persons; and when several persons speak of the same subject, it is not a case of 'Repetition'. If it were so in the case of several Vedic texts, it would be so in the case of the same subject being spoken of several times in the same Vedic text also.—From all this it is clear that there are not several acts in the case in question, but only one act.

(SUTRA (16A)

BECAUSE OF THE NON-INHERENCE OF TEXTS.

Tantravārtika—This Sūtra has escaped the notice of the author of the Bhānya: what it means is that the texts of several Recensions cannot be retained in the memory of a single person.]

SŪTRA (17).

ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS NOT PRESENT (IN EVERY RECENSION).

Bhāşya.

The term applied to the Vedic Recensions is 'Shākhā' (Branch); this name is applicable to particular recensional texts only on the ground that all that is needed is not present (mentioned) in each of them; so that the Homas (offerings mentioned in the several texts) are like so many 'branches', hence called 'Shākhā'; so that there are so many parts of the Veda, as there are branches of the tree.—"Wherein does the similarity to Branches lie?"—The branches are of different shapes and different positions, and no one branch contains all the flowers and fruits of the tree; similarly in the case in question also, there is no recensional text of the Veda which mentions all the accessories of sacrifices; thus the name 'Shākhā' is applicable on the basis of this non-presence of all that is needed.

For this reason also the Act is one and the same.

SUTRA (18).

What is taught (in any one text) is not for any one (class of Brāhmaņas) only.

Bhāsya.

The Agnihotra mentioned in the Kālhaka text has not been enjoined for one (class of) persons: as it has been enjoined for the followers of the Twittiriya text also; as nowhere is any particular person mentioned.—The particular details also of the Agnihotra which are enjoined in any one text

are meant for all kinds of Agnihotra. So that the Agnihotra of the follower of the Kāthaka text is also for the follower of the Taittiriya text; as there is no word or expression that would connect it with any particular class of persons only. Hence the conclusion is that all the recensional texts combine to lay down the single act of Agnihotra complete in all its details.

SŪTRA (19).

THERE IS DECLARATION OF COMPLETION.

Bhāsya.

People are found to make such declarations as 'our Agni is completed at this point', as we find in the following passage—'The Agni of those belonging to the Maivrayani Recension is completed at the Anvarohas—but our Agni is not completed at those'.—Now if the 'Agni' of the speaker were different from that of the Maitrayanis, how could they say—'our Agni is not completed here'?—The only reasonable view is that the act is one and the same, so that the Anvarohas form part of the same act as performed by the speakers.

SŪTRA (20).

[Answer to Purvapaksa arguments (5), (6) and (7) under Sutra 8]—Even if the act is one and the same (5) 'the deprecatory declarations, (6) 'the incapacity,' and (7) 'the declaration of completion' are quite explidable.

Bhāşya.

- (5) A 'deprecatory declaration' is made, not for the purpose of decrying what is deprecated, but for the purpose of glorifying its contrary; so that the deprecation does not necessarily imply the negativing of what is deprecated; what it implies is the affirming of its contrary. So that when a text deprecates that time of the Agnitotra which has been enjoined by another text, all that is meant is that the two points of time are optional alternatives; and thus there is no incompatibility between the two texts.
- (6) As regards people who suffer from 'incapacity', they may not be able to carry out the entire body of details that are found enjoined in even one recensional text; on the other hand, for those who have the requisite capacity, they may be able to carry out, not only the details laid down in their own text, but also those laid down in all the texts. This discrepancy regarding capacity therefore is not incompatible with the view that the Act is one and the same.
- (7) Lastly, as regards the 'mention of completion', people make use of the expression 'it is finished' (complete) in regard to an Act, only after some part of it has been done; e.g., at the Jyotistoma, after the operations of the Adhvaryu have been finished, people speak of the Jyotistoma itself as having been 'finished' (complete).

SŪTRA (21).

As for the mention of the occasion for Explatory Rites ;-

Bhāşya.

It has been argued by the Purvapakṣa [argument (8) under Sūtra 5] that expiation has to be performed in connection with the Post-survise Homa, as also in connection with the Pre-survise Homa, and that this would be incompatible if the act of Homa were one and the same;—and this incompatibility ceases if the act is regarded as different.—Now this argument has got to be refuted. This Sūtra is meant to recall the Pūrvapakṣa argument (8).

SŪTRA (22).

[The answer is]—In reality it (the explatory rite)
WOULD ALWAYS BE DETERMINED BY THE METHOD
WITH WHICH THE PERFORMANCE STARTED.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The term ' $v\bar{a}$ ', 'in reality', rejects the opponent's view just set forth.—The argument brought forward by the $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$ has no force against us. If the performance of the Agnihotra starts with the determination to offer the Homa after sunrise, then the performance becomes defective if the Homa is offered otherwise (i.e. before sunrise); and this makes the agent liable to the Expiatory Rite.—This method would be quite compatible even with the view that the Δet is one and the same.

SŪTRA (23).

Inasmuch as Completion presupposes a beginning, it would be recognised in accordance with what one might know

Bhāşya.

The term 'completion' is used only in connection with what has had a beginning;—i.e. it is only what has been begun that is completed; so that when we have the notion that our 'Agni' has been completed, what we mean is that 'the act that had been begun is completed'.

[Or, the Sūtra might mean that, inasmuch as all verbal usage is dependent upon its previous acceptance by people, we could conclude that the 'completion' spoken of is like what we actually find to be. As for this practice, we find that even when the action has not been completed, as soon as the details mentioned in one recension are completed, the Professors of that Recension declare 'our sacrifice ends here', and hence there is no incompatibility between this declaration and our view—Tantravārtika, p. 917.]

SÜTRA (24).

[Answer to argument (9a) under Sü. 8]—The Indicative text is equally applicable (to both views); because what is stated (regarding the Jyotistoma being the very first sacrifice to be performed) appertains to all (Recensional texts); nor does the text enjoin a (Jyotistoma) sacrifice; consequently there would be an incongruity in the performance of the Dyādashāha sacrifice.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (9) that "the text 'yadi purā didīkṣānāh, etc.,' indicates the possibility of the sacrifices at the Dvadashaha being performed by such men as have previously performed the first sacrifice (Jvotistoma), as also by such as have not performed it, -and this would be possible only if the act were different, not if the act mentioned in all the Recensional Texts were one and the same ".-This, however, does not affect our position ; because if the previously initiated Agent may perform the Dvadashaha, then the previously uninitiated Agent may also do it. That is all that the indicative text indicates] .-- As regards the Sāmavēda (Tāndya text quoted by the Opponent), it does not contain an injunction of a different Justistoma (in regard to which it might lay down the character of being the first to be performed) .- "What, if it is so?" - The Jyotistoma could be referred to (for the purpose of laying down the said character of being first) only in a passage where it has been enjoined .- So that even under the view that the Act is different (as mentioned in different recensional texts), all Juotistoma sacrifices would have to be regarded as having the character of being the first to be performed; and hence even under the Pūrvapaksa view that the Act is lifterent, the incongruity-in the shape of the presence of uninitiated sacrificers at the performance of the Dvadashaha-would have to be admitted (so that on this point, both the views, the Pūrvapaksa and the Siddhānta, stand on the same footingl; consequently it does not affect the validity of the Siddhanta at all.

SŪTRA (25).

[Answer to argument (9b) under Sc. 8]—Inasmuch as the 'measuring' has not been enjoined in regard to the substance, there can be no choosing from among the several methods (of measuring);—one or the other might be chosen for adoption in the various cases, on the ground of (both the methods) being mentioned;—for this reason the text speaking of the two methods should be regarded as the mere statement of a standing fact (that there are these two methods

POSSIBLE). Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as the measuring of the substance has not been enjoined in regard to the 'Agni' sacrifice, the rule spoken of cannot be adopted in regard to the measuring of the Ekādashinī (at the 'Agni' sacrifice). As a matter of fact, when the Ekādashinī itself is not enjoined in regard to the 'Agni', how could there be any measuring of it-either 'by the Axle' or 'by the Altar'? As a matter of fact, both those methods (of measuring) are spoken of for the entirely different purpose of leading up to the injunction of the Ekādashinī,—the meaning of the entire context being—'if the Ekādashinī were of the size of the Axle, there would be such and such an incongruity, while there would be no such incongruity if it were of the size of the Altar .who is to put an end to this doubtful state of things ?- [the answer is] that 'to a sinule Post, eleven animals should be tied up' [this last clause embodying the injunction of what has been called the Ekādashini, to which the statement of the two methods of measuring is supplementary] .- Now, in connection with the Vachastoma and other acts, -as the declaration of the two methods of measuring would be a mere statement of a standing fact,—at the Yupaikādashinī, the interstices in the Posts should have to be of the size of the 'axle (aksa) of the chariot'; -and again, because of the said declaration (of the two mathods) being a mere statement of a standing fact, even though there be no actual measuring, either 'by the Axle' or 'by the Altar', the said statement could be explained as serving the purpose of leading up to the injunction of the Ekādashinī; so that there is no incongruity at all.

[The Sūtra may also be taken as follows:—If the measuring by the Allar were not laid down with regard to a substance, then there would be no restriction in regard to the measuring by the Azle and such other things, all of which would be equally implied; and this absence of restriction would be repugnant to the direct assertion of 'measuring by the axle of the chariot'.—In the case in question, however, it is not so; hence there is no incongruity.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 918.1

SŪTRA (26).

[Answer to Pürvapakṣa argument (9c) of Sū. 8]—Inasmuch as there is Injunction as well as Prohibition, there would be an 'excess' in one case.

Bhāsya.

The Sodashi has been enjoined in the sentence 'Atirātrē grhnāti sodashinam';—it has also been prohibited in the sentence 'Nātirātrē grhnāti sodashinam'. Thus in one case, there would be an excess of two, and in another of three, verses over a Virāj. The difference, being thus explained, does not affect the Siddhānta view.

Question-"Why should there be an excess of two or three verses?"

Answer—(a) There is the three-fold Bahispavamāna stotra, which makes 9 verses;—(b) there are the fifteen-fold Ajyas, whose number being four, these make 60 verses;—(c) the number of verses in the Midday Pavamāna is 15;—these 15, with the original 9 [under (a)], make 24, which, with the 60 [under (b)] make 84;—(d) there are 4 Prethas of 17, making up 68, and 17 of the Arbhava Pavamāna; thus these being 5 times 17, the number comes to be 85;—these 85 with the previous 84, make up 169;—(e) there are 21 verses in the Yajñā-yajñīya-stotra, which, along with the said 169, make up 199 verses;—so say the Brāhmaṇa-texts.—

In reference to the Agnistoma only, it has been declared that 'a complete Virāj consists of a group of ten verses'. [So far as the Atirātra is concerned, the number of verses in the Stotras is as follows:—]

B (a) There are the three (additional) rounds of stotras for the Ukthya, of 21 verses each, making up the number 63; (b) the (additional) stotra (for the) Sodashī has 21 verses; with these 21 we get (63+21=) 84 (additional) verses. (c) There are three rounds of stotras of 15 verses at the night Extractions, each round containing 4 such stotras: these make up $(3 \times 4 \times 15 =)$ 180 verses, which give us complete Virājas. (d) There is also the three-fold Rathantara, the Panchasaman, which contains 9 verses. Thus a group of 9 is added to 84 [under B (a) and (b), excluding the 180 verses of the nightextractions, under B (c), because they make up complete Virājas] (and that gives 33, i.e. $9 \times 10 + 3$). Thus three verses are left over in these stotras after making up Virājas. When the Sodashī cup is not held (and the corresponding stotra not used), we have 21 verses less; and in this case we have 2 verses left over in the chants after making up complete Virājas. [63, as under B (a) + 9, as under B (d) = $72 = 7 \times 10 + 2$]. [Consequently there is hardly any difference between the Atiratra with the Sodashin and the Atirātra without the Sodashin.]

Thus it is found that the indicative text quoted is quite compatible with the Siddhānta view that the Act is one and the same.

[The principal varieties of the Jyotistoma are Agnistoma-Ukthya, Soḍashin and Alirāina. (A) In the first three there are three payāyas or rounds of the Extraction of Soma all in day time, and in the last there are in addition 3 extractions at night. In the Agnistoma, 5 stotras are used in the morning-extraction, 5 in the midday-extraction and only 2 in the evening. In the Ukthya,

the evening extraction has also 5 stotras. The total is 15. In the Sodashin, there is an additional stotra corresponding to the additional Sodashi graha. In the night-extractions of the Ativitra, there are 4×3=12 stotras; and in the day-time the Sodashin cup and stotra may or may not be used. Now a stotra is a Sama-chant based on some verses which are sung with repetition in various groupings. Each constituent verse of a stotra is called a stotriya. Now the total number of stotriyas in the Agnistoma is 190 which is a complete dividend of 10, which is the number of syllables in a pāda of the Virāj metre. And as Virāj stands for completion, Agnistoma is thus complete. In the noctunal rounds, the Ativātra has got 180 stotriyas, i.e. 18 complete Virājas, in this peculiar Brāhmana-computation; and in its Day-rounds, 93 stotriyas with the Sodashin and 82 without; consequently only 3 or 2 are left over after dividing by 10 (the number of a Virāj line). There is thus the difference of only one (1) and Shabara claims that that is no difference.

SŪTRA (27).

[Answer to Pūrvapakṣa aegument (9d) under Sū. 8]—In connection with the 'Sārasvata', there being an incongruity,—the sentence should be taken with a conditional 'when'.

Bhāsya.

It has been argued [under (9d)] that "it is possible for both 'Sannayyins' and 'Purodashins' to be present at the Sarasvata, etc. etc."-(Our answer to this is that as a matter of fact, all Soms-sacrifices are preceded by the performance of the Jyotistoma, so that (under both views) there would be an incongruity (in the presence of those who have not performed a previous sacrifice-i.e. the Purodashins,-along with those who have not performed such a sacrifice.—at the same Sārasvata); hence (for both the Siddhāntin and the Pūrvapaksin) it is necessary to add the conditional 'yadā' ('when') to the sentence (quoted by the Pürvapaksin), which has to be explained as when the Sannayyins also are in the position of Purodashins [as they are at the Paurnamasil, they should sit down (or keep fast), etc. etc.'--[The different sacrificers are thus found to be mentioned only with a view to indicating the different time of the performance, and not for laying down the difference in the character of the sacrificer, -- says the Tantravārtika. The sense of the argument is that the names 'Purodashin' and 'Sannayyin' are not meant to be taken in the technical sense of those who have not performed a previous sacrifice, and those who have performed a previous sacrifice, but only as indicatives of time,-the performers at the Paurnamāsi performance being called 'Purodashins', as Purodasha is the material used at the Paurnamāsa sacrifice, and the performers at the Amāvāsyā performance being called 'Sannayvins', because Sannayva (curd-milk) is the material used at the Amavasya (Darsha) sacrifice. Thus it is that the same performers who were called 'Sannayyins' in connection with the Darsha sacrifice come to be called 'Purodāshins' in connection with the Paurnamāsa sacrifice, irrespective of the fact of their having performed, or not performed, a previous Jyotistoma sacrifice.]

SŪTRA (28).

As regards the argument that "at the 'Upahavya', the two Sāmans would come in by transference (from the Arche-type)".—

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the opponent [under (9e)] that "at the Upahavya, the Brhat-Sāman and the Rathantara-Sāman would come in from its Archetype itself, in the event of the Upahavya being one and the same; so that in that case, a separate injunction of the Sāman would be entirely superfluous".—This argument has got to be refuted.—The present Sātra is only for the purpose of recalling the previous argument (of the Pūrvapakṣin).

SŪTRA (29).

[The answer is that] in reality, the repetition serves the purpose of pointing out further details.

Bhāşya.

The sentence quoted serves the purpose of pointing out further details,—the construction being—'if Rathantara is the Sāman sung, then the sacrificial fee should consist of the white horse,—if Bṛhat is the Sāman sung, the sacrificial fee should consist of the Horse with golden forehead.

SUTRA (30).

THE VEDA ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME IDEA (OF THE ACT BEING ONE AND THE SAME).

Bhāṣya.

If the Act mentioned in all Recensions were not one and the same,—
then, how could the act be enjoined in one Recension and its details laid
down in another? For instance, (a) the Mairāyani Recension does not
mention the Samid and other Prayājas, and yet it speaks of its details in the
sentence 'Rtavo vai prayājāh samaniya hotavyāh' [Mai. Sam. 1. 4. 12; see
Shata. Brā. 1. 5. 31].—(b) Similarly, in certain Recensions the mantra for
picking up the stone, beginning with the words 'Kuṭarurasi' [Mai. Sam.
1. 1. 6], is not mentioned, and yet even in those Recensions we find the
assertion—'Kukkutosityashmānamupādattē, Kūṭarurasētī vā.—From all this
we conclude that it is one and the same act (spoken of in the several
Recensions).

SŪTRA (31).

[Objection]—"But, there being distinct orders of procedure Laid down in each Recension, the Injunction in Each should be taken as distinct."

Bhāşya.

"If a man follows up the Injunctions laid down in Recensions other than his own, he must surely act against what is enjoined in his own Recension; for this reason, the act mentioned in the other Recensions should be taken as different."

SŪTRA (32).

[Answer]—As there is no connection with any incompatible process, the Act is taken as one and the same; hence all the Injunctions bearing upon

> THAT ACT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AFFORDING INFORMATION

> > ABOUT THAT SAME

Act.

Bhāşya.

Our answer to the objection is as follows:—If we take the Act mentioned in all Recensions as one and the same, there is no connection with any incompatible process; as a matter of fact, there can be no conflict between Order and Syntactical Connection; as Order is the weaker and Syntactical Connection is the stronger of the two;—and that all that is laid down in the various Recensions has to be taken together and acted up to (in the performance) is what is indicated by Syntactical Connection [while the Order of procedure is a matter of Order, which is weaker than Syntactical Connections].

From all this it becomes established that one and the same Act is laid down in all Recensional and all Brähmana texts.

End of Pāda iv of Discourse II.

End of Discourse II.

DISCOURSE III.

AUXILIARIES.

PADA I.

Adhikarana (1): Declaring the Subject-matter of the Discourse.

SŪTRA (1).

Now there (follows) an account of Auxiliaries.

Bhāsya.

[For a different explanation of the term 'shēṣalakṣaṇa'—see Tantravārtika— Trans., pp. 921–923,—where it is shown that the term may be taken as standing for all the rest of the Sūtras, i.e. Discourses III—XII, all of which deal with matters auxiliary to Dharms, and as such are included under the term 'shēṣalakṣaṇa'.]

[Immediately after the treatment of the subject of the Differentiation of Acts, it becomes necessary to treat of the 'auxiliary character', because the due consideration of all other questions of Motive, etc., dealt with under Discourse IV et. seq. is dependent upon the question of 'auxiliary character'.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 924.]

The account of 'Different Acts' has been finished; next we shall deal with the account of the 'Auxiliary' [where we shall deal with the following questions]—What is an 'auxiliary'? For what reason is something an 'auxiliary'? In what way is it used? It will be pointed out that 'Direct Assertion' and others are the means by which the use of the Auxiliary is determined; the relative strength of these means will be discussed; and also other matters relating to and arising out of these subjects.

Adhikarana (2): [Definition of 'Auxiliary']. SÜTRA (2).

THE AUXILIARY IS AN 'AUXILIARY' BECAUSE IT SERVES THE PURPOSES OF ANOTHER,

Bhāṣya.

In this $S\bar{u}tra$ we have the definition of the Auxiliary, and also the statement of the grounds on which it is an 'auxiliary';—both these are pointed out here. The definition is that 'that which helps another is called auxiliary'; for instance, when people help others, they say, 'in this matter we are auxiliaries'.

Objection—"In some cases, even the Principal Factor also helps another; e.g. though the Teacher is the Principal person at the institution, yet he helps his pupils by imparting intellectual and moral instruction."

Answer—It is true that the Principal Factor sometimes helps others; but we call that thing 'Auxiliary' which exists entirely for helping others; such for instance as the 'born slave' who is purchased for the sole purpose of working for the master, and the ox is purchased only for the purpose of carrying loads for the master.

"But the master also, when making provision for the born slave, would (by that act be helping him and thus) become subservient (auxiliary) to him. [So that even the born slave cannot be said to exist *entirely* for helping others.]"

It is not so, we reply; because even when making provision for the slave, the master subserves his own purpose; the help accrues to the slave only because the master's own interests are inseparably bound up with the well-being of the slave. Similarly in the case of making provision for the Ox. So what we call an 'auxiliary' is that which always and absolutely exists for another.

Objection—"What is it that has already been dealt with before, under the Sūtra 2. 1. 8, where it has been stated that—"those that are meant to be productive of a material substance are to be regarded as subsidiary'? [That is to say, under the Sūtra quoted, the subsidiary character having been already explained, why should the same matter be taken up again?]"

Answer—Under that Sūtra, what was shown was that those verbs which spoke of acts bringing about visible results cannot be regarded as serving any transcendental purpose; while under the present Sūtra we have the definition of all kinds of Auxiliaries.

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Adhikarana (3): [Enumerating Auxiliaries.] Sūtra (3).

"[THE 'AUXILIARY CHARACTER' BELONGS] TO SUBSTANCES,
PROPERTIES AND PREPARATIONS",—SAYS BĀDARI.

Bhāşya.

The teacher Badari has opined that the term 'auxiliary' can be applied only to Substances, Properties and Preparations,-not to Sacrifices, Results and Agents.-(a) The Substance serves the purposes of the Act; if the Act is to be done for a purpose, it must be accomplished by means of a substance; -no Act can be accomplished without a substance; -therefore for the accomplishment of the Act, a substance has to be found out ;-thus Substance serves the purposes of the Act .- (b) The Property serves the purpose of distinguishing the particular substance that has been enjoined;-there is need for such distinguishing of it,—as it is only a particular qualified substance that can be the means of accomplishing an act; -thus the Property also helps the Act though the substance, and this 'serves the purposes' of the Act.-(c) The Preparation is that on the accomplishment of which a certain thing becomes fit for some purpose; -this also 'serves a useful purpose' in the accomplishment of an Act; so that this also 'serves the purposes of another'.—Thus it is that Substances, Properties and Preparations are 'auxiliaries' inasmuch as they serve the purposes of another.

Sacrifices, Results and Agents are not auxiliaries.—The Sacrifice is to be performed by the Agent, and when that has been performed, there is nothing else to be done by him. The purpose of the Agent is the performance of the sacrifice itself, as for the other things, substance and the rest. they serve the purposes of the sacrifice and are 'auxiliary' thereto; the sacrifice itself is not performed for accomplishing anything (to which it could be 'auxiliary'); as the Result also is not brought about by the sacrifice, the fact being that when the sacrifice is performed, the Result comes by itself;-from the Veda also all that we know is that 'the Result comes about when the sacrifice is performed', and there are no words to the effect that 'the Result is brought about by the Sacrifice' .- Thus the Sacrifice is not 'auxiliary' to anything.—As regards the Result, that also is not enjoined in reference to the Agent :- all that the text of the Veda says is 'one who desires Heaven should perform the sacrifice'; it says nothing as to whether the Heaven is for the Agent himself or for someone else; the term used in the text is 'svargakāmaķ', 'desirous of heaven'; and one becomes 'desirous of heaven' merely by having a desire for Heaven :hence Heaven (the Result) is not understood to be 'auxiliary' to the Agent; -hence the Result also cannot be an 'auxiliary'.-If then, neither the Result nor the Sacrifice is enjoined as an 'auxiliary', in regard to what could the Agent be the 'Principal'! He is however clearly 'auxiliary'

to the Act (Sacrifice), because he is a 'substance' (not because he is the 'Agent').

For these reasons, Bādari has opined that the auxiliary character belongs to Substances, Properties and Preparations only.

SŪTRA (4).

ACTIONS AS ALSO (ARE 'AUXILIARY'), BECAUSE THEY SERVE THE PURPOSE OF THE RESULT,—SAYS JAIMINI.

Bhāṣya.

The Teacher Jaimini however has held that Actions also are auxiliaries; he did not, like Bādari, hold that the auxiliary character is restricted to the three aforesaid things only. What Jaimini saw was that the Sacrifice is enjoined, not as something to be accomplished (in itself), but as a means of accomplishing the Result, for one who desires that Result; it is only when thus taken that what is directly enjoined in the texts becomes followed; and there can be no doubt as to the Injunction serving a useful purpose. This same idea is going to be further supported by the Sātras themselves, under Discourse VI; all that is done here is that the idea that 'actions serve to accomplish Results' being accepted as established (under Discourse VI), it is shown that the Action is 'auxiliary' (to the Result).—Thus it is clear that there can be no such restriction as that 'Substances, Properties and Preparations only are auxiliaries',—the Sacrifice also being 'auxiliary' to the Result.

SŪTRA (5).

THE RESULT ALSO (IS AN 'AUXILIARY'), AS IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE AGENT.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The Result also is declared with reference to the Agent; the meaning of the Injunction is that 'the sacrifice is to be performed by a person who desires that Heaven may become his',—and not that 'the Heaven should obtain itself';—that such is the meaning is clear from the use of the Atmanēpada ending (in the injunctive word 'yajēta', 'should sacrifice'), which ending is used only when the Result of the act is meant to accrue to the Agent;—so that the sacrifice is performed in order that the Agent may experience (enjoy) the Result. Thus the conclusion is that the Result is asserted as following from the Sacrifice for the sake of the Agent, and not merely for its own accomplishment. Thus the Result also is an 'auxiliary'.

SŪTRA (6).

THE AGENT ALSO (IS AN 'AUXILIARY'), AS HE IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTION.

Bhāṣya.

The Agent also is found to be mentioned as an auxiliary to such acts as the measuring of the Udumbara Post (which has to be of the height of the Agent).—Thus there can be no such restriction as that Substances, Properties and Preparations alone can be 'auxiliaries'.

On the subject-matter of this Adhikarana, the revered Vrtikāra has come to the following conclusion:—In relation to the Sacrifice, it is only Substances, Properties and Preparations whose 'auxiliary character' is absolute [these alone are such as are always 'auxiliary' to the Sacrifice]; the 'auxiliary character' of the others (Actions, Results and Agents) is only relative [they are both Principal and Auxiliary]; for instance, the Sacrifice (Action) is 'Principal' in relation to the Substance, but 'auxiliary' to the Result; the Result is 'Principal' in relation to the Sacrifice, but 'auxiliary' to the Agent;—and the Agent is 'Principal' in relation to the Result, but 'auxiliary' to acts like the Measuring of the Udumbara Post.—Thus then, the Restriction of the auxiliary character to Substances, Properties and Preparations (as held by Bādari) is quite right, as in relation to the Sacrifice, Substances, Properties and Preparations are always 'auxiliary'.

ADHIKABANA (4): Preparatory Acts like 'Nirvapana' are applicable to definite things, according to the useful purpose served by it.

SŪTRA (7).

THEY ARE CONNECTED WITH A DEFINITE PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

[The 'auxiliary character' having been defined, we now proceed to consider the manner in which the auxiliaries are employed in actual practice. The present Adhikarana deals with the employment of Preparations, followed by that of Substances, Objects or Implemente in Adhikarana 5, and of Properties in Adhikarana 7.]

There are the two sacrifices of the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa enjoined in the text 'Darshapūrnamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajīta';—and in connection with these the following accessory details are found mentioned—(a) Nivarpana (Pouring out), Prokṣaṇa (water-sprinkling), and Avahanana (threshing) and so forth, in relation to grains;—(b) Utpavana (clarifying), Viāpaṇa (melting), Grahaṇa (holding) and Āsādaṇa (placing) and so forth, in relation to Butter;—(c) Shākhāharaṇa (Fetching of Twigs), Gawām-prashāṇana (Fetching of the Cows), Gawām-prashāṇana (making the cows yield milk) and so on, in relation to the Sānnāyya (Curd-milk). [All these details are of the nature of 'Preparation', Samskāra.]

In regard to these there arises the *question*—are all these details to be performed in connection with all the three kinds of substances—Grains, Butter, and Curd-milk? Or are they to be performed only where they may serve a useful purpose?

Objection to the question:—"As a matter of fact, the preparatory details referred to are always found mentioned along with definite substances—e.g. the text 'Vrikinavahant' (speaks of the Threshing as to be done to the Vrihi Corn), 'Tandulän pinasii' (speaks of the Pounding as to be done to the Husked Grains). So that there can be no room for any such doubt as finds place in the Question [as none of the Preparatory Details is ever found mentioned except in connection with a definite substance.]"

The answer to this is that it is true that they are found to be spoken of as connected with definite substances; but the fact of the matter is that while the details like Threshing are spoken of by Direct Assertion (through such words as 'avahanti'), their connection with the substances like Vrihi is indicated only by Syntactical Connection (of the verb 'avahanti' with the word 'wrihin'); [so that the general applicability to all substances of the Threshing is more authoritative than its special application to the Vrihi corn only.]—Thus there is room for the doubt expressed in the Question.

On this question, the view that appears to be most reasonable is that 'they are connected with a definite purpose';—'artha' stands for prayojana, purpose;—that is, the preparatory acts are to be performed only where, on being performed, they serve a useful purpose; such acts, for instance, as Prathana (spreading out) can serve no useful purpose in connection with

Butter and Curd-milk; and hence they are not to be done to those substances; similarly acts like Utpavana (clarifying) are not to be done to Grains or Curd-milk; and acts like Fetching the Twigs are not to be done to Butter and Grains—"But we actually find it directly declared that all are to be done to all'".—We do not yet know whether they are so declared or not; in fact, this is exactly what we have got to consider.—But even if they were so declared, they should not be done where they serve no useful purpose.

[As against this preliminary statement of the Siddhānta, we have the following Pūrvapaksa.]—

SŪTRA (8).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" WHAT IS ENJOINED SHOULD PERTAIN TO ALL THINGS, BECAUSE IT IS EQUALLY CONNECTED WITH ALL.

AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF CONNEXT!"

"What we have to say in answer to the above statement is as follows: If an act were one recognised as to be done, only on the basis of an implication (e.g. the employing of unhusked rice being laid down, it implies the doing of the act of threshing for the husking),-then such an act would naturally be performed only in cases where it could serve a useful purpose. The preparatory rites under consideration, however, are such as are all directly enjoined; so that it is not that those should be performed only where they serve a visible purpose; --where then ?--wherever they are enjoined; and the acts in question are recognised to be such as are enjoined in all cases. How so ?-Because it is equally connected with all, and because there is no difference of Context; that is to say, (a) all things-Butter, Grains and Curd-milk-are equally connected with, or related to, the Apūrva (Transcendental Result of the main Act), in the relation of cause and effect; i.e. in all these cases, wherever the acts are done, they are recognised as done for the bringing about of the Transcendental Result :-(b) secondly, the Context also is the same, being enjoined in which, therefore, the details become recognised as enjoined for all the substances.-From these two reasons it follows that all the acts in question are to be done to all the substances.—As for the argument that all the acts do not serve useful purposes in connection with all substances, our answer is that, on the strength of the injunction itself, they have to be regarded as serving useful purposes with all substances; -this 'purpose' may be of an invisible (transcendental) character."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—WHERE THERE IS NO USEFUL PURPOSE (TO BE SERVED), THERE SHOULD BE NO ACTION.

Bhāsya.

It is not right that all the acts should be done to all the substances; in fact, acts do not deserve to be performed in cases where they do not serve any useful purpose,—as we have already explained.

Says the Opponent—"But on the strength of their Injunction itself, they should be taken as serving a useful purpose in all cases."

Certainly not, we reply. [For reasons detailed in the following Sutra.]

SŪTRA (10).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE RESULT ALWAYS APPEARS ALONG WITH THE OPERATION; IF THERE WERE NO (VISIBLE) RESULT, THEN ALONE COULD THIS ABSENCE (OF RESULTS) JUSTIFY AN ASSUMPTION ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS

EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS.

Bhāsya.

In fact, there is no such Injunction as would justify the performance of all the acts with all the substances; -nor do we perceive any useful purpose (served by all in all cases) by Sense-percention or by any other means of cognition. As for Presumption, that also would be necessarily operative (in justifying the assuming of purpose) only in a case where there is a distinct Injunction in actual words, -in no other case; that is to say, when as a matter of fact, we know that such acts as Prathana (Spreading out), when performed ever Butter and Curd-milk, serve no visible purpose, we could be justified in presuming an invisible purpose, only if, without such a presumption, the injunction of those acts in that particular context were found to be unjustifiable (meaningless);—as a matter of fact, those acts have to be enjoined in connection with Grains, in connection with which visible results in the form of unhusking and the like are found to appear along with the operation-of threshing and the like:-there is need too for this unhusking, as without it, the Cake could not be prepared. Such being the case, the injunction of the act in question in the Context is found to serve a useful purpose. Thus then, when the injunction of the Act is found useful in connection with Grains, there can be no ground for presuming an invisible Result (as resulting from the performance of the act in question over Butter and Curd-milk). Hence no such invisible result can be presumed.—If in the case of the threshing done to the Vrihi, no such visible result as the preparation of the Rice (by unhusking) were found to appear, then, in the absence of such a result, we might take the purpose served to consist in what is spoken of by the words of the text, irrespectively of any visible Result; so that an invisible result might be taken as following from the act (of Threshing) as done to the Butter and the Curd-milk [solely on the basis of the fact that these substances also are mentioned in the same Context] .- From all this it follows that acts like Prathana (Spreading out) are not to be done over all the substances.—Similarly with acts like Clarifying and those like Fetching the Twigs .- Thus it becomes established that it is not right that all the acts are to be done to all the substances; and that acts like Prathana (Spreading out) should not be done to Butter and Curd-milk, -they are to be done to Herbs only ;-acts like sprinkling should be done to Butter only, nor to Grains or to Curd-milk; and acts like Fetching the Twigs should be done to the Curd-milk, not to Butter or to Grains.

ADHIKARANA (5): Implements like 'Sphya' have their employment restricted in accordance with their connections.

SŪTRA (11).

ON ACCOUNT OF ITS CONNECTION WITH THE ORIGINATIVE TEXT, THE IMPLEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THAT (WHICH IS MENTIONED IN THAT TEXT).

Bhāşya.

There are the Darshapūrnamāsa sacrifices, in connection with which we read—'(1-2) Sphyashcha, Kapālani cha, (3-4) Agnihotrahavani cha, Shūrpaācha, (5-8) Kṛṣnājinaācha, Shamyā cha, (7-8) Ulūkhalaācha, Musalaācha, (9-10) Dṛṣachcha, Upalā cha—ētāni vai dasha yajñāyudhāni' [where Sphya and the rest are laid down as the 'ten sacrificial implements'] (Taitti. Sam. 1. 6. 8. 3).

In regard to these there arises the question—Are these implements enjoined here for the doing of everything that can be done with them? Or for doing that only in connection with which they are mentioned?

On this we have the following Paraapaksa:—"They are enjoined here for the doing of anything and everything that can be done with them;— why?—because it is only thus that the injunctions serve a useful purpose; otherwise they would be mere references serving no useful purpose. Further, the circumstance that 'there is no difference of Context' applies equally to all things. Lastly, the fact that they are called 'sacrificial implements' shows that they are all equally connected with the 'sacrifice'.—From all this it follows that all the implements are to be used in all cases."

Against this Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:- On account of its connection with the originative text, the Implement should be taken as enjoined for the purpose of that which is mentioned in that text':i.e. when an act is spoken of in the originative text, as connected with an Implement, that act should be done with that Implement; e.g. the originative text being (1) 'Sphyena uddhanti' (Digs up with the Sphya), where the indication of Syntactical Connection is that the Sphya is to be used for doing the Digging,-it follows that the Digging is not to be done by any other implement save the Sphya. If this view is accepted, then, the using of the Sphya having been enjoined in this same text, its mention in the sentence 'Sphyashcha Kapālani cha, etc.' would be a mere reference to it for the purpose of asserting that 'these are the ten sacrificial implements.'-In this way the mention of each one of the implements would be a reference to it as enjoined in the originative text laying down the action to be done with it; these originative texts being-(2) 'Kapāleşu shrapayati' ('Bakes on the pans'), (3) 'Agnihotrahavanyā havīmsi nirvapati' ('Pours the

grains with the Agnihotrahavani'), (4) 'Shūrpēna vivinakti' ('Separates the husks with the winnowing basket'), (5) 'Krsnājinamadhastāt ulūkhalasvā. vastrnāti' ('Spreads the antelope-skin under the mortar'), (6) 'Shamvāvām drsadupadadhāti' ('Places the lower pounding stone on the Shamuā stick'), (7-8) 'Ulükhalamusalābhyām avahanti' ('Husks the grains with mortar thestle'), (9-10) 'Drsadupalābhyām pinasti' ('Pounds with the two stones') .- It is only through Context that all the Implements would he indicated as to be used for all the acts, while through Suntactical Connection the use of each becomes restricted to the act along with which it is mentioned in the originative text .- As for the term ' Yaināwudha' ('Sacrificial Implements'), which may be taken as laying down the use of the implements by means of this common term, the indication of this also would be set aside (by what is indicated by the particular originative texts); because a particular injunction by a general statement is only indirect, while a particular injunction by a particular statement is direct.—From all this it becomes established that each of the Implements is to be used only for that particular act with which it is connected in the originative text.

ADHIKARANA (6): Properties like 'Redness' are restricted, not mixed up.

SŪTRA (12).

WHEN THE SUBSTANCE AND THE PROPERTY SERVE THE SAME PUR-POSE, THEY HAVE THE SAME FUNCTION; AND HENCE THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION.

Bhāṣya.

With reference to the Purchase (of Soma) at the Jyotistoma, we have the text—'Arunayā pingāksyā Ēkahāyanyā somam krināti' (cf. Taitti. Sam. 6.1. 6.7) ('One purchases Soma with a tawny-eyed and one-year-old (cow), which is red', where 'arunayā', 'red', stands for the property, and the other two terms stand for the substance, animal. There are other texts such as—'Ajayā krināti' ('Purchases it with the she-goat'), 'Vāsasā krīnāti' ('Purchased with the cloth'), and so forth].

In regard to this, there arises the following question:—Does the property of Redness go with the entire context (qualifying all that is mentioned in the Context)? Or does it go with the one-year-old cow only, and that too in connection with the act of Purchasing only?

Objection to the question—"Why should there be any such doubt when the connection of 'redness' with the 'purchase' is clearly expressed by the words 'arunayā krināti'?"

Answer-All that the word expresses is that the unsubstantial (shapeless) property of Redness is the instrument of the act (of Purchase),-this fact being expressed by the third case-ending in the term 'arunava' expressing instrumentality; and yet no unsubstantial object can ever be the means of accomplishing an act; -hence it would seem to us that the property of Redness has no connection with the act of Purchasing; and yet it is not likely that an authoritative text would assert what is impossible: -there may be all this supposition in our mind. With the notion that some sort of connection might be possible (between the Redness and the Purchasing), there arises a desire to search out some way of making the text yield some sort of a valid cognition; while pondering over this, if we can find some capacity (in the Redness) to be connected with the act (of Purchasing), then, on the basis of the two words being syntactically connected, we shall apply the Redness to the act of Purchasing only; -if, on the other hand, even though looking out with all due care, we cannot find any way of making a connection between the two possible, then, we shall admit a syntactical split and connect the Redness with the entire Context .- For these reasons, the question that has been raised is deserving of full consideration.

On this question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—

"The property of Redness is connected with the entire Context;—why?
—because it is equally connected with the whole (all that is mentioned in the

Context) and because there is no difference of Context [the same reasons that have been put forward by the Pūrvapakṣa under Sū. 8].—'Syntactical Connection being more authoritative than Context, the Redness should be connected with the act of Purchasing only'.—Such is not understood to be the sense of the text; not even a hundred texts could lay down what cannot be done; if one were to say 'Burning should be done with Water and wetting should be done with Fire',—could he ever be regarded as making a reasonable statement? In fact, no unsubstantial thing can ever be the means of accomplishing an act. It is for this reason that no connection between the words 'aruṇayā' and 'kriṇāti' being possible, the two cannot be taken as syntactically connected."

Objection (to the above Pūrvapakṣa-reasoning)—The word 'aruṇayā' ('red')' does not denote property, it denotes the substance;—how '-because it is in the Feminine Gender; it is only particular substances (objects) that are either Feminine or Masculine or Neuter; and the Feminine ending is appended to that noun-base which denotes a female substance; and it is a Feminine ending that we find in the term 'aruṇayā' (red);—hence we conclude that this term denotes a substance.

Answer (given by the Pūrvapaksin)-"This is not right: when a certain substance is characterised by the property of redness, then alone it becomes capable of being spoken of as 'aruna' (red); if that same substance were characterised by a property other than redness, it could not be spoken of as 'aruna'; -thus then, while the term 'aruna' is inseparable from the property of redness, it is not so inseparable from the substance: -hence it follows that it is the property that is denoted by the term 'aruna'. Thus the fact of the term denoting a property is perceived directly, while the fact of its denoting a substance could only be got at through Inference in the form-' Because the noun-base in the word arunaya has taken the Feminine ending, therefore it must denote a substance':-Direct Perception is always more authoritative than Inference; -- for this reason the term 'arunava' must be taken as denoting the property .- 'How then is the presence of the Feminine ending to be accounted for?'-Words denoting properties also take the Feminine Gender; for instance, just as we have the expression (a) 'arunā buddhih' or (b) (v.l.) 'karunā buddhih' [where the substance. Buddhi is spoken of as having the property of redness, and the word 'arunā', which denotes the property, is in the Feminine Gender,—(b)or in the other reading, the substance, Buddhi, is spoken of as having the property of compassion, and the word 'karuna' denoting that property takes the feminine ending],-in the same manner we may account for the Feminine Gender of the word 'aruna' (in 'arunaya', in the sentence under consideration). -And if the word denotes a property, then it cannot be connected with the act of Purchasing .- Consequently, we must have recourse to syntactical split and connect the term with the entire Context."

Says the Objector (to the Pūrvapaksin)—If the Redness is not connected with the act of Pūrchaeing, it can be connected with the other term in the same sentence, 'Ēkahāyanyā' ('one-year-old'), so that there would be no syntactical split.

The Pūrvapakṣin answers—"That cannot be; what the term 'aruna' denotes is the Property only, not the Property and the Substance both,—while the term 'ākahāyanī' denotes the substance only, not the substance along with a property;—under the circumstances, how could we recognise any connection between the two in the absence of the Genitive ending?"

The Opponent to the *Purvapakṣin* says—Even in the absence of the Genitive ending, we can regard the two terms ('aruṇaṇā' and 'ākahāṇanṇā') as co-extensive (in apposition), by reason of both having the same case-ending; just as we do in the case of the expression 'nīlam utpalam'.

The Pūrvapakṣin replies—"This is not possible; in fact, by its very form (and nature) the term 'aruṇa' denotes a property, while its co-extensiveness with the term 'ekahāyanī' (one-year-old) can only be assumed through a Syntactical Connection based upon the fact of the two words ('aruṇayā' and 'ekahāyanyā') having the same case-ending, and also upon the proximity of the term 'ekahāyanī';—and Syntactical Connection cannot be more authoritative than Indicative Power; hence what has been just said is not right."

The Opponent of the Pūrvapaksin urges the following argument:-When it is found that a word, if taken merely as denoting a property, is incapable of being connected with any other word .- then, in order to guard against the word being uninstructive and hence useless, it is taken as denoting a substance; and under these circumstances, it comes to be syntactically connected with some other term (like 'ēkahāyanī') which is in close proximity to it, and has also the same case-ending as the word itself,-and hence co-extensive with it. It is in this same way that we have such expressions as 'nilam utpalam'.-The case with the word 'arunaya' is exactly like this; if it is taken in its own sense (as denoting property), it becomes dissociated from the sentence and ceases to have any sense at all even in the entire Context.-Why so?-For the same reason that it cannot be connected with the act of purchasing,-namely, the reason that what is itself unsubstantial cannot be the means of accomplishing an act:-nor can it be connected with substances conducive to the accomplishment of the act; because a word which denotes a mere property cannot signify a substance; -and this same will be the reason why the word cannot have any connection with the Context; because if it were connected with the Context at all, then it could be so either by being connected with the act (spoken of in the Context), or with the substances conducive to the fulfilment of those acts; and both these connections have been shown to be impossible.—For all these reasons, in order to save it from becoming meaningless, we must take the term 'aruna' as connected with the term 'ēkahāyanī' which is in close proximity to it; and there need be no syntactical split.

"It is not so", replies the Pārvapakṣin; "the term 'aruṇā' cannot be taken as qualifying the Ēkahāyanī;—why?—because the term 'aruṇā' appears along with the third case-ending, and through the force of this third case-ending, it can only be taken as qualifying an act; as agents (kārakas denoted by the case-endings) are connected with acts, not with substances. Thus then, through the direct signification of the third case-ending, the word should be taken as qualifying an act,—and on the strength

of Syntactical Connection, it should be taken as qualifying the substance, <code>&kahkyuni:</code>—and Direct Signification is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection. Hence the word ('arunayā') cannot be connected with the <code>&kahkyuni.</code>"

The Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent—The property not being capable of being connected with the act, no significance can attach to the case-ending (in 'armayā'); it is for this reason that the connection of the property with the ēkahāyani is admitted (even though it is not directly signified).

The Pūrvapaksin answers-"This also is not possible: if the idea is that, inasmuch as no significance attaches to the case-ending, the word 'arunaya', though denoting a property, should be taken as denoting a substance,-then, in that case (the case-ending having no significance), the noun-base would be all that would be significant, and in that case the right. ending would be the Nominative one (acc. to Pāninī's Sūtra ' Prātinadikārtha ..., mātrē prathamā'); specially as a word with the third case-ending (Instrumental) could not express the connection (desired by the Opponent). The mere fact that something is not otherwise possible cannot justify the assumption of such a meaning (of a word) as is impossible: for instance, in the case of the assertion 'the boy is standing in the fire', the mere fact of the standing being impossible in the fire does not justify the assumption that the word 'fire' means horse or ox,-all that is admitted is that the word 'fire' signifies near the fire. 'Similarly in the case in question, inasmuch as the word which is without the first case-ending cannot be taken in the sense of the noun-base pure and simple. From all this it follows that the word 'arunaya' might well be regarded as meaningless; it can never be taken to have any connection with the 'ēkahāyanī'.

Says the Pūrvapaksin's Opponent-We do not say that the term 'aruna' signifies no active agent; for it clearly does signify an active agent characterised by the quality of Redness. What happens is that at one time it is one thing that is meant to be predicated, while at another time it is something else; that is to say, the connotation of a word consisting of a predominant and a subordinate factor, at one time it may be the subordinate factor that is meant to be predicated, and the predominant factor is merely referred to; for instance, the term 'dandi' ('man with the stick') is known as having a connotation in which the danda (stick) forms the subordinate, and the man, the predominant, factor; and yet, when the man is already known and it is intended only to state that the stick forms his accessory (in this case, the subordinate factor, the stick, is what is predicated and enjoined); as we find in the injunction 'Dandi praisānanvāha' (' the man repeats the directions with stick in his hand');so also in the case of the sentence 'Lohitosnisa rtvijah pracharanti' ('the red-turbaned priests operate') [where, the Priests and their operating being already known from other sources, what is predicated or enjoined is the subordinate factor of their wearing red-turbans |. - Similarly in the case in question (in the word 'arunaya') even though the property of Redness is the subordinate factor, and the active agent is the predominant factor, yet the word may be taken as predicating the property of Redness as belonging to the active agent, which latter is only referred to (for the purpose of the said predication). In this way, the connection of the word 'arunayā' with the ēkahāyanī becomes possible; and there is no syntactical split.

The Pūrvapakṣin answers—"There is not much in this argument. In this case the term 'ēkahāyanī' has been used for the purpose of expressing the connected relationship between the ēkahāyanī (animal) and the act of Purchasing; how then can it be ever connected with the word 'arunayā'? Though we have already urged this point, yet it is being reiterated again and again."

The Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent asks—When the word 'ēkahāyanī' has been used along with the act of Purchasing, just as much as along with the property of Redness,—why should we accept its connection with the Purchasing and not with the Redness?

The Pūrvapaksin answers—"The reason for this acceptance lies in the attority of the word; that is to say, the case-ending attached to the term 'b̄kahāyanī' signifies its connection with the act (of purchasing), while there is no such ending expressive of its connection with the property (of Redness)."

Opponent—What is it that is expressive of connection with the Act? and what is it that is expressive of the Property?

Pūrvapakṣin—"When the relation of the action meant to be spoken of is that with an active agent (kāraka), then we have the second (Accusative) and other case-endings; whereas when the active agent is not meant to be spoken of, and all that is meant to be spoken of as relation in general, then we have the sixth (Genitive) case-ending. In the case in question we do not find the sixth case-ending at all; what we do find is the third (Instrumental) case-ending; that is why we admit the connection of 'ākahāyanī' with the verb to purchase, not with the word 'arunā' (which signifies property of Redness)."

The Opponent retorts—How then do we have the connection that we have in the expression 'nilam utpalam'?

The Pūrvapakṣin answers—"There certainly is a connection in that case; but it is got at, not through Direct Signification, but, through Signiac-tical Connection; in proximity to the term 'utpala' there is the term 'nila', which (being an adjective) needs the other term,—and hence becoming syntactically connected with that other term ('utpala'), it is taken as so connected by indicating a particular Utpala,—its function in this consisting of that process of Indication in which the word does not entirely surrender its own connotation [i.e. the term 'nilam' denotes the blue colour,—but when connected with the word 'utpala', it comes to indicate the blue-coloured utpala, and thus in the sentence 'nilam utpalam' we have the statement of the equation 'the blue lotus is a lotus']."

The Opponent—In the case in question also, there may be connection between the Redness and the Ekahāyanī, through Syntactical Connection.

Pārvapakṣin—"That cannot be, we reply. Direct Signification is stronger than Syntactical Connection; and Direct Signification asserts the connection of the Ekahāyanī with the act (of Purchasing) and not with the property (of Redness)."

The Opponent—"If connection with the Act can be admitted on the basis

of Direct Signification, then connection with the Property may also be admitted on the basis of Syntactical Connection."

Pārvapakṣin—"That cannot be done; when one thing is spoken of as related to some other thing, no other thing, even though in close proximity to ti, can become related to it. For instance, in the expression 'Bhāryā rājānh puruṣo āēvadattasya', it the term 'rājānh' be taken as used for the purpose of qualifying the 'bhāryā', then it cannot be connected with the term 'puruṣa'. In the same manner, in the case in question, when the term 'ākahāyani' has been used for the purpose of qualifying the act (of Purchasiny), it cannot be connected with the term 'aruṇā'.'

Says the Opponent-It is true that, so long as there is no actual need (for one word to be connected with another), mere proximity cannot be a reason (for connecting them); -in fact, in every case, it is only when the meaning of the word alone by itself is found to be incompatible, and is on that account rejected, that there is justification for taking it as part of the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs (i.e. as connected with some other word or words of the sentence); this is not justifiable under any circumstances other than the said one: -and the reason for this lies in the fact that the connotation of the word by itself is of a generic character (as the word always denotes the Universal, the Class), -while the meaning of the sentence is of a particular character; i.e. the meaning of the sentence is that which restricts to particulars the Universals denoted by the component words. This is what has been explained under Sū. 1. 1. 25- 'Tadbhūtānām krivārthēna samāmnāyo'rthasya tannimittatvāt.'-It may be that the meanings of words are perceived directly, while the meaning of the sentence is inferred; but so long as the word remains confined to its own denotation, it does not teach anything; that is why it has to be syntactically connected with another word,-not for any other reason. So that in the case in question, even though the term 'ēkahāyanī', having all its needs fulfilled by being connected with the act of Purchasing, does not stand in need of the connection of any other word, -yet the term 'aruna' is such that, unless it be connected with another word, it remains meaningless, and hence it becomes syntactically connected with the term ' ēkahāyanī'.

Pūrvapakṣin—"It has been already pointed out that the term 'ākahā-yanī' is meant to be connected with the act (of Purchasing), not with the property denoted by 'arunā'."

Opponent—What we say is that, with a view to save the term 'arunā' from becoming meaningless we have to take the term 'ākuhāyanī' to be connected with both (the act of Purchasing, as well as the property of Redness). In fact, what is done for the sake of one thing may well be done for the sake of another; for instance, canals are dug for irrigating paddy, and yet water from them is used also for drinking and washing; similarly, in the case in question, the term 'ākahāyanī', used for the sake of being connected with the act of Purchasing, may be connected with the term 'arunā' also; there would be nothing wrong in that.

Pūrvapaksin—"It is not so; though it may be that, in order to guard against the contingency of making the term 'arunā' meaningless, it is connected with the 'ēkahāyanī',—yet, in this way, it could be connected

with the entire Context; because this term 'arunā' could not be qualified (restricted) by the words 'somam krināti' ('purchases 'Soma'); because these words are not used as a qualifying clause; in fact they enjoin an Apūrva (something not already known)."

Opponent—Even though enjoined, this Apūrva might become connected with something else, just as the term 'ēkahāyani' is connected.—How so?—A word is always used for a definite purpose; hence it should be taken as serving all that purpose for which it is used; and so long as such a word is present in the mind, and is found to be in need of some connection, it can become connected with another word, which also may be present in the mind.

Pārvapakṣin—"It is not so; that word alone is connected with another which becomes meaningless unless so connected,—not any other word.—Why so?—Because when the word becomes so connected, its universal connotation becomes restricted to particulars; so that direct signification (of the Universal) suffers at the hands of syntactical connection (indicating the Particular). (As regards the term 'aruṇā'), even when it is not connected with the act of Purchasing, it does not become meaningless; as it can be connected with the several ēkahāyanī-animals mentioned in the Context."

Opponent—It has been already pointed out that it is not possible for the term 'aruna' to be connected with the Context.

Pārvapaksin-"It is not impossible. The fact of the matter is that in any particular sentence, when a certain factor is enjoined by it, that same factor cannot be connected with any other factor; because of difference in the form of expression; the expression that is used for enjoining a thing is different from that used for connecting it with a property; further, that which is enjoined is made known as something not already known; while what is meant to be connected with a property is only referred to as something already known. Now if a certain thing is spoken of only once, it could not be known as well as not known; so that if the 'ēkahāyanī' has been enjoined in regard to the Purchasing, it could be so only as something not already known; while if it were connected with the property signified by the term 'aruna', it could be so only as something already known.—There would be no such incongruities if the sentence were split up (one connecting the ēkahāyanī with Purchasing, and another connecting the ēkahāyanī with Redness); -in the Context itself there are several acts and substances spoken of by means of other sentences; and it is with them that what is enjoined in the latter of the two sentences (into which the first sentence has been split up) becomes connected; so that while it would be enjoined in one sentence, it would be referred to (for being connected with the other factors) in a different sense; in which case there would be no incongruity.

"From all this it follows that the Redness is connected with the entire Context, because it is equally connected with all and because there is no difference of Context".

In answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta—When the Substance and the Property serve the same purpose, they have the same function, and hence there should be restriction (Sū.): that is to say.

in a case where the Substance and the Property are spoken of as serving the same purpose, these two—the Substance and the Property—should be taken as restricted to one and the same thing;—why !—because they have the same function;—i.e. because the function of both is the same; i.e. in the case in question, the only function spoken of as belonging to the Substance (Ekahā-yanī) and the Property (Redness) is that they should be connected with the act of Purchasing.—How do you get at this idea ?—This is got at by taking the whole as 'one sentence'.—"How are they taken as 'one sentence'?"—The words—'arunayā-pinyāksyā-ēkahāyanyā' ['with the red, tawny-eyd, one-year-old']—do not convey any idea at all; as both the speaker and the person spoken to still need some other word to comprehend the meaning; when however the words 'Somam krivāti' ['he purchases the Soma'] are added, then the idea conveyed becomes completed; as with this addition both the speaker and the person spoken to find all that they need.

Objection—"In case the Substance and the Property serve the same purpose and have the same function, why cannot there be option [the two being treated as optional alternatives]?"

Reply—This cannot be right; as (in the first place) the argument,—that "the two things concerned fulfil the conditions of optional alternatives because of what has been declared (under Sütra 12. 3. 10) regarding 'things serving the same purpose being optional alternatives'",—has no force against us.—Why?—Because that alone is an effective objection which establishes the objector's own thesis and goes against that of his opponent; your objection (that the two should be treated as optional alternatives) does not go against our view,—our view being that Redness is connected with Purchasing.—(Secondly) there can be no option in this case, as the purposes served are diverse.

"But it has just been asserted that the purpose served is one and the same; so that what you assert now involves a self-contradiction. Then again, it has been explained (by the *Pūrvapaksin*, above) that the Property, being unsubstantial, cannot be connected with the Act; while what is said now is that the Substance and the Property serve the same purpose of accomplishing the *Purchase*,—which is contrary to that statement."

Our answer to the above is that there is no self-contradiction; nor is there any chance of the two being regarded as optional alternatives. It is true that the purpose served by both is one and the same; but there is difference in the efficiency of the two; the Substance helps the Act directly, while the Property helps the Act only indirectly, by qualifying and specifying the substances that help the Act.

"In that case the Property does not help in the accomplishment of the Act all; all that it does is to specify that (Substance) which accomplishes the Act."

It is not so; in the accomplishing of the Act, the efficiency of the Property lies in this that it specifies what does accomplish that Act; in fact the Act stands in need of the specification of the means of its accomplishment; the Property serves to specify that means of accomplishment as its distinguishing mark;—in the absence of such a mark, there could be no specification as to which one of the many possible things is the means of

accomplishing the particular Act; and in that case we could not determine how to accomplish the Act. It is in this way that Property becomes the means of accomplishing the Act.

Under these circumstances, the two (Substance and Property) cannot be regarded as optional alternatives.—To take an example, as between the Locus (Adhikarana) on the one hand and the Nominative and other Agents on the other,—the Locus contains (supports) the Nominative and other Agents,—until these latter are so supported, they cannot accomplish the act;—similarly the Nominative Agent brings together the Instrumental and other Agents;—and until these latter are so brought together, they cannot accomplish their respective functions. [So that though there are so many agencies at work in the accomplishing of an act, all these agencies cannot be regarded as optional alternatives.]—In fact, it is a case of option only where a second instrument is prescribed for the imparting of that very aid which can be imparted by an instrument already known; e.g. in the case of the sentences 'Vrihibhiryajatē' and 'Yavairyajēta', where both the wihi and the yava accord precisely the same help to the action by supplying the material for the Rice.

"Then it comes to this that the ēkahāyanī is enjoined (as a means to the Purchasing), and the property of Redness is a qualification of the ēkahāyanī; and this explanation will involve the same incongruity of a syntactical split."

We do not say that the term 'arunā' is connected with the term 'ākahāyanī'; what we say is that it is connected with the verb 'to purchasing chase',—the meaning of the sentence being that 'the act of purchasing should be accomplished by means of the Property of Redness';—now, according to this, the Agent has to make an effort by which the Purchasing could be accomplished by the Property of Redness;—but the Property cannot accomplish the act except by serving as a qualification for the Instrument whereby the act is directly accomplished; so that it follows as a matter of course that the Property becomes a qualification of that Instrument (in the present case, the Ēkahāyanī). For instance, when it is said that 'one should cook in a pot',—where the Pot is mentioned as a means of accomplishing the cooking, it is employed in holding (containing, the article to be cooked); similarly in the case in question also.—Thus there is no possibility of a syntactical split.

"Even so there would be syntactical split.—How?—In the text under consideration, there are several sentences, each complete in itself; just as in the case of the sentence 'Devadatta—Yajānādatta—Viṣnumitrāh bhojyantām' ['Devadatta, Yajānādatta and Viṣnumitra should be fed'], where the act of 'feeding' is meant to be complete in itself with reference to each of the three persons,—so also in the case of the sentence 'Yasya pitā pitānahah somam na pibēt, etc.' ['One whose father and grandfather have not drunk the Soma should perform the Vrātyapashuyāṇa'] [where the condition of 'the non-drinking of Soma' pertains to the Father and the Grandfather, each by himself];—similarly in the case in question, there would be two sentences, each complete in itself—'aruṇayā kriṇāti' and 'ēkahāyanyā kriṇāti' [and thus there would be a syntactical split]."

This argument is not subversive of our main thesis; for, even so, the redness is connected with the purchasing only, and not with the entire Context.

"True, the argument does not vitiate your main thesis; but (by your interpretation) it would be possible to have the purchase effected by an itehahāyanī which is not red, as also by a red animal which is not ēkahāyanī; and this militates against your thesis that there is 'restriction regarding the Substance and the Property' (Sütra 12)."

In that case, we shall assert that there is no syntactical split (involved in our explanation).-How so ?-Because what are enjoined are the Substance (Animal) and the Redness in reference to the Purchasing,-and not the Purchasing in reference to these two (Substance and Redness); and the Principal does not vary with each accessory; it is only the accessory that varies with each Principal. We have several instances where a sentence dealing with a large number of factors is taken as one complete unit dealing with all the factors taken collectively; e.g. the sentence 'Gargah shatam dandyantām' ('The Gargas should be fined a hundred'; where, though each member of the Garga community is meant to be fined, yet the sentence is taken as one complete unit dealing with them all in the aggregate),-and the sentence 'Abhisutya hutvā bhaksayanti' [where, though there are two distinct actions, of extracting the juice and pouring the libation, yet the two together are taken collectively as forming the antecedent of the action of eating 1.—Similarly in the case in question what is enjoined is the Purchasing as qualified by the two qualifying factors (of Redness and one-yearoldness) taken collectively [and thus there is no syntactical split].

"As a matter of fact, in each of the instances cited, the act enjoined is found to be such as is complete in regard to each of the individuals concerned; how then is it concluded that the sentence is one complete unit as dealing with all the individuals taken collectively, and not with each of them severally? [The Fine, for instance, serves to absolve the person fined, and hence it has to be repeated with each person of the Garga community; and the eating has to be preceded by each of the two acts mentioned as its antecedents.]"

Our answer to this is as follows:—In the case in question, the Substance (Animal) and the Redness are found to be connected with the act (Purchasing), and not connected with each other;—the Purchasing also is found to be qualified by both, the Animal and the Redness collectively, not one by one;—under the circumstances, if this sentence were taken as predicating the animal and the redness,—then the Purchasing would be undubtedly connected with each of the two factors severally; if, on the other hand, the animal as well as the redness be taken as enjoined with a view to enjoining the act of Purchasing, then this Purchasing would be as qualified by the one-year-old animal as by the property of Redness; so that the connection of both would have to be admitted. Further, what is meant to be brought about in this case is the Purchase, not the Animal and the Redness; as it is through this Purchase that the Soma, which is required as the material for the Jyotistoma sacrifice, is secured. As for the Animal and the Redness they would be desired to be brought about only if they

served the purposes of the Purchase, not otherwise.—From all this we conclude that what is enjoined is the Purchase, and this Purchase is qualified, not by each of the two factors severally [but by both collectively],—so that the sentence is a complete unit as dealing with both collectively. Such being the case, it follows that, with the exception of the one-year-old Animal, there is no other means of effecting the Purchase,—and that with the exception of Redness, there is nothing else to specify the means of effecting the Purchase,—so that this 'restriction' becomes duly established.

"What we have to urge against this is as follows:—If the Property (Redness) simply becomes connected with that by which the Purchase is effected, then, even on the split of the sentence, the Redness itself would remain a means of effecting the Purchase; so that it would not be necessary for this Redness to enter into the Animal as its qualification; under the circumstances, why is so much effort being made to treat the sentence as one composite whole?"

Our answer to this is as follows:—If the sentence is split up, then one Purchase becomes recognised as effected by means of the One-year-old Animal,—and another Purchase becomes recognised as effected by means of the Redness; and the Redness does not become predicated in reference to the same Purchase that is effected by means of the One-year-old Animal;—so that, if there is another Purchase effected by means of Redness, then, by implication, there should be something else also as a means of effecting the Purchase [as the mere property of Redness, by itself, cannot effect any thing]; and the property of Redness would, in that case, qualify this something else and become connected with it.—If, on the other hand, the whole sentence is taken as one composite whole, then all this becomes avoided.

Thus the only right conclusion is that 'when the Substance and the Property serve the same purpose, they have the same function, and hence there should be restriction' (Sū.).

ADHIKABANA (7): The Cleansing should be done to all the Grahas (Cups): No significance attaches to the Number.

SUTRA (13).

[Purvapakṣa]—" It is qualified by singleness, because singleness is directly mentioned."

Bhāşya.

[The general question of the employment of Accessories having been dealt with, we now proceed to consider the details regarding special cases.]

(a) There is the Jyotistoma sacrifice laid down in the text—'Ya ēvain-vidvān somēna yajatē, etc.' (Taitti. Sain. 3. 2. 2. 3.);—in connection with this sacrifice we read 'Dashāpavitrēna graham sammārṣti'.—(b) Similarly, in connection with the Agnihotra, we read 'Agnēstrnāni apachinoti'.—(c) Lastly, in connection with the Darsha-pūrnamāsa, we read 'Purodāsham par-yanni karoti' (Shata, Brā, 1, 2. 2. 13).

In connection with all these, there arises the question—Are the (a) cleansing, (b) the removing of straws, and (c) the taking round of the Fire to be done in connection with (a) only one Cup, (b) only one Fire, and (c) only one Cake,—or with (a) all Cups, (b) all Fires, and (c) all Cakes?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—"It should be understood to be done to (a) one Cup, (b) one Fire, and (c) one Cake.—Why?—Because of this being directly mentioned; that is to say, every one of these things has been mentioned by a word with the singular ending; it is only one thing that is found to be mentioned in these texts; and in regard to Acts for which the Word (Vedic text) is our sole means of knowledge, we must accept as authoritative whatever the Word says; e.g. when the Word says 'Pashum ālahhēta', what is sacrificed is a single animal and that a male one (as such is the signification of the word 'pashum' which is in the singular number and masculine gender). Similarly in the case in question, (a) one Cup is to be cleaned, (b) straws have to be removed from one Fire, and (c) Fire has to be taken round one Cake."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE ACT IS TO BE DONE TO ALL,

BECAUSE OF THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURE; THE

DISTINGUISHING FEATURE IS PRESENT

EQUALITY IN ALL.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the acts should be done to only one of the individual Cups (and Fires and Cakes); in reality, (a) all the Cups should be cleansed,

(b) straws should be removed from all the Fires, and (c) all Fire should be taken round one Cake.—Why?—Because the cleansing has been enjoined in connection with the substance characterised by the generic character 'Cup' as its distinguishing feature, and this distinguishing feature is equally present in all the individual cups; so that it cannot be understood which one vessel should be cleansed, and which should not be cleansed; so that inasmuch as we find the cleansing laid down in connection with the Cup in general, and as we do not find anything pointing to any particular Cup, it follows that the act is to be done to all the Cups.—Similarly with the Fires and the Cakes.

"But we find the singular number, which shall specify (the particular Cup to be washed)."

That cannot be; because what the singularity (denoted by the singular number in the word 'graham', 'cup') may do is to affirm the singularity with regard to the Cup (i.e. may denote the one Cup)—it cannot deny (i.e. exclude) the second and other Cups; as the singular number only affirms singularity, it does not deny (exclude) the second and the rest;—so that the second and the rest not being excluded, why should not the cleansing and other acts, which have been enjoined by means of words expressive of the Cup and other things in general—be done to all the individuals?

The following argument may be urged here against our view:—"When the singular number is used in reference to only one possible object (as in the text under consideration), what else could it do except excluding in regard to the second and the rest; i.e. if the singular number did not exclude the second and other objects, it would be entirely superfluous;—as a matter of fact, it is quite capable of excluding the second and other objects just as the sentence 'Ashvābhidhānimādattē' ('He holds the reins of the horse') excludes the reins of the Ass, so should there be exclusion in the present case also."

Our answer to this is that this cannot be; in the case cited, the connection between the Mantra and the Reins is laid down by-'Imamagrbhnan rashanāmṛtasya-ityashvābhidhānīmādattē (Tai. Sam. 5, 1, 2, 1,-where the connection between the Mantra and the Reins in general is expressed by the text of the Mantra itself-'Imāmagrbhnan rashanāmrtasya';-that the reins meant are to be of the Horse is not expressed by the Mantra (but by the additional sentence 'ityashvābhidhānīmādattē'); and as for the act of Holding itself, it is indicated by the words of the Mantra itself :so that in this case it is only right that there should be exclusion of the Mantra (from being used in the holding of the reins of the Ass). [The Tantravärtika-Trans., pp. 1007-1010-takes objection to this reasoning.] -In the case in question, on the other hand, the Singular Number that we find used in connection with the object (Cup), -even though present,cannot serve the purpose of exclusion, as it is itself not enjoined. For example, if one were to say, with reference to cooked rice- Whoever eats this rice, be it a dog or a cat, should be prevented',-if what is laid down as the condition (for prevention), is the eating of the rice, -and not the connection (presence) of dog or cat,-then the crow also, when coming to eat the rice, should be prevented; because, even though the Dog and the Cat are specially mentioned, the presence of these has not been laid down as the condition (for preventing). Similarly, in the case in question, as the connection of singleness has not been enjoined, even though this singleness is mentioned,—all the cups become connected (with the cleansing).

In fact, there is no word injunctive of the connection between the Object and Singleness.—"But there is the word 'sammärgi' ('cleanses')".—This word 'cleanses' does not lay down the connection between the Object and Singleness.—"What then does it lay down?"—It lays down the connection between the Object and the Cleansing; it is only when this is so that the text lays down what it directly expresses; otherwise it would be taken, on the basis of Syntactical Connection, as laying down what is expressed not by itself but by other words; and Syntactical Connection can function only when Direct Assertion is not there,—never when the Direct Assertion is there.—Thus it is that, not being enjoined as qualifying anything, the Singleness cannot serve the purpose of excluding the second and other cups, it would not be anything not-enjoined, or forbidden; because the Cleansing is actually predicated as much of the one as of the second and other cups.

Then again, there is the following difficulty also (in the Pūrvapakṣa view)—The Singleness (if enjoined) could not be restricted in regard to the Cleansing of the object; because the Cleansing cannot be the qualification of that object in regard to which the Singleness would be restricted; as the Cleansing is what is enjoined in this same sentence; it is not something enjoined elsewhere and only referred to (mentioned) here as the qualification of the object,—nor is it possible for the same thing to be enjoined and at the same time to be mentioned (referred to) as a qualification. A thing can specify (or qualify) another only when it is something of which the connections are well known already; but things like those in question, which are cognisable only by means of Vedic texts, cannot have their connections already known. As a matter of fact, however, the Cleansing is actually enjoined; hence it cannot serve as a qualification;—and if it is not a qualification, the Singleness cannot be regarded as restricted to the object.

"We shall say then that the Singleness is asserted in regard to the Washina."

Even so, there would be only two possible alternatives—either (a) the Singleness or (b) the Cleansing is the primary (predominant factor). As a matter of fact, however, both these alternatives are impossible. (a) Because the Cleansing cannot be done to the Singleness [and this would be the meaning if the Singleness is the predominant and Cleansing the subordinate factor]; nor does the Cleansing, when done to the Object, bring any benefit to the Singleness;—nor is there any need for any benefit to be brought to the Singleness; because (under the alternative proposed) the Singleness is not spoken of as the subordinate factor.—(b) "Well, we may regard the singleness as subordinate to the cleansing (the second alternative)."—That also is not possible.—"Why?"—Because it is unsubstantial (formless), and as such it cannot accomplish the Cleansing. Though there may be other formless things which accomplish actions by qualifying the means by which

those actions are accomplished,—yet it cannot be so in the present case of Singleness; because in the present case, it is not the Cup that is enjoined for the Cleansing; in fact, it is the Cleansing that is enjoined for the Cleansing is something that serves a distinctly useful purpose; and we have not got to assume a use for the Cleansing. If the Cup rendered any help to the Cleansing, then the Singleness, as helping (qualifying) that helper (Cup), could be taken to help the Cleansing also;—but as a matter of fact, this is not so.—For these reasons, there can be no connection between the Singleness and the Cleansing.

"The Cup, even though the predominant factor, does accomplish the Cleansing; so that by qualifying this act of Cleansing, as also the means of accomplishing this act, it would render help to it; just as the details of the Pranita-water performed over the curd and milk brought up for sacrificial purposes, help the cooking (of the rice), -or the details of the Sacrificial Post performed over the Paridhi brought up for the purposes of the Encircling, help in the tying (of the animal to the Paridhi). Thus then, what has been said is no answer (to the Pūrvapaksa-argument). is to say, in the first place, the capacity to accomplish the Cleansing belongs to the Cup, and hence it would be through this that the Singleness would help the Cleansing; and even though the Cup is the predominant factor, yet it would become the property of a subordinate object by becoming qualified by a property (e.g. Singleness) that is subordinate to the Action. It is not necessary that an accessory must rest upon an accessory; all that is necessary is that it should rest upon something that helps the Action and thereby helps its accomplishment.—Tantravārtika— Trans., p. 1013.7"

Our answer to the above is as follows:-We do not say that they do not help that which is not conducive to the accomplishment of the Action; what we do say is that when the Cup, which is the predominant factor, is mentioned as a qualification, then the Singleness has no connection either with the Cup, or with the Cleansing, Why? - Whenever anything is put forward as a qualification, there is certainly an agreement between the two: but such a thing is not laid down as something to be known.-"Why then is it put forward at all?"-It is put forward with a view to something else being enjoined for it; as for instance, in the case in question, the Cup is qualified (by Singleness), and the Cleansing is enjoined for it. In addition to this, if the connection with Singleness were another factor enjoined in regard to the Cup or the Cleansing, then there would be a split of the sentence, as there would be two connections predicated .- It might be argued that-"the cup having been qualified, what is enjoined in regard to it is connection with Singleness, not connection with Cleansing". - But in that case it will have to be admitted that the presence, in the text, of the word 'cleansing' would have to be regarded as a mis-reading; -which, in fact, it is not. Hence the conclusion is that neither of the two (the Cup or the Cleansing) has any connection with Singleness. Thus it is that Singleness renders no help either to the Cup or the Cleansing; and it has to be taken as only referred to. From all this it follows that Singleness is not intended to do anything at all, and that the Cleansing should be

done to all the Cups.—"Why so?"—Because it is equally connected with all and because there is no difference of Context.

Objection—"If no significance is meant to be attached to Singleness, then why is the Singular Number used? When several things were meant to be spoken of, the Plural Number should have been used."

Our answer to this is as follows:—We are not discussing here whether the Singular Number should be used or should not be used; what we are discussing is—when the Singular Number has been used, what should it be understood to mean?—Should it be taken to mean that the Cleansing should be done to one (Cup) or to all?—And it has been established that it should be done to all.—Then again, the signifying of the number is not the sole function of a case-ending;—what then?—it also signifies an active agency; so that, when it is not meant to signify the Singleness (Number), its presence would serve the purpose of signifying the active agency; so that it would not be entirely superfluous.

Lastly, in the word 'graham', the Cup is denoted by the noun-base (the term 'graham'), and Singleness is denoted by the case-ending (in 'graham').—"What if it is so?"—From this it follows that it is by Direct Assertion that the case-ending speaks of its connotation as subsisting in what is denoted by the noun-base.—"Even so, why should that (Singleness, denoted by the ease-ending) not be connected with Cleansing?"—If it were connected with, it could be so only through Syntactical Connection; and when a thing has become connected with one thing, by Direct Assertion, it cannot be separated from it and connected with another, through Syntactical Connection. Thus then, when the Cleansing is not connected with Singleness, there is nothing lost if it is not done as qualified by singleness. Nor is the Cleansing qualified by Singleness; it is enjoined only for the Cup;—why then should it not be done to the second or the third Cup?

SŪTRA (15).

THAT WHICH IS ENJOINED (OR PREDICATED) IS FOR THE SAKE OF SOMETHING ELSE; HENCE IT SHOULD BE TAKEN EXACTLY AS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT.

Bhāşya.

It has been argued by the Purvapakein above (towards the end of the Bhāṣya on Sū. 13) that—"as in the case of the sentence 'Pashumālabhēta', what is sacrificed is only one animal, and that also a male one,—so should it be in the case in question also".—The two cases however are not analogous; (a) There is this difference that in the present case the cleansing is for the Cup, while in the other case, the animal is for the sacrifice.—"What, if it is so?"—When anything qualifies that which is for the sacrifice, then it renders help to the sacrifice; as the sacrifice cannot be performed by means of anything which is not qualified (or specified); in the case in question, on the other hand, the cleansing is not to be done by the cup as qualified (or specified) y anything, which latter thing would qualify the cup and render help to the cleansing.—(b) Then again, in the case of the Animal, its singleness has been

enjoined in reference to the sacrifice.—"It has been asserted that it is by Direct Assertion that the case-ending expresses its connotation as subsisting in what is denoted by the noun-base (Bhā. Text, p. 229, line 1); while it is through Syntactical Connection that the singleness could be enjoined in regard to the sacrifice;—and Direct Assertion is stronger than Syntactical Connection;—all this has been asserted (by the Siddhāntin himself)."—True; in a case where the directly-expressed connection is meant to be expressed, it is as has been asserted; but in a case where such a connection is not meant to be expressed, what is learnt through Syntactical Connection cannot be rejected. It is for this reason that only one animal is sacrificed, that too a male. In the case in question, the singleness of the cup does not render any help to the cleansing, and hence it cannot qualify the cup. Hence it follows that no significance attaches to this singleness.

ADHIKARANA (8): There is no 'cleansing' of the 'Chamasacups': Exception to the foregoing Adhikarana.

SŪTRA (16).

[PČRVAPAKSA]—" BECAUSE THEY ARE OF THE NATURE OF A PURIFICATORY (PREPARATORY) ACT, THE ACCESSORY DETAILS (LIKE 'CLEANSING') SHOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED IN THEIR APPLICATION''.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotistoma* sacrifice, in connection with which we read—
'Dashāpavitrēņa graham sammārsti'; we have understood (from the foregoing Adhikuraṇa) that all the cups (grahas) are to be cleansed.—Now there arises the question—Are the Chamasas (Soma-cups) also to be washed or not?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapaksa:—"Chamasa-cups and all similar vessels are to be cleansed.—Why?—Because they are all equally connected and because there is no difference of Context. Just as the Graha-Cups are connected with a transcendental result, so are the Chamasa-cups also; and just as the Graha-Cups are mentioned in the Context, so are the Chamasa-cups also. Hence the Cleansing is to be done to all.

Objection—'What are specially named are the Graha-Cups, and these would exclude the Chamasa-cups.'

"Answer—The mention of the graha-cup may be taken as merely illustrative, standing for all Soma-cups; so that all those cups are to be cleansed which are of this nature that if the Soma-juice were not kept in them, there would be fear of its being thrown out.—[Read 'yasmin-naghyamānah', not kept;—as printed, the passage may be rendered as 'if the Soma-juice were kept in them there would be an idea that it is meant to be poured out '].—For example, when it is said 'dining time has arrived, wash the dishes', all those vessels are washed which are likely to be used at dinner,—and the 'dish' is taken as mentioned only by way of illustration; similarly should it be in the case in question also."

Says the Purvapakṣin's Opponent—In the world of ordinary experience, all activity is determined by some purpose or need; so that whatever thing may be there which, on being cleansed, would serve a useful purpose,—all that should be cleansed;—in the case of the Veda however, all action is determined by the words of the text,—and in the case in question, the words of the text speak of the cleansing of the graha-cup; and so long as the adopting of the directly-expressed meaning of the words is possible, why should the term 'graha' be taken in an indirect figurative sense (of all kinds of cuppe)?

Pürvapaksin—"Our answer to this is as follows:—What the word 'sammärsti' ('cleanses') can enjoin by direct signification is the agent's

activity towards the act of cleansing,—while the connection with the grahacups can be indicated only through Syntactical Connection;—and Direct Assertion is always more authoritative than Syntactical Connection. It is in this sense that connection with the graha-cup has been described as indirectly indicated, and not as directly asserted.—From all this it follows that every cup that is capable of the purification should be cleansed; and such accessory details as cleansing are not to be restricted to the grahacups only."

SÜTRA (17).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION, AS THE PARTICULAR OBJECT IS MENTIONED DIBECTLY, AND THE SCRIPTUBAL WORD IS THE SOLE AUTHORITY IN THESE MATTERS.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

In reality, the cleansing should be restricted to the Graha-Cups only, it could not apply to the Chamasa-cups .- Why? -Because the particular object is mentioned directly; the Graha-Cup is directly mentioned in the text; therefore it could not be left out (from being cleansed); for if it were left out, the direct Vedic text would be disobeyed; and it would follow that according to you, the presence of the word 'graham' in the text is a mistaken reading:-this would not be right. Hence the conclusion is that the text specifies the Graha-vessel by means of the term 'graham' and then enjoins the connection of the cleansing; but unless it enjoined the cleansing itself, the text could not enjoin the connection of the cleansing; hence the text must enjoin the cleansing itself .- This would not involve any disobeying of the Veda.—Why?—Because by means of the verb 'sammärsti' ('cleanses'), the Vedic text can enjoin the agent's activity towards the act of cleansing, -and it makes no difference whether the cleansing itself is brought about or it is only connected with something else; -so that there would be nothing repugnant to the Vedic text if the Graha-Cup were connected (with the cleansing); and hence it is only right that the cleansing should be restricted to the Graha-Cups only.

Objection—"Inasmuch as the connection of the transcendental result is equally present, and as there is no difference of Context—the cleansing should be applicable to the Chamasa-cups also, and its injunction should not be restricted to the Graha-Cups only;—as we have already explained above."

Answer—The Injunction (of the Chamssa-cups) could be possible only after all the objects mentioned in the text have been syntactically connected into a single sentence,—not until this syntactical connection has been made;—now such a syntactical connection with all the objects could only be inferred from the indications of the Context; while that of the Graha-Cups is directly perceived;—hence the Injunction cannot apply to the entire Context.

In the case of the connection between the cup and singleness (dealt with in the previous Adhikarana) it was found impossible for the text to enjoin that connection without abandoning what is directly expressed by it. So

that the case of the present Adhikarana is not analogous to the case of the injunction of the singleness of the cup.

It has been argued (by the Pūrvapaķsin) that—"Just as in the case of the expression 'wash the dishes', the term 'dishes' is taken to be indirectly indicative (of all those things that may be required at dinner-time), so in the present case also (the term 'graham' should be taken to be indicative of all cups)."—This argument has already been refuted by the assertion that in the world of ordinary experience all activity is determined by some purpose or need, while in the case of the Veda, it is determined entirely by the words of the text.

Adhikarana (9): The measure of 'seventeen cubits' appertains to the Sacrificial Post used at the 'Pashu-sacrifice'.

SŪTRA (18).

BEING OF NO USE IN THE PRIMARY, IT SHOULD APPERTAIN TO ITS SUBSIDIARIES.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

In connection with the $V\bar{a}jap\bar{v}ya$ sacrifice we read—' $Saptadash\bar{a}ratnir-v\bar{a}jap\bar{v}yasya$ $y\bar{u}pah$ ' ['The Sacrificial Post of the $V\bar{a}jap\bar{v}ya$ is seventeen cubits in height'].—In regard to this there arises the question—Does the measure of 'seventeen cubits' appertain to the upright vessel at the $V\bar{a}ja-p\bar{v}ya$ sacrifice,—or to the Sacrificial Post at the Pashu-sacrifice?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:-

"It appertains to the upright vessel.-Why ?-Because at the Vajapēya sacrifice, there is no Sacrificial Post at all; so that the measure can appertain only to that vessel used at the Vajapēya which resembles the Sacrificial Post: there is the vessel named 'shodashi', used at the Vājanēva, which resembles the Sacrificial Post in being 'made of Khadirawood' and in being upright; -if therefore the measure appertain to this vessel, then the term ' Vājapēya' retains its direct connotation; otherwise (in the other alternative), the term 'vājapēya' would have to be taken in its indirect sense, indicating the Pashu-sacrifice, which is a subsidiary of the Vājanēva-sacrifice.—' In your view also, the term sacrificial post has to be taken in the indirect sense, indicating the Upright Vessel.' - Our answer to this is that in either case we cannot entirely avoid recourse to indirect indication : in our view however there is this advantage that the connection of the Vājapēva, which forms the subject-matter of the Context, is retained; hence the measure should appertain to the Upright Vessel (which is used at the Vājapēya itself)."

In answer to the above, we have the following Siddhānta—Being of no use in the Primary, it should appertain to its subsidiaries (Su.)—The term vājapēya' signifies a particular form of Soma-sacrifice;—this sacrifice by itself has no use for the Sacrificial Post;—there is however a subsidiary of the Vājapēya-sacrifice, which is called the Pashu-sacrifice, whereat there is need for the Post, for the tying up of the animal.—Under these circumstances, if the measure of 'seventeen cubits' were taken as enjoined for the 'Post at the Vājapēya itself';—then, as there is no such Post,—the Injunction would be meaningless. In order therefore to save it from becoming meaningless, it should be taken as appertaining to the Post at the Pashusarifice. The name 'Post' could be applied to the Upright Vessel only figuratively (indirectly).—"But in the other view also, the name 'vājapēya'

could be applied to the Pashu-sacrifice only indirectly."—Not so, we reply. In our view, the term 'vājapēya' stands for the Vājapēya-sacrifice itself; only it will specify (qualify) the Post used at the Pashu-sacrifice; because this Post is of use to its subsidiary, the Pashu-sacrifice; and when one thing helps the subsidiary of another, it becomes related to this latter by direct relationship; and this relationship does not cease simply because it is interrupted (by the intervention of the said subsidiary). For instance, in the case of 'Devadatta's grandson', their relationship is interrupted by the intervention of the 'son', and yet the grandson is related to Devadatta by direct relationship.—Thus then it is our view of the case that should be accepted; as it does not involve the necessity of having recourse to 'indirect indication' in the case of any word at all.

Adhikarana (10): Acts like 'Abhikramana' (Stepping Forward) are subsidiary to the 'Prayūjas' only.

SŪTRA (19)

[PÜRVAPARŞA]—"AS REGARDS AN ACCESSORY PERTAINING TO THE PERFORMER,—INASMUCH AS IT DOES NOT FORM AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ACTION, THERE WOULD BE A SYNTACTICAL SPLIT [IF IT WERE CONNECTED WITH ANY PARTICULAR ACTION]."

Bhāsya.

[Subsidiaries i₃ the shape of purely Purificatory Acts, Substances and Accessories have been dealt with; we now proceed to consider those cases where an action, mentioned as related to another action, comes to be regarded as a purificatory act.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 1031.]

In the passage relating to the Prayājas which form part of the Darsha-pūrņamāsa sacrifices, we read—'Abhikrāmam jūkotyabhijityai' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 1. 4).—In connection with this sentence, there arises the question—Does this act of 'abhikramana' (Stepping Forward) find place in the Prayājas only 1—or in the (acts dealt with in the) entire Context?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:-

"As regards an accessory pertaining to the Performer,—what we say is that—there would be a syntactical split,—because one act does not form an integral part of another action. That is to say, the act of Stepping Forward is something unsubstantial (formless); hence it cannot help in the accomplishing of the act of 'Homa' (spoken of by the second term in the sentence, 'jühoti');—and hence it cannot be syntactically connected with it.—From which it follows that the said act of Stepping Forward should find place in the entire Context,—'because of its being equally connected with all and because there is no difference of context' (Sb. 8)."

Objection against the Pūrvapakṣa—'For the same reason that has been propounded (against the act of Stepping Forward appertaining to the act of Homa), the act in question could not find place in any other act mentioned in the Context.'

Answer (from the Pūrvapakṣin)—"In the case of other acts, the act in question would be connected with the Performers."

Opponent—'In the case of the Prayājas also, the said act is connected with the Performers.'

Pürvapaksin—"That is not so; what the term 'juhoti' is able to enjoin is only that activity of the Agent which tends towards the offering of Homa;—it cannot enjoin the connection between that Agent and the act of Stepping Forward."

Opponent—'In the case of the other acts of the Context also, there could

be no injunction of the connection of the Agent with the act of Stepping Forward.'

Pārvapakṣin—"That does not affect our position; in the case of the other acts, as they are all spoken of in the same Context, they are all recognised as subsidiaries (to the main Act); so that the text laying down the entire procedure would naturally include the injunction of the act of Stepping Forward also, which will thus find place in the entire Context."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT BEING COMPLETED WITH WHAT PRECEDES IT,
THE ACT IN QUESTION REMAINS INCOMPLETE; IT SHOULD
THEREFORE BE SYNTACTICALLY CONNECTED
(WITH THE PRAYĀJAS).

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to say that the act of Stepping Forward finds place in the entire Context; in fact, it can find place only in the Prayājas;—why?—because it is syntactically connected with these; because the sentence speaking of the act of Stepping Forward—'Abhikrāman jūhoti'—not completed with what precedes it, remains incomplete. And as Syntactical Connection (which connects the act with the Prayājas only) is more authoritative than Context (which connects it with the entire Context), the Act of Stepping Forward should find place in the Prayājas only.

Objection—"But it has been pointed out that the act of Stepping Forward, being unsubstantial (formless) is unable to help the accomplishment of the Homa."

Answer—It is true that by itself, the Stepping Forward is unable to help in the Homa; but it can help in its accomplishment when connected with the Performer.—How so?—By Stepping Forward, the Performer comes close to the Ahavaniya Fire;—and the Homa can be done in both ways—from a distance the Performer may extend his hand and pour the libation, or Stepping Forward, he may draw closer to the fire (and pour the libation without having to extend his hand). Thus it follows that the act of Stepping Forward helps the Homa; and hence it should find place in the Prayājas only.

ADHIKARANA (11): The 'Upavita' forms part of the entire 'Darsha-pūrnamāsa', in whose context it is mentioned.—[Exception to the preceding Adhikarana.]

SUTRA (21).

IN A DOUBTFUL CASE, THERE BEING AN INTERBUPTION, THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE SPLIT UP.

Bhāşya.

[The fact of one Act appertaining to another having been established, we now proceed to consider the question as to whether such appertaining is determined by the intermediate or the prime Context.—Transradritka—Trans., p. 1034.]

(a) In the seventh and eighth Anuvākas relating to the Darsha-pūrnamāsa, we find the Sāmidhēni verses mentioned;—(b) in the ninth, the Nivids;—(c) in the tenth, the mention of those Sāmidhēnis that are to be recited with a view to particular results, to the effect that 'if one desires such and such a result, one should recite so many Sāmidhēni verses', 'if he desires another result, he should recite so many' and so forth;—in the eleventh, the Yayñopavita (sacrificial clothing) is mentioned: 'Upavyayatē devalakṣmamēva tat kurutē' ['when one wears the Upavīta, he wears the sign of the gods'] (Tlaitti. Sam. 2. 5. 11. 1).

Now, in regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Upavita* to be worn only while one is reciting the *Sāmidhēnis*?—or should it be worn while one is performing all the various acts that have been laid down in the Context?

Question-" Why should such a question arise at all?"

Answer—The question arises because it is not already perceived whether the *Upavita* is mentioned in course of the (intermediate) context of the Samidhānis, or after the close of the context of the Samidhānis.

Question—"But as a matter of fact, the entire Context is of the Darshapūrnamāsa, and it is only in the context of the other acts (constituting the Darshapūrnamāsa) that the Sāmidhēnis are mentioned [so that there can be no context of the Sāmidhēnis ']."

Answer—It is true that the Sāmidhēnis are mentioned in the Context of something else (the Darsha-pūrņamāsa); yet of the Sāmidhēnis themselves, there is a distinct intermediate Context. The assertion 'Sāmidhēniranu-brūyāt' ('should recite the Sāmidhēni verses') remains incomplete (wanting something to complete it),—and it is on account of this incompleteness that what is mentioned in proximity to the assertion becomes recognised as pertaining to the said assertion.

Question—" Even so, how can the context of the $S\bar{a}midh\bar{e}n\bar{i}s$ be said to cease?"

Answer—It ceases because of the interruption caused by the mention of the Nivids (in the ninth anwalka, which comes between the seventh and eighth anwalkas dealing with the Sāmidhēnis, and the tenth anwalka mentioning the Sāmidhēni).

Question—"If that is so, then why should there arise the idea that the context of the Sāmidhēnis continues (even after the said interruption)?"

Answer—As a matter of fact, even after the texts dealing with the Nivids (ninth anwäka), we find mentioned the details connected with the Sāmidhēnīs themselves, relating to the recitation of those done with the desire for certain results (in the tenth anwāka); and it is after this latter section that (in the eleventh anwāka) the Upavīta is mentioned; so that the treatment of the Sāmidhēnīs continues all through up to the Upavīta; this is what gives rise to the idea that the Context of the Sāmidhēnīs does not cease (with the mention of the Nivids); so that it is the Nivids that appear in the midst of the context of the Sāmidhēnīs and do not intercept it; just as the presence of the Twelve Upasads which belong to the Ahīna sacrifices appear in the midst of the context of the Jyotistoma and yet do not interrupt this latter.—Thus it is that there arises the question (dealt with in the present Adhikarana).

On this question then, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—"The Upavita has been mentioned before the context of the Sāmidhēnis has ceased.—How so?—Because the mention of the Upavita follows immediately after the texts speaking of that recitation of the Sāmidhēnis which is done with a desire for certain results; so that the Upavita is spoken of while the Sāmidhēnis are still in our mind. It is only a particular manner of wearing the cloth by the performer that is called 'Upavita'; and there arises a question as to the act at the time of doing which the Performer is to wear the cloth in that manner;—and the texts speaking of the Sāmidhēni become syntactically connected with the text speaking of the Sāmidhēni and thus it is that we conclude that the word 'Upavyayatē' ('wears the Upavita') lays down the Upavita as to be worn at the time of the reciting of the Sāmidhēnī verses."

In answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—In regard to the question at issue, the conclusion cannot be as asserted by you. The conclusion on this question is that 'the sentence should be split up' (Sū.)—Why !—'Because there is interruption' (Sū.);—that is, at one end there is the sentence, complete in all its details, speaking of the Sāmidhēni,—and at the other end there is the sentence speaking of the Upavita,—and in between these two intervenes the text laying down the Nivids, which has no connection with the Sāmidhēni verses. In a case where, even on the completion of a sentence speaking of a certain thing, another subject connected with the same thing is introduced,—the context of that thing is not discontinued,—and that thing does present itself to the mind when anything related to it is mentioned. On the other hand, in a case where, on the completion of a sentence, another subject is introduced which is not connected with it in any way, then (the continuity of the Context having been broken up) the thing spoken of in the first sentence does not come to the

mind. What is not present in the mind cannot be syntactically connected; the meaning of a sentence is completed only when there is connection between two things present in the mind,—not when only one of them is present in the mind. In fact this (being present in the mind) is the purpose served by the juxtaposition of two sentences (meant to be syntactically connected); and the meaning of a sentence may be sought to be completed with the help of a thing cognised immediately after that sentence, only with a view to bring about a complex cognition taking in both the things concerned. As a matter of fact, there is no cognition of a thing spoken of immediately after the sentence, if it is spoken of by means of a word which is not connected with it. Thus there can be no syntactical connection between one sentence and another when there is an interruption between the two.

"It may be possible to recall the previously-cognised thing to the mind, by means of contemplation and other means,—and then to connect it with what comes after the interruption."

The meaning of the sentence in such a case could not be regarded as countenanced by the Veda; as it would have its source in human intelligence. In fact, if the meaning of a sentence were evolved by obtaining an idea of a previous object by means of contemplation,—it would be like the meaning of a sentence formed by taking the verb from one chapter and the noun from another.—Thus then we conclude that it is not possible to treat as 'one sentence' a passage the two parts of which are interrupted by something totally unconnected with them; consequently there can be no syntactical connection between the Upavita and the Sāmidhēnī verses.

"As a matter of fact, the *Upavita* is spoken of in close proximity to those optional *Sāmidhēnis* (recited for special purposes), which have been spoken of and cognised immediately before (the mention of the *Upavita*); and in this manner it would become connected with the *Sāmidhēni* verses."

Our answer is that this cannot be; the context of the Sāmidhēnie is past and gone, having been interrupted by the texts of the Nivids;—as for the subsequently-mentioned Sāmidhēni-options recited for special pur poses,—though these may be connected through syntactical connection (with the Upaviia), yet the context (of the Sāmidhēni) does not continue; because the mere mention of an alternative does not make the Sāmidhēni-verses the subject-matter of the Context; because they are not spoken of as to be 'recited',—all that is said is that they should be connected with certain numbers,—but that also through syntactical connection, not through Context. Thus then, the Sāmidhēni verses not continuing to be the subject-matter of the Context, if there is an accessory detail which cannot be syntactically connected with the Sāmidhēni verses, then that detail can have no connection with them.

From all this it follows as the established conclusion that the performer should wear the *Upavita* during the performance of all that is mentioned in the entire context (of the *Darsha-Pūrņamāsa*) (and *not* in connection with the *Sāmidhēnis* only).

ADHIKABANA (12): Vessels like the 'Vāraṇa' and the 'Vaikankata' appertain to all Sacrifices: (Exception to Adhikarana (9).)

SŪTRA (22).

Inasmuch as all subsidiaries are subservient to something else, and are equal in that respect,—there can be no connection among themselves.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

In connection with the Fire-laying Rite, Vāraṇa and Vaikaṅkata vessels are found mentioned,—some of which are for the purposes of the Homaoffering, while others are not for the purposes of the Homa-offering,—
in the following text:—'Tasmāt vāraṇo vai yajñāvacharaḥ syāt, na tvētēna
juhuyāt; raikaṅkato yajñāvacharaḥ syāt, juhuyādētēna'.—As a matter of
fact, however, these Vāraṇa and Vaikaṅkata vessels have no connection with
the Fire-laying Rite;—why?—because they are spoken of in the text as
'yajñāvachara', which means that these vessels belong to the sacrifice; and
the Fire-laying Rite is not a 'sacrifice', as there is no injunction of 'sacrifoing' in connection with it;—so that this Syntactical Connection sets aside
the indications of the Context (by which latter the vessels would be connected with the Fire-laying Rite).—Thus then (it being clear that they
belong, not to the Fire-laying Rite, but to some sacrificial performance), there
arises the question—Do these vessels find a place in the Pavamāna sacrifices
only? Or in all socrifices, the Darshapūramāsa and the rest.

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:-

"The vessels are to be used in connection of the offering-materials of the Pavamāna sacrifices.—Why?—It has been declared (in a previous adhikaraṇa) that a factor which is found to be inapplicable to the Principal is assumed to appertain to the Subsidiary; then, inasmuch as the Pavamāna offerings are mentioned in the context of the Fire-laying Rite, those offerings must be subsidiary to the Fire-laying Rite; hence the vessels in question (not being connectible with the Fire-laying Rite) should be connected with the Pavamāna offerings (which are subsidiary to that Rite)."

In answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—
All subsidiaries,—the Pavamāna offerings and also the Fire-laying Rite (which also is a subsidiary),—being equal, there can be no connection among themselves. That is, just as the Fire-laying is subsidiary to the Fire, as tending to sanctify it,—so also are the Pavamāna offerings subsidiary to the Fire; how then could there be any mutual connection between these?—As for the argument that, "the Pavamāna offerings are mentioned in the context of the Fire-laying Rite,"—though they are so mentioned, yet the Context becomes set aside by Syntactical Connection, which makes these offerings belong to the Fire.

"Which is the sentence (which, through Syntactical Connection, connects the Pavamāna offerings with the Fire)?"—

That sentence is "Yadāhavanīyē juhoti tēna so'syābhīṣṭaḥ prīto bhavati" [wherein the Āhavanīya Fire is clearly spoken of as the most predominant factor, to which other factors would be subsidiary.]

"But in this sentence the Ahavaniya Fire is spoken of as the substratum of the sacrifice [that into which the Pavanāna offerings are offered], and hence subsidiary to it."

True, the Ahavaniya Fire is the substratum (of the offerings); and yet the sacrifice in question (i.e., the Pavamāna-Işti) is one that is performed for the sake of the Ahavaniya Fire; as it is this Fire which serves a useful purpose, while the Pavamāna offerings serve no useful purpose.

"In what way are these such as serve no useful purpose?"

They are so regarded because no result is spoken of (as following from them).

"But the result may be assumed."

True, the result might be assumed; but this result can only be the sanotification of the Fire, not Heaven; for, if Heaven were assumed to be the result, two unseen factors would have to be assumed—viz: (1) the Heaven following from the Homa, and (2) the transcendental sanctification of the Homa by the Ahavaniya Fire.

From all this it follows that the Pawamāna-offerings are for the purpose of the Fire, and hence they can have no connection with the Fire-laying Rite; consequently, what is spoken of in connection with the Fire-laying Rite cannot belong to the Pawamāna-offerings,—it belongs to all the sacrifices, Darshapūrnamāsa and the rest, which are the 'Principal' for which the Fire-laying Rite is 'subsidiary.'

ADHIKARANA (13): The 'Vārtraghnī' and the other 'Anuvākyās' are subsidiary to the 'Ājyabhāgas': The Vārtraghnī-Nyāya.

SŪTRA (23).

Because the connection of the two mantras (with the Primary Act) serves no useful purpose [therefore they cannot appertain to the Primary.]

Bhāşya.

[We now proceed to consider those cases in which Mantras are employed in accordance with the order in which they happen to be mentioned.]

In connection with the Darsha-pūrnamāsa, we read—' Vāṛtraghnī paurṇamāsyām anūchyētē, yrdhawcatī amācāsyāyām.' [The two mantras named 'wārtraghnī' as referring to the killing of Vṛttra, and the two called 'wdhamcatī', as referring to increase, are given in the chapter on the mantras for the Hotr-priest.] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 2. 5)—In regard to this there arises the question—are the two Amurākyā mantras (the Vārtraghnī and the Vṛdhamcatī) to be used at the Primary Sacrifice? Or only in connection with the two Ajyabhāgas?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—"They should be used at the Primary Sacrifice;—why?—because they are found to be spoken of along with the 'Paurṇamāsi' and the 'Amāvāṣyā'; and it is these two, the Paurṇamāsi and the Amāvāṣyā,—and not the Ājyabhāgas—that constitute the Primary Sacrifice. Hence on the basis of direct Syntactical Connection, the two Mantras should be used at the Primary Sacrifice (of the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa)."

In answer to this Pūrvapaksa we have the following Siddhānta:-

The two Anuvākyā mantras together serve no useful purpose at the Primary Sacrifice. That the Anuvākyās are to have the character of 'Vārtuaghnī' and of 'Vṛdhanvatī' is laid down in connection with that act where there are two Anuvākyās to be used;—at the Primary Sacrifice, however, there is only one Anuvākyā;—under the circumstances, if the sentence in question were taken as laying down 'duality' in regard to that Anuvākyā, then there would be a syntactical split.—On the other hand, two Anuvākyā,—the Anvākyā and the Saumī—are already known as belonging to the two Ájya-bhāgas; hence, if the sentence in question were taken as laying down the character of 'Vārtraghnī' and of 'Vṛdhanvatī' in connection with the Ajyabhāgas,—then it would be laying down only this one factor (and not the duality also); and this it could easily do.

"Even if we take the sentence as laying down a detail pertaining to the Primary Sacrifice,—there would be two Anucākyās at the two primary sacrifices (the Darsha and the Pārnamāsa),—one pertaining to the Āgnēya and the other to the Agnisomiya—[so that there need be no difficulty regarding the injunction of the 'duality' and the consequent syntactical split,"

Answer—Of the two Vārtrāghni Anuvākyās, one is Āgnēyi and the other Saumī; similarly of the two Vrdhanvati Anuvākyās also.—Now it is the Āgnēyi one only—not the Saumī—which, if enjoined, could be connected with the Amāvāsyā sacrifice also, the Anuvākyā (connected with Soma, i.e., the Saumī) could be used only in connection with the offering to Agni-Soma; but the Anuvākyā which is connected with only one deity (Soma) could not serve any useful purpose at an act which concerns two deities (Agni and Soma).

Question—"But both the Anuvākyās (Āgnēyi and Saumī) would be connected with the offering to Agni-Soma."

Answer—As a matter of fact, a single sacrifice can have no use for two Answäkyä; the Answäkyä has been enjoined as 'upäääya' (something to be secured or used); and hence the singular number (in the word 'puronu-väkyäm' in the injunction 'Puronu-väkyämanväha' occurring in connection with Paurnamäsi sacrifice) must be regarded as significant; so that at the Paurnamäsi sacrifice also there could not be two Answäkyäs.

From all this it follows that the two Anuvākyās should be used in connection with the two Ājuabhāgas.

ADHIKABANA (14): Acts like 'Mustrkarana' appertain to the entire Context; [Exception to the preceding Adhikārana].

SŪTRA (24).

THE IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE IS NOT AUTHORITATIVELY EXPRESSIVE.

Bhäsya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma we read—(A) 'Musikaroti, vācham yachhhati, dikṣitumāvēdayati' ['Closes the fist, keeps silence, has himself referred to as the initiated person'],—and elsewhere (in connection with the Darsha-Pūrņamāsa) (B) 'Hastau avanēnakti, ulapārājim strņāti' ['Washes the hands, spreads the grass-bundle'].

In connection with this, there arises the question—(A) Do fist-closing and silence-keeping appertain only to the act of Addressing the sacrificer?—or to the entire Context?—Similarly, (B) Is the hand-washing for the purpose of spreading the grass? Or for doing all the acts spoken of in the Context?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapaksa:-

"The washing of the Hands is for the purpose of purifying the hands;—and the keeping of silence is for the purpose of sanctifying or preparing the person engaged in the performance who (being thus prepared by silence) becomes attentive when getting himself referred to as the 'initiated', and is also enabled to carry on the many details.—When the question arises as to the acts that are aided by such purification and preparation,—on seeking for information on this point, we are supplied with it by 'immediate sequence'; and this 'immediate sequence' [i.e. the fact of their being spoken of in immediate sequence to each other] makes it clear that the keeping of silence and the closing of the fist help, and appertain to, the Reference to the Initiated,—and the Washing of the Hand helps and appertains to the enreading of the grass.'

In answer to this Pūrvapaksa, we have the following Siddhānta:—The acts in question are related to all the acts spoken of in the Context.—
"Why?"—Because the sentences are distinct.—"How are the sentences distinct?"—The two sentences are distinct because they convey two distinct ideas. As it is, the verb 'āvēdayati' ('addresses') does not express the idea of 'for referring to the initiated' [and it will have to be taken in this sense, if the Pūrvapakṣa view is accepted];—nor does the verb 'stṛnāti' ('spreads') express the idea of 'for spreading' [and this is what it is made to, do in the Pūrvapakṣa];—as a matter of fact, the spreading is enjoined, as also the washing of hands;—similarly fist-closing and silence are enjoined, as also is Referring. So that (acc. to Sū. 22 above) there can be no mutual connection among these [i.e. between spreading and hand-washing, or between Addressing and Fist-closing or Silence].—Further, whenever a

sentence is incomplete (wanting in certain factors), mere 'immediate sequence' cannot be the ground for syntactically connecting it with any, thing.—From all this it follows that the details of the kind of those under consideration must appertain to the entire Context.

SŪTRA (25).

Also because the sentences are complete in themselves. $Bh\bar{a}sya$.

As a matter of fact, every one of the sentences is complete with its own words; all the sentences quoted are equally complete.—So that each pair of sentences convey two distinct ideas,—and when they are separated, each is complete in itself; and thus (both the conditions of 'different sentence' being fulfilled, acc. to Sū. 2. 1. 46-47), the sentences must be regarded as distinct.

Thus then, being equally connected with the entire context, and there being no difference of Context, the details in question should find place in the entire Context.

ADHIKABANA (15): The 'Chaturdhākarana' (Quartering) appertains to the 'Āgnēya' Cake only.

SŪTRA (26).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA] "THE SUBSIDIARY, CONNECTED WITH THE AUXILIARY
DETAIL, SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE COMMON TO ALL;
SPECIALLY AS THERE IS NO MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP
AMONG THEM."

Bhāsua.

In connection with the Darsha-pūrnamāsa, we read—' Agnēyam chatur-dhā karoti. ("Quarters the Āgnēya").'—In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this Quartering to be done to all the cakes—Āgnēya, Agnīṣomīya, Aindrāgna? Or to the Āgnēya only?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa—"The subsidiary—in the shape of the Quartering—connected with the auxiliary detail—in the shape of the Deity, Agni, in the word 'āgnēya'—should be understood to be common,—i.e. to be done also to the Agnisomiya and the Aindrāgna (not to the Āgnēya only).—Why so !—Because those two (Agnīsomiya and Aindrāgna) also are 'āgnēya', in the sense that Agni is their deity; because that which has for its deity Agni, as well as another (Soma or Indra) is also 'Āgnēya'; for instance, 'the mother of Dittha and Davittha' is 'the mother of Davittha' also; similarly in the case in question also ('that which has Agni and Indra, or Agni and Soma, for its deity') is also 'that which has Agni for its deity').

If there were no relationship between the $\bar{A}gn\bar{s}ya$ Cake and the $Agn\bar{s}son\bar{s}ya$ Cake, then the Quartering might have been restricted to the $\bar{A}gn\bar{s}ya$ conly;—as a matter of fact, there is mutual relationship between them;—hence there should be no restriction. Just as,—though the text states that 'the $Pr\bar{a}shitra$ is sliced out after severing the head of the $\bar{A}gn\bar{s}ya$ Cake', yet the $Pr\bar{a}shitra$ is actually sliced off from all the cakes,—similarly the Quartering also [though spoken of as to be done to the $\bar{A}gn\bar{s}ya$ only, should be done to all the cakes]."

SŪTRA (27).

[SIDDHÂNTA] IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION; BECAUSE THERE IS CONNECTION WITH THE OBJECT; ALSO BECAUSE THE INDICATIVE POWER IS CONNECTED ONLY WITH WHAT IS 'CAPABLE'; AS FOR THE MENTION OF THE ACCESSORY, IT COULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING [BOTH, ONLY IF THERE WERE NO CAKE

DEDICATED TO ONE ONLY.] Bhāṣya.

The particle 'vā', ('in reality') sets aside the Pūrvapakṣa.—The Quartering should be restricted to the Āgnēya only; it cannot be common to all.

-Why ?- 'because there is connection with the object': i.e. it is only what is dedicated to one deity (i.e. the Agneya only) which is really related to the 'object', i.e. to the deity 'Agni'; what is dedicated to two deities-the Aindragna or the Agnisomiya-is not so related to Agni.-Why so ?-In the case of the cake related to two deities (Soma and Agni, for instance), its dedication is done in terms containing the names of both the deities; and of this cake Agni is the deity only as accompanied by Soma, -not independently by itself:-that of which the deity is Agni along with Soma, cannot have the nominal affix (expressing the deific character) added (to the term 'agmi'); because only 'capable' terms take that affix, and what needs the help of another cannot be 'capable':-hence that word with the nominal affix which indicates the cake of which the deity is Agni by itself can never signify that which is dedicated to two deities. From all this it follows that the Quartering should be done to that alone which has been dedicated to Agni alone by itself :- because the nominal affix which signifies the deific character can be connected only through 'capability', and not where the terms concerned have no such 'capability'.

It has been argued by the Pūrvapakṣin that "the Quartering should be done to all the cakes, just as the slicing of the Prāshira is done out of all."—But in the case of the Prāshira it is only right that it should be so; as there is nothing (in the sentence quoted) to show that the slicing of the Prāshitra is to be done out of the Āgnēya.—"How then do you construe the sentence 'Āgnēyasm masslakam vibhajya prāshiramavadyati' [which clearly speaks of the slicing being done out of the Āgnēya]?"—The text quoted contains two sentences: (1) 'Prāshitram vadyati' (slices out the 'Prāshitra'), and (2) 'āgnēyasya masslakam vibhajya' ('after breaking the head of the Āgnēya'); so that what is understood to be expressed by this is that the Prāshitra is sliced out of the head of the Āgnēya,—that much is certain; but as regards the other cakes, it is uncertain (and indefinite) as to whether the slicing is to be done out of the head or from some other part of it. [Hence there is no similarity between this case and the case dealt with in the Adhi-karana—savs the Tantravārtika—Trans. p. 1051].

If there had been no cake dedicated to only one deity (Agns), then even that dedicated to two deities could have been admitted to be intended, with a view to save the sentence from becoming useless.

[This passage explains the last clause of the sūtra 'Lakṣaṇārthā guṇa-shruih'; the sense of this is that if there were no cake dedicated to Agni alone, then the word 'agni' could be taken as indicating both Agni and Soma; and the mention of the accessory 'Agni' would, in that case, serve the purpose of indicating both. As a matter of fact, however, there is a cake dedicated to Agni alone; hence the term 'agni' cannot be taken as standing for Agni and Soma;—hence the quartering should be done to the Āgneya only.—Tantwaārtika.—Trans. p. 1052.]

As regards the expression 'Dittha's mother', what has been urged is only right; because the motherhood is not such as extends over both; the lady is called 'Dittha's mother' simply because Dittha has been born of her, and no other condition is needed (for applying the name to her); the relationship of 'mother' therefore resting in the lady entirely, it is only right that

she should be spoken of as 'Dittha's mother'. [In the case of the Agnisomiya cake, on the other hand, the deific character does not rest in Agni alone by itself, it rests in Agni along with Soma; hence this cake cannot be called 'agniya'.]

End of Pāda (i) of Discourse III.

DISCOURSE III.

PADA II.

Adhikarana (1): The Mantras speaking of 'Lopping' are to be employed in what is directly expressed by them.

SŪTRA (1).

The subsidiary character of Mantras is based upon their capacity to express a certain meaning; therefore they should be employed in connection with their original (primary) meaning; specially as it is with that meaning that their connection is eternal (and inseparable).

Bhāsya.

[Other kinds of Accessories having been dealt with, we now proceed to deal with Mantras, which are employed in accordance with the indicative potency (linga) of the component words. This 'potency' of the mantras points sometimes to what is directly expressed by the words, and sometimes to what is only indirectly implied by them; the former being regarded as the 'primary meaning' and the latter the 'secondary meaning'. Hence in regard to the actual use of a mantra, there arises a doubt as to whether it should be used in accordance with its primary or its secondary meaning. The actual discussion of this topic is prefaced in the Bhāsya by a discussion regarding the possibility of the two kinds of meaning.]

The texts to be dealt with under this Adhikarana are all the Mantras;—
the one taken as typical is the mantra 'Varhirdēvasadanam dāmi' ('I am
lopping the grass which is the seat of the gods').

The question in regard to Mantras is—are they to be employed in connection with what is expressed by them primarily? or also in connection with what is indicated by them only secondarily?

Question-"What is the primary and what the secondary meaning?"

Answer—What is understood directly from the words (of the Mantra) is its prior or primary meaning; it is called 'mukhya' (primary) because it is like mukha (face, the most important part of the body). On the other hand, that which is deduced from the primary meaning, through some sort of relationship, is the posterior or secondary meaning, called 'jaghanya' (posterior) because it comes later (second), and hence is like the thigh (jaghana, which lies very much lower down); it is also called 'gauna' (secondary) because it is connected with a 'quana' property (of the primary meaning).

Objection—"If such be the explanation of the primary meaning,—then all meanings are primary; as every meaning is understood from the words; for example, the meaning of the word 'agni', as applied to the Fire in the

sentence 'agnih jvalati' ('Fire burns'), is 'understood from the word' exactly in the same manner as the meaning of the same word 'agni' as applied to the Boy, in the sentence 'Agnirmanavakah' ('The Boy is Agni'). (So that there is no difference in the character of these two meanings, which are the stock-examples of the Primary and the Secondary meanings.]--It might be added that-'That meaning which is understood from the word itself independently of qualifying adjuncts is the Primary meaning; while that which is derived from the word as accompanied by qualifying adjuncts is the Secondary meaning'.-This also will not be right; when the verbal form of a word is expressive of a meaning, that form of the word remains the same, whether it is accompanied or not accompanied by qualifying adjuncts; and so long as the cause (the expressive verbal form) is there, it is not possible for the effect (the expression of the meaning) not to be there .-'What if it is so?'-If it is so, then, it cannot be asserted that 'the secondary meaning is not expressed when the qualifying adjuncts are not there, and it is expressed when the adjuncts are there'. Nor can it be said that in the latter case what is expressed and understood is the meaning of the group (consisting of the main word and its adjuncts). Because the distinction among the meanings of words always depends upon affirmation and negation [i.e. if a meaning is expressed when a word is there, and is not expressed when it is not there, then that meaning is attributed to that word !-- 'But in the case in question (of the word and its adjuncts), what is understood is the meaning of a sentence (not of a word).'-This also is not possible; because there is no 'meaning of the sentence' apart from the meanings of the words as correlated together.—Thus then, you must accept the following conclusion—The term 'agni' is expressive of the Fire, and the same term 'agni' is expressive of the Boy; and hence there is no difference between the 'primary' and the 'secondary' meanings of a word.—It might be explained that—'that meaning which is well known is primary, while that which is only a little known is the secondary meaning',-This also will not be acceptable; 'being well known' is nothing more than being cognised, and as regards cognition, there is no difference between the two meanings.—It might be added that—'that is the Primary meaning in which sense the word is used in most cases, while that is the secondary meaning in which it is used in only a few cases'.—This also is not right; even when used in a few cases, the word could not express that meaning unless it had the capacity to do so; so that that meaning also is understood 'from the words', and as such must be regarded as the primary meaning."

Answer—There is a difference: as a matter of fact, the Boy is not understood from the word 'Agni'.—"How do you know that ''—It has been explained above that it is not right to attribute several meanings to one word.

Question—"Why then can it not be the other way (the Fire being the secondary and the Boy the primary meaning)?"

Answer—We find people comprehending Fire from the word 'Agni', without paying any heed to, or having any idea of, the Boy; but no one even comprehends the Boy from the word 'agni', except through the notion of Fire.—"Why is it so !"—As a matter of fact, the word 'fire'

is always applied to things that resemble Fire; that is why we find the word ceasing to apply to a thing that has ceased to resemble Fire;—what therefore makes the word 'agni' applicable to other things is the similarity to Fire;—and until we have the notion of Fire itself, there cannot be any notion of similarity to t;—from this it follows that what the word 'agni' is expressive of is the Fire, not the Boy; that is why its primary connotation consists of the Fire, not the Boy.

Similarly the word 'varhih' has its primary connotation in grass, not in what resembles grass.

Thus then, there being two kinds of meanings of words, it is only right that there should be a consideration of the question as to whether a certain word is to be taken in its primary or secondary signification.

On this question as relating to Mantras, we have the following Pūrvaraksa:-- 'The Mantra may be used in its primary as well as in its secondary sense.—Why?—Because both the meanings are equally capable of being expressed; for instance, both-grass and the thing resembling grass-are capable of being signified by the term 'Varhih' ('grass'), -the only difference being that the grass is signified directly, while the thing resembling grass is signified indirectly, through the grass. So that where the term 'varhih' is used as expressing something that helps in the Darshapurnamasa sacrifices, every one of those things should be understood by it that are capable of being signified by that term; as there is no ground for picking and choosing among them.—Further, if this view is accepted, then it is no longer necessary to transfer, from the Darshapurnamasa sacrifice, all those mantras that are addressed to Püsan [the transfer which has been considered necessary on the ground of there being no such deity as Pusan at the Darshapurnamāsa]; -this transference becomes unnecessary as the term 'pusan' bu indirect indication, stands for Agni, which is a deity at the Darshapurnamasa [and ex-hypothesis, what is indirectly indicated by the Mantras is as acceptable as what is directly expressed]."

In answer to the above, we have the following Siddhānta:—The Mantra is to be used in its primary, not in its secondary, sense.—Why?—Because both are not equally capable of being expressed. When a mantra is mentioned in a certain context, it is in its primary (direct) sense that it comes to be connected with the rest of the context; so that the idea comes to be that 'one should accomplish by this Mantra whatever one is capable of accomplishing by it'; it is found that the mantra is capable of helping the act by expressing its meaning (and thereby indicating certain accessory details in connection with that act);—it is however not capable of expressing what is only its indirect or secondary meaning;—hence it follows that it cannot be used in this secondary sense.

Objection—"The secondary meaning can be comprehended through the primary meaning".

True; but its purpose having been fulfilled by the expressing of the Primary meaning, there is no justification for its being used in its secondary sense. When it is used in its primary sense, its uselessness or meaninglessness becomes set aside;—and when the uselessness has been set aside, there is no more reason for admitting the secondary meaning; specially because the word cannot indicate its secondary meaning without having previously expressed its primary meaning. Thus, there being no justification for it, the mantra cannot be used in its secondary sense.

Further, for the signification of the secondary meaning,—which is based upon the capacity of the word,—there are various means (or methods): and 'capacity' is only a part of the word, as has been declared under Sütra 1. 4. 30, where it is said that 'the deducing of the conclusion may be based upon the capacity of things, because the capacity of things forms an integral part of things'. Under the circumstances, if the mantra were always used in accordance with its secondary meaning, then every other means would have to be rejected and there would be no authority for this.

"The fact of the mantra occurring in the Veda would be the requisite authority."

This fact has no power to set aside the other means.

"This same objection would apply to the case of the mantra being used according to its primary meaning."

Not so, we reply. If the mantra were not used even according to its primary meaning, then it would not help the Principal (Sacrifice) at all; and in that case, the very presence of the mantra in the Vedic text would be meaningless.—Thus there is a difference between the Primary and Secondary meanings.

Further, the man who employs the mantra in its secondary sense. should be asked .- For what purpose do you admit the signification of the Primary meaning at all ?—If he says that—"I do so, as otherwise, there could be no cognition of the secondary meaning,"-then the answer to him should be that there are other means also of getting at the secondary meaning.-Being thus pressed, he might say-"The cognition of the Primary meaning also is one of those means."-The Siddhantin should say in reply-In that case, the mantra cannot be always used in its secondary sense; because in a case where the Primary meaning is admitted for the purpose of getting at the secondary meaning,-it would come to this that the mantra would be used according to its primary meaning (which would have come in first).-What is wanted to be known for practical purposes is, not the expressive mantra, but the expressed meaning; so that if (in any case) there were need for what is sought to be got at indirectly from the words of the mantra (as its secondary meaning),-that could be got at through some other means (some other sentence),-and recourse need not be had to the mantra in question itself. If, on the other hand, there were need to get at some meaning from the mantra, then, that need would be fulfilled by the signification of the primary meaning itself, and in that case there would be all the less reason for using the Mantra in its secondary sense.—Thus it is established that, as between the Primary and the Secondary meaning, it is through the Primary meaning only that the Mantra should be used.

SŪTRA (2).

BEING SANCTIFICATORY IN CHARACTER, IT SHOULD NOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT IS NOT ENJOINED.

Bhāsya.

It has been argued by the Pūrvapakṣin that—"[if we accept the secondary meaning of mantras] there would be no need for transferring the mantras addressed to Pūṣan (from the Darshapūrnamāṣa, on the ground that Pūṣan is not a deity at this sacrifice)';—our answer to this is that, it is only right that there should be this transference of the Mantra in question;—the mantra is sanctificatory in character; and as such would be absolutely useless if the object to be sanctified were not there; consequently it is only right that it should be transferred to a place where it may serve a useful purpose; and there could be nothing objectionable in this.

ADHIKARANA (2): Mantras indicative of Indra are to be used in approaching the 'Gārhapatya' Fire—[Exception to the foregoing Adhikarana].

SŪTRA (3).

THE 'AINDRI' MANTRA SHOULD NOT BE USED ACCORDING TO ITS PRIMARY SIGNIFICATION,—BECAUSE THERE IS THE DISTINCT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

[This is an exception of the general law propounded in the preceding Adhikarana, that 'Mantras should be used according to their primary meaning.']

In connection with the 'Agni', we read—'Nivēshanah saṅgamanō varinām—ityaindryā gārhapatyamupatiṣhatē ['With the Aindri mantra—Nivēshanah saṅgamanō vasūnām—one worships the Gārhapatya Fire']. (Maitrā. Saṁ. 3. 2. 4).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the worshipping to be done of *Indra* or of the *Gārhapatya* Fire?

Objection—"Why should there be any such doubt, when there is the clear declaration to the effect that one should worship the Garhapatya."

Answer—When the worshipping is done with a certain mantra text, it is not mere worshipping that is meant to be done, but a 'sanctification' by means of words expressipe of glorification;—now as a matter of fact, the Aindri-Mantra (i.e. a mantra descriptive of Indra) could not, in any way, be expressive (and eulogistic) of Fire (Gārhapatya);—so that there might be a suspicion that the sentence 'Gārhapatyamupatishata' does not lay down the approaching (or worshipping) of the Gārhapatya Fire;—and yet there is no word in the sentence—either with the Instrumental or the Locative ending—which could express this latter idea. Hence a discussion becomes necessary for the purpose of getting at the right solution of the difficulty.

On the said question then, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa—"Through the force (of the words), it is the worshipping of Indra that is to be done with the Mantra; specially as the worshipping of the Gārhapatya Fire is something that cannot be done with it.—'How then is the Accusative ending (in 'gārhapatyam') to be explained?'—The Accusative ending is not meant to signify what is the most desired; it is meant to signify mere connection; or through the connection, the term 'gārhapatya' would qualify the act of worshipping; the sense of the injunction being that 'the worshipping qualified by the Gārhapatya Fire should be done to Indra'; and the Gārhapatya Fire would thus serve the purpose of specifying the place for that act (of worshipping Indra) which forms the primary signification of the Mantras."

In answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—
The 'Aindri mantra' should not be used according to this primary signification, because there is the distinct declaration. (Sū.).—It is not right that
the approaching should be done to Indra; in fact the Aindri mantra should
not be used according to its primary signification.—Why so?—Because
of the force of the 'distinct declaration',—i.e. the declaration in the shape
of the words 'Aindryā gārhapatyamupatishati' ['with the Aindri mantra
one approaches the Gārhapatya Fire']; where the Accusative ending points
to the Gārhapatya Fire as the predominant factor.—[As regards the
objections urged against this interpretation] what is there that a direct
Vedic declaration cannot do? In fact there is no burden too heavy for a
direct Vedic declaration.—Hence it follows that the worshipping to be done
is of the Gārhapatya Fire.

SŪTRA (4).

EVEN THOUGH THE CONNECTION (BETWEEN WORDS AND THEIR MEANINGS) IS NOT CREATED BY VERBAL DECLARATIONS, YET THERE WOULD BE INDICATION OF FIRE BY REASON OF COMMON PROPERTIES.

Bhāsya.

Objection—"It has been pointed out above that it is not possible for the worshipping of the Gārhaputya Fire to be done with the Aindri mantra."

It could be done on the strength of the direct declaration ('gārhapatyam unatisthatē'),

"Even a hundred direct declarations could not make this possible: in fact, by making the declaration that 'Fire is denoted by the term indra' one would be stultifying himself; as such a declaration would be like such absurd declarations as 'one should sprinkle with Fire ' one should light with water' .- Then again, the connection between the word and its meaning is not created by scriptural texts; in fact that connection is something eternal and is only learnt from ordinary usage; -as has been explained under Sūtra 1. 1. 5 .- 'The relationship of the word with its meaning is eternal'.-It might be argued that 'sometimes the connection between a word is actually created by verbal declarations, as is found in the case of such artificial names as Dēvadatta, Yajñadatta and the like' .- There may be some case where a verbal declaration lays down the connection (between a word and its meaning); but the sentence under consideration is not one laying down any such connection as that 'the term Indra is the name of the Garhapatya Fire.' Under the circumstances, how could the word 'indra', whose meaning is well known, be taken to signify that the Garhapatya Fire should be worshipped; -it is not possible for a word expressive of one thing to signify another. What can any direct declaration do in this matter ?"

Our answer to this is as follows:—Even though the connection is not created by verbal declarations, yet there would be indication of Fire by reason of common properties—(Sū.)—That is to say, even though the sentence under

consideration has not the efficiency to lay down the connection between a word and its meaning, yet it is possible to have the Garhapatya Fire spoken of by means of the term 'indra'; -how !-by reason of common properties; that is, the said indication (of Fire by the word 'indra') would be indirect; there are such indirect indications based upon the presence of common properties; for instance, in such expressions as 'The Boy is Fire', 'Dēvadatta is a lion'; -similarly, the term 'indra' could be applied to the Garhapatya Fire, which is not the God Indra (which is what is directly signified by the term 'indra'); but there is a point of resemblance between the Fire and the god Indra, -in the fact that the Garhapatya Fire helps in the accomplishment of the sacrifice, just as the god Indra does; or the point of resemblance may be that the term 'indra' is derived from the root 'indi' (to be supreme), - and the Garhapatya Fire also is supreme in regard to its own functions. Thus then, that (god) which is directly denoted by the term 'indra' would indicate the Garhapatya Fire through similarity, or though the common property of being supreme; -so that there would be no incongruity at all.

Adhikarana (3): Mantras expressive of 'calling' should be used in Calling.

SŪTRA (5).

[Purvapakṣa]—"So also in the case of the 'Calling',"

IF THIS BE URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE

NEXT SÖTRA].

Bhāsya.

[We have dealt with the general rule that Mantras are to be used in accordance with their primary meaning,—and also with an exception to this rule. We now proceed to consider which special cases come under the general rule and which under the exception.]

There are the Darsha-pūrnamāsa sacrifices, in connection with which we read — 'Haviskrt ēhi iti triravaghnam āhvayati' —In regard to this there arises the question—Is the mantra ('Haviskrt ēhi') enjoined in connection with the strikina ' or does the strikina indicate the time (for the Calling)?

Question—"In what way can the mantra be taken as enjoined in connection with the striking? And in what way can the striking indicate the time?"

Answer—If the sentence is construed as 'Haviskrt šhi-iti trih avaghnan ahvayati', then the manina should be taken as enjoned in connection with the striking [the meaning of the sentence being 'while striking with the mantra—O Preparer of offering-materials, come!—he calls'];—while if the construction is 'Trih avaghnan āhvayati—haviskrt šhiti', then the time (of calling) would be indicated (by the striking) [the meaning of the sentence being—'while striking, he calls—O Preparer of offering-materials, come!'.]

On the question here propounded, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa—"So also in the case of Calling (Sū.)—i.e. just as the Aindri mantra is enjoined in regard to the Gūrhapatya (as decided in the foregoing Adhikarana), so here also, the mantra is enjoined in regard to the striking. If this is done, then the Direct Assertion of the Veda becomes followed; while if the other construction were adopted, then it would be necessary to have recourse to indirect indication, and in that case the connection would be between the mantra and the time of striking, not between the mantra and the striking; so that the mention of 'calling' ('āhvayati') would become a mere reference; that the man should do the 'calling' having been learnt from other sources, the present text would mean that 'He who repeats the mantra—Havişkrt this—does the calling'; and under this interpretation, the mantra would have to be taken as indicating the striking, through some property [thus involving recourse to indirect indication].—From this it follows that the Mantra should not be used in calling."

SŪTRA (6).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT IS NOT SO; IT IS THE INJUNCTION OF TIME, [THE 'STRIKING'] HAVING BEEN ALREADY ENJOINED (ELSEWHERE).

Bhāsya.

It is not right to take the sentence as laying down the Manira in regard to the striking.—"What then is the right view to take ?"—The right view is that it should be taken as laying down the time.—"Why ?"—The sentence 'trih āhvayati' lays down the threefoldness of the calling:—if this same sentence were taken as laying down the mantra also, then, by reason of the sentence containing the injunction of more than one accessory detail, there would be a syntactical split. Hence the construction should not be as 'Haviskri thi iti avaghnam, etc.' ['while striking with the mantra Haviskri, etc.—he calls'],—it should be as 'avaghnan āhvayati' ['while striking he calls with the mantra'].

Objection—"In this construction also, the sentence would contain the injunction of the Mantra, and also of the Time,—so that there would be the same incongruity (of syntactical split)."

Answer—Not so; as a matter of fact, the Preparer of the Offering-materials has to be called at the time of the striking,—because her presence is needed at the time; so that in the sentence in question the connection of the calling is only referred to (not enjoined), and all that is enjoined is the threefold repetition [so that there is no syntactical split involved].

As for the argument that "the proposed interpretation involves the incongruity, that the word has to be taken as indirectly indicating the Time (which recourse to indirect indication cannot be right),"—our answer is that there is nothing wrong in this; because, in the first place, indirect indication is after all only an ordinary (secuiar) process [so that there is nothing inherently wrong in it];—and secondly, the Mantra, from its very form, is recognised as to be used for the calling (and as such needs no injunction);—so that the sentence in question contains only a reference to the Mantra;—as for the striking, that also is known to be already enjoined by another sentence [e.g. Vrihin avahanti, strikes the corn for threshing]:—so that in the sentence in question, the mention of this striking can very well be taken as indicating the time. From all this it follows that the Mantra is to be used in the calling.

SŪTRA (7).

BECAUSE THE PROPERTY IS NON-EXISTENT.

Bhāşya.

This sūtra has to be explained after supplying a few preliminary words (presenting the following argument from the Pūrvapakṣin)—"Why cannot the name 'haviṣkṛt' be taken as signifying the act of striking itself? As a matter of fact, the striking (of the corn, in the process of threshing) does tend to the preparing of the offering material, and as such it can be called 'haviṣkṛt' (Preparer of the offering material).—What would be gained by

this?—The advantage would be that the mantra 'Haviskri, etc.' in that case, by its very form, would be recognised as to be used at the striking; so that all that would be left to be enjoined by the sentence in question would be the threefold repetition; and thus there would be no syntactical split.'

The answer to this is given in the Sūtra—Because the property is non-existent;—the indirect indication of the act of striking (by the term 'haviskrt-cannot be possible. As a matter of fact, the act of striking cannot understand that it is being 'called'; so that any 'calling' of it would serve only an invisible (transcendental) purpose; while in the case of the sacrificer's wife (who, according to the Siddhānta, is the Haviskrt, Preparer of the offering materials), the 'calling' serves a visible purpose (the lady coming up actually helps in the performance).—For this reason also, the Mantra is not to be used in connection with the striking.

SŪTRA (8).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāsya.

There is an indicative text also (pointing to the same conclusion)-'Vägvai haviskrt vächamēva ētat āhvayati' (Cf. Shatapatha, Brā. 1, 1, 4, 11). [Where Vāk, speech, is spoken of as the 'Haviskrt']; as a matter of fact, there is no similarity between speech and the act of striking (which latter, according to the opponent is the Haviskrt); while between speech and the sacrificer's wife, there is a distinct similarity,—the wife is a female, and the word 'Vāk' (speech) also is of the Feminine Gender; the act of striking, on the other hand, is neither Feminine, nor Masculine, nor Neuter.—"For striking also there is a word in the Feminine Gender-in the shape of the word 'Kriya' (act)."-Our answer to this is that the word expressive of the act of striking is not always necessarily of the Feminine Gender; there is the word 'avaghāta' (which means striking), which is in the Masculine Gender: there is also the word 'Karma' (act), which is in the Neuter Gender .-Further, the similarity of the wife to the Vak is in her own form (the lady herself being a female), while that of the act of striking, is though a foreign element in the shape of the word expressive of that act.—For all these reasons, the Gender is more compatible if the wife (and not the striking) is regarded as the 'Haviskyt'.

SŪTRA (9).

LASTLY, IF THE SENTENCE WERE TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN THE MANTRA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'STRIKING',—IT WOULD BE REPUGNANT (TO OTHER INJUNCTIONS).

Bhāṣya.

If the Mantra in question were taken to be enjoined as to be used in connection with striking, it would be repugnant to other injunctions;—such as (a) 'Apahatam rakşa ityavahanti', (b) 'Apahatā yātudhānā ityavahanti', [where other mantras are distinctly enjoined as to be used in connection with

striking]. Now these injunctions would be disobeyed in the event of the mantra 'Havişkri čhi' being used in connection with the striking.—For this reason also, the striking should be taken as indicating the time (of the Calling), and the Mantra also should be taken as to be used in connection with the Calling.

Adhikarana (4): The Mantras speaking of acts like the 'Agniviharana' should be used in connection with those same acts.

SŪTRA (10).

So also with 'rising' and 'giving vent'.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma, we read—(a) 'Uttisthan anväha-agnā-dagnīn vihara'; and also 'Vratam krņuta—iti vācham visrjati' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 1, 4, 4).

In regard to these texts, there arises the question—Are the two mantras enjoined here in connection with the two acts of (a) rising and (b) giving vent to epech? Or are these acts mentioned only as indicating the time (for the repeating of the Mantras)?

The present Sūtra applies to the present case the principle arrived at in the foregoing Adhikarma; so that the Pūrvapakṣa of the previous Adhikarana should be the Pūrvapakṣa here, and the Siddhānta arrived at there should be accepted as the Siddhānta here also.

According to the Pūrvapaksa then, the meaning of the two sentences would be—(a) 'While rising with the mantra, Agnīdagnīn vihara he says', and (b) 'He gives vent to speech with the mantra, Vratam kṛnuta'.

According to the Siddhānta on the other hand,—inasmuch as the acts of rising and giving vent do not possess the qualifications mentioned in the mantras, the meaning of the two sentences should be—(a) 'While rising, he repeats the mantra Agnidagnin vihara', and (b) 'While repeating the mantra Vratam kṛṇula, he gives vent to speech'.

The Pürvapaksa interpretation is supported by Syntactical Connection, while the Siddhānta view is supported by Indicative Power [and Indicative Power is always more authoritative than Syntactical Connection].

(a) Even if the mantra 'Agnidagnin vihara' were somehow capable of expressing the act of rising, on the basis of the fact that Fire becomes brightened by the act of rising and it is the Fire that is 'carried over',—[so that the term 'agnid' in the mantra, literally meaning agnividhyate anëna, would signify the act of rising],—and (b) even if the mantra 'Vratam krauta' were somehow capable of expressing the act of giving vent to speech,—the repeating of the mantra could serve a transcendental purpose only; hence the two mantras cannot be regarded as meant to be repeated in connection with the acts of rising and giving vent respectively. [What is meant is that, inasmuch as Rising and Giving Vent do not possess the qualifications spoken of in the mantras, these latter could not be used in connection with those acts.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 1069.]

If the mantras were taken as to be used in connection with the acts of

Rising and Giving Vent,—this would set aside another Mantra which has been enjoined—viz. the mantra 'Yāh pashūnām ṛṣabho vāchah, etc.'

Lastly, if the mantras were enjoined in connection with the acts of Rising and Giving Vent, then they could serve a transcendental purpose only; on the other hand, if they were used as directions (addressed to the priests concerned), they would serve a visible purpose.

For these reasons, in this case, the right course would be to have recourse to indirect indication [and take the mantras as to be addressed to the priests at the time of 'rising' and 'giving vent to speech'].

ADHIKARANA (5): The 'Sūktavāka' Mantra is to be used in the 'Prastara-praharana', 'Throwing-in of the Grass-bundle'.

SŪTRA (11).

[PÖRVAPAKŞA]—"IN THE SÖKTAVÄKA-MANTRA THERE IS INJUNCTION OF TIME, AS IT IS SUBSERVIENT TO THE PURPOSES OF SOMETHING ELSE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Darsha-pūrņamāsa we read—'Sūktavākēna prastaram prakarati' (the mantra beginning with 'Idam dyāvāprithivi bhadramabhūt' (Tai. Brā. 3. 4. 10. 1) is called 'Sūktavāka'; a handful of kushagrass is called 'prastara'; its 'praharaņa' consists in its being thrown into the Fire].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the Sūklavāka enjoined in reference to the Throwing-in of the grass-bundle? or do we have here an indication of the time?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—"The sentence should be taken as indicating the time;—why?—because the Sūktwaka is for the purpose of pointing out the Deity, and as such cannot have any connection with the Throwing-in of the Grass-bundle,—and the grass-bundle is for the purpose of being used as a receptacle for the Sruks (ladles); [so that this also can have no connection with the Sūklavāka;—and thus the two being independent of one another, neither of them could be treated as an auxiliary to the other.]"

SŪTRA (12).

[Siddhanta — In reality, the sentence should be taken as an injunction (of the mantra in reference to the throwingin); because the name 'yājyā' could not be applied to the mantra haphazardly—(without reason).

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The sentence should be taken as an injunction of the mantra (Sūktavāka) in reference to the Throwing-in of the grass-bundle; it is only when this is done that the meaning comes to be what is actually declared through Direct Assertion, by the Instrumental ending in the word 'Sūktavākāra';—if the sentence were taken in any other sense, it would involve indirect indication,—the meaning being that 'one should throw-in the grass-bundle at the time indicated by the Sūktavāka'.—Further, it is only when the sentence is taken as enjoining the mantra in reference to the Throwing-in of the grass-bundle that the name 'Yājyā' becomes applicable to the Sūktavāka;

for the Sūktavāka can be 'Yājyā' (a sacrificial auxiliary) only if it is to be used in connection with an offering, and in the case in question the grass-bundle is an offering (that is thrown into the fire with the Sūktavāka-mantra).

SŪTRA (13).

As for the pointing out of the Deities, the mantra serves that purpose also, by reason of the connection of those deities (with the act of 'offering').

Bhāsua.

It has been argued (by the Pūrvapaksin) that the Sūktavāka is capable of pointing to the deity, not of being used in connection with the "Throwingin of the grass-bundle" .- Our answer to this is as follows :- It is not impossible for the mantra pointing to a deity to be used in connection with the Throwing-in; the Throwing-in is a form of sacrifice, and the Deity of that sacrifice is pointed out by the mantra; -so that the connection between the two is clear .- As a matter of fact, we find that the actual words of the mantra-' Agniridam havirajusatāvīvrdhata', (Taitti. Brā. 3. 5. 10. 2: Shata. Brā. 1. 9. 1. 9) mention the deity Agni;—then come the words 'āshāstë'uam uaiamanah' (Taitti, Bra. 3, 5, 10, 4; Shata, Bra. 1, 3, 1, 12), which go on to mention the several things that the sacrificer hopes for, and then concludes-'yadanēna havisā āshāste tadasya syāt' (Shata. Brā. 1.9.1.16);-these words point to the grass-bundle as the offering-material and Agni and the rest as the particular deities of the offering; thus (by virtue of this connection between the deities and the grass-bundle) the throwing-in (of the Bundle) becomes an act of sacrifice; and hence it is quite possible for the grass-bundle to be 'thrown-in' (i.e. offered in sacrifice) with the Sūkta-vāka-mantra.—if the act of 'throwing-in' is a sacrifice and of this sacrifice Agni and the rest are the deities.-Thus even when the Sūktavāka is connected with the act of Throwing-in, it is quite possible for it to serve the purposes of the Deity.—If there were only the words 'agniridam havirajusatāvīvrdhata'. and the other words 'ashaste 'yam yajamanah', etc. were not there,-then the sentence would have ended with the declaration that 'Agni and the other deities are to be sacrificed to', without any other desired factor; as, however, there are the other words also - 'āshāste 'yam yajamānah', etc. - the full meaning of the sentence comes to be that 'Agni and other deities are sacrificed to with Cake and other substances,—and that whatever else the sacrificer desires, he would obtain by means of the grass-bundle (thrownin).*

^{*} The sense of this is that, even before the words 'Sūktavākāna prastaram praharati', it is found that a portion of the Sūktavāka-mantra itself is capable of connecting it with the offering in question. Though the indicative power of the mantra is equally applicable to all kinds of offering-materials, yet, on the strength of the Direct Assertion in question, the words 'yadanāna havieā, etc.' must be taken as referring to the grass-bundle.—Or it may be that from the very beginning, the word 'idam' refers to the grass-bundle; for the simple reason

Objection—"Even though all these words are there, the sentence should be taken as ending in the pointing out of the Deities,—the meaning being that 'Agni and the other deities have been sacrificed to with Cake and other things,—and from this same act the Sacrificer would obtain whatever else he may desire, in the shape of longevity and the like '."

Answer.—If the mantra is connected both ways (with the act of Throwing-in and with the pointing out of the deity), it should be used in connection with the act of Throwing-in, and this would not interfere with the indicative power of the mantra (pointing out the deity), and it would also be compatible with the indications of Syntactical Connection.

Or, we may take the words' Agniridam havirajusata' as referring to the grass-bundle itself as the 'havih' (offering-material); so that the pronoun 'idam', which refers to the factor in close proximity to it, becomes quite compatible.

SŪTRA (14).

"THE ACTION IS OF THE NATURE OF 'DISPOSAL' [HENCE THE MANTRA COULD NOT BE AN AUXILIABY TO IT],"—IF THIS BE URGED, [THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT] LIKE THE 'SVIŞTAKRT' OFFERING, IT COULD BE THE SANCITETICATION OF BOTH.

[This sūtra has been taken as two separate Sūtras in the Tantravūrtika where it is remarked that this splitting up of the Sūtra into two has been indicated by all old teachers.]

Bhāşya.

The following argument might be urged (by the Opponent)—"The grass-bundle having been used for the depositing of the Sruks, the act of throwing it in would be of the nature of 'disposal' [and hence neither the mantra nor the deities could be auxiliary to it]."

The answer to this is that it would be like the Swiştakrt;—that is to say, in the case of the Swiştakrt, it is found that out of the Cake that has been used at the (Darshapūrṇamāsa) sacrifice, the Swiştakrt-offering is made, on the strength of the injunction to that effect;—and this Swiştakrt offering is of the nature of a 'sacrifice', as well as of the nature of the 'disposal' of the Cake-remnant;—similarly in the case in question, by the offering of the 'grass-bundle', there would be a 'disposal' of the bundle that has been used, as well as an act of 'sacrifice' would be accomplished. So that there is nothing incongruous in the Siddhānta view. In fact, when a substance is 'disposed of', then also there is a 'giving away' (offering);—so that it follows that the substance is directly 'disposed of', and at the same time an act of 'sacrifice' is accomplished, on the strength of the distinct injunction ('Prastaram praharata').—Thus then, we conclude that the

that the other materials—Cake and the rest—are not there at the time.—Thus there can be nothing incongruous in the Saktavaka being used in connection with the Throwing-in of the grass-bundle.—Tantavavartika—Trans., pp. 1075-1076.

 $S\bar{u}ktav\bar{u}ka$ is the mantra to be used in connection with the act of 'Throwing-in'.

[Kumārila suggests two other interpretations of the Sūtra--for which see $Tantrav\bar{a}rtika$ —Trans., pp. 1076-1077.]

Adhikarana (6): The Sūktavāka-mantras are to be used in accordance with their significations.

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE ENTIRE SET OF SŪKTAVĀKA-MANTRAS IS TO BE USED AT BOTH THE SACRIFICES; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED AS ONE COMPOSITE WHOLE."

Bhāşya.

In connection with the Darshapūrnamāsa, we read—'Sūktavākēna prastaram praharati' ['With the sūktavāka, he throws-in the grass-bundle'].

—In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the entire Sūktavāka to be used at the Paurnamāsi sacrifice', and the entire one again at the Amāvāsyā sacrifice? Or, are parts of it to be extracted and used according to the signification of each mantra (composing the Sūktavāka)?

On this, we have the Pūrapakṣa stated in the Sūtra—"The entire set is to be used at both the sacrifices;—why so?—because it is the entire body of the particular mantras that is named 'sūktavāka'; so that if even a single word were omitted, it would cease to be 'sūktavāka',—and the act of Throwing-in done in that case would not have been done 'with the sūktavāka'.—Hence the entire Sūktavāka should be taken as to be used at both the sacrifices."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY, THE MANTBAS SHOULD BE USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR SIGNIFICATION; BECAUSE THEY ARE SANCTIFICATORY OF WHAT IS AN AUXILIARY.

Bhāşya.

Those mantra-texts that indicate the deities of the Paurnamāsi sacrifice should be used at the Paurnamāsi sacrifice,—not at the Amāvāsyā sacrifice, similarly, those that indicate the deities of the Amāvāsyā sacrifice should be used at the Amāvāsyā sacrifice,—not at the Paurnamāsi sacrifice;—It has been explained (under 3. 2. 2) that Mantras help in the sacrifice only by 'sanctifying' something that is auxiliary to that sacrifice—not in any other way; hence mantras should be used only at that sacrifice to which they render such a help. Consequently it is not right that the entire set of 'sūktavāka' mantras should be used at the Paurnamāsī sacrifice, or that the entire set should be used at the Amāvāsyā sacrifice.

SŪTRA (17).

IF IT BE URGED THAT "ON THE STRENGTH OF THE INJUNCTION

[THE WHOLE SHOULD BE USED AT BOTH]"—[THEN THE

ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING SÜTRA].

Bhāşya.

There is the following argument of the Pūrvapakṣin—"There is the injunction in the form that 'one throws in the grass-bundle with the Sūktavāka'; and even if a single word were omitted in the mantras, the Throwing in would not be done 'with the Sūktavāka', as what has been enjoined is the use of the entire set of the Sūktavāka."—The answer to this is given in the following Sūtra:—

SŪTRA (18).

THE TERM 'ENTIRE' IS IN REFERENCE TO BOTH (SACRIFICES) TAKEN TOGETHER; AS THE CONTEXT (OF BOTH) IS THE SAME.

Bhāşya.

The term 'entire' (when used in the expression 'the entire Sūktavāka should be used') must be taken in reference to what is done at the Paurņamāsī and the Amāvāsyā taken together,—because the context belongs to both these sacrifices; so that when the Sūktavāka is used at both together,—in parts (one part at the Paurņamāsī and another at the Amāvāsyā)—the entire Sūktavāka becomes used.

Objection (to this presentation of the Siddhanta)-"This explanation is not right: factors dependent upon something else (and hence incomplete in themselves) cannot have any connection with the procedure (of a sacrifice); in fact, it is not the Procedure that is declared (in the Vedic texts) as to be qualified by those factors; it is those factors themselves that are taken as qualified by the Procedure.-Why so ?-Because Actions are not enjoined in reference to the Procedure: they are enjoined in reference to the Result: the Procedure itself is enjoined in reference to the Actions. Now, as the entire Procedure is equally circumstanced (in reference to the Actions composing the Darshapurnamasa), it cannot be understood which part of the Procedure is enjoined in reference to which particular Action, and is not enjoined in reference to which other.—Thus then, (a) because all (the mantras of the Sūktavāka) have been laid down as helping the action,-(b) because the entire Procedure is equally circumstanced in relation to the action, -(c) because there is the direct declaration ('with the Sūktavāka, he throws-in the grass-bundle'),-(d) because the indication of the Context is equally applicable to all,-the entire Context belongs to each of the actions concerned, as taken independently by itself, not as along with the other action. Consequently, it follows that the entire Sūktavāka has been enjoined in reference to each of the actions (composing the Darshapūrnamāsa); so that even if the two primary actions (the Paurnamāsi sacrifice and the Amāvāsyā sacrifice) are separated, it is the Sūktavāka in its entirety that has to be used at each of them.—Hence even those words (of the Sūktavāka·mantra texts) that have no bearing upon either of those sacrifices have got to be used, and (though having no direct visible bearing upon the action) they would serve some sort of a transcendental purpose;—all this is on the strength of the injunction that one should throwin the grass-bundle with the Sūktavāka-mantra'; certainly no burden can be too heavy for a Vedic Injunction. In fact, even those words may, through some quality or the other, serve the purpose of indicating the deities (pertaining to the sacrifice concerned)."

In regard to this last assertion, what we have to say is that it is not right. It has already been explained (under 3. 2. 1), that Mantrus have to be used according to their direct meaning, not according to their indirect meaning. Being meant, as they are, to be sanctificatory, they may have to be moved away from their Context, but they cannot be taken as making any indications indirectly (through the presence of some quality).

"What answer have you got to the arguments that have been set forth in support of the view that the entire Suktavaka should be used at each of the two sacrifices?'

Our answer is as follows:-The entire Sūktavāka is not one sentence; it consists, in fact, of many sentences; of these, those sentences that speak of the principal deities appear in the middle, while of those other words that are such as are applicable in common to several sentences, some appear before and some after the aforesaid sentences (speaking of the principal deities).-For instance, sentences speaking of the principal deities are the following-(a) 'Agniridam havirajusatāvīvrdhata maho jyāyokrta (Taitti. Brā. 3. 5. 10. 2),—(b) 'Agnīsomāvidam havirajusētāmavīvydhētām'; now the common words preceding each of these mantras are 'Idam dyavaprithivi, etc.', and those coming after each are 'asyamrdhet, etc.'-Now every one of these sentences is entitled to be called 'Sūktavāka', because it contains a good-declaration (sūkta-vachana) [in that it indicates deities]; and nothing useful is spoken of by all the sentences taken as one composite whole. Hence this composite whole cannot be regarded as 'Sūktavāka'. Nor is any such composite whole directly helpful in the sacrifice. As for the singular number used,-in such expressions as 'Sūktavāko vartatē',-it is due to the fact that all the Sūktavākas form a single class or group, which is one only; hence the injunction that 'one should throw-in the grass-bundle with the Süktaväka' would be strictly obeyed if the grass-bundle were thrown-in with any one of the said several Sūktavākas. Thus it is that there is no Sūktavāka consisting of a composite whole (made up of the several sentences) .- Under the circumstances, if those words which speak of the deities of the Amavasya sacrifice are not used at the Paurnamasi sacrifice, the Sūktavāka itself does not become rejected by that omission; as in this case what happens is that what is indicated by the Context is set aside by what is indicated by the Indicative power (of the Mantras); and it is only right that this should be so.

From all this it follows that the Sūktavāka should be split up and then used at the Paurnamāsi sacrifice and at the Amāvāsyā sacrifice.

[Kumārila is not satisfied with this presentation of the Siddhānta; he has suggested another and a simpler exposition; for which see Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 1083–1085.]

Adhikarana (7): The Kāmya 'yājyā-anuvākyās' are to be used only at those sacrifices that are declared to be conducive to the fulfilment of definite desirable results.

SŪTRA (19).

On account of 'Indicative Power', 'Order of Sequence' and 'Name', the injunction in question should be taken as related to the sacrifices declared to be conducive to desirable results.

Bhāsya.

There is a section of the Veda wherein the Kāmay Xājyā-Anuvākyās—consisting of the verses 'Indrāgnī rochanā divah', etc. (Mai. Sam. 4. 10. 4)—'Indrāgnīnavatim purah, etc.' (Mai. Sam. 4. 10. 5)—'Shlathadvṛtiram, etc.' (Mai. Sam. 4. 10. 5, also Kātha. Sam. 4. 10. 5)—'Shlathadvṛtiram, etc.' (Mai. Sam. 4. 10. 5, also Kātha. Sam. 4. 10. 5, and so forth—appear in a certain order.—Then we have certain Kāmya sacrīfices also (mentioned in a definite order)—such as—(a) 'Aindrāgnamēkādashakapalam nirvapēt yasya sajātā viyāyuh', (b).' Aindragnamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt bhrātryovām', (c)' Agnayē wishvānarāya dvādashakapālam nīrvapēt rukkāmah', (d)' Agnayē wishvānarāya dvādashakapālam nīrvapēt sapatnamabhidrogyan', and so forth.

Now, in connection with the said $Y\bar{\alpha}jy\bar{a}$ -Anuvākyās, there arises the question—Is the couplet of $Y\bar{\alpha}jy\bar{a}$ nuvakyās connected with the name of the deity Indra-Agni to be used in connection with all those sacrifices that are offered to that deity Indra-Agni? Or only at the one particular sacrifice to Indra-Agni which has been enjoined in the sentence just quoted (a)?—Similarly with the $Y\bar{\alpha}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}s$ connected with the deity $Vaishv\bar{a}nara$.

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:--

"The Yājyā-Anwākyās are to be used at every one of those sacrifices that are connected with the deities, Indra-Agni, Voishvānara, Agni-Soma or Jātavedāsa.—Why so?—Because of the indicative potency of the Mantras concerned.—But the Order of Sequence and the Name would restrict the Yājyā-Anwākyās to sacrifices to particular deities.—True; but even so, Indicative Power would always reject the indications of Order and Name."

Against this Pārvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—On account of 'Indicative Power', 'Order of Sequence' and 'Name', the Yājyā-Anwākyās in question should be used in connection with those same Kāmŋa sacrifices which are mentioned in the texts quoted;—the 'indicative power' and the 'order' of the Yājyā-Anwākyās are the same as those of the said sacrifices; from which it follows that they are auxiliaries to these same sacrifices.

[&]quot;But it has been pointed out that Indicative Power is more authorita-

tive (than Order and the rest; and the Indicative Power of the mantras connects them with all the sacrifices, not only with the Kāmya ones)."

That is true; but in the case in question what is more authoritative is the Name; except through the indication of the 'Name', the Mantras cannot be held to apply to the $K\bar{a}mya$ sacrifices, and not to the sacrifices mentioned alsowhere.—Why?—Except through the names (' $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ ' and ' $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$ '), we cannot recognise even the fact of the mantras being $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$ '), we cannot recognise even the fact of the mantras being $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$ ') and the verses are for), how could the $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$ ') itself indicates that it is only the $K\bar{a}mya$ mantras—and not all verses—that can be recognised as ' $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$ '. If no heed is paid to the Name, then the Mantras are not $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$; if heed is paid to the Name, then the Mantras are not $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$; if heed is paid to the Name, then the Mantras are not $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$; if heed is paid to the Name, then the Mantras are not $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$; if heed is paid to the Name, then the Mantras are not $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$ - $Anuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$; if heed is paid to the section in which the mantras appear is called the ' $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}nuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$ - $X\bar{a}nuv\bar{a}ky\bar{a}$.

Question—"Why does the Sūtra speak of both—(1) Indicative Power and Order, and also (2) Name?" ["The fact of the mantras being connected with the Kāmya sacrifices is proved by Indicative Power helped by Order; or the very Name only is enough to prove the same conclusion. Why then should both have been put forward?—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 1087]".

Answer—There are such sacrifices as the (a) the Pāthikṛtēya, and (b) the Vrātupatiya; and at these, there is room for the use of two sets of mantras—(1) the Sāmidhēnī verses and (2) the Yājyānuvākyā verses. If the Sūtra had put forward only 'Indicative Power and Order'; then it would be possible for the Yājyānuvākyā verses to be used in place of the Sāmidhēni verses, as such use would be pointed out by the Indicative Power of the mantras. [This anomaly is avoided by mentioning 'Name' also, which restricts the Yājyānuvākyā-mantras to their own sphere.]

Question—"Why then should 'Indicative Power' and 'Order' be mentioned [when the necessary conclusion is established by Name only]?"

Answer—[If Indicative Power and Order had not been added, and reliance were placed upon Name only, then] in that case, all the verses would be used for the purposes of the Yājyā-Anwākyā, and none would be used for the purposes of the Sāmidhēnī. If, however, the purposes of the Yājyā-Anwākyā are accomplished through Name, and also through Indicative Power and Order,—then the use of the mantras with the Sāmidhēnīs becomes possible. For instance, after the place (in the order of sequence) of the Agni-Vārunī sacrifice has been passed over,—and that of the Somāraudrī sacrifices has not yet come up,—there come in certain verses called 'Manoh rchah', which, in connection with the Sāmidhēnī verses, are called 'Dhāyyā';—and two such Dhāyyā verses come to be assumed in this manner.

Thus it is necessary that the Sūtra should mention both (Indicative Power and Order and Name).

[There would have been no need for mentioning all the three, if the montrus speaking of the deities of the sacrifices were exactly the same in number as the sacrifices themselves; as a matter of fact, however, we find that, in the order of the sacrifice which has a deity other than Agmi,—and which has a Yāyjā-Anwōkyā in

keeping with itself,—there are certain mantras actually pertaining to Agni:-if these were to be used according to the Name only, then they would come to be used in connection with the functions of the Yājyā (in connection with deities other than Agni) .- Such use of the mantras is not possible; (1) because there is difference in the Indicative Power (of the verses indicating deities other than Agni), and (2) because the application of the mantras pertaining to Agni would be set aside by the other mantras which are indicative of those same other deities. Thus then, if the use of the mantras rested upon Name only, then the mantras pertaining to Agni would not be used at all .- If, however, we admit the force of Indicative Power and Order also in controlling the use of the mantras, then, -after the Name (' vāivā') will have ceased functioning, after having pointed out the fact of the mantras being connected with a sacrifice, 'yaga', the precise use of the mantras will be determined by their Indicative Power and Order; and in this manner, the mantras pertaining to Agni would come to be used as 'Sāmidhēni' mantras.—The Bhāsua shows a case where this actually happens: Between the Yājyānuvākyās related to the Agni-Vārunī sacrifices and those related to the Somāraudrī sacrifices,-we find the Manu-verses; and yet these latter are used as 'Dhāuyā' verses of the Sāmidhēnī: [and this is possible only because we depend upon all the three--Indicative Power, Order and Name, and not upon Name only .- If we did not admit the Order, and had only Indicative Power and Name. then there would be the anomaly that the first mantra pertaining to Indra would be used at the second sacrifice, which is to Indra-Agni; when however Order steps in, the first mantra becomes connected with the First sacrifice, the second with the second and so forth; because as the order becomes operative before the Name, it controls the Indicative Power also; so that there is no chance for the connecting of the mantras with any sacrifices not in keeping with the Order of Sequence .-Tantravartika-Trans., pp. 1088-1089.]

ADHIKARANA (8): At the 'Upasthāna' of the Agnīdhra, the mantras to be used must be those appearing in the same Context.

SŪTRA (20).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" WHEN MANTRAS ARE ENJOINED IN A CERTAIN CONNEC-TION, THAT INJUNCTION SHOULD INCLUDE THOSE THAT DO NOT APPEAR IN THE SAME CONTEXT; BECAUSE ALL ARE ENJOINED (AS AUXILIARY TO THE SACRIFICE)."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma, we read—'Agneyyā agnidhramu-patisthatē (cf. Taitti. Sam. 3. 1. 6. 1), Aindryā sadah, Vaisņavyā havirdhānam'. (Tai. Sam. 3. 1. 6. 1) [With the Āgnēyi verse, one approaches the Agnīdhra,—with the Aindrī verse, the Assembly-room,—with the Vaisnavī verse, the Havirdhāna'].—In regard to this, there arises the question,—Is the approaching to be done with only those mantras indicative of the said deities that are found in the same Context? or are the mantras indicative of the deities to be culled from the whole ten mandalas of the Rgveda ('Dāshatayī') for being used at the Approaching?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapaksa:-"When in a certain connection (context), a mantra is enjoined, through its Indicative Power, it should be culled out of the Ten Mandalas; as the mantras in the Ten Mandalas are capable of being called by such names as 'agnëyi' and the rest (anyone of which names cannot be confined to the one particular mantra appearing in the same context as the action in question); the particular one appearing in the same context is one that has been already used elsewhere in connection with another action [i.e. the main Jyotistoma sacrifice itself], and as such cannot be enjoined in connection with the action in question [i.e. the act of Upasthanal: because, for mantras like those under consideration, it is not right that what has been enjoined once should be enjoined again .-'Mantras like what?'-What we mean is that when a mantra has been once enjoined in a qualified form, it cannot be enjoined again, in its unqualified (general) form, through its Indicative Power. [For instance, if a certain Mantra speaking of Agni-viz. 'Agnirmurdha, etc.'-has been enjoined specifically in its own special form, it cannot be enjoined again under the general name of 'Agneyi'; and yet this is exactly what would happen if, in the sentence 'Āgnēyyā agnīdhram upatisthatē', the term 'āgnēyī' were restricted to the one mantra in the Context .-- 'Why so ?'-Because if the Indicative Power (through which it is meant to be enjoined) is taken as mentioned by way of specifying the Mantra, then it could be specified only in the qualified form,—the sense being that 'the act in question (upasthāna) is to be done with such mantras as contain words indicative of the deity (Agni)'; and in this case, the Mantra cannot be taken as enjoined [as the potency of

the injunctive word is taken up by the said specification]. On the other hand, if the Indicative Power is taken as enjoining the Mantra, then the sense of the injunction would be 'one does such and such an act by means of the mantra possessed of such and such Indicative Power'; and in this latter case there would be no specification of any particular mantra [and hence any Agneyi mantra might be taken up]. It is for this reason that when a mantra has been enjoined once in this manner, it is not right that there should be another injunction of it of the kind in question. From this it follows that all the mantras in the Ten Mandalas which are found to have the Indicative Power in question should be culled out for use."

Objection (against the *Pūrvapakṣa*)—Through the force of the Context, the most reasonable course would be to adopt those same *mantras* that are found in the same context.

Pūrvapaksin's answer—"This cannot be; as Indicative Power is more authoritative than Context." [Tantraŭatika—Trans., p. 1092 notes that henceforward, in the present connection; the term 'linga', 'indicative power' is to be taken in the sense 'Direct Assertion' or Text, which is literally connected with the particular deity ?]

Says the Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent—Indicative Power would set aside the Context only if there were conflict between the two; in the case in question, there is no such conflict; because if we accept the indication of the context and adopt the one particular (Agnēyi) Mantra in the context which contains the requisite indicative words also (containing, as it does, words expressive of the delivt, Agni),—we do not, in any way reject the indications of the Indicative Power; if we adopted some such Mantra in the Context as did not contain the indicative word, then alone would we have gone against Indicative Power:—but by doing what we do (i.e. by adopting that mantra in the context which does contain the requisite Indicative words) we are following both, the Context as well as the Indicative Power.

The Pārvapakṣin answers—"It is not as you put it. What Indicative Power indicates is that the act in question may be done by any mantra in the Ten Manḍalas (which possesses the Indicative words); so that all such Mantras contained in the Ten Manḍalas can be spoken of as 'āṇēyī';— now this notion provided by Indicative Power is certainly rejected as wrong, if you follow the Context; that is, if you follow the Context (and thereby adopt only one Mantra as 'āṇēyī'), you certainly reject the said indication by Indicative Power as wrong; if you do not accept the Context (and apply the name 'āṇēyī' to all the Mantras in the Ten Manḍalas containing the indicative words), then the notion derived from Indicative Power remains correct;—thus there is a clear conflict (between Context and Indicative Power); and when there is a conflict, the Context must be regarded as the weaker of the two."

Says the Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent—All that should be done in course of the action of Ūpashāna is that the condition of the presence of the indicative words should be adhered to; and it is not necessary that we should necessarily admit any mantra contained in the Ten Mandalas;—now if the mantra appearing in the Context is adopted, the said condition becomes entirely fulfilled. On the other hand, if we adopt any mantra contained in

the Ten Mandalas, we set saids the particular mantra appearing in the Context,—without any such conflict (as would justify this exclusion). Nor is there any conflict between the Context and Indicative Power; because the Context points out the individual (āgnēyī) mantra, while Indicative Power indicates the (Agnēyī) in general; and the individual is different from the Universal (or General).—From all this it follows that the mantra adopted should be one that contains the indicative words and that appears in the Context.

The Pūrvapakṣin's answer—"It is true that by adopting the mantra appearing in the context, the indication of Context is not infringed, and also that the indication of Indicative Power becomes honoured; but all the same the fact remains that a certain notion derived from Indicative Power—that any mantra in the Ten Mandalas, which contains the indicative word may be used '—comes to be regarded as wrong."

Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent—As a matter of fact, no individual (āgnēyī) verse is denoted by the term ('āgnēyī'); why then should the said general notion be taken as rejected if a certain individual (āgnēyī verse) is not adopted. [The general notion is that 'Agnēyī Mantras should be used'; this general notion is not contravened if we adopt one particular Agnēyī Mantra and not adopt any other. —

The Pūrvapaksin answers-"We do not yet quite know whether what pertains to the case in question is, or is not, the generic character of containing the indicative word. What is clear is that the term ('agnēyī) denotes the deity by means of the Nominal Affix, by virtue of which the Deity (so denoted) serves to indicate the particular Mantra; what helps in the sacrifice is any individual mantra, not the class 'Mantra': class also there is none other (in the case in question) than the deity; and it is this Deity that indicates that which helps in the sacrifice. It is, however, not known that the individual mantra to be used is this one, and not that other ;- and so long as the individual mantra is not recognised as the one to be used, all those mantras should be admitted which contain the indicative word :- so that the mantras in the Ten Mandalas would come to be recognised as to be used; such being the case, it would be very wrong to reject these through considerations of the Context (and use only that mantra which appears in the Context).—Even so, it is not only those appearing in the Ten Mandalas that are to be used,-but that also may be used which appears in the Context."

The Opponent argues—It has been said above that the mantra that appears in the context has been enjoined elsewhere for some other purpose, and hence it could not be enjoined for any other purpose.

The Pūrvapakṣin answers—"It is not necessary that the same mantra alone should be used for this other purpose; in fact that same, as also others—which resemble it in having the indicative words,—may be used; and thus there would be no incongruity."

The Opponent—There would be this incongruity that both, Indicative Power and Context, would not be followed.

Piirapaksin..." True, they would not be followed; but the Context does not deserve to be followed, for the simple reason that what it indicates is contrary to what is indicated by the Indicative Power...Then again, it is not necessary that either the Indicative Power or the Context should be followed; in fact, though it is true that the activity of the agent tends towards what is indicated by these, yet it is only when this is recognised as something fruitful that the agent betakes himself to that activity [and not merely because the action has been indicated by Indicative Power or by Context or by both]."

Question-What if this be so?

Pārvapakṣin—"The effect of this is that the Indicative Power is not followed in any case; so that there would be no activity towards anything else that may be indicated by that Power.

"From all this it follows that the mantras in the Ten Mandalas should be admitted."

SŪTRA (21).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, ONLY THAT MENTIONED IN THE CONTEXT (ARE TO BE ADMITTED); BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT AND OF REASONS.

Bhāsya.

'That mentioned in the context'-i.e. the mantra that which is spoken of in the Context of the Juotistoma-should be admitted :- why ?-because of the Context and of reasons :- i.e. the said mantra is what is indicated by the Context, and it is only right that the indication of the Context should be accepted.-Why so ?-It would not be right to take the sentence in question as laying down merely the fact of the mantra having some sort of a function to perform in connection with the Jyotistoma: because this general connection of the mantra with that sacrifice is already known from other sources [i.e. by the direct enunciation of the mantras to be used at the Jyotistoma sacrifice—says the Tantravartika; the sentence may, however, be taken as laying down the particular purpose to be served by the mantra in connection with the sacrifice, -because as yet, the fact of the mantra serving that particular purpose is not known; [so that what the sentence means is that at the Upasthana only those agneyi mantras are to be used that are connected with the Juotistoma-says the Tantravartikal. Such being the case, if the indications of the Context were entirely ignored, and the sentence were taken as laying down any (Agnēyī) mantra contained in the Ten Mandalas,—there would be a syntactical split; as in that case the sentence would have to be construed as- one should do the Upasthana of the Agnidhra, -and that with a mantra containing such and such indicative words'.

SŪTRA (22).

The Injunction would be purposeless,—as there would be no connection with anything fruitful; because the 'Upasthana' is not fruitful.

$Bh\bar{a}$ şya.

Says the Pürvapakşin—" On the strength of the indication of the Context, any Āgnēyi mantra may be taken as helpful to the Jyotistoma".

If the sentence in question is taken as asserting the connection between the act of Upashāna and the Jyotisjoma sacrifice, then the sentence might be taken as laying down the act of Upashāna in connection with the Jyotisjoma; and in that case, on the strength of the Context, it might be possible to take the two factors [(a)' should do the Upasthāna,'—(b) and 'that with āynēyi mantras'] as syntactically connected and forming 'one sentence'. When, however, the sentence is taken as asserting the connection of the mantra with all kinds of Upashāna (not only that connected with the Jyotisjoma),—then all that we get out of it is the mantra only, without any reference to the Context (which bears upon the Jyotisjoma only); nor can the Context serve the purpose of specifying (the particular Upashāna at which the Mantra should be used). In fact, if it did do both these (i.e. if the sentence laid down the use of the mantra and also specified the particular Upashāna at which it should be used), then there would be syntactical split.

There is no such incongruity in our view; as, according to that view, that mantra—either the one indicating Agni or the one indicating Intra-which is already known as functioning (in general) at the Jyotistoma—comes to be enjoined in connection with the particular function of the Upasthāna which is done at the Jyotistoma sacrifice,—and all the rest of the sentence is a mere reference (to what is already known from other sources). Thus there would be no incongruity at all.

Or, the three sentences—[(a) 'Agnēyyā agnīdhramupatishlatē, (b) aindryā sadaḥ, (c) vaiṣnavyā havirdhānam']—may be taken as laying down merely the connection of the Agnīdhra, the Sadaḥ and the Havirdhāna,—the verb 'upatishlatē' being a mere reference; the meaning of the sentence thus is—'with this (āgnēyi) mantra [which is already known] one approaches the Agnīdhra'.

From all this it follows that only those mantras containing the indicative word are to be used which are found in the Context.

SŪTRA (23).

ALSO, BECAUSE ALL THE MANTRAS ARE SUCH AS HAVE BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that the mantras in the Context are such as havebeen already enjoined in connection with another action [i.e. with the main Jyotistoma sacrifice]. Our answer to this is that this argument has been already answered.

Then again, there are no mantras that have not been already enjoined (in connection with some action or the other); all mantras are such as have been enjoined in the Vachastoma and in the Ashvina shastra before the sun rises.—So that on this point of being already enjoined in connection with another action, the mantra in the Context does not differ from any other. Hence in the case in question the mantra admitted must be that appearing in the Context.

ADHIKARANA (9): [The 'Bhakṣa-mantras' are to be used at the act of 'Holding' and the rest, in accordance with the indications of the words of the mantras.]

SŪTRA (24).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THROUGH 'INDICATIVE POWER' AND 'NAME', THE ENTIRE ANUVAKA SHOULD BE TAKEN AS BEING FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE 'EATING'."

Bhāsya.

We find the following Bhakṣamantra—' Bhakhṣēhi mā visha dīrghāyutvāya shantanutvāya rāyaṣpoṣāya varchas suprajātevāya; —ēhi vaso purovaso
priyo mē hṛdosyashivinostvā bāhubhyām saghyāsam; —nṛchakṣasantvā dēva
soma suchakṣā avakhyēṣam; —hinva mē gātrā harivo gaṇān mē mā vitītṛṣaḥ,
shivo mē saptarṣīn upatiṣṭhasva mā mē vān nābhimatiyāh, —mandrābhibhūthi,
keturyajñānām vāg juṣāṇā somasya tṛpyatu; vasumadganasya rudramadganasya ādityamadganasya soma dēva tē matividaḥ prālaḥsavanasya mādhyandinasya savanasya tṛtīyasavanasya gāyatrachchhandasaḥ tṛṣṭupchhandaso
'gnihua indrapītasya narāshamsapitasya pitṛpītasya madhumata upahūtasyopahūto bhakṣayāmi, etc. etc.'—(Taitti. Sam. 3. 2. 5. 1-3).

[The Bhāsya has quoted the entire anuwāka with a view to show which word in it is capable of what use,—questions relating to which will be discussed in the next four Adhikaranas. As a matter of fact, there are soveral portions of this Anueāka—e.g. 'Gāyatrachchhandah, etc.', as also 'Indrapita, etc.'—are such as are used separately according to their several significations.—Tantrawārtika—Trans. p. 1102.]

In connection with this *Bhakṣānuvāka*, there arises the question—Is the whole of this *anuvāka* to be used in connection with the 'eating'?' or may some part of it be used elsewhere also?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—"Through 'Indicative Power' and 'Name', the entire Anuvāka should be taken as being for the purpose of the 'eating' (sū.); i.e. the entire Anuvāka should be used in connection with eating.—Why !—Because the term 'bhakṣayāmi' ('I eat', occurring in the mantra) is clearly one that should be used in connection with eating, as the only thing that it can denote is eating, nothing else; as for the other words in the text, they are such as are expressive of qualifications (or concomitants) of the act of Eating,—and, as such, are used wherever the term 'bhakṣayāmi' is used. [The Anuvāka begins with the term 'bhakṣa' and also ends with 'bhakṣayāmi'.—both denoting the act of Eating only; this also implies that all the words between these two terms form one composite whole, to be used in connection with eating.]"

Objection (against the Pūrvapakṣa)—(A) As a matter of fact, that portion of the Anuvāka which begins with 'āhi vaso' and ends with 'saghyā-sam' must be taken as to be used in connection with the act of Holding; as

all the words included herein are such as require each other for the completion of the sentence and are expressive of a single idea (and serving a single purpose); so that it must be syntactically distinct from the sentence speaking of Eating.—(B) Similarly, the portion beginning with the word 'nrchaksasam' and ending with 'avakhyēsam', is expressive of the act of Looking into.—(C) So also, the portion beginning with the words 'Hinua me gatra' harival', and ending with 'ma me' 'vāhnābhimatigāh' is expressive of the act of Proper Digesting.—Thus then, as there are several ideas expressed by the several portions of the 'Anwāka, they should be taken as so many distinct sentences. How then can it be said that the whole of it is a single sentence, to be used in connection with the act of Eating?

Pūrvapakṣin's answer—"It has already been asserted that all the various things expressed by the different portions of the Anunāka are only concomitants of the act of Eating".

Objection—Even so, there would be different sentences; as it is not possible for anything to be spoken of simultaneously along with its concomitants.

Pūrvapakṣin—"We do not mean that the concomitants are expressed independently; what we mean is that what is expressed by the sentence is the single factor (of eating) as qualified and accompanied by its several concomitants in the shape of Holding, Looking into and so forth."

Objection—It cannot be right to take the words expressive of the concomitants as not intended to be significant of their meanings, and yet as signifying the concomitants of the eating; such an idea could be derived only from indirect indication; and as between Direct Assertion and Indirect Indication, it is the former that should be accepted. Hence the whole Anuralka cannot be treated as a single sentence.

Pirrapaksin—"Our answer to this is as follows:—Though the act of Holding and several other factors are found to be signified by the words of the mantra, yet all these factors are not such as are equally meant to be spoken of (or emphasised); it is the act of Eating only that is meant to be spoken of (and emphasised); hence it is only this act of Eating that is 'directly asserted', the concomitants are not 'directly asserted';—nor is any useful purpose to be served by a cognition of these concomitants;—and that group of words is to be treated as 'one sentence' which is found to serve one single purpose;—thus it is that the whole of the Anuvāka is to be treated as 'one sentence' serving the single purpose of speaking of the act of Eating along with its concomitants; and for that reason, the whole is to be used in connection with the act of Eating."

"Further, there is the name 'Bhakṣānuvāka' which is applicable to the whole Anuvāka, not to any portion of it. [This also shows that the entire Anuvāka is to be used in connection with the act of eating.]"

Objection (against the Pūrvapaksa)—Name is a thing of secular origin, how can it restrict the use of anything that forms part of the Veda?

Pūrvapakṣin—"Though the Name is something of secular origin, yet its application to the Anuvāka has had no beginning in time".

What if it is so?

"This is what follows.—The name speaks of (signifies) the entire Anuvāka along with the Eating,—and such signification is possible only when there is a definite connection between the two factors spoken of together; for instance, when we find the 'cooker' and 'the chopper' spoken of together, we at once infer that there is some connection between the two."

Objection—In matters like what we are discussing, the relation of subserviency cannot be a matter for Inference,—it can be learnt only from an Injunction,—not from any other source; and certainly Name can never be injunctive.

Pūrvapakṣin—"Our answer to this is that what the Name does is to bring to our mind the two factors related, and the injunction will be done by the directive sentence laying down the procedure of the action.—From all this it follows that the entire Anuvāka is to be used in connection with the act of Batina".

SÜTRA (25).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ON ACCOUNT OF THE FORM (WORDS OF THE MANTRAS),
AND ON ACCOUNT OF INJUNCTION,—PORTIONS OF THE ANUVĀKA
SHOULD BE EXTRACTED (FOR SEPARATE USE); SPECIALLY
BECAUSE THE ACTIONS (AT WHICH THE EXTRACTS
ARE TO BE USED) ARE ACTUALLY

ENJOINED. Bhāsua.

It is not right that the entire Anwöka should be used in connection with Eating.—(a) In fact, on account of the 'form' (words) of the sentence speaking of the act of Holding—i.e. the sentence beginning with '\$\frac{2}{6}k'\$ and ending with 'saghyāsam'—should be used in connection with the act of Holding;—(b) the sentence beginning with 'nrchakpasam' and ending with 'awakhyāsam' should be used in connection with the act of Looking into;—"why so?"—Because, if used in this way, the sentences are used according to their primary meaning; if taken in any other way, they would be used according to a secondary meaning; and it is more reasonable to accept the Primary than the Secondary meaning.

Objection—"It has been pointed out that no useful purpose can be served by the pointing out of the concomitants."

Answer—What the sentences speak of are not 'concomitants'; in fact each of these—Holding, Looking into and the rest—are independent acts, each spoken of by an independent sentence by itself.

"How is it so?"

(They are to be taken as independent acts) because there is a useful purpose served by the cognition of these acts as spoken of by the sentences; in fact, all these acts are such as have been enjoined,—some by direct independent injunctions, and some by implication;—as such all these have got to be indicated (by mantras);—and it is this indication of the acts that is done by the sentences in question.—The 'form' or nature of these also consists in this capacity to indicate things.

Thus, inasmuch as the various sentences (in the $Anuv\bar{a}ka$) serve different purposes (and have different meanings), they are not regarded as 'one sentence'.

Objection—"The 'form' of the sentences is also such as makes them supplementary to the sentence speaking of the act of Eating."

Answer—True: that is their 'form'; but these acts (spoken of by these sentences) are not to be taken as concomitants (qualifications) of that act of Eating.

"Why so?"

Because, if so taken, they would have to be regarded as serving some transcendental purpose; and in that case, whether spoken or not spoken of (by means of a mantra recited at the time), they would serve that purpose all the same. [So that there would be no necessity for speaking of them by means of a mantra.] In the other case, the sentences would serve the purpose of indicating the acts of Holding and the rest, and thus serve a visible purpose.

From all this we conclude that on account of their form and injunction, some portions of the mantra should be extracted (and used in connection with different acts).

ADHIKARANA (10): [That portion of the 'Bhakṣānuvāka' which begins with the word 'mandrābhibhūtih' and ends with the word 'bhakṣayāmi' forms a single 'shastra' (mantra)].

SŪTRA (26).

Inasmuch as a concomitant (qualification) is spoken of, the passage beginning with 'Mandra' should be treated as one Mantra; specially because the two sentences (of which this passage is composed) jointly express a single Idea.

Bhāsya.

In the Bhakṣānuvāka (the whole of which has been quoted as the Viṣayavākya of the preceding Adhikarana), we read the passage—'Mandrā-bhibhūtiḥ kēturyajñānām vāgjuṣānā somasya trpyatu,—Vasumadgaṇasya soma dēva tē matividaḥ prātuḥsavanasya gāyatrachchhandaso 'gnihuta indra-pītasya madhumata upahūtasyopahūto bhakṣayāmi' (Taitti. Sain., 3. 2. 5. 1-2).

In regard to this passage, there arises the question—In this passage, are there two mantras—one beginning with 'mandra' and ending with 'trypatu', and the other beginning with 'vasumadganasya'? Or, is the whole passage—beginning with 'mandra' and ending with 'bhaksayāmi' a single mantra?

On this question, the Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"there are two mantras;—two distinct things are spoken of by the two sentences—'trpth' (satisfaction, spoken of in the first sentence) is one thing, while 'bhakṣaṇa' (cating, spoken of in the second sentence) is an entirely different thing; thus their meanings being different, the sentences should be taken as two distinct sentences; this would be in accordance with what has been just stated in the foregoing sūtra—'on account of the form and the injunction, the portions should be extracted, etc. etc.''

In answer to this, we have the following Siddhānta—Inasmuch as a concomitant (qualification) is spoken of, the passage beginning with 'mandra' should be treated as one mantra;—the 'trphi', 'satisfaction', is spoken of in the first sentence as a concomitant (qualification) of the eating (spoken of in the second sentence),—the meaning being that 'the vāk (assertion) of bhakşayāmi (eating) shall satisfy'.

Objection—"The term used in the original text is 'trypatu' (with the Imperative termination) which is different from the term 'tarpsyati', where we have the Future Termination; if we connect the two verbs 'bhakṣayāmi' and 'tarpsyati', then we get at a logical connection between the two actions of eating and satisfying,—the idea conveyed being that 'eating shall satisfy': with the word 'trypatu' on the other hand, the word 'bhakṣayāmi'

can have no connection; as the expression 'bhakşayāmi trpyatu' gives no sense."

Answer—The termination in the word 'trpyatu' cannot be regarded as expressing the sense of the imperative; it should be taken as expressing either a request or the idea of the present time. But whether we construe the words as 'bhakşayāmi vāk tarpsyati' ('the assertion of eating shall satisfy'), or as 'bhakşayāmi vāchastarptum kālaḥ' (the assertion of eating is the time for being satisfied'),—in either case the 'satisfaction' shall be the concomitant (qualification) of the eating; so that the two sentences together expressing a single idea, they should be taken as forming 'one sentence' and hence treated as one mantra.

Objection—"In reality the two sentences are totally distinct, independent of one another; and they are made inter-dependent by force."

Answer—Even if the two sentences served two distinct purposes, were independent of one another, and conveyed two distinct ideas,—it would be the indication of the eating that would be found to serve a perceptible purpose,—not that of the satisfying; so that on this ground also, the two sentences would really serve a single purpose;—how much more so then is it when one act—(that of satisfying)—is distinctly recognised as being a concenitant (nualification) of the other (i.e. sating)?

From all this it follows that, inasmuch as a concomitant (qualification) is spoken of, the passage beginning with 'mandra' should be treated as one mantra.

Adhikarana (11): [The words of the 'Bhakṣānuvāka', beginning with 'indrapītasya', are to be used in connection with all 'eatings'—with necessary modifications.]

Preliminary Adhikarana.

SŪTRA (27).

[Preliminary Pürvapakşa]—When all are enjoined in the same sentence, the eating of the offerings 'not made to Indra' should be done without mantras;

Because the 'Indicative Power' (of the mantra) points to particular 'Eatings'.

Bhāṣya.

The mantra dealt with in the foregoing adhikarana forms the basis of the present adhikarana also. At the sacrifices with which the Bhakşāmuāka is concerned, there are several offerings made to Indra, as also several not made to Indra (but to other deities).—In regard to these, there arises the question—Is the mantra in question to be used in connection with the eating of both kinds of offerings—those to Indra as well as those not to Indra? Or is it to be used in connection with the eating of the offerings to Indra only, while that of the offerings not to Indra is to be done without mantras?

On this question, we have the following Pūrnapakṣa—"The eating of the offerings not made to Indra is to be done without mantras.—Why?—Because all the offerings have been enjoined in the same sentence;—now from among these offerings, that which is not made to Indra cannot be taken as spoken of by the mantra beginning with 'indrapītasya' [which clearly speaks of that only which has been 'drunk by' (offered to) 'Indra'].—Nor is there any modification of mantras possible in the case of those mentioned in the Context (of a primary act,—and every eating is a primary act); because unless there is a distinct declaration to the effect, the mantra cannot be taken as expressing any meaning other than the one indicated by its words."

[As against this Pūrvapakṣa we have the following preliminary Siddhanta.]—

SŪTRA (28).

[Preliminary Siddhānta]—In reality, offerings should be made with mantras in accordance with the deity (to whom the offering has been made); because there is a text indicating the fact of the offerings to the other deities having the offering to Indra for their Archetype.

Bhāsya.

In fact, the offerings have to be made with mantras modified in accordance with the deity to whom the offerings are made. - 'Why so?' -Because the Dhruva-chamasas (which are offered to Indra) are the Archetypes (of the other offerings under consideration) .- 'What are Dhruva-chamasas ?'-It is the name of those offerings of Soma that are made in the beginning of the Savanas (pressings) at the Shukrāmanthi Prachāra (Shukra and Manthi Foreoffering); these are all related to Indra; of these, the act of offering is the Archetype and the others, its ectypes.- 'How do you know this?'-Recause there is a text indicating the fact of the offering to Indra being the Archetype.—'How is this indicated?'—This is indicated by the fact that the Vedic text shows modification in the Bhaksamantra in the case of the Sodashin (Sixteenth Cup) in the Atiratra Soma-sacrifice with the word anustupchandasah (in the place of gayatrachchandasah, etc. of the Bhaksamantra in the Agnistoma ceremony, mentioned above).— What is the indication here?'-The term 'namati' indicates modification .- 'But this (that one modifies the Bhaksamantra) would be a Direct Assertion (not Indication).'-Not so; because the text quoted does not directly assert the term 'namati', all that it does is to mention the term 'namati' and the term 'anustupchhandasah',-and hence it is indicated that the Bhaksamantra is to be modified .- Now such a modification is possible only in the ectypal acts :whence it follows that these other offerings under consideration are all ectypes: -and consequently even at the offerings not made to Indra, the mantra to be used must be that whose use is indicated by its having been used at the Archetype (of those offerings), but with necessary modifications.

Objection—'In support of the view that these other offerings are ectypes, you have pointed to Indication; please mention some reasons.'

Answer—It is the Soma to be offered to Indra that is 'held' and 'measured';—hence it is in the cups dedicated to Indra that there is Soma,—and there is no Soma in the cups not dedicated to Indra; so that all the details meant to be performed in connection with Soma are to be performed in connection with the cups dedicated to Indra,—while the other cups (which are not dedicated to Indra) have no details performed in connection with them, and are (to that extent) defective (incomplete).—'How do you know that it is the Soma to be offered to Indra that is held and measured?'—This we learn from the words of the mantra—'Indraya to accumate?' (Vēja. Sam. 6. 32);—mantras like this speak of only that Soma which is to be offered to Indra, none

other;—hence there can be Soma only in the cups dedicated to Indra; and the details relating to Soma are performed only in connection with the cups dedicated to Indra,—all the other offerings remain incomplete, and hence these latter borrow those details. This is the reason for our conclusion (which had been supported by the Indicative Power of the mantras).

From all this it follows that the offerings not made to Indra, are to be made with mantras modified in accordance with the deity to whom the offerings are made.

The discussion rests unsettled at this point (with the statement of the preliminary Siddhānta); and at this stage (before it is resumed, the arguments answered, and the final Siddhānta stated under Sūtra 43 below), we shall proceed with the consideration of certain other matters (related to the question of mantras to be used in connection with the eating of remnants of offerings made to the various deities).

[The position of the Pūrvapaksa-Siddhānta, from this Adhikarana onwards is somewhat obscure: the question dealt with in Adhikarana 11 has been-Is the Mantra to be used in the eating of the remnants of the Indra-offerings only, and that of all the other offerings is to be done without Mantras-or is the Mantra to be used in connection with all,-the only difference being that while with the Indraofferings, the Mantra is to be as in the original form, while in the others, the names of the deities have to be modified ?-The first alternative represents the Pūrvapaksa-that the Indra-offerings alone are to be done with the Mantra as in the original form and the others are to be done without Mantras.-The Siddhanta (preliminary and hypothetical) is that all the eatings are to be done with Mantra,but at the Indra-offerings the Mantra shall be used in the original form and at the others with modifications of names of deities.-This, however, is not the final Siddhanta.—For the present the matter is left here in its 'aparyavasita'. 'unsettled', non-final stage.—Adhikaranas 12 to 16, embodied in Sūtras 29-37, deal with other questions relating to Mantras to be used at the eatings, with or without modifications, in accordance with the Preliminary Siddhanta set forth in Sutra 28. -The main thread of the discussion on the subject of Adhikarana 11, is resumed in Adhikarana 17, Sūtra 38, and carried on in three Adhikaranas 17 to 19, Sūtras 38-42, wherein the alternative of using no Mantras at certain eatings is discussed .-Then at the end of the Pada, the final Siddhanta is stated in Adhikarana 20, Sütra 43, which represents the final upshot of all the discussions relating to the use of mantras at the eatings of the remnants of offerings.

The position is briefly and clearly stated in Tantravärtika—Trans., p. 1110, where, in the introduction to Adhikarana 12, we read—While the foregoing Adhikarana (11) still rests in the 'Pūruspaka' [the preliminary Siddhānta stated under Sūtra 25 being so called, in view of, and in relation to, the final Siddhānta stated under Sūtra 25, at the end of the Pāda], and the Sūdhānta is not finally stated and established till the end of the Pāda,—we take for granted, for the time being, the propriety of having modifications (in accordance with the said preliminary Siddhānta in Sūtra 28), and then proceed to consider under what circumstances, the modifications, if allowable, would be possible.

ADHIKARANA (12): ['Indra' should be mentioned in the mantra used in connection with the 'Punarabhyunnīta-Soma' i.e. 'the Soma brought up again.']

SŪTRA (29).

In connection with the 'Soma brought up again',

ALL THE DEITIES SHOULD BE MENTIONED,

BECAUSE THERE ARE REMNANTS

OF BOTH (OFFERINGS).

Bhāsya.

[The preliminary Siddhānta of the preceding Adhikaraṇa has been that at the eating of the remnants of offerings instead of the term 'Indra' in the mantra 'Indra-pitasya, etc.,' we should mention the name of the deity to whom the offering in question has been made. We now proceed to consider what names are to be introduced and under what circumstances.]

There are certain 'Soma-offerings brought'up again', connected with the beginning of the Savanas at the Shukrāmanthi Prachāra; -in connection with these what happens is that as soon as the Hotr-priest has pronounced the 'Vasatkara' and also after the 'Anuvasatkara' [See the T.V.-There are 4 oblations after the Vasatkara and 4 after the Anwasatkara], four libations are (twice) offered with the four ladles of 'Middlemost Persons [i.e. the Brahman, the Hotr, the Udgatr and the Yajamana]'; -then single libations are offered with the Hotraka ladles (i.e. the ladles belonging to the assistants of the Hotr-Maitravaruna, Brahmanacchamsin, Potr, Nestr, Acchavaka, and Agnidhra), on the utterance of the 'Vasatkāra'; [at all these offerings the deity is Indra]; -after this, Soma is again brought up in the ladles containing the remnants of the previous offerings. - In connection with this 'Soma brought up again', the Adhvaryu-priest issues the following directions-'Let the Chamasadhvaryus offer libations from the ladles of the Middlemost Persons on the pronouncement of 'Vasat' and 'Anwasat', -let the Chamasadhvaryus offer single libations from the ladles of the Hotrakas and return after having filled the Shukra cup' .- Now in the course of this, the Hotrakas offer sacrifices to several deities as follows:-(a) the Maitravaruna makes the offering to Mitra-Varuna, with the Mantra 'Mitram vayam havamahë, etc.' (Rgveda, 1, 23, 4),—(b) the Brāhmanāchchhamsī makes the offering to Indra, with the Mantra 'Indra tvā vṛṣabham vayam, etc.' (Rgveda, 3. 40. 1),-(c) the Potr makes the offering to the Maruts, with the Mantra 'Maruto yasya hi kṣayē, etc.', (Rgveda, 1, 86, 1),—(d) the Nestr makes the offering to Tvastr and the Patnis', with the Mantra 'Agne patnir ihavaha, etc.' (Rgveda, 1. 22. 9),-(e) the Agnidhra makes the offering to Agni, with the Mantra 'Ukṣānnāya vashānnāya, etc.' (Rgveda, 8, 43, 11). Out of these cups (all of which had been previously dedicated to Indra), the offering to Indra is made at the first pronouncement of the 'Vasat',—then after pouring more Soma-juice into the same ladles the offerings to Mitra-Varuna and other deities are made; —thus the ladles come to contain the remnants of all these offerings, those to Indra as well as those to Mitra-Varuna and other deities. [So that when the remnant of the Mitra-Varuna and other offerings come to be eaten, the ladle contains the remnant, not only of the offerings to those deities, but also that of the offerings previously made to Indra.]

In regard to these arises the following question—In the Mantra recited in connection with the Esting of this Remnant [viz. the Bhakşamantra, ending with the words 'indrapitasya, etc.']—re all the detities, the previously worshipped Indra as well as Mitra-Varuna and the rest, to be named (as in 'Indrapitasya')? Or is Indra not to be mentioned? [That is, is the Mantra used to be in the form 'Indra-Mitrā-Varunapitasya' or 'Mitrāvarunapitasya'?]

The apparent conclusion is that in connection with the remnants of offerings out of the 'Soma brought up again', all the deities are to be mentioned i.e. the form used should be 'Indra-mitrāvarunapītasya'].—Why so ?—Because there are remnants of both; i.e. each of the Cups contains the remnant of two offerings; what has been offered to the Deity (Indra) at the Archetypal Sacrifice,—the remnant of that offering is said to be 'pita', 'drunk', by that Deity [hence it is that the remnant of the offering made to Indra is called 'indrapīta' in the Mantra];—the same should be held to be true in the case in question also [that is, the remnant of the offerings to Indra, Mitra-Varuna and other deities should be spoken of as 'pita', 'drunk', by all these; so that the term 'indrapītasya' should be modified into 'indra-mitrāvaruna-pītasya'].—Thus it follows that along with each of the cups, two deities should be spoken of.

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THERE HAS BEEN REMOVAL (OF THE REMNANT OF THE PREVIOUS OFFERING), THERE SHOULD BE NO MENTION OF THE PREVIOUS DEITY".

Bhāşya.

"We think that the remnant of the offering made to the initial deity was 'removed'—set aside [when fresh Soma was poured into the ladle].—Why so !—Because the Soma contained in the ladle (after the pouring in of the fresh supply) is all dedicated (by the Yājyā mantra) to Mitra-Varuna etc.—How is that !—The answer is as follows:—The offerings (out of the freshly poured Soma) are made to Mitra-Varuna etc. (and not to Indra also); and in a case where Dēvadatta eats the remnant of the food eaten by the Teacher and makes over the remnant of what he has eaten to another person, Pūrnaka,—this latter, Pūrnaka, when referring to it, mentions Dēvadatta—saying 'I am eating the leavings of Dēvadatta',—and he does not say 'I am eating the Teacher's leavings'.—In the same manner, in the case in question, the deity of the previous offering is not to be mentioned."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ĪNASMUCH AS THERE IS NO ACTUAL TAKING UP (OF THE REMNANT OF THE PREVIOUS OFFERING, BY THE LATTER DEITY),
THERE SHOULD BE NO SETTING ASIDE (OF THE PREVIOUS DEITY).

[The right reading of the Sūtra is—Agrahanād vā anapāyaḥ.]

Bhāsya.

It is not right to say that Indra should not be mentioned :-- because the remnant is clearly seen to be of the offering made to that deity also,-" But that offering has been removed."-Our answer to that is that it is not removed; because what actually happens is that the performer fills from the Abhidrona-jar the ladles out of which a single set of libations has been offered :-- and the presence of the remnant of that offering is what distinguishes the ladles when the fresh supply of Soma is brought up to it :-- so that it is the Soma contained in this ladle that can be said to be 'brought up', or to be that in regard to which the directions are given (by the Adhvaryu, to the Priests) .- As regards the argument-that "the remnant of the previous offering has been dedicated (along with the fresh supply) to the other deities to whom the later offerings are going to be made (so that after this later offering has been made, there would be no remnant of the previous offering.)"-our answer is as follows. It is true that the Soma is dedicated to these other deities; but it is not stated whether this much or that much is dedicated; hence that alone is really regarded as 'dedicated' which is taken up for being actually poured into the fire. Nor is the connection of the substance with a particular deity established at the time of the 'dedication' [it being established only by the actual offering]; so that what is dedicated is not necessarily what is connected with a deity.-From all this it follows that (even on the pouring in of the fresh supply), the remnant of Indra's offering is present, and is actually seen, in the ladle; so that all the deities (Indra as well as Mitra-Varuna) should be mentioned in the mantra.

This Adhikarana is only a hypothetical discussion (which has proceeded on the basis of the hypothetical Siddhānta of Adhikarana 11); hence it is not necessary to explain the purpose served by it; specially as the purpose served by this Adhikarana (as also by the following Adhikaranas) is the same as that served by the foregoing Adhikarana.

ADHIKARANA (13): [At the eating of the Remnant of the 'Pātnīvata' offerings, Indra and the other deities are not to be included]—[First counter-instance to the foregoing Adhikarana].

SUTRA (32).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'PÂTNĪVATA' OFFERING, IT SHOULD BE AS IN THE PREVIOUS CASE."

Bhāsua.

There is the 'Pātnīvata offering-cup'—laid down in the text 'With the Upānīshupātra he takes up the Pātnīvata offering out of the Āgrayaṇa vessel';—in the Āgrayaṇa vessel there are collected the remnants of those offerings that have been made to deities in couples; and it is out of this that the Pātnīvata offering is taken out. After this Pātnīvata offering has been actually made, when its remnant comes to be eaten, there arises the question—Should Indra and the other deities also be mentioned or not?

The Purvapaksa view is that they should all be mentioned; as the Remnant in question is as much the remnant of the offerings to these other deities as of that of the one deity to whom the final offering is made—[according to the Siddhānia of the foregoing Adhikarana].

SŪTRA (33).

[Siddhinta]—Inasmuch as there is actual taking up (of the remnant of the previous offering, by the later deity), (the connection of the previous deity) should

BE SET ASIDE. Bhāsua.

In the present case, the remnant of the previous offering is set aside; hence this case is not similar to that dealt with in the foregoing Adhikarana, the Soma is mentioned as an indication of the particular vessel, not as something to be taken up; while, in the present case, the words are 'he takes it out of the Agrayana', whereby the Soma contained in the vessel becomes pointed out as something to be offered as a libation for the deity to whom the sacrifice is going to be offered.

Objection—"As a matter of fact, the Agrayana vessel contains both kinds of Soma—the Agrayana as well as the non-āgrayana (Sampāta); so that out of these that alone is the Pātnivata Soma which is taken out of the Agrayana-portion, while that which is taken out of the Sampāta (the non-āgrayana portion decented from the remnant of the previous dvi-devatya cups) should not be the Pātnivata."

Answer—The Agrayana vessel is the source (from which the Pātnīwaka offering is taken out); hence all the Soma that comes out of that vesselbe the Soma itself āgrayana or non-āgrayana—should be meant for Patnīwat; for the simple reason that all this has been taken out of the Āgrayana vessel (which is the only condition laid down by the Injunction).

Objection—"But some part of the Soma thus taken out would have come out of the non-agrayana-portion also,"

Answer—That does not affect our position; the mere fact of the Soma having come out of the Āqrayaṇa cannot justify its being described as 'drunk' by the previous deities. At the archetypal sacrifice that remnant alone is spoken of as 'indrapita' ('Drunk by Indra') which formed part of the Soma-juice that was intended for Indra; and in the present case also, that remnant alone should be spoken of as 'drunk by the previous deities' which formed part of the Soma-juice intended for those deities.

. Objection—"In the present case also, the Soma-juice in question is that which formed part of what was intended for the previous deities."

Not so, we reply. In the case of libations poured into the fire, we do not perceive any 'parts'.

Opponent—"At the archetypal sacrifice also, no part can be perceived of what has been offered into the fire."

Answer—At the archetypal sacrifice, what is perceived is the part of that composite whole offered to the previous deity which is made up of portions out of which libations have been offered, as well as of those out of which no libations have been offered.

Opponent—"In the present case also, there was a composite whole consisting of what was offered to the previous deities,—and it is of this whole that the Pātnīvata offering forms part."

Not so, we reply. It is true that there was 'a composite whole consisting of what was offered to the previous delties'; but at the time of the offering in question the part of that whole has become offered to another delty (Patnivat), and hence the said composite whole has ceased to be related to the previous delties.

Objection—"The part in question having been a part of what has been 'drunk' by the previous deities, it would still continue, on the basis of that previous connection, to be regarded as part of the same."

Answer—In connection with the archetypal sacrifice, the part was not spoken of as such, on the basis of any previous connection; hence in the case in question also, it should not be so described on that basis.

Then again, at the archetypal sacrifice, what had been offered to Indra was spoken of as 'drunk by Indra',—and its connection with Indra' had not ceased (when it came to be offered to the latter deity); in the present case, however, the connection of the previous deities has ceased (before it is offered to Patnivat); consequently, these previous deities should not be mentioned.

ADHIKARANA (14): ['Tvastr' should not be mentioned at the eating of the remnant of the 'Pātnīvata' offering.— Second counter-instance to Adhi. 12.]

SUTRA (34).

[PŪEVAPAKṢA]—" TVAṢṬR SHOULD BE MENTIONED, BECAUSE OF THE DRINKING."

Bhāşya.

There is the Pātnīvata Soma (Soma offered to Patnīvat); in connection with which there is the mantra—'Agnā³ i patnīvā³h sajūrdēvēna tvaṣṭrā somam piba.' (Taitti. Sam. 1. 4. 27. 1)—

In regard to this there arises the question—Should Trastr be mentioned or not (in the mantra used at the eating of the Pātnīvata remnant)?

On this, the Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"Tvaṣtṛ must be mentiond.—Why?—Because of the drinking; as a matter of fact we find
'drinking' mentioned in the text (as done by Tvaṣṭṛ)—'Sajūrdēvēna tvāṣṭrā
somam piba'; from which it is clear that the offering is made to
Patnivat accompanied by Tvaṣṭṛ; and what is offered to a person accompanied by another is regarded as offered to both; for instance, when it is
said that 'a hundred should be given to Dēvadatta accompanied by
Yajāadatta',—the 'hundred' is given to both. Consequently, the Somaremnant in question is 'tvāṣṭra' (related to Tvaṣṭṛ) (as well as 'pātnīvata');
hence Tvaṣṭr must be mentioned in the mantra; because, like Indra, he also
'drinks' the Soma.'

SÜTRA (35).

[SIDDHANTA]—BECAUSE OF INEQUALITY, SUCH SHOULD NOT BE THE CASE.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The view expressed above is not right. As a matter of fact, the Vedic Word is our sole authority; what the Word says that alone we regard as authoritative. In the case in question, what the Word (of the Text) declares is the actual 'drinking' by Agni-Patnivat only,—and of Tvasir, it declares the mere fact of his association (with Agni-Patnivat);—under the circumstances, the actual 'drinking by Tvasir can only be inferred from the fact that the said 'association' is not established without the drinking [and Inference is not as authoritative as the Vedic word].

"But the actual drinking by (or v.l., 'offering to') Trastr is distinctly enjoined."

True, it is enjoined, but only through the words of the mantra, not by a direct. Injunction;—all that the direct Injunction says is that one holds the

Pātnivata'; in ordinary life, an act—whether enjoined or unenjoined—is performed whenever a need is perceived for it; but there ordinary practice is the determining factor; but texts like those under consideration do not establish any connection between the Soma and the deity Tvash.

ADHIKARANA (15): At the eating of the Remnant of the 'Pātnīvāta' offering there should be no mention of the 'Thirty'.—Third counter-instance to Adhi. (12)

SUTRA (36).

So also the 'Thirty',—as these have been mentioned for another purpose.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same Pātnīvata offering, there is another mantra—' Aibhih agnē saratham yāhyarvāk nānāratham vā vibhavo hyashvāh, patnīvatastrimshatastrimshcha dēvānanusvadhamāvaha mādayasva' (Rgveda, 3.6.9).

In regard to this there arises the question—Should, or should not, mention be made of the *Thirty-three Deities* (in the *mantra* used at the eating of the remnant of the *Pātnīvata* offering)?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvanaksa:-" The Thirty-three Deities must be mentioned.-Why?-Because the Soma is actually offered to the Thirty-three Deities, with the following mantra-' Agnimagnidadhichchhati āyāhyagnērvāchīnam trayastrimshatā dēvaih saha samānam rathamadhisthäva nänärathairvä vibhavanti hi te' shväh tadidamanusvadhamävaha travastrimshatam patnivato devanagamaya tarpaya cha': from this we understand that when the Agnid Priest approaches Agni (Patnivat), it is for the satisfaction of the Thirty-three Deities :- the Soma spoken of here must be taken as related to that Deity which appears to be the predominant factor in the mantra; hence it is that we hold that the Thirty-three Deities should be mentioned,—'But in the Injunction itself, the deity spoken of is Agni-Patnīvat'-True; in the Injunction the only deity spoken of is Agni-Patnīvat. but the connection of other deities is not denied.—What if it is so ?-What follows from this is that the Thirty-three Deities indicated by the words of the mantra are recognised to be not incompatible with the Injunction (which while enjoining the one deity, Agni-Patnīvat, does not shut out the possibility of other deities).'

In answer to this Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta—The Theirly-three Detries should not be mentioned. In the mantra quoted, Agni is not spoken of either as the inviter, or as the server, or as the satisfier [of others];—nor is there any purpose served by sacrifices offered to the Thirty-three Detries.—"What then is the deity to whom the sacrifice is to be offered?"—It is Patnivat (Agni).—"How is that?"—Because it is Patnivat (Agni) that is enjoined by the words 'one takes up the Pātnivata'.—"But then there is mention of the Thirty-three Detries who are indicated by the words of the mantra."—The answer to this is that these are mentioned in the mantra for a different purpose.—"How so?"—Until the Soma has been actually offered,

it does not belong to Agni, and what belongs to one cannot be offered to another: hence any such assertion as that 'you please give this to the Thirty-three Deities' [which is the sense attributed to the mantra by the Pūrvapaksin] would be most incongruous. In fact, even such an assertion would imply that the offering is made to Agni .- "How so?"-It is only when one owns a thing that he gives it to another; hence if the mantra speaks of Agni giving the Soma to the Thirty-three Deities, it implies that 'you (Agni) are the owner of it' .- " But what Agni is requested to do is to intoxicate (render happy, 'mādayasva'), not to give."-The answer to this is that deities are never 'intoxicated'; hence if the mantra spoke of intoxication. such mention could be only for some transcendental purpose; on the other hand, if the words are taken as speaking of giving, it would do so by indirect indication, and serve a visible purpose; -- and Indirect Indication, being based upon a reliable source of knowledge, is more reasonable than the assumption of a transcendental purpose .- "Even if giving be taken as indirectly indicated, it is Agni who is mentioned as the agent doing the act of giving."—Such mention of Agni as the agent could only serve a transcendental purpose. For these reasons the only right interpretation of the sentence (in the mantra) is to take it as indicating the ownership of Agni (over the Soma).—Then again, the fact remains that the Soma is enjoined as to be offered to Patnivat (Agni), in the sentence one takes up, the Patnivata'. -"But it has already been pointed out that this Injunction does not preclude the deity indicated by the words of the mantra."-The answer to this is that it has been already explained that there is no deity indicated by the words of the mantra. Then again, in reality, the connection of other deities is precluded by the Injunction, by implication (if not directly); when the fact of Patnivat being the derty is expressed by the nominal affix in the term 'pātnīvata', this deific character of Patnīvat is not understood as being dependent upon anything else; so that the only deity in the case is Patnivat pure and simple. In fact, the mantra has to be explained on the basis of this Injunction (regarding the Pātnīvata Soma); hence the only way in which the mantra can be explained is as we have explained it.

The deity Patnivat (spoken of above) is Agni, as is clearly indicated by the expression 'agni patnivan'—where the two appear in apposition to each other.—From all this it follows that the deity to be mentioned is Agni only, not the Thirtu-three Deities.

ADHIKARANA (16): At the eating of Remnants, there should be no mention of the deity of the 'Anuvaṣaṭkāra'— Fourth counter-instance to Adhi. (12).

SŪTRA (37).

LIKE THE PERFORMER, THE 'VASATKĀRA' ALSO [should not be mentioned].

Bhāşya,

The deity of the Anuvasatkāra is spoken of in the mantra—'Somasyāgrē vihityanuvasatkaroti' (Aits. Brā. 3. 5).—In regard to this there arises the question—Should, or should not, this deity be mentioned (in the mantra used at the eating of Remnants)?

On this question the Pürvapakşa view is that—"the deity in question should be mentioned; because in this case we do not find—as we did in the foregoing Adhikarana—anything to indicate that the deity has been spoken of for some other purpose; hence it must be mentioned."

As against this we have the following Siddhānta—The deity of the Anwaşaţkāra should not be mentioned,—like the Performer; the Performer of the acts is not mentioned in the mantra,—in which no such expressions are used as 'Hotppitasya' or 'Adhvaryu-pitasya' (where the performing priest, Hoty or Adhvaryu, might be spoken of in the mantra recited at the time of the eating of Remnants);—similarly the deity of the Anwaşatkāra also should not be mentioned; specially because this deity has not been mentioned at the Archetypel Sacrifice; and at the ectype only that should be done what has been done at the Archetype. Hence we conclude that the deity in question should not be mentioned.

Adhikarana (17): Remnants of offerings other than those to Indra should be eaten without mantras.

[This and the next two adhikaranas are purely hypothetical, since they only traverse the Preliminary Hypothetical Stidhänta, left incomplete at the end of Adhikarana (11); these three Adhikaranas may be taken as setting forth the view which has been spoken of in Adhikarana (11) as the second possible alternative (Pūrvapakṣa).]

SŪTRA (38).

As the Soma belongs equally to all [there can be no distinction of 'Archetype' and 'Ectype' among the several offerings]; [as for the mention of the other metre] that is meant only to procude the previous metre.

Bhāsya.

Now follows the answer to what had been set forth (under Adhi-karana 11) as a preliminary (hypothetical) Siddhānta. It has been asserted (as the conclusion of adhi.11) that the eating of remnants should be done with mantras duly modified (according to the names of the deities to whom the offering may be made);—this, however, is not right; because the right course is that the eating should be done without mantras.—Why?—The answer is—because of all being equally enjoined, there is no relation of 'archetype' and 'ectype' (among the several offerings).—Why so?—Because the Context pertains equally to all.

Then as regards the argument urged (under Sū. 28) on the basis of a text indicating (the fact of the offering to Indra being the Archetype),—that text only serves the purpose of precluding the previous metre. That is to say, on the analogy of the third Savana, it is understood that the metre to be used should be the Japañ;—in order to set aside this notion we have the said text mentioning the 'anuştup' metre as the one to be employed with the Bhaksa-mantra.

As regards the argument based upon 'namati' (see under Sū. 28),—
that is not incompatible with the view that all the offenings are equally
important.

Then as regards the argument that 'it is the offering to Indra that is held and measured' (see under St. 28)—the fact of the matter is that the sacrifices offered to Indra and the sacrifices not offered to Indra are not distinct sacrifices; they are so many repetitions of the same sacrifice; all the sacrificial accessories also do not belong to these repetitions; in fact they belong to the sacrifice itself. Hence the whole lot of them—the Soma, as well as the details regarding the Soma—should be taken as enjoined in connection with the sacrifice.—As regards the cup for Indra being 'held and measured', as a distinct mantra is specifically laid down for Indra, the 'holding' in connec-

tion with that deity has to be indicated by the words of the mantra itself; while that in connection with the other deities is to be remembered by means of contemplation and other means.

From all this it follows that the eating of the remnant of the offerings not made to Indra should be done without Mantras.

ADHIKARANA (18): The eating of the remnant of the offering made to Indra-Agni is to be done without Mantras.

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE OFFERING TO INDRA-ĀGNI, MANTRAS SHOULD BE USED; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF INDICATIVES".

Bhāṣya.

As in the foregoing adhikarana, so here also, the discussion starts on the basis of the Preliminary Siddhānta (set forth under Adhi. 11).

An offering of Soma to Indra-Agni is laid down in the text 'One holds the Aindragna cup (cf. Taitti. Sam. 6. 5. 4. 1).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the eating of the remnant of this offering to be done with Mantras?—Or without Mantras?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa—"The mantra should be used in the case of the offering to Indra-Agni; because Indra is certainly the deity of the offering of which Indra-Agni (jointly) constitute the deity: so that that offering is capable of being spoken of as 'indra-pita' ('drunk by Indra'); for that of which a part has been 'drunk' by Indra is certainly 'indrapita' ('drunk by Indra'); because when the Soma-juice was offered to, and drunk by, Indra-Agni (jointly), a part of it was certainly 'drunk by Indra'.—Hence it follows that the eating of the remnant of the offering in question should be done with the mantra'.

SŪTRA (40).

[Siddhanta]—In fact, the mantra should be used in the case of the offering to a single deity; because 'Indra-Agni' is a drity distinct from 'Indra',—Just as in the case of the 'Quartering' (of the 'Āgnēya' cake).

Bhāşya.

It is not any part of the offering that is 'drunk' by Indra; even if a part of it were 'drunk' by Indra, it would not become 'drunk by Indra'; in fact, the phrase 'drunk by him' is a figurative expression [as there is no actual drinking or eating of the offerings by the deities]; what is really meant is that it has been 'dedicated to Indra', i.e. 'that of which Indra is the deity'.

Then again, just as any factor which is incomplete without something else [as for example, any one member of a couple] can have no connection with what is connoted by a Nominal affix,—so also compounding like 'indrapita-

sya' ('drunk by Indra') is not possible with any factor which is incomplete without something else; [i.e. no such form as '\$\dangle \eta \eta \text{in} \dangle \eta \text{is possible}\$, when the deity is agni with some other deity; not \$Agni\$ by itself,—in the same manner, the compound 'indrapītasya' is not possible when the 'drinking' is done by \$Indra along with some other deity.]—This has been made clear under 'Vuanasha \dangle a, etc.' S\dangle \eta 3. 1. 27.

Objection—"If this is so, then this matter has been already settled under that adhikarana (3. 1. 27); why should it be discussed here over again?"

Answer-What has been discussed there is already an established fact.

Question—"Then why is it discussed again and urged that there is no connection (in a compound) with the name of a deity which is incomplete without something else?"

Answer—In the present discussion, the Pārvapakṣa does not consist of the proposition that "there is connection with a deity" (i.e. 'each one of the two should be regarded as the deity')—it consists of the proposition that there is connection with drinking [i.e. each of the two deities is the 'drinker']; and the Siddhānta consists in the proposition that 'in a case where the drinking is done by two deities, either one of them singly cannot be regarded as the deity [and hence in that case the mantra 'Indrapitasya, etc.' cannot be used].—Thus the present adhikarana is not a repetition of what has gone before (under Stitra 3. 1. 27).

[The difference is thus explained by Kumārīla—In the present case what the Pārvapakṣin holds is that the distinguishing character expressed by the term 'indrapliasya' is not the deific character, but the character of being the drinker, subsisting in the Receiver of the Gift,—and that it is present in each of the two deities (Indra and Agni);—while the Siddhāntin answers that the actual character of 'drinker' cannot belong to the deities, hence what the term 'indrapliasya' indicates is the fact of Indra being the deity (and Indra' is not the deity of what is offered to Indra Agni)— Tantruvārtika—Trans, p. 1126.]

ADHIKARANA (19): The mantra beginning with 'gāyatrachchhandasah' is to be used in connection with the eating of the remnant of the Soma-offerings at which several metres are used.

SŪTRA (41).

[PÜRVAPAKȘA]—"THE METRE IS LIKE THE DEITY."

Bhāsya.

In the Bhaksamantra we are discussing, there occurs the term 'gāyatra-chchhandasah' (Tai. Sam. 3. 2. 5. 2).—In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this section of the mantra to be used at the eating of the remnant of only that Soma-offering at which a single metre (Gāyatri) is used?—Or is it to be used at the eating of the remnant of that also at which several metres are used?

The Pūrvapaksa on this question is that 'the mantra is like the Deity'; that is, just as the mantra (containing the term 'indrapitasya') is not to be used in a case where the Deity is Indra along with another Deity (as decided in the foregoing adhikarana).—so also the mantra (containing the term 'gāyatrachchhandasah') should not be used in a case where several metres have been used; for here also the compound 'gāyatrachchhandasah' could not apply to a case where the 'chhandah' (metre) was the 'gāyatra' along with soma other metre'.

SŪTRA (42).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY, THE MANTRA SHOULD BE USED
IN ALL CASES; BECAUSE THERE IS NO CASE
WHERE A SINGLE METRE IS USED.

Bhāşya.

In reality, the mantra should be used in the case of all offerings.—Why so?—Because there is no case where a single metre is used;—i.e. there is no Soma-offering at which a single metre is used,—of which the association of another metre could be a qualification. Consequently, the mantra in question should be used in connection with the Soma-offering at which several metres are used.

[Next follows the final Siddhānta on the whole question discussed under Sūtras 27 to 42, Adhikaranas 11 to 19].

SŪTRA (43).

[Final Siddhanta on the whole question]—as held by
Aitishayana, one and the same mantra should be
used at the eating of the remnants of all
offerings;—because what the mantra
containing the term 'indrapitasya'
refers to is the 'Savana'
[not the 'Soma'],—the
term 'pita' being
figurative.

Bhāsya.

It has been asserted above (under Adhikarana 17) that the eating of remnants of offerings not made to Indra should be done without mantras .-This is not right. In fact, all the eatings should be done with mantras; and the mantra should be used just as it stands in the text (without any modifications). - As a matter of fact, the term 'indrapita' refers, not to the Soma, but to the Savana, as is clear from the fact that the term 'indrapitasya' is in the same case (genitive) as the term 'prātahsavanasya'.--"But we have the genitive ending in 'somasya' also".—True, the genitive ending is there; but that does not make the two (indrapita and soma) appositional. Because the Soma (that remains) is not drunk by Indra; -nor is it given to Indra; -what has been drunk was something else; and this something else has ceased to exist; and what has ceased to exist is not pointed out by the pronoun 'this', which refers to something that is present .- All these objections are not applicable to the case of the Savana; the Savana is 'indrapita' in the sense that the drinking has been done by Indra during that Savana; in this sense that offering also which has not been made to Indra becomes included under the Savana named 'indrapita', -and as such can be taken as spoken of by the mantra (containing the term 'indrapitasya'). When it can be so taken, and it is enjoined as equally applicable to all, -why should the mantra not be used in all cases ?-It is in the figurative (indirect) sense that what is not 'drunk by Indra' comes to be spoken of as 'drunk by Indra'.

Such is the opinion of the revered Teacher Aitishāyana;—such also is our own view. The Teacher has been named, only with a view to show that the view was originally propounded by him.

DISCOURSE III

PADA III.

ADHIKARANA (1): Properties like 'Loudness' appertain to the entire Veda, not to the form of the Mantra.

SŪTRA (1).

[PÜRVAPAKṢA]—"BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT ASSERTION, THE WORDS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THE TYPES".

Bhāsya.

[Having dealt with the use of Mantras according to the indication of their words, we now proceed to deal with their use, in accordance with Syntactical Connection.]

In connection with the Jyotistoma we read—'Uchchair-rchā kriyatē, uchchaih sāmnā, upāmshu yajusā' (Maitrā. Sam. 3. 6. 5).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Do the words ('pk', 'sāman' and 'yajus') as found in this text stand for the types—'Rk' (Verse), 'Sāman' (Music) and 'Yajus' (Prose-passage)—lie. for these kinds of mantras wherever found, irrespectively of the Vedic samhitā of which they form part]—or to the Vedics—Ryvāda, Sāma-Vēda and Yajurvāda—themselves [i.e. each of the Samhitās taken as a whole, composed of mantras in both prose and verse]?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapaksa-" They should be taken as standing for the types; -why?-because of the Direct Assertion; by merely hearing the words as used in the text, we understand that it is the type that is meant; hence the quietness (softness) becomes connected with the tupe referred to (i.e. the vaius); and there is no word that would connect it with the entire Vēda (Yajurvēda).-Then according to this view, those portions of the Yajurveda which are in verse-and yet not found in the Raveda-would come to be recited loudly; otherwise (if the properties applied to the Vedas, then all that forms part of the Yajurveda, -be it in verse or in prose-would have to be recited quietly, and hence one and the same verse (that is found in the Yajurvēda as also in the Rgvēda) would have both the properties alternatively; and this would mean the rejection of the injunction in one case [because when the common verse is read loudly, the Yajurvedic injunction is violated, and when it is read softly, the Rgvedic injunction is violated .- Lastly, the Pūrvapaksa view is in conformity with the indications of the Context; otherwise, if the property (quietness, for instance) applied to the Vēda, then, at all sacrifices, the same property of quietness would have to be adopted (for which there is no justification) [according to the Pūrvapaksa, the quietness would have to be adopted only in connection with those Yajus, -i.e. Prose, -mantras that are used at the Jyotistoma] .- From all this it follows that the words apply to the types."

SUTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ÎN REALITY, THE WORDS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STAND-ING FOR THE ENTIRE 'VĒDA'; BECAUSE THEY ARE FOUND IN A CONTEXT DEALING MOSTLY WITH THE 'VĒDA'.

Bhāsya.

What is declared in the text should be taken as referring to the Vēda ;why ?- 'prāyadarshanāt' [because they are found in a context dealing mostly with the Veda].- "What is the 'prayadarshana' (on which the Siddhanta is based)?"-The words in question are found in a passage dealing mostly with the Vēda,—the passage starting with a reference to the Vēdas, and ending with the sentence containing the words in question; -this passage is as follows-'Prajapati alone existed at the time,-he performed austerities,while he was performing austerities, the three Deities, Agni, Vāyu and Aditya, came out of him :- these Deities performed austerities,-and while they were performing austerities, there came out from them the three Vēdas-the Rgvēda from Agni, the Yajurvēda from Vāyu, and the Sāmavēda from Āditya'; -starting thus, the passage concludes with the following words-'what is done with the Rk is done loudly, what is done with the Saman is done loudly, -what is done with the Yajus is done softly' ['Uchchair-rchā kriyatē, uchchaih sāmnā, upāmshu yajusā'].-For this reason, we assert that the loudness and the quietness have to be adopted with what are mentioned in the Context [i.e. the Vedas themselves], and not with the types of mantras, the (metrical) Verse (the verse set to music, and the prose).—"How is this conclusion deduced?"-Insamuch as we find the words ('rk' and the rest) in the concluding portion of the entire passage—which means that 'inasmuch as the Vedas were produced in this manner, they should be used with loudness, etc.', -we conclude that the concluding sentence also must be taken as containing the terms 'rk', "saman and 'yajus' in the sense of the three Vedas: specially as, if not so taken, there would be no syntactical connection between the two portions of the passage, and this would make the words entirely meaningless .-- From this it follows that the words should be taken as standing for the Vedas.

SŪTRA (3).

ALSO BECAUSE OF INDICATIVES.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text also which is indicative of the fact that the words 'rk', 'sāman' and 'yajuş' stand for the $V\bar{e}das$; this text is—'(a) In the morning, the Deity moves with rks,—(b) at mid-day, he stays by the $Yajurv\bar{e}da$,—(c) at sunset, he is worshipped with the $S\bar{a}mav\bar{e}da$;—(d) so that the Sun moves along, never bereft of the three $V\bar{e}das$ ' (Taitti. Brā., 3. 12. 9. 1);—here the first three parts speak of the 'rk' and the two ' $v\bar{e}das$ ' (Yajurvēdş and Sāmavēda), and then the fourth part—'the sun moves along, never bereft of the three Vēdas'—recapitulates the whole lot by means of the common word ' $V\bar{e}das$ ' in the plural; which indicates that the term 'rk' (in the first

part) also is meant to stand for the Vēda [as otherwise, the plural number would be unjustifiable, as standing for only two Vedas, the Yajurveda and the Sāmavēda].-From this also, we conclude that the terms in question stand for the Vēdas.

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO, BECAUSE THERE IS A DISTINCT INJUNCTION OF PROPERTY (FOR THE SAMAVEDA) :-- AND IT COULD HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH

THE SUBSTANCE TYSELE.

Bhāsua.

There is a distinct injunction of the property (of loudness), in connection with the Saman,-in the sentence what is done with the Saman is done loudly':-this distinct injunction would be justifiable only if it referred to the Veda; if it referred to the type of mantra (i.e. the verses set to music), then, inasmuch as the loudness of the Sama-verse would have been established by the mere fact of its being a Rk (the loudness whereof has already been enjoined by the foregoing sentence) [as the Saman is nothing more than the 'rk' verse set to music, its connection with the thing 'Saman' would not need to be reiterated. [So that the distinct injunction in regard. to the Saman would be entirely superfluous .- From all this it follows that the words in question should be taken as standing for the Vēdas.

SŪTRA (5).

THE NAME 'TRAYIVIDYA' IS APPLIED TO ONE WHO KNOWS THE THREE VEDAS ('TRAYI').

Bhāsva.

That person is called 'Travividya' whose learning (vidyā) consists of the 'Travi.'-i.e. one who reads the three Vedas is called 'travividya'. As a matter of fact, the term ' trayi' is well known as applying to the Rk, Saman and Vaius; and it is only by reason of these three terms-'rk', 'sāman' and 'vajus'-standing for the three Vedas, that the name 'Travividya' is applicable, and actually applied to the person knowing the three Vedas. For this reason also the words in question must stand for the Vidas.

SUTRA (6).

[OBJECTION]-"IN THE CASE OF VERSES (OF THE YAJURVEDA WHICH ARE NOT FOUND IN THE RGVEDA), THE INJUNCTION (OF 'LOUDNESS') COULD BE FOLLOWED LITERALLY TONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PURVAPARSA VIEW] "-IF THIS BE URGED, [then the

> answer is as given in the next . Sütral.

Bhāsua.

It has been argued by the Pūrvapaksin that—"Those metrical verses of the Yajurveda which are not found in the Rgueda could be recited with loudness—only if the Pürvapaksa view were accepted (by which metrical verses wherever found should be recited loudly); so that the injunction would be literally followed in this case."—Now this argument has got to be refuted.

This $S\bar{u}tra$ serves the purpose of stating the argument to be refuted [and the refutation follows in the next $S\bar{u}tra$].

SŪTRA (7).

[Answer]—It is not so; because the quality belongs to the whole.

Bhāsya.

The argument that has been urged does not vitiate our position; because as a matter of fact, the quality of 'loudness' belongs to the entire $Rqjw\bar{e}tds$, and the quality of 'quietness' belongs to the entire $Yqjurv\bar{e}da$; under the circumstances, if those verses in the $Yqjurv\bar{e}da$ that are not found in the $Rqv\bar{e}da$ come to be recited quietly, there is nothing wrong in this; because the quality pertains to the $V\bar{e}da$, not to the Rk; and the $V\bar{e}da$ does not come to have the two qualities (as urged by the $P\bar{u}rvapaksin$).

SŪTRA (8).

INASMUCH AS THE CONNECTION OF THE VEDA (WITH 'LOUDNESS' ETC. IS VOUCHED FOR BY SYNTACTICAL CONNECTION), IT COULD NOT BE SET ASIDE BY THE CONTEXT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the Pūrvapakṣin that it is only the Pūrvapakṣa view that is in keeping with the indications of the Context.—But, as a matter of fact the connection of the entire Vēda (with 'loudness', etc.) is vouched for by Syntactical Connection; and if Context is set aside by Syntactical Connection, there is no incongruity in this.

ADHIKABANA (2): At the 'Fire-laying', the singing is to be done quietly.

SŪTRA (9).

When the Primary and the Subsidiary belong to two different Vedas, the Vedic characteristic of the Subsidiary is to be determined by that of the Primary; as the Subsidiary is subsecribent to the Primary.

Bhāşyz.

The Fire-laying Rite has been spoken of in the text—' Ya ēvamvidvānagni mādhattē' (Maitrā. Sam. 1. 6. 6.);—it is a rite enjoined in the Yajurvēda; a this rite, the singing of the Sāman is laid down in the text—' Ya ēvamvidvān vāravantāyam gāyati' (Maitrā. Sam. 1. 6. 7.), ' Ya ēvamvidvān yajūāyajnīyam gāyati',—' Ya ēvamvidvān vāmadēvyam gāyati' (Maitra. Sam. 1. 6. 7.).

In regard to this there arises the question—This singing at the Firelaying Rite—is it to be done 'loudly' (in accordance with the character of the Sāmavēda, to which all Sāma-singing belongs)—or 'quietly' (in accordance with the character of the Yajurvēda to which the Primary Rite of Fire-laying belongs)?

The $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$ view on this question is that the singing is to be done 'loudly';—why?—because what is done through the $V\bar{u}ravantiya$ and other $S\bar{u}mans$ is done through the $S\bar{u}mans\bar{u}a$; hence all these $S\bar{u}mans$ are to be sung 'loudly.'

On this we have the following Siddhanta-If there is a doubt as to whether the character of the Primary is to be altered in consideration of the character of the Subsidiary-or that of the Subsidiary should be altered in consideration of the character of the Primary,-the only reasonable conclusion is that the character of the Subsidiary is to be altered, and that of the Primary is to be left intact.-Why so ?- Because the Subsidiary is subservient to the Primary :- that is, the Performer takes up the performance of the Subsidiary solely for the purpose of making the Primary complete in all its details; if the performance of the Subsidiary brings about any defect in the character of the Primary, then nothing is gained by the performance of that Subsidiary, (since the main purpose of making the Primary complete in all details fails entirely). On the other hand, with a view to accomplish the details of the Primary, if the Performer undertakes the Subsidiary, and (in this performance) drops a characteristic of that Subsidiary,—then no harm is done to his main purpose; because the main purpose of his undertaking the Subsidiary does not lie in making the Subsidiary complete in all its details.-The singing of the Samans is after all a Subsidiary to the Fire-laying Rite, which is the Primary. This Fire-laying Rite belongs to the Yajurvēda; -hence its characteristic feature is 'quietness',-which characteristic sets aside 'loudness'

which is the characteristic of the Sāmavēda (to which the Sāma-singing belongs).—From all this it follows that the Sāmans (at the Fire-laying Rite) are to be sung 'quietly'.

[Kumārila has proposed a somewhat different presentation of the adhikurana:—
Le puts the question in the form—In a case where a thing (e.g. Sāma-singing) has its origin in one Vēda (the Sāma-Vēda), but its application or use is laid down in another Vēda (the Yajurvēda), should that thing be equipped with the properties peculiar to the former Vēda, or with those of the latter!—The Pūrvapakṣa—"Inasmuch as the origination of a thing always precedes its application, the properties adopted should be those of the Vēda in which the thing has its origin:"—The Sūd-dānuta—The properties should be those of that Veda which lays down its application,—(1) because the origination of a thing is only for the sake of the uses to which it may be applied,—(2) because it is only when the thing in question—i.e. the Sāma-singing—is applied to actual use, that it stands in need of some tone (loud or quiet) to be applied to it; and hence the tones enjoined in the texts 'Uchchaih rchā etc.' are those that can be perceived only at the time of application, not at the time of origination; as at the latter time it is not in use at all.—There are three other forms proposed for this Adhikuraṇa. See Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 1150-1151.]

ADHIKABANA (3): The Jyotistoma belongs to the Yajurvēda.

SŪTRA (10).

If an action is laid down in two Vedas, it is to be taken as belonging to that in which most of its constituent details are found.

Bhāṣya.

The Jyotistoma sacrifice is laid down in the Yajurvēda, in the text— 'Jyotistomēna svargakāmo yajēta'. ('One desiring heaven should perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice');—there is a similar injunction of it in the Sāma-Vēda also. As a rule, when an action has been laid down in one text, the mention of it in another text can only be for the purpose of laying down accessory details relating to it.

In regard to this, therefore, arises the question—Is the injunction in the $Yajuvv\bar{c}da$ to be taken as serving the purpose of laying down the action performance of the sacrifice,—and that in the $Sama-V\bar{c}da$ to be taken as serving the purpose of laying down accessory details relating to it? Or is it the other way about ?—[This enquiry is necessary, as] the performance will take up the characteristics of that $V\bar{c}da$ whose text is taken as laying down the performance.

The Pūrvapakṣa view on this question is that "it cannot be definitely ascertained whether it is the Sāmavēda-text or the Yajurvēda-text that is to be regarded as laying down the performance,—as we do not find any determining factor in the case."

Against this, we have the following Siddhanta: - The question should be determined by the fact of one or the other Veda providing the larger number of details of the sacrifice in question; so that the text of that Veda should be regarded as laying down the performance of the sacrifice which provides the larger number of the sacrificial details. As a matter of fact, when a Veda lays down the performance of a sacrifice, it is there that there arises the need for information regarding the details of its procedure; and an injunction of these details of procedure has its right place only where such information is needed: --wherever the larger number of sacrificial details are laid down, that is what constitutes the 'Procedure'; -so that it is on the basis of this principle (of the laying down of the larger number of sacrificial details) that we shall determine by inference which particular text is to be regarded as the injunction of the performance.-In a case where many persons resembling the king are seated, we infer that one to be the king who has a white umbrella (over his head) and chowries (on his two sides), -even though he may not be actually pointed out as the King ;-in this same manner, when we find that it is the Yajurveda-text which lays down the larger number of sacrificial details of the *Jyotisiona*,—which fact is a sign of its being the injunction of its performance,—we conclude that this text is the injunction of the performance.

From this it follows that the performance of the *Jyotistoma* should be done 'quietly'; as it is by the *Yajurveda* that the sacrifice is enjoined, and hence it is by means of that *Veda* that the sacrifice is performed;—and what is not enjoined cannot be performed.

[Kumārila is not satisfied with this explanation of the Sūtra. He explains the meaning of the Sūtra to be as follows:—'That action which is mentioned in two Vedas should have its appellation determined by the mention of a larger number,—i.e. the whole—of its constituent details, which may be capable of supplying all its requirements'. See Tantavārtika—Trans., p. 1154.]

Adhikarana (4): The 'Context' is indicative of the connection of subsidiaries.

SŪTRA (11).

THAT WHICH IS NOT CONNECTED (OTHERWISE) BECOMES CONNECTED THROUGH CONTEXT; BECAUSE DETAILS OF PROCEDURE ARE ALWAYS WANTED.

Bhãsya.

(a) Direct Assertion, (b) Indicative Power, and (c) Syntactical Connection,—these three means of determining the connection of subsidiaries have been duly described (in the foregoing Adhikaranas): (a) The Direct Assertion—'Aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣhatā' (Maitrā-Sarn. 3. 2. 4)—has been found to determine, through the Accusative ending (in 'gārhapatyam'), the use of the mantra (under Sū. 3. 2. 3);—(b) Indicative Power, which consists in the force of words contained in the mantra, has been found to determine the application of the mantra 'Varhirdēvasadanam dāmi' [Maitrā-Sarn. 1. 1. 2] (under Sū. 3. 2. 1);—(c) Syntactical Connection has been shown to determine the connection of subsidiaries (under Sū. 3. 1. 12) as in the case of 'arunayā krināti'. Tai. Sarn. 6. 1. 6. 7].

Now there arises the question—Are these the only means of determining the use of mantras?—The answer is—No.—What then is the other means?

It is with this question that the present investigation starts; just as in the case of such questions as—What is the name of this river?—What is the name of this mountain?—What fruit is this?

The answer to the said question is provided by the Sūtra—That which is not connected (otherwise) becomes connected through Context, because details of procedure are always wanted. That is to say, that which is not connected (with any act), through either Direct Assertion, or Indicative Power, or Syntactical Connection,—becomes connected through Context,—because details of procedure are always wanted; that is, when a certain statement (injunction of action) is found to 'stand in need for the statement of the details of procedure (of the action enjoined),—and in close proximity to it is found a statement which is capable of supplying this need,—then this latter statement becomes syntactically connected with the aforesaid injunctive sentence; and hence that procedure comes to be adopted at the action enjoined.

"What is the example for such connection?—What too is the purpose served by this enquiry?"

In connection with the Darshapürnamäsa-sacrifice, we read—'Samidho yajati, tanünapätam yajati, ido yajati, varhir yajati, svähäkäram yajati, '(Taitti. Sam. 2, 6, 1, 1); and through the force of Context, all these acts (sacrifices)

come to be performed in connection with the Darshapūrņamāsa-sacrifice,—not with either the Agnihotra or the Jyotistoma.

[So long as the continuity of the details of procedure relating to the Primary Action has not been broken,—whatever other action happens to be mentioned, without the mention of a distinct result, is to be taken as an auxiliary of the said Primary:—and this conclusion is based upon the force of the Context.—Tantravārtika—Trans. p. 1156.]

ADHIKARANA (5): The connection of subsidiaries indicated by the Order of Sequence.

SÜTRA (12).

THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE ALSO (DETERMINES THE CONNECTION OF SUBSIDIARIES), ON THE GROUND OF THE SAMENESS OF PLACE.

Bhāsya.

Question—"Are these [Direct Assertion, Indicative Power, Syntactical Connection and Context] then the only means of determining the connection of subsidiaries?"

Answer-No.

Question-"What else then ?"

Answer—The Order of Sequence also, on the ground of the sameness of place. When one set of actions and another set of accessories are laid down in a definite order of sequence—then there is inferred a sort of mutual need between the action mentioned in one place in the series of actions, and the accessory mentioned in the same place in the series of accessories; and when this need is there, the two become syntactically connected;—consequently the accessory in question is used at the action in question.

"Where is there an instance of such use? What too is the use of this enquiry?"

A set of three sacrifices is mentioned in a definite order of sequence [(1) Agnēya—,(2) Upāmāskuṣāja—,(3) Agnēyamīya]; among the three mantras mentioned, the mantra mentioned in the same place (i.e. the second) as the Upāmshuṣāja is 'Daādhirnāmāsi, etc.' (Taitti. Sam. 1. 6. 11. 6; See Mānava Shrautasūtra, 1. 4. 2. 4) [the first mantra being 'Agnēraham dēvayajyayā, etc.', and the third, 'Agnīṣomīyayoraham, etc.'];—a mutual need thus being inferred between the second sacrifice and the second mantra, the two are syntactically connected and the mantra comes to be used accordingly.

Similarly, there is the Aindrāgna sacrifice laid down as to be performed by one whose kith and kin have been ruined and one who has enemies [Maitrā-Sam. 2. 1. 1]; in connection with this there are two Yāyyānu-wākyās laid down, both related to Indra-Agni-first, 'Indrāgni rochanā divah' 'Pravarṣaṇibhyah' (cf. Maitrā-Sam. 4. 10. 4),—and second, 'Indrāgni nawatim purah Shnathadayrtram' (Maitrā-Sam. 4. 10. 5);—the use of these mantras at the Aindrāgna sacrifice having been already indicated by the Indicative Power of the words of the mantrus themselves,—it is through the order in which the two mantras occur in the text that we get at the particulars of their use, to the effect that the Arst mantra is to be used at the first Aindrāgna sacrifice and the second mantra at the second Aindrāgna sacrifice.

These are the examples; and this also makes clear the use of the Adhikarana.

Adhikarana (6): The connection of subsidiaries determined by 'Name'.

SŪTRA (13).

'Name' also (determines the connection); because it is for that purpose.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

Question—"Are the aforesaid the only means for determining the connection of subsidiaries?"

Answer-No; Name also is a means of determining the same.

Question—"How can Name be the means of determining the connection of subsidiaries?"

Answer—A Name is applied to things only on the basis of some connection or relationship; for instance, in ordinary parlance the name 'cooker' is applied to one who is connected with the action of cooking, and the name 'chopper' is applied to one who is connected with the act of chopping.—Similarly in the Veda also, when we find a term expressing connection with things eternal, we have the cognition of that connection.

Question-"What instance is there of this? What too is the use of this investigation?"

Answer—Those acts that are found to be named as 'Adhvaryava' should be performed by the Adhvaryu priest,—and those named as 'Hautra', by the Hott priest.—This is the instance of the connection of things being indicated by Name; and the purpose also served by this is that we get at the said conclusion regarding the performance of the acts.

ADHIKARANA (7): Among the six means of determining the connection of subsidiaries—'Direct Assertion', 'Indicative Power' and the rest,—that which precedes is more authoritative than that which follows.

SŪTRA (14).

Among 'Direct Assertion', 'Indicative Power', 'Syntactical Connection', 'Context', 'Place' and 'Name',—that which follows is weaker than that which precedes;—because it is more remote from the final objective.

Bhāsya.

The means of determining the connection of subsidiaries—'Direct Assertion', 'Indicative Power', 'Syntactical Connection', 'Context', 'Place' and 'Name'—have been described.—'Now arises the question—Which of these is to be regarded as most authoritative in a case where they are all applicable (but in conflict with one another)? As a matter of fact, one sentence can have only one meaning; so that no one thing can be taken as connected with two things at one and the same time; consequently there is likely to be a conflict between any two of the said six means.

⁽A)- 'Direct Assertion' more authoritative than 'Indicative Power'.

⁽¹⁾ The first question therefore that has to be considered is-Between 'Direct Assertion' and 'Indicative Power', which is to be regarded as the more authoritative ?-- "Which is the particular instance where there is such a conflict?"—In regard to the Injunction 'Aindryā gārhapatyam upatisthatē' ('With the Aindri verse, one should worship the Garhapatya Fire' Maitra-Sam. 3. 2. 4),-there is the question as to whether the 'worshipping with the Aindri verse' may be done of Indra or of the Garhapatya Fire (as one may choose)-or is it to be done of the Garhapatya Fire only ?--If the two means (Direct Assertion and Indicative Power) are of equal authority, then there would be option (one may do the 'worshipping' either of Indra or of the Garhapatya Fire); -- if however Direct Assertion is more authoritative, then the 'worshipping' should be done of the Garhapatya Fire only.-" In this case what is the Direct Assertion and what the Indicative Power?"-The Direct Assertion consists in the presence of the term 'garhapatya' itself in the Injunction [whereby the worshipping should be done of the Garhapatya Fire only]; and Indicative Power consists in the presence of the term 'indra' in the Aindri verse itself, which reads as ' Kadā cha na starīrasi nēndra sashchasi dāsusē (Mai.-Sam. 1. 3. 26; Taitti. Sain. 1. 5. 8. 4; Rgveda, 8. 51. 7), -this term 'indra' having the power of

indicating the deity Indra (to whom the worshipping would be done with the mantra).

Question-"What is a 'sentence'?"

Answer—When a number of words combine to express an idea, they constitute a sentence.

Objection—"If that is so, then the injunction, 'Aindryā gārhapatya-mupatis|hatē' is a sentence, and so also is the mantra, 'Kadā cha na starirasi, etc.'; as in both these a number of words combine to express an idea. Such being the case, the instance cited is one of conflict between one Sentence (Syntactical Connection) and another Sentence (Syntactical Connection), not between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power.—Or, the discrimination may be made among all these three—Direct Assertion, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection,—it being determined that such is the difference between Direct Assertion and Syntactical Connection, and such between Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.'

Answer-Indicative Power is the power or capacity of a word to denote a certain thing ;-while Direct Assertion consists in the expression of that meaning which is understood on the mere hearing of the word; this being called 'Shruti', i.e. Hearing .- It has already been explained that when several words express a single idea, they constitute a 'sentence'. Now as a matter of fact, all these three contingencies are present, either collectively or severally, in all sentences.-In the case in question, however, the idea that 'Indra is to be worshipped with the mantra 'Kadā cha na starīrasi, etc.' is not got at on the mere hearing of any word :- nor is there any word which. uttered in proximity to another word, could supply this idea;-all that happens is that in the mantra the term 'indra' is present, which has the power to indicate a certain deity, by the denoting of which a useful purpose is served :-viz, that the idea is provided that in the 'worshipping' of the deity Indra, the term 'indra' should be used, -as also the other words (of the mantra) that are syntactically connected with that term ;-on the other hand, there is no word in this mantra which has the power to indicate the Garhapatya Fire as the deity to be 'worshipped'; in fact the idea that the Garhapatya Fire is to be worshipped we obtain from directly hearing the term 'garhapatya' itself (in the injunction 'Aindrya garhapatyamupatisthate'), -not from the Indicative Power (of any word). Thus then, it comes to this: If Indicative Power is more authoritative than Direct Assertion, then Indra should be worshipped with the mantra; whereas if Direct Assertion (of garhapatya) is more authoritative than Indicative Power, then the Garhapatya Fire should be worshipped with the mantra.

Objection—"If such is the case then the comparison to be instituted in this instance is between Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection (Sentence),—not between Indicative Power and Direct Assertion. Because Indra is to be taken as to be worshipped, on the strength of the power of the term 'indra' to indicate the particular deity, Indra,—in the event of Indicative Power being more authoritative;—if, on the other hand, Syntactical Connection (Sentence) is the more authoritative, then Gārhapatya Fire is to be worshipped; as this is what is expressed by the injunction 'Aindryā gārhapatyamuyatisfhatê', which is a sentence."

Answer-It is not so; even though the injunction ('Aindryā gārhapatyam unatisthate') is a sentence, yet it also contains a Direct Assertion; and what is actually contradicted by Indicative Power is this Direct Assertion, not the sentence .- "How so?" -- Even if Indicative Power were the more authoritative, the meaning indicated by it (that 'Indra should be worshipped'). could be got at only through the said term 'indra' being syntactically connected with the word 'garhapatyam' (in the Injunction); if it were not so syntactically connected with the term 'garhapatyam', then the idea expressed by this term would be incompatible with the said Indicative Power; so that if the Indicative Power is the more authoritative, then, what is expressed by the term 'qarhapatya' will have to be rejected; as this would have no connection with the act of 'worshipping'; and in that case the term 'garhapatya' would have to be taken as (somehow) denoting the deity Indra itself. or proximity to the Fire [the meaning being that 'with the Aindri verse one should worship Indra near the Garhapatya Fire'l.-If, on the other hand. Direct Assertion were the more authoritative, then the idea of 'worshipping Indra', which is expressed by Indicative Power, would be set aside.—Thus then, the instance cited is one really of conflict between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power, not between Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.

Or [we may put the case differently]—The idea of Indra or Gārhapatya being the deity to be worshipped is not obtained through the Syntactical Connection (of the term 'Indra' or 'Gārhapatya'); in fact, the idea of Indra being the deity to be worshipped is deduced from the fact of the Mantra containing the term 'indra',—and the idea of the Gārhapatya Fire being the deity to be worshipped is obtained from heaving the Accusative ending (in 'gārhapatyam').—Thus also the conflict is between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power.

Now then (on this question of conflict between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power), we have the following Pürvapaksa-" Both these (Direct Assertion and Indicative Power) are of equal authority :- why ?-because this and that-i.e. Direct Assertion and Indicative Power-are the means of determining the connection of subsidiaries; -- between one cognition and another, there is no difference in form,—as that this has a form like that of an ephemeral thing and that has a form like that of a lasting thing.- 'But as a matter of fact, the form of Indicative Power is like that of an ephemeral thing, inasmuch as the cognition obtained from it is always doubtful, while that obtained from Direct Assertion is certain.'-This is not right; because if the cognition derived from Indicative Power were doubtful, then there could be no conflict or comparison between Indicative Power and Direct Assertion. In fact, it is because the cognition derived from Indicative Power is certain that it can be treated as an alternative to Direct Assertion .- : But, as a matter of fact, the cognition derived from Indicative Power is never free from doubt.'-It is not so; because in that case Indicative Power could not be a valid means of cognition at all.—' It may not be a valid means of cognition; but in regard to things cognised by means of Indicative Power there is always a doubt (as to its being true or otherwise). Or, we may

go further: the cognition derived from Indicative Cognition is not even doubtful; it is entirely invalid, wrong. For all that is learnt from Indicative Power is that such and such a word has the power to accomplish such and such a purpose; and when one thing is capable of accomplishing a certain thing, it is not necessary that it should accomplish it only when there is no verbal declaration to that effect. Hence we conclude that Indicative Power is not a means of determining the connection of subsidiaries.'-Our answer to this is as follows: -When a thing is spoken in proximity to a certain thing in a context dealing with this latter,—then the former is regarded as a means of accomplishing the latter :- and when the question arises as to how it will help in the accomplishment of that thing,-we obtain definite information regarding it from the Power or capacity of the thing,i.e. the thing will be useful for the purpose to the extent that it may be capable of doing. It is thus that Indicative Power comes to be a valid means of determining the use of things .- Nor is there any ground for discriminating between the validity (and authority) of Indicative Power and that of Direct Assertion (whereby we could reject the authority of one or the other) .- Hence it follows that these two means (Direct Assertion and Indicative Power) are of equal authority; so that on the strength of Indicative Power, the mantra 'Kadā cha na starīrasi, etc.,' is to be used in worshipping Indra, and on the strength of Direct Assertion, it is to be used in worshipping the Garhapatya Fire.—Further, we accept this conclusion (viz. that the two courses are optional) on the ground that there is no incompatibility between the two alternatives. Even in a case where one reason is stronger than the other, it sets aside this latter only when there is an incompatibility between the two,-not when there is no incompatibility. And there is no incompatibility in the conclusion that 'with the mantra in question one should worship Indra or the Garhapatya Fire',- 'There is certainly this incompatibility (or incongruity) in this conclusion that while only one act of worshipping has been enjoined, the act is done more than once (once of Indra and then of Garhapatya)' .- But subsidiary acts are always repeated along with each of the several primaries, -- so that the act of worshipping is repeated only with reference to the different deities to be worshipped; and this is quite logical, there is no incongruity in it.—' Well, then, there is this incongruity: when the mantra is used in worshipping the Garhapatya Fire, the term 'indra' (contained in the mantra) would be taken as denoting the Fire, and it would stand in need of some quality or function (establishing the similarity of the Fire to the deity Indra); -and when it is used in worshipping Indra, the term 'indra' would denote the deity Indra, independently by itself; and as between the indirect and direct signification, the direct one is to be accepted.'-It is not so, we reply. The direct meaning is to set aside the indirect meaning only when there is an incompatibility between the two; in the present case, there is no incompatibility; because there would be incompatibility only if the two meanings were expressed at one and the same time; as a matter of fact, however, the term 'indra' is taken as denoting the Fire at one act (where the worshipping is done of the Garhapatya Fire), while it is taken as denoting the deity Indra at an entirely different act (where the worshipping is done of Indra) .-

From all this it follows that the two—Direct Assertion and Indicative Power—are of equal authority,"

In reply to the above Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following Siddhānta:—Between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power, Direct Assertion is the more authoritative.—Why?—Because of remoteness from the final objective.—"What is this remoteness from the objective?"—It is remoteness—'viprkarṣa'—of the objective, 'artha'?—"What is this objective, 'artha'?"—It is what is expressed by the Vedic text directly. For instance, in the case in question the idea that 'one should worship the Gārhapatya Fire' is what is expressed most proximately by the Direct Assertion (contained in the injunction 'Andryā gārhapatyam upatiṣthatē'),—while the idea that 'Indra should be worshipped vis very much 'remoter'; that is, the idea that 'Indra should be worshipped with the mantra, Kadā cha na starīrasi, etc.' is not directly expressed by any Vedic text; even though the mantra contains a word capable of denoting Indra, since there is no assertion regarding the use of the mantra in worshipping that Indra, it is understood that Indra is not to be worshipped with the mantra.

Opponent—"It has already been explained that, inasmuch as the mantra occurs in the Context of a particular sacrifice, it is regarded as an accessory of that sacrifice;—and on the strength of its Indicative Power, it is taken as to be used in the worshipping of Indra."

Answer—It is not so; it has already been declared above that—'inasmuch as Dharma is based upon the Veda, what is not Veda should be disregarded' (Sūtra 1.3.1).—As a matter of fact, both of what have been cited
—Context and Indicative Power—are not Veda;—and in the matter of things
beyond the range of Sense-perception, there is no means of cognition available except the Veda. It is for this reason that we hold that Indicative
Power is very remote from the objective of Direct Assertion.

Objection—"If such is the case (and Indicative Power, being not Veda, is no authority in super-sensuous matters), then, Indicative Power could never be a means of determining anything, even where there is no Direct Assertion to the contrary; so that it comes to this that there is no truth in the assertion that 'Indicative Power is a means (of determining the connection of subsidiaries)'; and in that case how could there be any conflict between Indicative Power and Direct Assertion? For all these reasons we assert that there is no ground for instituting any comparison between the authority of Indicative Power and that of Direct Assertion."

Reply—When a certain act mentioned in a context stands in need of the mention of its details of procedure, and a mantra is found in close proximity of it,—the mantra, by the force of its presence in the text, comes to be syntactically connected with the words speaking of the act,—and this gives rise to the idea that 'one should perform the act of sacrifice with this mantra'; —that is to say—'when one is seeking to obtain the desired result by means of the sacrifice, one should help the performance of the sacrifice with this mantra'. Now, in the case in question, the mantra concerned ('Kadā' cha na starirasi, etc.') cannot help the sacrifice except by indicating the deity Indra; it is thus that we come to the conclusion that 'Indra should be

taken as indicated by the mantra'.—This idea is thus one that is based upon the Vedic Text (Direct Assertion) itself.

Objection—"If the idea is based upon Direct Assertion, it cannot be set aside by any other Direct Assertion; so that either Indicative Power should not be regarded as authoritative or it should be treated as optional with (equal in authority to) Direct Assertion."

We assert that it is neither to be regarded as devoid of authority nor to be treated as optional with Direct Assertion.-How so ?-It has been explained that the idea (derived from Indicative Power) is based upon Direct Assertion; hence it cannot be totally devoid of authority; -and yet, there is a remoteness from the objective, inasmuch as the idea that 'Indra should be worshipped with this mantra' is derived from Direct Assertion indirectly, through the inference of a syntactical connection (between the mantra and the injunction of the sacrifice) and of a power (in the mantra) of indicating (the deity, Indra); -while the idea that 'the Garhapatya Fire is to be worshipped with this mantra' is obtained directly from the Direct Assertion in the text 'with the Aindri mantra one should worship the Garhapatya Fire' .- (In the case of Indicative Power) thus, in the first place, there is to be a recognition of the Indicative Power itself, and then by the force of this power, the particular idea becomes indicated; -now all this cannot be possible when the idea (to be thus got at) is one that is contrary to the Direct Assertion which clearly declares that 'the Garhanatua Fire is to be worshipped with this mantra', and from which we already obtain the idea as to the manner in which the mantra is to help the sacrifice; - when this idea has been already obtained (from Direct Assertion), there is no justification for the assumption that the idea of Indra being worshipped with the mantra is derived from Syntactical Connection and Context, which (in face of the Direct Assertion) could not acquire the capacity to provide any such idea.

From all this it follows that by reason of its 'remoteness from the objective', *Indicative Power* is set aside by *Direct Assertion*.

This same conclusion is to be accepted also on the ground that it is not right to admit of an Option (as suggested in the Pūrvapakṣa). As a matter of fact, it is not right to admit an Option; because when an option is admitted, it means that in one alternative something that is directly enjoined is to be rejected; for instance, in the case in question, the idea that 'the Gārhapatya Fire is to be worshipped with the Aindri mantra' having been directly expressed by the Text as unalterable (eternal),—if we accept the negation of this idea (when we accept the other alternative of Indra being worshipped, as indicated by Indicative Power),—it means the rejection of what has been directly asserted by the Veda, and the acceptance of what is not so asserted;—and the acceptance of what is not asserted is as open to objection as the rejection of what is asserted; because in both cases, a well-ascertained idea is rejected.—Thus then, on account of the fact that it is not right to admit an Option, we conclude that between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power, Direct Assertion is the more authoritative.

It has been argued (by the Pūrvapakṣa) that the rejection (of Indicative Power by Direct Assertion) could be right only if there were a conflict be-

tween the two, and in the case in question, there is no conflict.—As a matter of fact, however, there is actual conflict; as the Vedic text could be taken as expressive of the idea that 'Indra should be worshipped' only on the basis of Syntactical Connection and Context, which (in face of the Direct Assertion to the contrary) have not acquired the capacity of providing such an idea;—no such idea can be expressed by any such Syntactical Connection and Context as have acquired the requisite capacity (from Direct Assertion); nor is it possible for Syntactical Connection and Context to be regarded, at one and the same time, as having acquired the requisite capacity and also as having not acquired the requisite capacity.—Thus there is a real conflict; and when there is conflict, between the two, Direct Assertion is more authoritative than Indicative Power.

(B) 'Indicative Power' is more authoritative than 'Syntactical Connection'.

Question—"What is the example of conflict between Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection?"

Answer-There is a mantra '(a) Syonante sadanam krnomi ghrtasya dhārayā sushēvam kalpayāmi—(b) tasmīn sīdāmrtē pratitistha vrīhīnām mēdha sumanasyamānah' [(a)' O Cake, I am preparing a pleasant seat for thee and am making it comfortable with a stream of butter; -(b) O essence of corns, with mind at ease, please sit and remain steady on this seat'] (Taitti, Brā. 3. 7. 5. 2-3; see Māna. Shrau. Sū. 1. 2. 6. 19).—In regard to this mantra there arises the following question: -Is the entire mantra to be used at the preparing of the seat and the placing of the Cake? Or the portion (a) ending with 'kalpayami' is to be used at the preparing of the seat (by spreading Kusha grass), and the portion (b) beginning with 'taemin sida' at the placing of the Cake? The point to consider is that, if Syntactical Connection has a higher authority than Indicative Power, then the entire mantra is to be used at both the acts .- "How so?" -The phrase 'tasmin sīda' is grammatically dependent upon the sentence ending with the words ' sush evain kalpayāmi" and hence becomes syntactically connected with that preceding sentence, the construction being-'yat kalpayāmi tasmin sīda' ['Please sit on what I am preparing'] .- If, on the other hand, Indicative Power has the higher authority, then the portion (a) ending with 'kalpayāmi' should be used at the preparing of the seat,-because the sentence 'syonantë sadanam krnomi' ['I am preparing a seat for thee'] is sufficient to indicate the act of preparing the seat,-and the portion (b) beginning with 'tasmin sīda' is sufficient to indicate the placing of the Cake, and hence this latter portion should be used at the placing of the Cake.

On this question we have the following Pūrvapaksa:—"Both these means (Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection) are of equal strength (authority); because, as a matter of fact, Indicative Power is not held to be superior (in authority) to Syntactical Connection, in the same way that Direct Assertion has been held to be to Indicative Power.—Or (we may go even further), it is Syntactical Connection that is superior to Indicative Power.—'Why?'—Because Indicative Power is what is set aside by Direct Assertion, and what is really authoritative can never be set aside; hence we conclude

that *Indicative Power* is something ephemeral (and not possessed of any lasting authority); because what is set aside by one is liable to be set aside by another also."

Against this Pūrvapaksa we have the following Siddhanta: -Between Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection, Indicative Power is possessed of higher authority :- why ?-because of the remoteness of the objective .- "What is 'the remoteness of the objective' in this case?"-Inasmuch as the mantra occurs in proximity to the Darshapurnamasa sacrifice with which the Context deals, we conclude that it is subsidiary to that sacrifice :-- now as regards the portion (b) of the mantra beginning with the words 'tasmin sīda', it has the power to indicate the act of placing the Cake; hence when it comes to be used at this act of placing the Cake, the presence of the mantra becomes justified and the purpose of its indication becomes fulfilled. There is, on the other hand, no authority whereby this portion of the mantra could be used also at the preparing of the seat.—Similarly, the other portion (a) of the mantra-'Syonantë sadanam krnomi, etc.'-is regarded as subsidiary to the Darshapūrņamāsa on the ground of its occurring in the Context of that sacrifice,—and when, on the basis of its indicative power, it comes to be used at the preparing of the seat, it has its purpose fulfilled, and hence cannot be used at the placing of the Cake, specially as there can be no useful purpose served by its being used at this act of placing .- Then again, the portion (b) beginning with 'tasmin sīda' has no 'power' (or capacity) to be used at the preparing of the seat; nor has the portion (a) beginning with 'syonante' the ' power' to be used at the placing of the Cake. - What may be possible is that the second portion (b) may acquire the 'power' to be used at the preparing of the seat after becoming syntactically connected with the first portion (a),and the first portion (a) may acquire the 'power' to be used at the placing of the Cake after becoming syntactically connected with the second portion; -and neither of the two portions, by itself, has the said power ;-this is the ' remoteness of the objective' (in the event of Suntactical Connection being taken as the determining factor in the case in question).

Further, the inherent (direct) 'power' that the portion (a)-'Syonantē, etc.'-possesses of indicating the act of preparing the seat is primary;-while the 'power' (to indicate the act of preparing the seat) which the second portion (b)- 'Tasmin sīda, etc.'-acquires by becoming syntactically connected with the first portion is only secondary. Thus then, the use of the first portion of the mantra at the preparing of the seat becomes declared directly by the indicative power inherent in the mantra itself, and hence the meaning of the Direct Assertion (Vedic) is in close proximity to the Indicative Power; -on the other hand, in the case of a similar use (at the act of preparing the seat) of the second portion of the Mantra, the requisite meaning of the Direct Assertion could be got at only indirectly, after its power 'to indicate' that act had been brought into existence (by its becoming syntactically connected with the first portion); -so that in this case, the meaning of Direct Assertion becomes intervened by Indicative Power (whose functioning is necessary before the required meaning is obtained through Syntactical Connection) and hence, to that extent, it is 'remote', -Similarly, in the case of the act of placing the Cake, its connection with the second portion is proximate (direct), while

that with the first portion is intervened by Indicative Power (whose functioning is necessary before the required meaning can be obtained from Syntactical Connection).—From all this it follows that between Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection, Indicative Power is possessed of higher authority; hence, even though the first portion of the mantra,—'Syonante, etc.'—is needed (syntactically) by the second portion,—and as such might be used at the placing of the Cakes—yet, what should be done is that the sentence should be split up and the first portion used only at the preparing of the seat,—and the second portion.—'Tasmin sida, etc.'—only at the placing of the Cake.

Objection—"The words of the first portion of the mantra—'Syonants, etc.'—possess the 'power' of becoming syntactically connected with the second portion, exactly as they possess the 'power' of indicating the act of preparing the seat;—and it is only power that is called 'Linga', Indicative Power. So that when the sentence is split up (in the manner just explained), what becomes set aside is an Indicative Power itself (and not Syntactical Connection)."

Answer—True; this (what is set aside) also is an 'Indicative Power'; but even though it is Indicative Power, if it is of the nature described, it is one that is 'remote' from the objective,—in the sense that (1) first of all, the Indicative Power brings about Syntactical Connection,—(2) then the mantra attains the 'power' to indicate,—and then (3) the meaning of Direct Assertion (to the effect that 'the first portion of the mantra should be used at the placing of the Cake);—it is in this sense that there is 'remoteness of the objective'; and it is this 'remoteness' that is the ground for the Indicative Power being set aside;—and when it is thus set aside, the first portion cannot become syntactically connected with the second portion. Similarly, the second portion—'Tasmin sida, etc.'—cannot become syntactically connected with the first portion.

Further, there is no perceptible purpose served by the first portion of the mantra through being syntactically connected with the second portion, —while by itself (through its Indicative Power) it serves the perceptible purpose of indicating the preparing of the seat.—"How so?"—Because the preparing of the seat (by spreading grass), and the placing of the Cake, have been declared to be the desired objectives [so that there can be no other objective in the case which could be fulfilled by the connecting of the two portions of the mantra].—Similarly, the second portion of the Mantra serves the perceptible purpose of indicating the placing of the Cake, without living syntactically connected with the first portion. And the two portions are not incapable of accomplishing their own respective purposes without being syntactically connected with one another.—From this it follows that the first portion is to be used at the first act (of preparing the seat) and the second portion at the second act (of placing the Cake).

It has been argued above that—"that which has been set aside by Direct Assertion shall be set aside by Syntactical Connection elso [so that Indicative Power cannot be superior to Syntactical Connection]."—This is not right. Because one thing has been set aside by one thing, it does not necessarily follow that it should be set aside by another also. Because even though Indicative Power has been set aside as against Direct Assertion, on the ground of its being remoter than Direct Assertion from the objective, yet when serving a useful purpose, it may be admitted to be authoritative as against Syntactical Connection, on the ground of its being nearer to the objective than this Syntactical Connection.—Thus also is Indicative Power possessed of higher authority than Syntactical Connection.

(C)- Syntactical Connection' is more authoritative than 'Context'.

Now the question arises as between Syntactical Connection and Context.—But first what we have to consider is—what is 'Prakarapa', Context' —Prakarapa (Context) is the declaration of what is to be accomplished and which stands in need of the procedure; it is the beginning ('pra') of the action ('kriyā') of declaring;—this is also called 'vidhyādi' (Beginning of Injunction) standing in need of (and taken along with) 'vidhyanta' (End or Sequel of Injunction).—What 'Syntactical Connection' (Vākya) is has already been explained.*

Now, what is the example of conflict between these two (Syntactical Connection and Context)?

The Sūktavāka-nigada provides the requisite example—[This Sūktaxāka contains the Mantra-passage—'(a) Agnīsomāvidam havirajusētām avīvrdhētām maho jyāyo 'krātām—(b) Indrāgnī idam havīvajusētām avīvrdhētām maho jyāyo 'krātām'—and so on, with the names of other deities as variants].—Here we find one set of deities (Agnī-Soma) mentioned in connection with the Paurņamāsī sacrifice, and another set (Indra-Agnī) in connection with the Amāvāsyā sacrifice. These two sets of deities do not

^{*} The Bhasya explains the signification of the component parts of the term 'prakarana'. 'Pra' means beginning, and 'karana' or 'kriya' means act; hence 'prakarana' or 'prakriya' means the beginning of an act; the particular act of which Prakarana is the beginning is explained to be the act of declaring or expressing; that is to say, Prakarana is the beginning of the act of expressing the Bhavana,-i.e. the beginning of the operation of the sentence laying down the performance of an action. Of any such action, the factor of the Result and that of the Instrument are expressed by single words, while the declaration of the factor of Procedure is done by means of sentences. Briefly then, Prakarana, Context, may be defined as the entire passage describing the details of Procedure of any particular action.- 'Vidhyadi'. 'Beginning of Injunction', is another synonym for 'Prakarana'; and it stands in need of the 'vidhyanta', 'End of Injunction', by which is meant the cognition of the entire mode of the action. Every Injunction of action has (a) for its beginning' (adi) the cognition of its procedure, (b) for its 'middle' the cognition of the subsidiaries of the action enjoined along with their results, -and (c) for its 'end', the cognition of the Result accomplished by the act enjoined .- What distinguishes Context from Syntactical Connection is the fact that, for a definite purpose, we connect, over again, several sentences that have already served their purpose through the expression of the meaning of their component words; whereas Syntactical Connection does not operate, for the slightest purpose, in disjoined parts, and its purpose is served only by the connecting together of the parts in a definite relationship.—Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 1208-1209.

become syntactically connected with one another;—hence on the basis of the *Indicative Power* of the *Mantra* the term 'indrāgnī' should be withdrawn at the performance of the *Paurņamās*' sacrifice, but retained at that of the Amāvāsyā sacrifice. [And similarly, at the performance of the Amāvāsyā sacrifice, the term 'Agnī-soma' should be withdrawn: but it should be retained at the performance of the *Paurņamās*' sacrifice.]

Now in connection with this, there arises the question-after withdrawing the reference to the deities (which have no connection with the Paurnamāsī sacrifice), is the rest of the passage (b)-i.e. the words 'avīvrdhētām maho jyāyo 'krātām' Taitti. Brā. 3.5, 10.3)—to be repeated at both sacrifices, the Paurnamäsi and the Amāvāsuā, as many times as it occurs in the entire Sūktavāka-hymn; -- greater authority being attached to Context [all the mantras that constitute the Sūktavāka being found in the context of both sacrifices] ?-Or is the remaining passage to be used only at that sacrifice at which the reference to the deities-Indra-Agni-has been retained (i.e. at the Amāvāsyā sacrifice)—greater authority being attached to Syntactical Connection [the passage in question being syntactically connected with the reference to Indra-Aoni]? [That is, at the Paurnamasi sacrifice, the passages (a) and (b) should be read as '(a) Agnīsomāvidam havirajusētām maho jyāyo' krātām-(b) avīvrdhētām maho jyāyo krātām', the reference to Indra-Agni in (b) being dropped out?-or as only '(a) Agnisomāvidam havirajusētām avivrdhētam maho jyāyo' krātām,' the whole of (b) being dropped out?-Similarly, at the Amāvāsyā sacrifice, should the mantras be read as '(b) Indragni idam havirajusētām avivrdhētām maho jyāyo' krātām,—(a) avīvrdētām maho jyāyo' krātām'? or as 'Indrāgnī idam havirajusētām maho jyāyo' krātām'?]—Similarly, in regard to the other mantras (composing the Süktaväka).

On this question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa.—" Both these means (Syntactical Connection and Context) are of equal authority.—Why?—There is as much 'need' (incompleteness) in one case as in the other; and when the need is equal in both, there can be no ground for discriminating between them;—hence both should be regarded as of equal authority.—Or we may regard Syntactical Connection as the weaker of the two; as it has been shown to be liable to be set aside by Indicative Power."

In answer to the above we have the following Siddhānta:—Syntactical Connection is more authoritative than Connect.—How?—Beccuse of the remoteness of the objective.—"What is the remoteness of the objective in this case?"
—In the case of Syntactical Connection, each individual word of the sentence, detatched from the rest, becomes incomplete,—and the sentence is complete only when the whole of it is taken together;—in this case therefore the fact of Syntactical Connection (all the words forming one sentence) is directly perceived;—in the case of Context, on the other hand, the fact of the whole of it forming one connected unit is not perceptible.—"How is that?"—In the case of Context, what happens is that when some detail is found mentioned in close proximity to an act which stands in need of the mention of the details of procedure, then, the latter becomes complete (by being supplemented by the former);—so that what is inferred in this case is that the act in question was incomplete (without the supplement),—and not that the two together

form 'one sentence' (are syntactically connected). It is only when there is Syntactical Connection that, on the basis of that connection, we assume the power of indicating (the requisite detail), and this detail then becomes duly indicated.—Thus the 'remoteness of the objective' in this case is that Direct Assertion is nearer to Syntactical Connection than to Context, from which latter it is far removed.*

Thus then, when action is taken according to the Injunction, 'with the Sūklavāka one should offer the Kusha-bundle'—and when mantras are used after omitting the names of the deities of the Paurnamāsī or those of the Amāvasyā, as the case may be,—then the rest of those mantras also is to be used after similar omissions. So that even though, on the strength of Oontext, the portion of the mantra (a) left after omitting the names of the deities of the Paurnamāsī (Agni-Soma) may be inferred to be syntactically connected with that mantra-portion (b) which speaks of the deities of the Amāvāsyā (Indra-Agni),—yet the connection of this latter portion with the names of the deities of the Amāvāsyā (Indra-Agni) is directly perceived;—as a matter of fact, however, there can be no valid Inference contrary to a fact of Perception. Further, the purpose of the Context having been thus accomplished, the several factors in it become complete, and not being in want of anything, they cannot be made to be in want (and incomplete).

It has been argued that "Being set aside by Indicative Power, Syntatical Connection should be set aside by Context also."—If a means of right cognition has been set aside once, it does not necessarily follow that it is entirely evanescent (and hence rejected) in other cases also. If it were so evanescent, it would not be a 'means of right cognition' at all. The fact of the matter is that a certain thing is effective against one thing (but not against another); for instance, though Syntactical Connection has the power to set aside Context, it has no such power against Indicative Power; and the reason for this lies in the fact that, while as compared to Indicative Power.

^{*} If we accept Context as the authority in this case, then,—(1) inasmuch as there is no syntactical connection perceived between the mantra-portion (a) from which the names 'Agni-Soma' have been omitted and the names 'Indra-Agni',-it will be necessary to assume this Syntactical Connection; -(2) then, on the basis of this Syntactical Connection, it would be necessary to assume in the mantra (a) the Indicative Power to indicate the deities Indra-Agni; -(3) when this Indicative Power has been assumed, on its basis, there could be the assumption of the Direct Assertion to the effect that 'such and such a portion of the mantra is to be used at the performance of such and such an act'; -thus then between the Context and the actual use of the mantra, there are three intervening steps to be assumed .- In the case of Syntactical Connection, on the other hand, the connection between the mantra-words and the Deity is directly perceived; -and (1) on the basis of this connection there is assumption of the Indicative Power in the mantra to indicate the deities concerned; -- and (2) then follows the assumption of the Direct Assertion laying down the actual using of the mantra; -so that in this case between Syntactical Connection and the actual using, there are only two intervening steps to be assumed .- It is in this sense that the 'objective' is 'remoter' in the case of Syntactical Connection than in that of Context.

Context, it is nearer to the 'objective'. Thus it is that Context is set aside by Syntactical Connection.

(D) ['Context' is more authoritative than 'Order'].

Question—"What is the instance of conflict between Context and Order?" Answer—There is the Rājasūya sacrifice which consists of several (primary sacrifices) enjoined in a definite order;—one of these is the Abhishčchanīya sacrifice;—among the details of those sacrifices there is enjoined the Reciting of the story of Shunahshēpa, which occupies the same place in the order of sequence among the details which the Abhisēchanīya does among the sacrifices.—Now if 'Context' is to be regarded as of higher authority, then the said Reciting of the story should be taken as forming part of all the sacrifices;—on the other hand, if higher authority attaches to 'Order', then it should form part of the Abhisēchanīya sacrifice only. [The question thus is—of which sacrifice does the Reciting of the story form part 7]

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa;—"Both these means of knowledge ('Context' and 'Order') are of equal authority.—Why?—Because we do not find any grounds for discriminating between the two, whereby we could determine that this one is possessed of superior authority; hence we conclude that both are of equal strength.—Further, we have seen that 'Context' is rejected by 'Syntactical Connection'; it will then be equally liable to be rejected by 'Order'."

Against this Pūrvapaksa, we have the following Siddhanta: -- Context' is superior to 'Order' .- Why ?- Because of the remoteness of the objective' (Sū.) .- "What is the remoteness of the objective in this case?"-In cases like the one under consideration the connection of the details with sacrifices would depend upon the 'Syntactical Connection' (between the texts enjoining them); -now among a number of details mentioned in the same 'Context',-inasmuch as there is likely to be a 'need' of supplementing. -it may be possible to syntactically connect a sacrifice even though complete in all its details, -with a further detail mentioned in close proximity to itself (in the same Context) :- but it is not equally possible to syntactically connect a sacrifice mentioned in a certain order of sequence with a detail that may be found to be mentioned (elsewhere) in the same order of sequence. The 'Order' of a thing consists only in the particular position that it occupies among a number of things mentioned together; so that it has to be admitted that when we connect a thing mentioned in a certain 'Order' with others mentioned along with it, simply on the basis of that proximity, -we do not really perceive any 'need' in the thing in question (for such connection). In the case of 'Context', on the other hand, such need (among the several details mentioned in the same Context) is directly perceived .- It is not possible for what is mentioned in the same 'Context' and what is mentioned in the same 'order' to be syntactically connected with the sacrifice in question.—Thus it is that there is a conflict between the two ('Context' and 'Order') .- Now, in the case of 'Context', the 'need' (for mutual connection) is directly perceptible; and as such it can set aside the assumption of 'need' based upon 'Order', which could only be inferred. [The process by which these means of knowledge function in the case, leading up to the assumption of the necessary 'Direct Assertion' is as follows]—(I) There is the assumption of mutual 'need',—which leads to (2) the assumption of 'Syntactical Connection',—which leads to (3) the assumption of the 'power to indicate',—and this leads to (4) the assumption of 'Direct' Assertion'. Now this 'objective', 'Direct Assertion', is nearer to the 'Context' than to the 'Order' [because in the case of 'Context', the first step of 'need' is directly perceived, while in that of 'Order', the recognition of 'need' involves an inferential process, which is less directl,—For these reasons, as between 'Context' and 'Order', 'Context' should be regarded as more authoritative.

As regards the argument that "having been set aside by 'Syntactical Connection', 'Context' could be set aside by others also",—this is not right; because what is proper is that what has been set aside (once) should be helped (by another), and not that it should be further set aside.

(E) ['Order' is more authoritative than 'Name'].

Question—"What is the example of conflict between 'Order' and 'Name',—and which of the two is more authoritative?"

Answer—Under the section named 'Paurodāshika' ('Pertaining to the Cake'),—but in a place in the 'order of sequence which is the same as that of the Sānnāyya' (Curd-Butter),—we find the mantra 'Shundhadhvam daivyāya karmanē' (Taitti Sain. 1. 1. 3. 1), laid down for the purposes of purification.—In regard to this, there arises the question—'Name' being regarded as more authoritative, should the mantra be used for the purification of the vessels containing the Cake ?—Or 'Order' being regarded as more authoritative, should it be used for the purification of the vessels containing the Card-Butter ?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa—"The two means of knowledge are of equal authority.—Why?—Because there is no difference between the two.—Or, we may regard 'Name' as the more authoritative of the two; as 'Order' has been found to be liable to rejection by 'Context' also."

In answer to this, we have the following Siddhānta:—'Order' is the more authoritative of the true.—Why?—'Because of the remoteness of the objective' (Sū).—''What is the remoteness of the objective in this case?''—(In the case of the use of a mantra being indicated by 'Order') what happens is that the 'Syntactical Connection' (of the mantra) with something (in the same context) having been recognised by means of 'Context',—if any particular thing happens to be mentioned in proximity to it (i.e. in the same order of sequence), there follows the assumption of mutual 'need', which again leads to the assumption of 'Syntactical Connection' (of the mantra) with that particular thing.—As for 'Name' on the other hand, it is only a secular (non-Vedic) term, and nothing secular can have any authority on matters like the one under consideration.—Consequently 'Order' should be regarded as more authoritative (than 'Name').

Objection—"If that is so, then what follows is that in matters like the under discussion, the use of mantras is indicated by 'Order',—not that 'Order' is more authoritative because of the remoteness of the objective (in the case of 'Name') [which is the thesis desired to be proved by the Siddhānia]. It is when two means of knowledge appertain to the same matter that there is a comparison between the two regarding their authoritative character; in the way in which it has been argued, however, 'Name' is not a means of knowledge at all, because it is a secular word, and in the case of secular words it is the person (the speaker) who is the authoritative source of knowledge."

Renly—This does not affect the position at all. As a matter of fact. in the case in question the fact of the mantra being subsidiary to one thing or the other is not cognised through the authority of any Person; what is cognised through the Person is the fact that the name 'Paurodashika' applies to this particular section of the Veda: in reality, our sole source of information consists in the Person (or Persons who, in the course of their reading, have given definite names to certain sections of the Veda);-just as such person or persons are the sole authority for such ideas as-(a) 'this mantra is mentioned in the same order of sequence as the Sānnāva'. (b) 'it occurs in such and such a Context', (c) 'it is thus syntactically connected',-(d) 'this is a Vedic term'.-These ideas do not pertain to matters beyond the senses:—hence trustworthy persons are the source of knowledge in regard to such matters: it is only in matters beyond the senses that trustworthy persons are not the source of knowledge. [This is what is meant by our argument that 'Name' is a secular word.]-So that 'Name' is a real means of knowledge; and in so far as it is a means of knowledge, its authority has to be examined.

Says the Opponent—"In that case you have to explain the remoteness from the objective in the case of 'Name'."

The remoteness from the objective is as follows:—As a matter of fact, the definite connection of the mantra with the Kännäyya is indicated by the fact of its occurring in the same 'Order' of sequence (as the Kännäyya); but no such definite connection of the mantra is indicated by the 'Name' ('paurodāshika')—all that happens is that when we find the term ('paurodāshika') pronounced, we gather, from Presumption, that there must be some sort of connection (between the mantra and the Purodāsha).—Thus it is that, as before (in other cases), there is remoteness from the objective (in the case of 'Name'); and (for this reason) 'Name' is set aside by 'Order'.*

^{*} What is meant is that in all cases the action of one man depends upon what he has seen in other men; nor do we find the Veda making any such declarations as 'this thing is mentioned in the same order of sequence as something else', 'this occurs in such and such a Context', and so forth;—it is only when men are reciting the Veda, that we come to notice these facts;—those readers themselves must have noticed the same facts when some other men had been reciting the Veda; and so on and on, such noticing of the facts could be traced to time without beginning, and as such these facts would come to be regarded as authoritative. Otherwise, from the point of view of the Veda alone, the 'Context' as well as 'Non-Context' (per se)

(F) [The setting aside is possible even for such cognitions as have got at their objective.]

Question (against the entire Adhikarana)—"When it is said that 'this means of knowledge is set aside by that' and 'that by this' and so on,—that which is set aside,—is it one that has got at the objective of that which sets it aside? [i.e. Is the rejected Pramina one that has got at the same objective as the rejecting Pramina?]—'What are you driving at?'—Well, if the former has not got at the same objective, what would be set aside? [as there would, in this case, be nothing to be set aside—says the Rjuvimalā]—If, on the other hand, it has got at the objective, then how could it be set aside?"

Answer-The previous cognition is certainly one that has got at the objective of the subsequent rejecting cognition .- How so ?- We infer this from the fact that the general causal agency that brings about cognitions is present (in the case of the previous cognition also).- "Then, how is it set aside? "-It is not quite set aside; what happens is that there follows another cognition to the effect that 'this previous cognition is wrong' .- "What would be the character of a cognition that is not-wrong?"-When, even upon pondering over it, it is found that the cognition is not followed by a contrary cognition sublating it, then that cognition is regarded to be not-urong.-It is on this principle that among the several means of knowledge in the case in question-viz. (1) 'Direct Assertion', (2) 'Indicative Power', (3) 'Syntactical Connection', (4) 'Context', (5) 'Order' and (6) ' Name',-the one that precedes is more authoritative than what follows, because in the case of the cognition obtained through it, even pondering over it, it is found that there is no contrary cognition sublating it.-It is for this reason that when there is a collision-i.e. conflict-among these, the one that follows is weaker than what precedes, because of the remoteness of the objective.

[The whole of this last discussion (F) has been alternatively explained as having a wider scope and referring to all cases of the setting aside of one cognition by another. See Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 1217-1222]—Mandana Mishra, however, in his Anukramanikā has treated this as a distinct Adhikarana, under Sūtra 14, just like the foregoing five Adhikaranas (A to E).

would be equally without authority.—Then, inasmuch as the above facts will have been noticed by many persons, there could be no suspicion of their being defective through discrepancies in the perceptive faculty of any one person.—Thus then, it is clear that due authority does attach to 'Name', as a means of knowledge; but though it is so in certain places, yet in others, it is set aside whenever it is found to be more remote from its objective than other means of knowledge.—[Tantravār-tāka—Trans., p. 1215.]

ADHIKABANA (8): The number 'twelve' in connection with the 'Upasads' pertains to the 'Ahīna' sacrifice.

SŪTRA (15).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" ON ACCOUNT OF THE 'CONTEXT', THE TERM 'AHINA' SHOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE TAKEN IN THE SECONDARY (FIGURATIVE) SENSE."

Bhāşya.

[We have dealt with cases of conflict between one means of knowledge with the with a follows immediately after it, in the enumeration; we are now going to deal with cases of similar conflicts at random; and the present Adhikarana is going to deal with a case of conflict between 'Direct Assertion' and 'Context'; according to the Rjuvimalā this a case of conflict between 'Syntactical Connection' and 'Context'.]

In the context of the Jyotistoma sacrifice, we find the text—'Tisra ēwa' sāhnasya upasadah, dvādasha ahinasya' ['There are three Upasads at the Sāhna sacrifice and twelve at the Ahīna'] (Taitti, Sain. 6, 2, 5, 1)—['Sāhna' is a name for the Jyotistoma, based on the ground of its being completed in one day;—'Upasads' are the homa-offerings made during the time following the Initiation-day and before the day of the Soma-extraction;—'Ahīna' is the name given to those sacrifices which consist of several repetitions of the Soma-sacrifice lasting for two, three or more days.]

In connection with this text, there arises the question—Does the number 'twelve' mentioned in connection with the *Upasads* pertain to the *Jyotistoma* or to the *Ahina* sacrifice?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa—"The number should be taken as appertaining to the Jyotisjoma.—Why?—Because of the 'Context';—i.e. it is only when it is thus taken that the 'Context' is honoured.—"But 'Context' should be set aside by 'Syntactical Connection' (as the sentence 'dvādasha ahīnasya' distinctly says that the number of Upasads is 'twelve' at the Ahīna,'."—It is not set aside.—Why?—Because the term 'ahīna' literally means 'what is not hīna or poor',—i.e. the sacrifice which is not poor, either in the point of sacrificial fee, or of sacrificial implements, or of results;—and in this sense the Jyotisjoma itself would be Ahīna (in the said figurative sense) [so that the said sentence also would connect the number 'twelve' with the Jyotisjoma itself, and not with any other sacrifice of the name of 'Ahīna']."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—THE NUMBER SHOULD BE SEPARATED (FROM THE CONTEXT), BECAUSE THE WORD ('AHINA') IN ITS PRIMARY SENSE HAS NO CONNECTION (WITH JYOTISTOMA).

Bhāṣya.

The number 'twelve' of the Upasads 'should be separated' (from the Context);—why?—because there is no connection with the Jyotistoma.—"Why should there be no connection (with the Jyotistoma)?"—Because it is clearly perceived that the number in question is syntactically connected with the Ahīna.—"But the Jyotistoma itself is 'Ahīna' in the figurative sense."—It will not be right to take it in that sense; so long as the primary sense is applicable there can be no justification for the word being taken in a figurative sense.—"But the term 'ahīna' can be taken as a negative compound (meaning that which is not-hīna, not poor); and this will be a primary signification of the term."—This is not possible, we reply; for if the term 'ahīna' were a negative compound, then it would have the accent on the first syllable; as it is, however, it has the accent on the middle (second) syllable [See Vār-tīka under Pāṇini 6. 2. 2].—From all this it follows that the indications of the 'Context' should be set aside and the number 'twelve' should be taken as anvertaining to the Ahīna sacrifice.

Further, we have the assertion also in the text itself, to the effect that 'at the Sāhna there are three Upasads, but there are twelve at the Ahina';—this assertion becomes explicable only if the Ahina is a sacrifice different from the Sāhna (Jyotistoma); so that, the said assertion being there, the number 'twelve' must appertain to the Ahina sacrifice.

[Kumārila has taken exception to this presentation of the Adhikarana, and proposed a somewhat different presentation,—for which see Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 1226-1227.]

Adhikarana (9): The two 'Pratipads' are to be separated from the 'Context' and connected with 'Kulāya' and other sacrifices.

SŪTRA (17).

WHAT IS CONNECTED WITH DUALITY AND PLURALITY (SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM THE 'CONTEXT'), BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED (ELSEWHERE).

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma, we read—'Yuvam hi shah suspati (Sāmaveda 2. 351) iti dvayoryajamānayoh pratipadain kuryāt (cf. Padehvimsha-Brāhmaṇa 6. 10. 14);—Ētē asrgramindavah (Sāmaveda 2. 180) iti bahubhyo yajamānēbhyah' (cf. Padehavinsha-Brāhmaṇa 6. 9. 13). ['Pratipad' isthe name given to the verse that is recited before the singing of the Stotra-hymn; the meaning of the texts therefore is that 'for two sacrificers, the Pratipad should consist of the verse 'Yuvain hi sthah srapatī etc.', and for several sacrificers, the Pratipad should consist of the verse 'Ētē asrgramindavaḥ, etc.']

In connection with this, there arises the question—Are the two Pratipads here laid down to be used at the Jyotisjona sacrifice itself?—Or should they be separated from the Context and used at a sacrifice performed by two sacrificers, such as the $Kul\bar{u}ya$ and the like—and at one performed by several sacrificers, such as the $Dvir\bar{u}tra$ and the like?

The conclusion (Siddhānta) that suggests itself is that 'what is connected with duality and plurabity' (i.e. what is spoken of in connection with two sacrificers and several sacrificers), not having any connection with the Jyotistoma (which has a single sacrificer),—the two Pratipads should be separated from the 'Context': because in connection with the Jyotistoma we do not find two sacrificers mentioned,—as we do in connection with the Kulāya, in regard to which the injunction is—'The King and the Priest, desiring absorption into God-head, should perform this Kulāya sacrifice' (Jaiminīya-Brā. 2. 132).

SŪTRA (18).

[PCRVAPAKSA—urged against the Siddhānta stated in the foregoing Sūtra]—" They might find place (in the Jyotistoma), in the event of two or more sacrificers being engaged in it for some special furpose."

Bhāsya.

Says the Opponent—"If you hold the opinion that the two Pratipods should be separated from the 'Context',—then, this cannot be right; as it

would mean the rejection of the authority of the 'Context'.—'Let the Context be rejected (it is only right that it should be rejected), on the ground that the Jyotistoma has no connection with two or several sacrificers'.—Even though there may be no texts laying down two sacrificers for the Jyotistoma, it would be possible for two sacrificers to be there for some special purpose; for instance, there may be some act (connected with the Jyotistoma) which the sacrificer would be unable to accomplish singly by himself, and which he could accomplish with the help of an assistant; as a matter of fact, when a man has to perform a sacrifice, he should perform it in any way he can do it; consequently, it would be open to the sacrificer to take an assistant, even though this might involve the disobeying of certain injunctions (regarding the performance of certain acts by the sacrificer himself, for instance). In this manner, the two Pratipals would remain within the Context. Consequently they should not be separated from the Context.

SUTRA (19).

[Answer]—That cannot be; as the archetype is connected with one only.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The 'archetype' in this case is the Jyotistoma; of this the accessory details have been all clearly laid down by the texts themselves, and none of it has got to be deduced from the general maxim (that 'the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype').—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then what is clearly laid down by the texts cannot be rejected. In the case of ectypal sacrifices, on the other hand, as details would be deduced from the said general maxim, they would be merely inferred, and as such liable to rejection. Then again, due significance is meant to be attached to the singleness of the performer of the Jyotistoma, which, being thus directly asserted, could not be set aside by mere Indicative Power.—Even in cases where the performance of the Jyotistoma is found to be laid down as compulsory, we find only a single sacrificer spoken of;—e.g. in such texts 'Vasante vasante jyotisa yajēta' [where 'yajēta' is in the singular number]. From all this it follows that the two Pratipads in question should be separated from the 'Context'.

Question—"Why should not the text containing the terms in the Dual number (i.e. the first text 'Yuvam' hi sthah, etc.') be taken as referring to the sacrificer's wife? The two persons meant by the Dual number in the text 'yuvam' hi sthah, etc.' would thus be the sacrificer and his one wife? and cases where the sacrificer has several wives would come under the second text 'Etë asgramindavah, etc.'—Just as the injunction of wearing silk-kgaumë asināvagnimādadhiyātām' (where we have the Dual number) [has been taken as referring to the sacrificer and his wife,—in the same manner the injunction of using the Pratipals (which has the Dual or the Plural number) [may be taken as referring to the sacrificer and his one or several wives]."

Answer-In the case of the injunction (of wearing silk), it is impossible

to take the direct primary meaning (of the Dual number, as referring to two male sacrificers: as there is no performance of the Agnihotra laid down as to be done by two sacrificers), and hence the word (with the Dual number) is taken in a figurative sense, whereby the word in the masculine gender ('vasānau') is taken as including a female member (the sacrificer's wife). In the case in question, on the other hand, the Dual number and the Plural number, in their direct signification, are found to be applicable to the sacrifices actually laid down as to be performed by two men and several men; and hence there can be no justification for taking in an extended sense such expressions as 'bahubhuah yajamānēbhuah' ('for several sacrificers'). As for the expression with the Dual number, - 'dvayoryajamānayoh' ('for two sacrificers'), - the explanation that has been suggested,-that the term is to be taken as an Ekashēsa copulative compound made up of the terms ' Yajamānah' (Masculine) and 'Yajamānā' (Feminine), and as such standing for the two persons, the sacrificer and his wife-also takes the expression in a figurative (extended) sense.

Further [if, at all performances of the Jyotistoma, the Pratipads to be used were the two that we are considering—viz.: (a)' Yuwam hi shah, etc.' and (b)' Bits asygramindavah, etc.', on the ground that in every case the sacrificer would be accompanied by one or more wives, as suggested by the Pürvapakşa then], there would be no room for the Pratipad in the form of the mantra 'Upāsmai gāyatā naraḥ etc.' (Sāmaveda 2. 1-3) [which is the special Pratipad prescribed as the invarible concomitant of the Jyotistoma sacrifice].

From all this it becomes established that the two Pratipads under discussion should be separated from the 'Context'.

ADHIKARANA (10): The 'Jäghanī', 'Tail', should not be separated from the Context.

[We now proceed to consider cases which form exceptions to the principle of factors being removed from their Context.—Tantravāritka.—It has been established that sentence (i.e. Syntactical Connection) is more authoritative than Context; and we are now going to consider a case where the exact meaning of the sentence itself is doubtful.—Brhati.

SŪTRA (20).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" THE 'JÄGHANI' ALSO (SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM THE CONTEXT) BECAUSE IT IS A PART."

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Darsha-pūrnamāsa, we read—' Jāghanyā patnīḥ samyājayanti'—['Jāghanī' is the tail of the anima;—and the term' patnī' here stands for the action consisting of four oblations to the wives of the deities, which is, on that account, called 'Patnīsamyāja', 'sacrifice to the wives'].—In regard to this there arises the question—Does this injunction pertain to the Darsha-pūrnamāsa-sacrifices? Or is it to be separated from the 'Context' and attached to the Pashu (dedicated to Agni-Soma, at the Jyotistoma sacrifice)?

Question—"On what grounds should it be attached to the Darsha-pūrnamāsa? and on what grounds to the Pashu?"

Answer—If the Patnisamyājas are taken as enjoined in reference to the 'Jāghani', then the injunction in question should be separated from the context. If, on the other hand, the Jāghani is taken as enjoined in reference to the Patnisamyājas, then the injunction must remain in the context and be attached to the Darsha-pūnamāsa sacrifices.

The Pūrvapaksa view is as follows:-"What is laid down in the Injunction should be removed from the Context .- 'Why should it be removed?' —Because as a matter of fact, the Patnisamuāias are enjoined (as a Samskāra, sanctification) in reference to the Jāghanī.-How so?-Because the injunction of the Patnisamuājas is got at directly by means of the words (of the text 'Jāghanyā patnīh samyājayanti'); while that of the Jāghanī (Tail) is got at through 'Syntactical Connection'; and what is authoritative (as a means of knowledge) is the direct word, not 'Syntactical Connection'.- 'But the Patnisamyājas have been already enjoined (by another text)'.-True. they have been already enjoined; but they are again enjoined (by the text under discussion) in reference to the Jaghani (Tail),—the sense being that the Jaahani is to be made connected with the Patnisamyājas. Such being the case, at the Darsha-pūrņamāsa, even if the Patnisamyājas were performed without the Jaghani, they would not be defective; and yet the Jāghanī is brought up at it; hence it follows that the Jāghanī is to be used at a sacrifice where it might serve some useful purpose; and this is possible at the Pashu-sacrifice, not at the Darsha-pūrnamāsa-sacrifices. The Jāghanī too being only a part (of the animal) could not justify the employment of the entire animal (and it could be taken out of the animal that has been killed and used elsewhere).—From all this it follows that the injunction should be taken out of the Context."

SŪTRA (21).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY IT IS AN INJUNCTION (OF THE TAIL);
AS IT IS THE TAIL THAT IS SOMETHING NEW (NOT HAVING
BEEN ENJOINED ELSEWHERE).

Bhāṣya.

In reality it is the Jaghani, Tail, that is enjoined by the text in question as an accessory of the Patnīsainyājas.-Why ?-Because it is something new; that is to say, nowhere else has the Tail been prescribed as an accessory of the Patnisamyājas. In another text (as has been pointed out above) though the Patnisamyājas themselves have been enjoined, their connection with the Tail has not been prescribed. As a matter of fact, whenever the connection between two things is enjoined, one of the two members connected is always such as has been enjoined elsewhere, and the connection comes in as its invariable concomitant. Or, we may take it that the injunction is of the connection, and the members connected come in as invariable concomitants (of the Connection). So that, in a case where both members come in as mere indicatives of the Connection, it is the Connection that is enjoined directly by a word expressive of itself: whereas in a case where only one of the two members comes in as the indicative (of the Connection), what the injunction does is to point to that indicative member and enjoin the other member; -- in the case in question it is the Patnisamyajas that are pointed out as members indicative of the Connection.--" How do you know that?"-Because of the presence of the term 'Patnī' ('wife') in the name, -- which term certainly could not be understood as indicating all sacrifices (by reason of the presence of the wife being necessary at all performances); in fact, it indicates only that sacrifice of which the wives are the direct means of accomplishment [and the Patnisamuājas constitute such sacrifices].

Question—"Why cannot we take it the other way—i.e. it is the Tail that is pointed out as the member indicative of the connection, and it is the Patnisamyājas that are enjoined?"

Answer—The sacrifice spoken of in the text in question being something new (not already enjoined elsewhere), it is not possible for the 'wives' (alone) to be taken as enjoined in connection with that sacrifice;—and if the Tail were pointed out (as the member indicative of the connection), if the text were taken as enjoining the sacrifice along with the 'wives', then there would be syntactical split. As a matter of fact, the sacrifice along with the 'wives' (i.e. the Patnisaniyājas) is one that is already enjoined elsewhere; and it is this sacrifice that is merely pointed out in the text in question (as the member indicative of the connection); it is for this reason that we

conclude that what the text in question does is to point to this sacrifice as the member indicative of the connection and to enjoin the Tail.

As regards the argument that "the injunction of the Tail could be obtained only through 'Syntactical Connection', whereas that of the Patnisamyājas is obtained from 'Direct Assertion', "—it has been already explained that it is not possible for the text in question to be taken as an injunction of the sacrifice (Patnisamyāja), because such an interpretation would involve a syntactical split.

For these reasons, the text must be taken as enjoining the Tail. And such being the case, the performance of the Pathisanyāja sacrifice at the $Darsha-p\bar{u}rnam\bar{a}sa$ itself would remain defective, without the Tail; hence the Tail should not be removed from the Context (of the $Darsha-p\bar{u}rnam\bar{a}sa$, where it happens to be enjoined).

SŪTRA (22).

"IT IS ONLY A PART",—IF THIS ARGUMENT BE PUT FORWARD [then the answer would be as given in the next Sūtra].

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, above) that "the *Tail* being only a part of the animal, it could not justify the use of the entire animal,—and hence the *Tail* should be removed from its Context".—Now this argument has got to be refuted [and this is done in the following *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (23).

[Reply].—Not so; because the scripture does not lay down the 'Tail' in connection with the Primary sacrifice (Darsha-pūrņamāsa) itself.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the 'Tail' is not laid down in connection with the Primary Sacrifices of the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa [it is laid down only in connection with the Patnīsamyājas, which are subsidiary to the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa]; so that the Patnīsamyājas sacrifices would be performed with the 'Tail' obtained from the animal killed at the Pashu-sacrifice; specially as all that is prescribed for the Patnīsamyājas is the 'Tail', without any qualifications; so that when the Patnīsamyājas are being performed in connection with the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa, the 'Tail' could be obtained (if not from the body of the animal killed at the Pashu-sacrifice) even by purchase and such other means; and hence there need be no removal of the 'Tail' from the context of the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa).—[For the Patnīsamyājas, Butter also is found to be prescribed by another text as the material to be used; hence when the Patnīsamyāja comes to be performed in connection with the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa, one may use, at his option, either the Tail or the Butter!

ADHIKARANA (11): The 'Cementing of the Slabs' is to be done at the 'Ectypes' or 'Forms' of the Agnistoma.

SŪTRA (24).

[Preliminary Pürvapakṣa]—"The 'Cementing' should be done at the Archetypal Sacrifice (Jyotistoma), because, like 'Purchase', its usefulness does not chase".

Bhāṣya.

[This is another instance of conflict between 'Syntactical Connection' and 'Context'.—Tantravārtika,]

In the section on Jyotistoma, in connection with the two slabs used for pounding the Soma-shoots, we read—'Dirghasoma santydyad dhriyai' (cf. Taitti. Sam. 6. 2. 11. 3) ['At the Dirghasoma one should eement the slabs for securing proper support'].—In regard to this, there arises the following question—Is this 'cementing' to be done at the Jyotistoma itself (the term 'dirghasoma' in this case being taken as standing for the Jyotistoma],—or at those performances of the Soma-sacrifice which extend over a long period of time?—[The Tantravārtika sets forth five alternatives in this connection—(1) Is the cementing to be done at the main Jyotistoma?—or (2) at that Jyotistoma which is performed by a tall (dirgha) sacrifice?—or (3) at the Ukthya and such other 'forms' of the Agnistoma which extend over longer periods of time than the other 'forms'?—or (4) at the Sattra and Ahina sacrifices only, which extend over several days?—or (5) at all sacrifices other than the Agnistoma ?

[Before taking up the consideration of the several alternatives, the first point to determine is whether or not the 'Cementing' is to be disjoined from the 'Context' in which it is laid down. Because if it is decided that it cannot be taken away from the Context, then it will have to be done at the main Jyotistoma itself,]

On this preliminary question, we have the following Purvapaksa (A):—
"Inasmuch as the usefulness of the cementing 'does not cease' (is not absent) in the main Jyotisjoma,—it should not be removed from the Context [i.e. it should be done at the main Jyotisjoma itself].—'But in connection with the main Jyotisjoma, there is another declaration that the two slabs should not be cemented.' (Cf. Taitti. Sam. 6. 2. 11. 3; Mai.-Sam. 1. 10. 13.)—The answer to this is that there should be option, as in the case of the 'Purchase' (of Soma); that is to say, there are several things laid down (in Taitti. Sam. 6. 1. 10. 1-2) as the price to be paid for the Soma—such as 'gold', 'cow' and so forth; and these are regarded as so many optional

alternatives; in the same manner, in the case in question there should be option—so that the 'cementing' may or may not be done."*

SŪTRA (25).

[Preliminary Siddhānta]—In reality, there should be removal (of the 'cementing') from the Context;

BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF A SPECIAL

QUALIFICATION.

Bhāsya.

[In answer to the Preliminary Pūrvapakṣa (A), we have the following Preliminary Siddhānta (A)]—The 'Cementing' should, in reality, be removed from the Context; as the text mentions a 'special qualification'—viz. 'The Cementing should be done at the Dirgha-Soma' (where the 'Soma' has been qualified by the epithet 'dīrgha', 'long-protracted'), and it is the Sattras that are 'long-protracted' in comparison with the 'Jyotistoma [so that the 'Cementing' should have to be done at the Sattras, and not at the Jyotistoma to which the Context belongs.]

SŪTRA (26).

[OBJECTION]—"THE 'SPECIAL QUALIFICATION' MAY PERTAIN TO THE PERFORMER; AS IT IS BASED UPON HIM".

Bhāşya.

[Says the Opponent]—"The 'Cementing' should not be removed from the main Jyotistoma; thus would the 'Context' be honoured.—As

^{*} Kumārila is not satisfied with this explanation of the example of 'purchase' cited in the Sutra. He supplies the following explanation—The objection being that, since the main Jyotistama is finished in a short time, there should be no need for the cementing of the slabs, as there would not be much strain on them,—the answer is that even so, the Cementing will have its use, 'like the Purchase'; that is to say, in the case of the Purchase of Soma, even though the purchase is duly effected by the payment of any one of the alternative prices prescribed, yet in actual practice, all these prescribed articles are given to the vendor, in strict accordance with the scriptural text which lays down the giving of those in exchange for the Soma; and though the payment of all these is not necessary, yet it is not entirely useless; as it serves the purpose of winning the good graces of the owner of the Soma, and the scriptures declare that great prosperity accrues to the purchaser of the Soma if the purchase is effected to the entire satisfaction of the owner. In the same manner, in the case in question, even though the uncemented slabs would be quite sufficient for the purpose of pounding the Soma for the main Jyotistoma, - yet, as we are cognisant of the fact that the cementing of the slabs brings prosperity, the cementing should be done; and it would serve the useful purpose of bringing prosperity to the performer .-- See Tantravārtika-Trans... p. 1240.

for the term 'dīrgha-soma', this may be taken as pertaining to the performer,—the Soma-sacrifice performed by a 'tall' ('dīrgha') person being called 'Dīrgha-Soma'."

SUTRA (27).

[Answer]—It must pertain to the Sacrifice; as otherwise the commendation would be inexplicable.

Bhāşya.

It is not right that the 'cementing' should find place in the main yotistoma; it should be done only at that Soma-sacrifice which is long-protracted,—the 'dirghatva' (length) pertaining to the sacrifice, not to the performer.—Why?—Because 'otherwise the commendation would be inexplicable'; in the text in question, we have the commendatory term 'dhrtyai' which means 'for the purpose of securing proper support'. What happens at the long-protracted Soma-sacrifice is that the Soma is pounded with stones over and over again; so that there is fear of the slabs on which Soma is pounded breaking under the strain; and hence in this case the 'cementing' serves the purpose of making the slabs capable of 'supporting' the strain,—and thus the commendatory term becomes applicable [which could not be the case in the main Jyotistoma, where there are only three extractions of juice and hence the pounding is done only thrice].—For this reason the 'cementing' should be removed (from the 'context' of the Jyotistoma, and done at the long-protracted Soma-sacrifice).

[The conclusions hitherto reached are—(1) That the 'cementing' is not to be done at the main Jyotistoma in general,—nor (2) at the main Jyotistoma performed by a tall person.—Then the third alternative is taken up—viz. that it should be done at the other 'forms' of the Jyotistoma. Sütra (28) objects to this view;—Sütra (28) answers these objections and sets forth the final Siddhānta—viz. that the 'cementing' should be done at those 'forms' of the Jyotistoma which are long-protracted.—It has to be noted that the Bhāgya urges, in favour of this Siddhānta, the argument that this preserves the connection of the 'Context', as the 'Forms' are forms of the Jyotistoma, and the Context is of the Jyotistoma; so that in this Siddhānta, there is no 'removal' of the Cementing from the 'Context' of the Jyotistoma. A, the other 'forms' of the Jyotistoma do not belong to the same 'Context' as the main Jyotistoma itself; they are so many modifications of the Jyotistoma, and have distinct results of their own.—See Tantravārtika—Trans, p. 1243 and p. 1579.

It may be pointed out here that the Jyotistoma sacrifice is made up of seven 'Samethās' or 'Forms',—of which the following four are the more important ones—(1) The 'Agnistoma', which ends with the Yajnāyajniya Hymn, (2) the 'Ukthya', ending with the Ukthya Hymn, (3) the 'Sadashin', and (4) the 'Atriatra':—Of these the Agnistoma is the one most intimately related to the Jyotistoma; as there can be no Jyotistoma without the Agnistoma; while, even without the Ukthya and the other 'forms', the character of 'Jyotistoma' remains intact. The 'Context' therefore belongs to the Jyotistoma in its Agnistoma form; and the other 'forms' are therefore out of that 'Context'.]

SŪTRA (28).

[FINAL PURVAPAKSA]—"AS REGARDS THE '(OTHER) FORMS', [IF THE TERM 'DIRGHA-SOMA' WERE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THESE], THERE WOULD BE NO PECULIARITY IN THE 'SUPPORT'

RE WOULD BE NO PROULLARITY IN THE SUPPORT
REQUIRED; JUST AS THERE IS NONE IN THE
CASE OF THE TERM STANDING FOR THE
PERFORMER [so that the commendatory term 'dhythyai'

would remain inexplicable]."

Bhāṣya.

This Sūtra should be taken as following after a few words.—What are these words?—They are as follows—"Why cannot the cementing find a place in the other Forms? If it did, then the Context would be duly honoured, and the term 'dīrgha-soma' also would become applicable,—because the 'Soma-sacrifice' is longer protracted at the Ukthya and other Forms than at the Agnistoma (which is the first and the inseparable Form of the Jyotistoma)."

It is in answer to these words that we have the Sūtra (28), which embodies the following Pūrapakṣa—"Even though the Forms be long-protracted, the commendatory term cannot be applicable to them; because the quantity of Soma at these is the same (as that at the ordinary Jyotistoma),—the injunction on this point being that 'one should measure out ten handfulls'. So that in the case of the other Forms also, there would be no more 'support' needed for the slabs than in that of the Jyotistoma. For these reasons, the 'cementing' must be removed from the 'context' (and should not be done either at the main Jyotistoma or at its other Forms)."

SŪTRA (29).

[FINAL SIDDHANTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE DONE AT THE 'UKTHYA'
AND OTHER FORMS; AS THE PURPOSE TO BE SERVED
IS PRESENT IN THEIR CASE.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

It is not right that there should be 'removal' of the 'cementing' (from the Context); in fact, in consideration of the Context, there should be no such 'removal'.—As for the term 'dirgha-soma', this is quite applicable to the said Forms, because they extend over a long time.—As regards the quantity of Soma, that also is larger at these Terminuses than at the Agnistoma; because the number of offerings go on increasing at the said Forms,—and until there is an increase in the quantity of the substance offered, there can be no increase in the number of offerings.—It might be argued that the number of offerings might be increased by increasing the number of offering-cups, among whom the same small quantity of Soma might be distributed; but]—The name 'graha' (offering-cup) is applied to the cup only when it is full: hence one could not take up for offering.

the cups that would be not full. Thus then there being a large quantity of Soms to be pounded, there would be fear of the slabs breaking, and hence the securing of proper 'support' becomes desirable; and this renders the commendatory term 'dhṛtyai' quite explicable (and applicable).

SŪTRA (30).

[Objection]—"There being no difference in the two cases, the commendation would be meaningless in both",—if this is urged [then the answer would be as in the following Sütra].

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[Says the Opponent]-"If you hold the view that in the case of the other Forms, there being an increase in the quantity of the substance to be offered, the commendatory word becomes quite applicable,-then our answer is that it is not so; because even so, the commendation would be meaningless .- Why so !- Because there would be no difference in the two cases, regarding the quantity of Soma; that is to say, the quantity of Soma required at the Ukthya and other Forms would be the same as that at the Agnistoma; as at the Ukthya and other Forms also, only 'ten handfulls' of Soma would have to be secured.—'But for special purposes, the quantity of the substance to be offered would have to be increased.'-The substance to be offered having been declared to be 'ten handfulls' how could that be increased? For instance, in a case where the number of parvas (joints) in the Soma-twig has been fixed at three, it will not do for one to have a piece with a large number of joints.—Thus then, the support required being the same in both cases, the commendatory word remains inapplicable in the case of the other Forms. Consequently, there should be 'removal' (of the 'Cementing' from the Context)."

SŪTRA (31).

[Answer]—It would be quite applicable, as there is no fixity * (in the quantity prescribed).

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to say that there should be 'removal' (of the 'Cementing'); because it could be done at the Forms (of the Jyotisjoma), whereby the Context would be duly honoured.—As for the commendation, it would be quite applicable when the quantity of the offering-substance is increased in accordance with the needs of the situation.—As to how the

^{*} The term 'Anityatvāt' has been translated in accordance with the interpretation of the Bhāeya; according to Kumārila, who rejects this interpretation, the term stands for the absence of restriction regarding the quantity of Soma, which is distinctly declared in such texts as 'Avishietān amshūn abhyūhēt'.—See Tantravārtika—Trans. p. 1245.

quantity could be increased (when the quantity has been fixed at 'ten handfulls' of Soma-twigs, each of which should be three-jointed), -this could be done by taking up twigs in which the joints would be at longer intervals (so that the three-jointed twig in this case would make a much larger bulk than the same in the other case) ; -- further, at the third 'Extraction', one piece of Soma is pounded,-the exact size of this 'piece' is nowhere laid down: so that one could take up a piece which may have several joints or thicker joints,-whereby there would be an increase in the quantity of the offering-substance; and in this manner the commendation becomes quite applicable.-For these reasons it becomes established that the 'Cementing' is to be done at the Forms (other than the Agnistoma) [i.e. at the Ukthya and other Forms of the Jyotistoma]; [and as for 'removal' or 'non-removal', this would be a case of 'non-removal' if the 'Context' of the Forms is taken to be the same as that of the Jyotistoma itself; and it would be one of 'removal' if the 'Context' of those Forms is different from that of the Juotistoma-as has been proved to be the case under 3. 6. 41-437.

[Kumārila finds fault with this form of the Siddhānta; according to him the Siddhānta should be that the Cementing should find a place,—not only at the Ukthya and other Forms of the Jyotistoma itself,—but at all Soma-sacrifices with the single exception of the Agnistoma.—See Tantra-vārtika—Trans., pp. 1245-1246.]

ADHIKARANA (12): The prohibition of the 'Pravargya' pertains to the first performance of the Jyotistoma.

SŪTRA (32).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE TEXT CONTAINING THE NUMERICAL ADJECTIVE SHOULD PERTAIN TO THE SACRIFICE,
BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

In connection with the Jyotistoms, with reference to the Pravargya, we have the text—'Na prathamayajā pravnājyāt—dvitīyā trītyā vā pravnājyāt' ['One should not perform the Pravargya at the first sacrifice; one should perform it at the second or third'].

[As a matter of fact, the Pravargya is laid down without reference to any particular sacrifice,—the injunction, 'Yat pravargyam pranyājyāt', standing by itself; and it is only through the syntactical connection of such sentences as—'Purastādupasadām pravargyam charanti' ['Before the Upasads, they perform the Pravargya']—that it becomes connected with a sacrifice; and this Pravargya betakes itself to the Jyotistoma in accordance with Sūtra 3.6 c.; specially as it is only in connection with the Jyotistoma that the Upasads are performed. It is in this sense that the Bhāsya has spoken of the Pravargya as connected with the Jyotistoma—Or, it may be that in the Kauţitaki Brāhmaṇa, the injunction of the Pravargya is found in the section on Jyotistoma (8.2), and the statement of the Bhāsya is based upon this.—Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 1247.—The latter explanation is better; for, if the Bhāsya—and the Sūtra—had in mind that injunction of the Pravargya which is not found in the section on any sacrifice, then in the Sūtra, the Pūrvargya view could not have been based upon 'Context'. It is clear, therefore, that the Sūtrakāra and the Bhāsyakāra both had the Kaustikā Text in mind.]

In regard to the said prohibition of *Prawargya*, there arises the question— Is the *Prawargya* to be omitted at all performances of the *Jyotistoma*?—Or, does the prohibition apply only to its first performance?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—The prohibition pertains to the Jyotiṣtoma absolutely (in all its performances).—Why!—Because of the mention of the sacrifice; that is, the term 'prathama' stands for the sacrifice of the Jyotiṣtoma; because that the name 'prathama' (first) applies to the Jyotiṣtoma is clear from the following text 'Ēṣa vāva prathamo yajñānām yat jyotiṣtomah, ya ētēna aniṣtā athānyēna yajatē etc.' ['The first of sacrifices is the Jyotiṣtoma, if one performs any other sacrifice without having performed this etc. etc.']. Here we find that it is the Jyotiṣtoma that is spoken of by the expression 'yajñānām prathamah' ('the first of sacrifices'). Thus, then, if the prohibition in question is taken as pertaining to this sacrifice (Jyotiṣtoma), the 'Context' becomes honoured.—For these reasons the prohibitive text containing the numerical adjective ('prathama') should be taken as prohibiting the Pravaryya at the Jyotiṣtoma."

SŪTRA (33).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the numerical adjective is a relative term, in reference to the performer; because the Indicative Power of the term is actually Determined by that.

Bhāsya.

It is not true that the prohibition pertains to the sacrifice (Jyotistoma); because in all the four Vedas there is no mention of any sacrifice of the name of a sacrifice, by a certain person; the term 'first' applying to the performance, in relation to the second and subsequent performances; and hence this term can pertain to the performance of a sacrifice, not to the sacrifice itself. Then again, that the term 'first' refers to the performance of a sacrifice we learn directly from the word, while the idea of its referring to the sacrifice can be obtained only through the connection of the sacrifice with the performance; and Direct Assertion is more authoritative than Indirect Indication. Hence the Pravargya is to be omitted at the first performance (of the Jyotistoma).

As for the argument that "inasmuch as the phrase' prathamah' is in the same case as 'Jyotistoma' [in the text' Ēṣa vāva prathamo yaṇānām yut jyotistomah'], it must be taken as denoting that sacrifice",—this co-extensiveness (apposition) between the two can be based only on indirect indication; and this has been already rejected (on the basis of Direct Assertion).

Lastly, as for the argument that "in the compound 'prathamayajñah', the term 'prathama' is co-extensive with the term 'qajña' [and hence it must stand for the yajña, not for the performance]",—this does not militate against our view, as the term 'yajña' is connotative of the yāya, sacrificial performance.

ADHIKARANA (13): The grinding of 'Pūṣan's share' is to be done only at the Ectypal Sacrifices.

SŪTRA (34).

THE GRINDING OF 'PUSAN'S SHARE' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAIN-ING TO THE ECTYPE; AS IT HAS NOT BEEN ENJOINED IN REFER-ENCE TO THE ABCHETYPE.

Bhāşya.

[Though this Adhikarana is on the same lines as Adhikarana (11), yet it has been brought in here as serving to introduce the next two Adhikaranas bearing upon Pūṣan's share'.]

In connection with the Darshapūrnamāsa, we have the text—'Tasmāt pūṣā prapiṣṭabhāgaḥ adatko hɨ saḥ' ['Therefore Pūṣan has his share ground, as he is toothless'] (cf. Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 8. 5).—In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this grinding of Pūṣan's share to be done at the Archetype (the Darshapūrṇamāsa)?—Or at the Ectype (some modification of the Darshapūrṇamāsa)?

The Pūrvapaksa view is that it should be done at the Archetype;—why!—because of the Context.—It might be argued that Pūṣan has not been declared to be the recipient deity of any offering at the Archetype.—As for that, the term 'Pūṣan' may be taken as denoting any one of the several deities to whom offerings are made at the Archetype.

As against this, we have the following Siddhānta:—The grinding of Pūṣan's share' can be enjoined only in connection with a sacrifice where an offering is actually made to Pūṣan;—at the Archetype, Pūṣan is not a deity to whom an offering is made;—hence the grinding has to be removed from the Context.—As regards the statement that "the term 'pūṣan' may be taken as denoting any one of those to whom offerings are made at the Archetype",—the word could be taken in this (indirect) sense, only if there were no deity to whom the name 'pūṣan' applied directly.—"If the grinding is done at another sacrifice, then the Context would be discarded".—Let it be discarded, when what discards it is Syntactical Connection (which is more authoritative than Context).

In reality however, there can be no doubt on this point at all; we may assert it as an established fact that the grinding of Pūṣan's share should be done at the Ectype, not at the Archetype, for the simple reason that Pūṣan has not been enjoined as a deity at the Archetype.

"Why then should this well-established fact be introduced here at all?"

It is introduced here with a view to pave the way for the following discussion.

Adhikarana (14): The 'grinding of Pūṣan's share' can be done only when the material is 'Charu', Cooked Rice.

SŪTRA (35).

[PURVAPAKȘA]—"THE GRINDING IS TO BE DONE TO ALL OFFEBING-MATERIALS; AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION AMONG THEM."

Bhāsya.

It has been asserted that 'the grinding of Pūṣan's share', laid down in the 'Context' of the Archetype, should be done at the Ectype.—Now there arises the question—Is the grinding to be done to (all offering-materials)— Rice, Animal-flesh and Cake?—or to Rice only?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that it is to be done to all—the Rice, the Animal-flesh and the Cake;—why t—because there is no distinction among them; as there is no ground for discrimination, the 'grinding' should be done to all the offering-materials.

SUTRA (36).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY THE 'GRINDING' SHOULD BE DONE
TO THE RICE ONLY; IN THE CASE OF THE CAKE,
IT IS IMPLIED BY ITS VERY NATURE; AND
IN THE CASE OF ANIMAL-FLESH,
IT COULD NOT BE DONE
TO IT, AS ITS VERY
FURPOSE WOULD
BE DEFEATED.

Bhāsya.

The 'grinding of Pūṣan's share' is to be done to the Rice only.—As regards the Cake, the grinding of the corn is implied by its very nature, as unless the corn is ground (there could be no flour and hence) no Cake could be made; therefore in connection with the Cake, no injunction (of grinding) is necessary.—The grinding could not be done to the Animal-flesh; for if the Heaft and other limbs of the animal's body were ground down, then they would lose their shape.—"What is the harm if they do?"—In that case, there could be no 'slicing' of the Heart and other limbs, in accordance with the injunction that 'one should slice the Heart first, etc. etc'.—(Taitti. Sam. 6. 3. 10. 4.)—In the same manner the other slicings also could not be done.—"It is quite possible to make slices out of the Heart that has been ground down".—We say, no; it is the particular shape, not the lump of flesh, to which the name 'Heart' is applied; as has been declared under the Satra 1. 3. 33, where it has been shown that 'what is denoted by the word

is the shape'.—Even though it may be possible to make out of the ground flesh a lump having the shape of the Heart and other limbs, yet people would be bewildered regarding the exact point at which the slicing should be done.—From all this, the injunction of 'grinding of Püsan's share' should be taken as pertaining to the Rice only.

SŪTRA (37).

[Objection]—"The same may be said of the Rice also,"—if this is urged [then, the answer would be as in the following Sutra].

Bhasua.

[Says the Opponent]—"If your view is that 'the grinding could not be done to the Animal-flesh because its very purpose would be defeated'—then our answer is that the purpose would be similarly defeated in the case of Rice also; as a matter of fact, the name 'Charu' is applied to the rice when each grain is cooked and stands distinct from the rest; if the rice were ground down, it would become either dough, or gruel or like oil-cake [and it would not be 'cooked rice']."

SŪTRA (38).

[Answer]—No; as it is a name based upon 'being cooked'. $Bh\bar{a}sya.$

Our answer to the objection (put forward in Su. 37) is as follows:-It is true that the word 'charu' is applied to the rice when each grain is cooked and stands distinct from the rest; -as we find in such assertions as 'such charu is given in which each grain is cooked and stands distinct from the rest':-but the use of the name 'charu' is not based upon the fact of 'each grain being cooked and standing distinct from the rest': if this fact of 'each grain being cooked and standing distinct from the rest' were the basis of the use of the name 'charu', then it could not be applied to cooked rice-flour; while as a matter of fact, the name is applied to cooked rice-flour. Therefore the basis of the application of the name 'charu' must consist in some factor that is common to both (cooked grains of rice and cooked rice-flour).-It is this common factor that is pointed out in the Sūtra 'because it is a name based upon being cooked'. The sense of the reply is that the purpose is not defeated in the case of grinding being done to the charu; -why !-because it is a name based upon 'being cooked'; i.e. the name 'charu' is one that is based upon 'being cooked'; so that what is connoted by the term 'charu' is that rice which has been cooked by internal heat and from which the water has not been 'strained'; it is in this sense that people are found to apply the name 'charu' to cooked rice-flour as well as to the rice cooked with grains standing apart.

The use of this discussion as already indicated under the two views, is this that according to the Pūrvapaksa, the 'grinding' is to be done to the animal-flesh also, while according to the Siddhānta, it is to be done to the cooked rice only.

ADHIKARANA (15): The grinding of 'Pūṣan's share' is to be done only in cases where the offering is made to Pūṣan alone.

SŪTRA (39).

It should be done only when there is, a single deity;

as it is mentioned in connection with

one (deity) only.

Bhāṣya.

It has been established that 'the grinding of Pūṣan's share' should be done at the Ectype,—and only to cooked rice.—Now there arises the question—Is the grinding to be done only when the substance is to be offered to the single deity, Pūṣan? Or also when the substance is to be offered to two deities?—"What is an instance of an offering being made to two deities?"—In the second Iṣṭi of the three offerings in the Rūjasūya sacrifice, we have the injunction 'Saumūpauṣṇā ēkādashakapūlē aindrāpauṣṇashcharuḥ shyūso dakṣiṇā', where we find mentioned the 'aindrapauṣṇa charu', i.e. 'cooked rice dedicated to Indra-Pūṣan', wherein we have an instance of an offering to two deities.

On this point, the apparently right view is that the grinding should be done to only that substance which is meant for being offered to a single deity;—why?—because it is mentioned in connection with a single deity; just as we found in the case of the 'quartering' (of the cake dedicated to Agni alone)—wide above, 3. 1. 26-271.

SŪTRA (40).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT OF CHARACTER INVOLVED.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of the substance to be offered to two deities, there would be a conflict of character; (strictly according to the injunction) the share of Füşan would be ground, not the share of the other deity; so that if Füşan's portion would be ground, that of the other deity would have to be left un-ground; and the cooking of the whole would be very uneven; so that, as the name 'charu' is based upon 'being cooked', there would be an incongruity in the application of this name to what has not been properly (evenly) cooked.—If then, people were to grind the whole of the substance—the portion of Püşan as well as that of the other deity,—then there would be a confusion regarding their respective portions (which could not be distinguished from one another).—"Where would be the harm in that?"—The portion of one would become offered to the other, and in this something

would be done which would not be in strict accordance with the Veda.—For these reasons, the *grinding* should be done to only that substance which is meant to be offered to the single deity (*Pūṣan*).

SŪTRA (41).

[Says the Pürvapakşin]—"In reality, it should be done to a substance meant for Püşan coupled with a second deity; as the presence of that deity is the only condition laid down."

Bhāsua.

"We find the grinding laid down on the ground of the substance being meant to be offered to the particular deity in the text-'Pūsan should have ground substance assigned as his share'. Even when the 'grinding' is done to the substance intended for being offered to two deities (Pūsan coupled with another deity), the portion assigned to Püsan continues to be of ground substance' .- Such is not the case with the Quartering of the Cake (which has been cited by the Siddhantin as an analogical case); because the Quartering is laid down as to be done to the 'Agneya cake', where the nominal affix ('dhak', in the term 'agnēya') is such as can be there only when the name of Agni appears singly, not when it is coupled with the name of another deity.—Similarly in the case of the term 'indranita' (see 3. 2. 39-40). the compounding is with 'indra' standing by itself, and not as coupled with the name of another deity. In the case in question on the other hand, the compound 'prapista-bhāgah' (as qualifying 'Pūṣan') is a Bahuvrīhi compound (meaning 'one whose portion consists of ground grains');-and this compounding is possible in the case of the component words being 'capable' of being compounded; so that there would be no incongruity in the grinding of the substance meant for two deities [as even so $P\bar{u}san$ could continue to be one whose portion consists of ground grains'l.-Because, whether the Rice is meant to be offered to Pūsan only, or to Pūsan along with another deity,-in either case-' Pūsan's share' should be ground."

SŪTRA (42).

[PÜRVAPAKȘA ARGUMENT CONTINUED]—" ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"There are texts also, indicative of the same conclusion: For instance, in the text—'Pūgun is one whose share consists of ground grains, as he is toothless' (Tai. Sain. 2. 6. 8. 5),—the commendatory expression ('he is toothless') indicates that the grinding is to be done on account of the connection with the particular deity (Pūṣan).—Similarly, there is the text—'Saumā-pauṣṇam charum nirvapēt nēmapiṣṭam paṣhukāmaḥ' ['One desiring cattle should offer half-ground charu to Soma-Pūṣan'—Mai. Sain. 2. 1. 5], which shows that the Rice is to be half-ground; i.e. half of it is to be ground

and half left unground,—when it is meant for two deities; so that this text also indicates the fact that the *grinding* is to be done on account of the connection of the particular deity (Pūsan)."

SŪTRA (43).

[PÜRVAPAKSA ARGUMENT CONCLUDED]—"THERE WOULD BE GRINDING
OF ALL, IF IT WERE AN INJUNCTION; AS THE GRINDING
WOULD BE SCRIPTURALLY AUTHORISED IN REFERENCE
TO THAT; AND FOR THE 'CHARU', THERE
WOULD BE NO GRINDING, AS THERE
WOULD BE NO USE FOR IT."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"The Sūtra is to be taken as providing the answer to the question-'why cannot the text "Saumapausnam charum nirvapet nemapistam" be taken as an injunction by itself (laving down the half-grinding of a certain substance intended for the joint-deity Soma-Pūṣan; and not as simply indicating the fact of the grinding being dependent upon the connection of a certain deity)?'-The answer to this (provided in the Sūtra) is as follows:—If this were an injunction, then it would enjoin, in reference to Soma-Pūsan only, the grinding of all the three substances-Rice, Animalflesh, and Cake :- and then, if the sentence were taken as enjoining the connection of Soma-Pūsan with the 'Rice', as also with the 'half-ground' character,-then there would be a syntactical split. Hence all that the injunction could be taken to mean would be that 'there should be halfgrinding of whatever is meant for Soma-Pūsan'; so that what would be 'scripturally authorised' would be the 'half-grinding' only with reference to Soma-Püsan and this would mean the grinding of all the substances. Cake, Animal-flesh, and Rice, that might be meant for Soma-Püsan].-In fact, the sentence in question could be taken as an injunction only (a) if in the case of the Cake, the grinding of all the grain needed for it were taken as implied by the very nature of the cake itself,-and (b) if, on account of no useful purpose being served by it, the grinding were taken as not applicable to the Animal-flesh and the Rice; -and in that case the word 'charu' in the sentence could not be taken as meant to signify its own meaning [i.e. it would be meaningless].-If, on the other hand, the sentence is taken as a mere reference to the grinding (and not as an injunction of it), then there would be none of these incongruities; and being a mere reference, the sentence can be taken as a mere indicative (of the fact of the grinding being done on account of the connection with a particular deity) .-But in the case of the Animal-flesh, there could be no grinding, for fear of the disappearance of the limbs (required)'.-Not so, we reply; no limbs would be destroyed in the case of half-grinding, as the offering could be made out of the unground portion of the limb; and after all the grinding is meant to serve only a transcendental (not a visible purpose). [So that the cutting out of the Heart and other limbs to be offered could be done before the flesh is ground,—says Tantravārtika—Trans., p. 1266.1"

SŪTRA (44).

[Siddhāntin answers]—In fact, it should be done when there is only one (deity); because what is enjoined is a detail appertaining to an object; and, as in the case of Indra-Agni, it could not appertain to both (Indra-Pūṣan); because it is not enjoined as such.

Bhāsya.

The grinding can be done only to the substance meant for being offered to a single deity, Pūsan,-and not to that intended for two deities, Indra-Pūsan; --why?--because when it is said that 'a ground substance should be used as the portion of Pūsan', what is enjoined is not a characteristic of the deity,-but 'a detail appertaining to an object' .- "What is that object ?"-It is the sacrifice.—"How do you know that what is laid down is not a characteristic of the deity?"-Our answer to this is that there is no share (or portion) of the deity at all.-" Why? certainly what is offered to a deity, becomes its portion".-What we hold is that what is done in the case of a sacrifice is that the substance is offered (given away) with reference to the deity; but by this mere offering, the ownership of the deity over the substance does not become established; because the ownership is established by the acceptance (by the recipient of the gift):-and there can be no evidence to prove that the substance offered has been accepted by the deity; it is only when one accepts, takes up (bhajatë), a certain thing that that thing becomes his portion (bhaga):-and the deity never takes up the substance offered to it; -hence there can be no such thing 'Pūṣan's portion or share'.

Even if the substance could somehow be regarded as the 'portion' of the deity,-the 'grinding' could never be something appertaining to the deity; because, if it did not appertain to the sacrifice, it would be entirely useless .- "But being enjoined in a totally different Context, how could it be something appertaining to the Sacrifice?"-Our answer to this is that it would appertain to the sacrifice, on the strength of 'Syntactical Connection' .- "But in reality, we find the grinding laid down in connection with a deity, not in connection with a Sacrifice" .- Our answer to that is that it has already been pointed out that it cannot be connected with the deity, (1) because there is no such thing as the 'portion' (of the deity), and (2) because it would be entirely useless (if it were connected with the deity). -"And yet it behaves you to explain how the grinding can be connected with the Sacrifice" .- That we are going to explain :- The substance that is offered (at a sacrifice) in reference to Püsan is what is called 'Püsan's portion',-i.e. it is that substance in the offering whereof the deity is Pūsan;—now when the offering is made to the joint deity Indra-Pūsan, the deity of that offering is not 'Pūsan'; as the rice that is offered does not become subject to the ownership of 'Püşan'; hence it follows that when the offering is made to Indra-Püsan, there is no connection established between the Rice (offered) and 'Pūsan'. It is only when Pūṣan alone by himself is the deity of the offering that what is dedicated to him may become his 'portion'.—"Why so?"—Because it is a well-known fact that it is only when something is dedicated or made over to one that it becomes one's 'portion'.—Thus, even though Pāṣan would be helping the joint-deity 'Indra-Pūṣan' by utterance of his name,—i.e. by reason of the presence of his name in the name of the joint deity, he may be rendering some help to that joint deity,—yet what has been offered to the two deities (i.e. joint deity) does not become his (Pūṣan's) 'portion'; for the simple reason that it has not been dedicated to him.—From all this it follows that the grinding is to be done to that Rice in the offering of which the deity is 'Pūṣan' (alone), and not to that in the offering whereof there are two deities.

SŪTRA (45).

As for 'toothlessness', it is only a commendatory reason.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

It has been argued (under Sūtra 42) that—"the phrase 'because he is toothless' indicates that the grinding is something appertaining to the deity".—But this phrase is 'only a commendatory reason', and as such could be explained also on the basis of the Sūddhānta view.

SŪTRA (46).

As for the other sentence, it would be an Injunction.

Bhāṣya,

The other argument that has been urged (by the Pūrnapākṣin, under sū. 42) is to the effect that—"the sentence 'Saumāpauṣṇam' charum nirapēt nēmapiṣṭam' indicates that grinding is to be done in the case of the substance offered to two deities, and by declaring that half of the substance is to be ground and the other half is to be left unground, it indicates the grinding to be something appertaining to the deity".—Our answer to this is that, if such were the meaning of the sentence, then,—inasmuch as it would be dealing with what has not been enjoined elsewhere,—'it would be an Injunction'.—"But, if it were an injunction, then a single sentence would be injunctive of several things."—The answer to this is that, if, according to one view, it becomes injunctive of several things, then that contingency could be avoided by accepting the other view; and if there were no other view possible, then, with a view to save the sentence from becoming useless, we might even accept the view that it is injunctive of several things.

Thus it becomes established that there is to be no grinding of Rice meant for being offered to two deities.

ADHYAYA III.

PĀDA IV.

Adhikarana (1): The Declaration regarding 'nivita' is purely commendatory.

SÜTRA (1).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA (A)]—"THE 'NIVĪTA' SHOULD BE REGARDED (AS ENJOINED) AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF THE MAN; BECAUSE THE TEXT SPEAKS OF MAN AS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Darsha-Pürnamäsa, we read—' Nivitam manusyänäm—Prächinävitam piirpäm—Upavitam dēvānām—Upavayatā dēvalakṣmamēva tat kuruā' ['The Nivita is for men, the Prāchināvita for the Piṭṛs and the Upavita for celestial beings; when one adopts the Upavita form, he wears the mark of celestial beings'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 11. 1).—[These three are the names given to the three modes of wearing the upper cloth:—(1) When it is worn over the neck, the two ends hanging along the two sides of the neck, or the chest, it is the Nivita form; (2) when it is worn over the right shoulder and passes under the left arm-pit, it is Prāchināvita; (3) when it is worn over the left shoulder and passes under the right arm-pit, it is Upavita.]

Now, in regard to the clause 'Nivitam manusyāṇām' ('the Nivita is for men'), there arise the following questions:—(a) Is this an injunction or a commendatory declaration? [i.e. is it mandatory or only commendatory?]—(b) If it is an Injunction, is what is enjoined an attribute of the Man or of the action (sacrifice)?—and (c) Does the injunction appertain to those acts of men [such as the Anvāhāryapachana and the like—Tantravārtika] which are laid down in the same context (of the Darsha-Pūrņamāsa) or to those acts in which men are the predominant factors [such as the honouring of guests and the like—Tantravārtika]?

On these questions, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—"The clause in question is an injunction, and what is enjoined is an attribute of the Man.—If the sentence is taken as an Injunction, then alone it can lay down something not already known, and hence serve a useful purpose; otherwise (if it is not taken as an Injunction), it remains a mere assertion, and hence useless.—If the sentence is an Injunction, then the attribute laid down in the sentence 'Nivitam manusyūnūm' must belong to Man; as the declaration is one in which man figures as the predominant factor.—'How do you know this?'—In the sentence, the men are not enjoined;—what is enjoined is the Nivita' for men'; as what is not enjoined cannot become an accessory to anything:—if men also were taken as enjoined by the sentence,

then there would be a syntactical split. Hence it is concluded that the Nivita (which is enjoined) is helpful to man.—'From the Context it is clear that it is helpful to the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa sacrifice.'—But Syntactical Connection is more authoritative than Context. Further, if Men were the subordinate factor, then as case-terminations are meant to be significant, the term denoting men would have taken the instrumental ending; as a matter of fact, however, we find the Genitive ending (in the word 'manusyānām), which denotes relationship. In fact, if the men were the subordinate factor, then, it would not be necessary to mention the men at all; as, naturally, what had to be done could be done by men only; if, on the other hand, Men form the predominant factor, then it is necessary to mention them."

SUTRA (2).

[OBJECTION TO THE PÜRVAPAKŞA]—THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS MERELY DESCRIPTIVE, AS THE THING (NIVITA) EXISTS ALREADY.

Bhāsua.

'Apadēsha' stands for what is already known; the sense of the argument is that the sentence in question cannot be taken as an Injunction, it is purely descriptive;—why?—because the thing exists already: that is to say, it is already known that Nivīta is the mode for men; in fact, as a rule, men adopt the nivīta form for their own use. Hence the sentence must be taken as merely descriptive.

SŪTRA (3).

[Pürvapakşın's answer to the objection]—"But in reality, it should be taken as an Injunction; as it lays down something not already known."

Bhāşya.

"The sentence must be an Injunction; as it is only as an Injunction that it can serve a useful purpose; otherwise it would be a mere assertion, and hence useless. Then again, a sentence is to be regarded as descriptive only when it speaks of something already known; the sentence in question however lays down something not already known,—viz.: that 'men must always wear the upper cloth in the Nivila form'."

SŪTRA (4).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA (B)—REJECTING PÜRVAPAKŞA (A)]—"INASMUCH
AS IT IS MENTIONED IN A CONTEXT ABOUNDING IN THE
MENTION OF PROPERTIES OF ACTIONS,—THE 'NIVITA'
ALSO SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A PROPERTY

OF ACTIONS." Bhāşya.

"We accept the proposition that the sentence is an Injunction; but we do not accept the proposition that Nivila is an attribute of Man;—in fact it

must be the property of the Sacrifice, as is indicated by the *Context*; it is mentioned among many such properties as belong to Actions; hence it must be a property of Actions."

SUTRA (5).

"Also because of the closing words of the sentence."

Bhāsua.

"The closing word with which the sentence 'Nivitam manusyāṇām' ends is the name 'ādhvaryavam' ('Pertaining to, done by, the Adhvarya' Priest'); and it is only if the Nivita is an accessory of the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice that it could be 'done by the Adhvaryu Priest'; and it is only thus that the indication of the Name would be honoured."

SŪTRA (6).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA (C), SLIGHTLY MODIFYING (B)]—"IT MUST BE CON-NECTED WITH THE CONTEXT; AS SUCH CONNECTION WOULD IN-VOLVE NO INCONCRUITY."

Bhāşya.

Objection against the Pūrvapakṣa (B)—'From Context and from Name, the Nivīta appears to be a property of actions; and from Syntactical Connection it appears to be an attribute of man; hence (Syntactical Connection being more authoritative than Context and Name), the Nivīta should be removed from its context (and connected with Man)'.

"Not so, we reply. Even while retaining its place in the Context, the Nivika may be taken as appertaining predominantly to Man.—How so?—
It would find place in that act—of Anvähäryapachana, for instance,—which, while forming part of the Darsha-Pürnamāsa sacrifice, is connected chiefly with Man; and in this way both 'Context' and 'Syntactical Connection' would become honoured."

SŪTRA (7).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA (D)—MODIFYING (C)]—" IT MUST APPERTAIN TO AN ACTION WHEREIN MAN IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR; BECAUSE ITS MENTION IS SIMILAR (TO THAT OF THE OTHER MODES OF WEARING THE CLOTH, 'UPAVITA', ETC.); AND THE OTHER FACTOR ('MEN') IS MENTIONED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONNECTING WITH THE NIVITA."

Bhāşya.

"It is not right that the Nivita should find a place in the Context; in fact, it should be adopted at that act in which man is the predominant factor,—such as the act of Honouring the Guest.—Why so?—Because its mention is similar to that of the other modes; i.e. all the three modes are mentioned as being similar; so that (1) when it is said that "Upavita is for

celestial beings', what is enjoined is that the Upavita is to be adopted at the Darsha-Pürnamäsa (at which the deities form the predominant factor).—(2) when it is said that 'Prāchīnāvīta is for Pitrs', what is enjoined is that the Prāchīnāvīta is to be adopted at the action whereat the Pitrs form the predominant factor: similarly (3) when it is said that 'Nivita is for men', what is enjoined independently of the Context is that the Nivita is to be adopted at the act of Honouring the Guest .- 'How do you get the idea that it enjoins the Nivita as to be adopted at the act whereat Man forms the predominant factor?'-We gather this from the connection of 'nivita' with the word 'manusyanam', which has the Genitive ending .-- 'In that case the Nivita should belong to the men themselves, not to an action whereat man is the predominant factor.'-If it were taken as belonging to the men themselves, then it would be necessary to assume a result (following from such connection of Nivita with men); when, on the other hand, it is taken as appertaining to the action whereat man is the predominant factor, the Genitive ending will remain, which will bring about the necessary connection (between the Nivita and Man), and yet it would not be necessary to assume a result [as the result of the action would be there already]. This is what has been explained under Sūtra 'Samēsu vākyabhēdah syāt' (2. 1. 47).-'Having become syntactically connected with the action whereat Man is the predominant factor, the Nivita would again become similarly connected with the Darsha-Pürnamäsa to which the Context belongs.'-Two connections cannot be enjoined by one sentence; for, if it did, there would be syntactical split. In fact, inasmuch as 'the other factor'-i.e. the mention of 'men'is for the purpose of connecting with Nivita, - the connection of the Nivita with 'men' would be established directly by the words of the text, and when this connection would be found to serve a useful purpose, there would be no occasion for connecting it with the secrifice of the 'Context' (i.e. the Darsha-Pürnamäsa).—For these reasons, the indication of the 'Context' should be set aside and the Nivita should be adopted at the act of Honouring Guests."

SŪTRA (8).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY, THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A COMMENDATORY DECLARATION; BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that the sentence in question is an Injunction, and that Injunction pertains to an action whereat Man is the predominant factor. What is asserted in the term 'manusyāṇām' is connection with men, not connection with an action at which Man is the predominant factor; if it were connected with an action at which Man is the predominant factor; it would be necessary to assume a result;—and lastly, if it were connected with the act of Honouring Guests, it would be connected with an act which is not mentioned, which has nothing to do with the Context, and which can only be inferred.—"What would be the harm in that?"—The harm would be that the sentence in question, even though quite capable of being taken in connection with the Context, would be removed from it.—

"How would it be capable of being taken in connection with the Context?"
—It could be so taken, as connected with the Context, because it is a commendatory declaration, and as commending what appears in the Context, it would remain within the Context itself; while if it were taken as an Injunction, it would have to be removed from the Context.—From all these we conclude that the sentence is not an injunction of something in connection with an act at which Man is the predominant factor.

SŪTRA (9).

Also because it is syntactically connected with an Injunction.

Bhāsya.

For the following reason also, the sentence 'Nivitam manusuānām' cannot be taken as an injunction .- "For what reason?" - Because it is syntactically connected with an Injunction: The sentence 'Upavyayatē dēvalaksmamëva tat kurutë ' [which follows the sentence ' Nivîtam manusuānām'] is an Injunction; and with this Injunction, the sentence in question is syntactically connected; under the circumstances, if the sentence in question also were an injunction, then there would be a syntactical split; because there can be no syntactical connection between one Injunction and another Injunction, as the verbal expressions are different; consequently (if the sentence in question were taken as an Injunction) the indication of syntactical connection would become set aside.-" What is 'the indication of a syntactical connection '?"-The indication of the syntactical connection is that the sentence 'Nivitam manusyānām' is a declaration of what is already known (from other sources).-" Why then should there be a declaration of what is already known?"-For the purpose of commending the Upavita form.-"In what way is the Upavita commended (by the sentence 'Nivitam manusuānām') ?"—The idea meant to be conveyed is that 'the Nivita form is not fit to be adopted at the Darsha-Pürnamäsa, which is a sacrifice offered to the deities,-because it belongs to men,-similarly the Prachinavita form also is for the Pitrs, and not fit for an offering to the deities,—it is the Upavita which is fit for that offering,-hence the Upavita-form should be adopted (at the Darsha-Pürnamāsa sacrifice).' Just as we find in the case of such assertions as—'The dress that this man is wearing is the dress of dancers. the dress that Devadatta is wearing is the dress of Brahmanas'-where, for the purpose of commending Devadatta's dress, the other dress (that of dancers) is mentioned. Similarly in the case in question, for the purpose of commending the Upavita-form, the Nivita has been mentioned.—There is no such injunctive word in the sentence as that 'the Nivita should be adopted for men.'-"But there is the text laying down the method of Honouring Guests, and this would be the injunction laying down that the Nivita should be adopted."-Not so; no such assumption would be justified when the sentence is capable of being taken as serving the purpose of commending a certain act; because such an injunction is not perceptible, it could therefore be assumed only with a view to avoiding the contingency of the sentence in question becoming entirely useless;—when, however, this uselessness has become avoided (by other means), there can be no justification for assuming anything at all. For these reasons, the sentence in question must be taken as a commendatory declaration; and thereby the Context, becoming reconciled with Syntactical Connection, comes to serve a most useful purpose.

[Between Sütras 9 and 10, there are six Sütras, embodying four Adhikarana, sinch have not been noticed in the Bhāsya, nor by Mandana Mishra in his Mimām-sānkukramanī, nor in Bṛhatī or Rṛjuvimalā.—On this omission the following remarks by Kumārila (Tantravārtika, Trans., p. 1275) are instructive:—'After this (Sū. 9) there follow six Sūtras which we do not find treated in the Bhāsya; and there is a difference of opinion among the commentators regarding this omission. Some people say that the Bhāsyakāra forgot them; others say that he wrote commentaries upon these Sūtras also, but this portion of the Bhāsya has become lost us; some say he found them easy and not of much importance, and hence omitted them; while others declare that he omitted them because they are not Jaimini's Sūtras at all.—In support of this last theory we have the form of Sūtra (10) dealt with in the Bhāsya—'Digvibhāgaskha, etc.'—which distinctly shows that in Jaimini's Sūtra-text, this Sūtra (10) must follow immediately after Sūtra (9) ('Vidhinā-chaikavākyatvāt')—We find however that all other commentators, from Kumārila downwards, on the Sūtras have deals with these six Sūtras', on the Sūtras have deals with these six Sūtras'.

ADHIKARANA (2): The distribution of the directions is a commendatory declaration.

SŪTRA (10).

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DIRECTIONS ALSO SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE THE FOREGOING; SPECIALLY AS ITS CONNECTION IS FOR A DEFINITE PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma, we read—'Prāchīm dēvā abhajanta, dakṣinām pitarah, pratichīm manuṣṇāh, udichīmasurāh [or, according to others, 'udichīm rudrāh]' ['Celestial beings took over the East, the Pitṛs the South, human beings the West, and Asuras (or according to others, the Rudras) the North']. (Taitti. Sain. 6. 1. 1. 1.)

In regard to the sentence 'Pratichim manusyāh,' there arises the question —(a) Is this sentence an injunction or a declaration ?—(b) If it is an Injunction, does it enjoin an attribute of Man or a property of Action ?—Or (c) Is what is enjoined to find a place in the Context in which it occurs, or in some such act, in the Context, in which Man is the predominant factor, or in the act of the Honouring of Guests?

The apparent conclusion on these questions is that 'this distribution of the directions should be treated like the foregoing, specially as its connection is for a definite purpose ' (Sūtra). That is to say, the distribution of the directions that we find in the sentence in question should be treated like the sentence speaking of 'Nivita' (dealt with in the foregoing Adhikarana); so that the view that we had as 'Pūrvapaksa' in regard to Nivita should be the Purvapaksa here, the view that was the 'middle view' (a compromise) in the former case should be the 'middle view' here, and the view that was the Siddhanta in that case should be the Siddhanta here also. - For instance, the Pūrvapakṣa (A) in the present case would be that-"The sentence should be regarded as an injunction, as it serves a useful purpose. -and what is enjoined is an attribute of Man; the idea expressed being that men facing the west or the north have the sun behind them and hence are able to perform the acts more comfortably."-The Pūrvapaksa (B) would be that-" It is an injunction and what is enjoined should, in consideration of the Context, be taken as a property of the Jyotistoma. and in consideration of the Context and Syntactical Connection, it should find a place at that act which forms part of the Jyotistoma and at which Man is the predominant factor .- such, for instance, as the act of giving the sacrificial fee." -Pūrvapaksa (C) would be that-" The sentences being distinct from one another, what is enjoined should find place in the act of Honouring Guests." -The Siddhanta is that, in consideration of the Context, the sentence is to be taken as a commendatory declaration, as it is manifest that it is syntactically connected (and is to be taken along) with the injunction of 'making the Prāchinavamsha chamber'.

ADHIKARANA (3): The expressions 'Parusi ditam' and the rest are commendatory declarations.

SŪTRA (11).

The same is the case with the expressions—(a) 'parusi dita', (b) 'purna', (c) 'ghrta', and (d) 'vidagdha'.

Bhāsya.

(a) In connection with the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa, we read—'Yat paruṣi-diant tad dēvānām, yadantarā tamanusyāṇām, yat samūlam tat pitṛṇām.' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 6. 8. 6) ['That which is cut at the joints is for celestial beings, that which is cut in the middle is for men, that cut at the root is for Pitṛs']; also (d) 'Yo vidoydhah sa naiṛrtah, yo'shṛtah sa raudraḥ, yah shṛtah sa sadēvatyaḥ, tasmādavidahatā shrapayitavyam sadēvatvāya' (Taitti. Samh. 2. 6. 3. 4) ['What is burnt is for the Niṛṛṭs, what is uncooked is for Rudra, what is cooked is for celestial beings, etc.'];—and (b) in connection with the Jyotiṣtoma, we read—'Yat pūrṇam tat manusyāṇām uyarī ardho dēvānām, ardhah piṭṛṛṇām, 'Taitti. Sain. 1. 6. 8. 4) ['What is full is for men, what is above half for celestial beings, and half for Piṭṛṣ'];—and again (c) 'Ghṛtam devānām, mastu piṭṛṛām, niṣpakvam manusyāṇām' (Taitti. Sain. 6. 1. 1. 4) ['Clarified butter is for celestial beings, the curd-gruel is for the Piṭṛṣ, and the melted butter is for men'].

In regard to the sentences speaking of man, and the one that refers to Rudra, there arise the following questions:—Are these injunctions—and of properties of men? Or are they commendatory declarations, and what are spoken of are properties of actions?—And further, should these find place in that action mentioned in the context at which Man or Rudra is the predominant factor? Or at the action of Honouring Guests? Or is it all a purely commendatory declaration?

The apparent conclusion is that the case of all these is analogous to what has gone before (in the case of Nivita); that is, the view that was Piirvapakṣa in connection with Nivita is the Pūrvapakṣa here also; that which was the 'middle view' there is the 'middle view' here also; and that which was the Siddhānta there is the Siddhānta here also.—For instance, here also, the Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"the sentences should be taken as injunctions, because in this way they serve a useful purpose; and what are enjoined should be regarded as attributes of Men, because they are connected with men';—and the final conclusion is that what are spoken of, being already known by implication, the sentences should be taken as commendatory declarations; these are known by implication, because—(a) as there would be no definiteness regarding the cutting to be done at the top or at the root, it would be easier to cut at the joints [hence the propriety of the cutting being done at the joints, which is regarded by the Pūrvapakṣin as what is enjoined, is already got at by implication;—(b) similarly, what is uncooked causes

illness, hence it is 'raudra', terrible [this implies the propriety of proper cooking, which is regarded by the Pūrvapaksin as the object of Injunction]: -(c) similarly, what is full is soft, and hence it is easier to deal with it Ithis implies the propriety of having fulness, which is regarded by the Pūrvanaksin as the object of Injunction];—(d) similarly, if Butter is put on the head, it is very pleasing to men [this implies the propriety of using Butter, which is regarded by the Pūrvapaksin as the object of injunction l.—Similarly. the Purvapaksa view is that "the sentences are injunctions, and what are enjoined should be taken as properties of action (mentioned in the context itself), because of 'Name' and also because most of the details spoken of pertain to action" :- another Pūrvapaksa is that, "in consideration of the Context and Suntactical Connection, the properties should be taken as pertaining to only such actions as the Anvähärya-cooking and the giving of the sacrificial fee (at which Man is the predominant factor)";—the third Pūrvapakṣa is that-" the properties must pertain to the act of Honouring Guests, as otherwise there would be syntactical split";—and the Siddhanta view is that the sentences should be taken as commendatory declarations, because of the 'context' and because they are connected with other Injunctions ;-these injunctions being-(a) 'The cutting should be done at the joint' (Taitti. Sam. 6, 1, 1, 5), (b) 'One should hold it above the hole,' (c) 'One should besmear the body with fresh butter,' and (d) 'One should cook the substance without burning it ' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 3. 4).—From all this it follows that the sentences in question are commendatory declarations, not Injunctions.

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ADHIKARANA (4): The Prohibition of 'Telling Lies' is a detail pertaining to the Sacrifice.

SUTRA (12).

[PORVAPAKŞA]—"THE NEGATIVE ACT APPRICAINS TO THE SACRIFICE,
AND THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A REFERENCE TO A
PERMANENT INJUNCTION. BECAUSE IT IS RELATED TO
SUCH AN INJUNCTION."

Bhāşya.

In connection with the Darsha-Pürnamāsa, we meet with the text-'Nānriam vadēt' ['One should not tell a lie'] (Taitti, Sam. 2. 5. 5. 6).

In regard to this there arises the question—Does this prohibition (of Lying) apply to the centext of what is done in connection with the Darsha-Pärnamäsa? Or, is it the prohibition of an act to which ordinary man is mostly prone, and is addressed to man and hence appertains to him?

On this point we have the following Pūrvapaksa—" It should be regarded as appertaining to man (in his ordinary life); as the prohibition is addressed to the man, not to the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa.—Why so ?-Because the words of the text denote the effort of man; what the word 'vadet' (' one should tell') directly expresses is that 'one should do the telling': and in this the connection of the man (the speaker) is directly asserted; the connection of the action (sacrifice), on the other hand, would be only indirectly indicated by 'Context': and 'Direct Assertion' is always more authoritative than 'Context'.-Otherwise (i.e. if the prohibition were taken as appertaining to the sacrifice), the expression 'one should do the telling' would have to be taken as conveying the sense that 'there is telling'; so that the expression would be taken in a sense other than the one that it really expresses, and the sense of the injunction would thus be something different from its own; on the other hand, if the prohibition is taken as addressed to man, the expression would retain its own sense. For this reason the advice conveyed (by the term 'vadēt', 'should tell') should be taken as addressed to man; such being the case, the prohibition also must be taken as addressed to the same person to whom the injunctive word (affirmative) was addressed .- Now this fact-i.e. the prohibition of 'telling lies'-has been well known to the man ever since his Upanayana (at which his Teacher addressed to him the admonition 'never tell lies'); hence, being related to that admonition, the prohibition in question must be taken as a reference to that permanent admonition.—'In fact the text in question being a Shruti should be regarded as the basis for the Smrti-text (according to which the admonition at the *Upanayana* is addressed by the Teacher) [so that it is the Shruti-text under discussion that should be regarded as the injunction, and it is the Smrti-text that should be regarded as a reference to it].'-The Shrutitext under discussion cannot be the basis for the said Smrti-text; if the Smrti had been based upon this Shruti-text, then the Shruti-rule also would have mentioned the Darsha-Pürpamäss sacrifices; as a matter of fact also, the admonition (according to the Smrti) is addressed to the pupil at the time of the Upanayana only; and they also teach it as a duty of the man. For these reasons the Smrti-text in question cannot be regarded as based upon the Vedic-text in question."

SŪTRA (13).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN INJUNCTION,
BECAUSE THE CONNECTION IS DIFFERENT.

Bhāsya.

In reality, the sentence 'One should not tell a lie' should be taken as an injunction, pertaining to the Darsha-Pūrṇamāca sacrifices,—and it is not a mere reference or reiteration.—Why so ?—Because the connection is different.—That is to say, the Smṛti-rule declares the connection of the man with the observance of the rule (that' one should never tell a lie'); white what the sentence in question would do would be to declare the connection of the man with the prohibition of a certain thing. Under the circumstances, what is found in the Shruti-text being entirely different from what is found in the Smṛti-rule, how could one be a reiteration of the other? Consequently the sentence in question should be taken as the injunction of the prohibition.

Says the Opponent—"We accept the conclusion that the sentence is an injunction; but what we hold is that what is enjoined pertains to the man (in ordinary life), because the effort of the human agent is directly expressed by the words."

Our answer to this is as follows:—In the case of all verbs, what is directly expressed is the performance of an act, not any active agency.—"How is that deduced?"—It is deduced from our own experience; we actually cognise an action as to be performed.—"But people cognise also the nominative agent (as expressed by the verb)."—True, they cognise it, but not through the word;—then through what?—through implication; i.e. when the action is enjoined as to be performed, then the functioning of the active agency also becomes cognised by implication; and what is cognised by implication cannot be accepted as directly asserted; and what is not directly asserted cannot be regarded as cognised through the syntactical connection; under the circumstances, how could it set aside the indications of the context?

Says the Opponent—"The teaching of the teachers is that 'the base and the affix jointly express what is expressed by the affix'; and from this it follows that the nominative agent as well as the accusative object are denoted by the word; because the teachers have made it clear—by means of such sūtras as 'Kartari shap' (Pā. 3. 1. 68), 'Karmani yah' (Pā. 3. 1. 67)—that the nominative and the objective are both denoted by affixes (the affix 'shap' denoting the nominative, and the affix' yak' denoting the objective). Hence we conclude that the nominative agent and the objective are both expressed by words."

Answer-Simply on the strength of the word of Teachers, or of the authors of Sūtras, nothing can be taken to be expressed by a word: it can be taken to be so only on the basis of our own cognition (experience). As a matter of fact, when an act is recognised as to be done, it implies all the active agencies; this has been already explained above. Further, the Teachers have nowhere declared that the nominative agent, or the objective, is expressed by the affix.-" But the conjugational affix has been declared to be expressive of the nominative agent and of the objective."-The affix is nowhere declared to be expressive of the nominative agent or of the objective; all that is declared is that 'when there is only one factor, the singular number should be used,-when there are two things, the dual number; and when there are several things, the plural number should be used.' There is also another declaration, which is construed to man that 'when there is one nominative agent (the singular number is to be used),-when there are two nominative agents (the dual number is to be used), and when there are several nominative agents (the plural number is to be used)';it is in this way that the act becomes connected with the singular and other numbers. But there is no such construction as that 'Kartari bhavati ēkasmimscha' ('it is used when there is the agent and the one'); in fact it is in the form 'Kartari ēkasmin ēkavachanam' 'when there is one agent, the singular number is to be used,—i.e. when the agent is one only '; similarly in the case of there being two or more agents. If we construe the sentences in this manner the meaning of the Sūtra becomes explained in accordance with logical principles,—and the words of the Sūtra become logically connected. The teaching of the scriptures is also to the same effect—that when unity, duality and plurality are expressed by the affix, then the objective and the rest come in as qualifying factors.

Objection—"It has also been found that when the objective and other things are expressed by the affix, unity and the rest come in as qualifying factors."

Answer—As for the objective and the rest, they are got at by implication, and they are never regarded as being expressed by words; unity and the
rest, on the other hand, are never got at by implication, and hence they
are regarded as being expressed by words. Such being the case, even though
unity and the rest are qualifying factors, yet in this case it is the qualifying
factor that is regarded as being expressed. For example, in the case of the
statement—'Priests with golden necklaces proceed':—the wearing of the
golden necklace is a qualifying factor, yet it is this factor that has been
accepted as being enjoined by the sentence. For these reasons, it follows
that what is expressed by the word is the unity of the nominative agent,
not the nominative agent himself.

Objection—"As a matter of fact, where the nominative agent is one, the singular number is used, where there are two nominative agents, the dual number is used, and where there are several nominative agents, the plural number is used; and from this it is clear that the nominative agent (which remains the common factor, while unity, duality and plurality are variable) is what is expressed by the word."

Answer-This matter cannot be determined by Inference; in fact it is

a clearly perceptible fact that the cognition of the nominative agent follows directly from the cognition of the act to be done; and this clear fact cannot be set aside. As for unity and the rest, when the singular number is used, it is the unity of the nominative agent that is cognised;—when the dual number is used, it is the duality of the nominative agent that is cognised;
—and when the plural number is used, it is the plurality of the nominative agent that is cognised; this also is a clearly perceptible fact.—Now, which of these two perceptible facts can an Inference set aside!—In the case of words, it is found that though the word denotes the Class (which is one), yet when it takes the dual number, the diversity (duality) is understood as pertaining to the individual objects (included under the Class), and when it takes the singular number, the unity cognised is that of the individual substance;—the same thing happens in the case in question also.

From all this it follows that the active agent is not directly expressed by the word ('vadēt'); and when there is no Direct Assertion, there is nothing to reject the indications of the Context.

It has been argued that—"if what is mentioned pertains to the sacrifice, then the man's effort (expressed by the term 'vadēt') becomes useless, as all that has to be done in connection with the sacrifice is laid down in the passage that lays down its entire procedure."

Our answer to this is as follows:—If what is spoken of in the sentence were subsidiary (to the sacrifice), then it could be taken in by the Context; as a matter of fact however, what is not enjoined cannot be subsidiary to a sacrifice; hence in order that it may be subsidiary to the sacrifice, it is necessary that it should be enjoined,—even according to this view.—It is for this reason that we think that the prohibition relates to the speaking that may be done in course of the sacrifice in whose 'Context' the sentence occurs; and hence the advice that 'what is a lie should not be told' is subsidiary to the sacrifice; so that it is what has been determined upon that is subsidiary to the sacrifice and should be done; for instance, having determined upon an offering of Vriki corn, one should not make an offering of Yawa (barley).

Says the Opponent:—"When the teaching that 'a lie should not be told' is accepted in both the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the *Siddhānta*,—what is the use of all this discussion?"

Answer—The need for enquiry arises from the fact that if, according to the Pūrvapakṣa, the teaching pertains to the Man (in ordinary life), then a transgression of it would entail the Expiatory Rite laid down in the Smṛtis [as the prohibition of Lying in general occurs in Smṛtis]; while if, according to the Siddhānta, it pertains to the Darsha-Pūrnanāsa sacrifice, a transgression of it should entail the Expiatory Rite prescribed in the Yaiurvēda.

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Adhikarana (5): Details relating to the 'Yawning Person' appertain to the Context.

SŪTRA (14).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" THE DETAILS IN QUESTION SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE MAN, AS THEY ARE FOR HIS PURPOSE [AND HENCE SHOULD FIND NO PLACE IN THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY ARE MENTIONED], AS IN THE CASE OF THE AHIMA (SC. 3. 3. 1. 5)."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[This is a case of conflict between Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.]
(A) In connection with the Jyoispoma, we read—'Anjiraso vā, etc.'
(Taitti. Sam. 6. 1. 1. 2) ['The excellent Angirasas, going to the celestial region, introduced Initiation and Austority into Water; when one bathes in water, he directly acquires Initiation and Austerity; when one bathes in a sacred water, he becomes a sacred place for his relatives'].—(Where bothing in sacred waters is spoken of.)—(B) Again in connection with the Darsha-Pūramāsa there is the text—'Tasmāt janjabhyamāno'nubrūyāt mayi dakṣakratā it prāṇāpānāvēvātmandhattē' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 2. 4.; Vājasa. Sam. 38. 27)
['The yawning person should recite the mantra Mayi dakṣakratā, etc., thereby he draws within himself. Prāṇa and Apāna'].—[Where the reciting of the mantra is laid down for the 'yawning person'.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—What is laid down here the reciting of the mantra by the 'yauming person', as also the bathing in sacred waters), is it to be done in connection with the action to which the Context belongs (i.e. the Darsha-Pürnamäsa or the Jyotistoma)? Or is it meant only for men in ordinary life (apart from any sacrificial performance)?

On this question, we have the following Pürvapaksa:- "As in the case of the Ahina sacrifices, the details in question should appertain to the Man, as it is for his purpose (Sü.); and hence the Injunction in question should be taken away from the 'Context' in which it occurs.-Why so ?-Because the man (human agent) is directly expressed; that is, the term 'bruyat' ('should recite') is clearly meant to express the effort of the agent (towards the act of reciting) .- 'But in that case, the indication of the Context would be rejected.'—The answer to this is that, let the indication of the Context be rejected; in fact, Syntactical Connection is what rejects it, because what is laid down is in connection with the 'vawning person'. The indication of the Context is that the reciting is laid down as to be done at the performance of the Darsha-Pürnamäsa; while from Syntactical Connection it follows that it is laid down for the 'yawning person' (in general); -and Syntactical Connection is more authoritative than Context. For these reasons the injunction should be taken away from the Context,-The result also of the reciting has been declared to be that 'he draws within himself Prana and Apana' (which means longevity of the man); and this also tends to preclude the

connection of the act in question with the sacrifice.—From all this it follows that the act laid down appertains to the man, and should therefore be taken away from the Context; just as it is in the case of Ahina (see Sū. 3. 3. 15), the 'twelve Upasads' have been taken away from the Context (of the Jyotistoma, and taken as connected with Ahina),—in the same manner the reciting of the mantra 'Mayi dakşakratı' should be taken away from the Context (of the Darsha-Pürnamāsa, and taken as connected with Man), because of its being mentioned in connection with the 'yawning person'."

SÜTRA (15).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—IN FACT, FROM THE PECULIARITY OF THE CONTEXT,
THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PURIFICATORY OF THE MAN CONNECTED WITH THE SCRIFFICE (TO WHICH THE CONTEXT
BELONGS),—JUST AS (WASHING, ETC. ARE PURIFIGATORY) OF THE SUBSTANCE.

Bhāsya.

In reality the act in question should not be taken away from the Context;
—why?—because of the peculiarity of the Context. As a matter of fact it
is only when the 'yawning person' is connected with the sacrifice of the
Context that he becomes purified by the reciting (of the mantra 'Mayi
dakṣakratū etc.');—just as such substances as Barley and the like are purified
by such acts as washing and the rest.

Objection—"But the Context cannot restrict the term 'yawning person' to one person (connected with the sacrifice); because Syntactical Connection (which connects the reciting with the 'yawning person' in general) is more authoritative than Context."

Answer—We do not say that the Context entirely precludes the term 'yawning person' from all connection with men not connected with the Context; what we mean is that it will be necessary to assume some result that would follow from the reciting of the mantra by a man apart from the sacrificial performance.

"The result has been clearly declared in the text itself,—that 'the man draws within himself Prāṇa and Apāna'."

We say—it is not so; because we do not find any injunctive term in this sentence; all that we find is the mere statement of something present at the time,—'he draws within himself Prāṇa and Apāna,' where we have the Present Tense, not the Injunctive form of the Verb; and as such it can be taken as commending the act of reciting the mantra. From this it follows that the result spoken of does not follow (from the reciting of the mantra) apart from the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices. From all this it is concluded that the reciting of the mantra serves to purify the man (yawning) while he is performing the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices.

Objection—"We admit that the act (of reciting) is purificatory of the man; but we do not admit that it is so only while the man is performing the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices.—Why so?—As a matter of fact, whenever a man gawis,—even apart from the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa,—he is spoken

of as a 'yawning person'; and it has already been said (by the Siddhāntin himself) that the Context does not exclude (from the connotation of the term 'yawning person') one not engaged in the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa. Hence we conclude that the action of reciting should be taken away from the Context."

Answer—It is true that the man not engaged in the sacrifice is not excluded; but there is no purpose to be served by the purification of such a man.

Opponent—"Nor is there any purpose to be served by the purification of the man connected with the Context."

Answer—[There is this purpose served in that case that] it would be a purified person that would perform the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa sacrifices.

Opponent—" Even when the act is taken elsewhere, away from the Context, there would be this purpose served that it would be a purified person that would perform the other acts."

Answer—The purification could not form an accessory to any other act; as any such other act could not have any connection with the Context (in which the act of reciting is mentioned).

Opponent—"Nor can the purification be an accessory to the sacrifice mentioned in the Context, as through Syntactical Connection, it is found that it is a quality pertaining to man."

Answer—The act of reciting is not understood to appertain to the man (in general), as it would be useless in that case.

From all this it follows that the act of reciting is syntactically connected only with the two sacrifices of the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa which are mentioned in the Context,—and not with any other action, even though such other action be fruitful; as there would be no Context to indicate such connection. For this reason the act of reciting is not to be taken away from the Context.

It might be argued that—"in the event of the act of reciting being retained in the Context, the word 'brūyāt' ('should recite'), which denotes an activity of man in general, would have to be taken as used in a sense other than its own."—But, under the circumstances (if the term were taken as enjoining the activity of man) the word would be a mere reference to what is already known; as there can be no need for enjoining the connection of man (in general, with any mere activity).

SŪTRA (16).

A DETAIL CAN BE TAKEN AWAY FROM THE CONTEXT ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF A DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāşya.

It has been argued (by the Pūrvapakṣin) that—" just as the 'twelve Upasads' are taken away from their Context (of the Jyotisloma) (and connected with the Ahīna)—in the same manner, the act of reciting should be taken away from the Context."—Our answer to this is that in the case cited, the 'twelve Upasads' are distinctly declared, by Syntactical Connection, as belonging to the Ahīna sacrifices;—these Ahīna sacrifices are fruitful;—

the term 'Ahina' cannot apply to the Jyotistoma (the 'sacrifice' of the Context), because any such application could be only indirect and figurative; —and lastly, there is the direct declaration to the effect that—'There are only three Upasads in the one-day sacrifice, and there are twelve at the Ahina' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 2. 5. 1). For all these reasons, it is only right that the 'twelve Upasads' are taken away from the Context; specially as in this case there is no connection with any man, as such connection would be useless, and there is no other fruitful action mentioned in the Context. [Hence the case of the act of reciting is not analogous to that of the 'twelve Upasads' and the Ahina sacrifices.]

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ADHIKARANA (6): Acts like 'Threatening' appertain to the man in general.

SŪTRA (17).

In the case of 'Shamyu' (what is spoken of is to be taken away from the Context), because it applies to all conditions (of the Brāhmana).

Bhāşya.

In connection with the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa, we read—'Dēvā vai sham-yum etc.' (Tuitit. Sam. 2. 6. 10. 1). [The doities said to Shariyu, the son of Bṛhaspati, 'Please forward our offerings'.........They said—'What is the use to us of offspring?' If a man threatens a Brāhmaṇa, he should be fined a hundred; if he strike him, he should be fined a thousand; if he fetches blood, as many particles of dust may be wetted by the flowing blood, for so many years he should be kept away from the region of the Pitṛs; for this reason one should not threaten a Brāhmaṇa, or strike him, or fetch his blood.—[In view of this passage, the term 'Shamṇu' is taken as standing for the prohibition, contained in the last sentence, of threatening, striking, and fetching blood from, a Brāhmaṇa.]

In regard to this there arises the question—Does the prohibition of threatening appertain to the Darsha-Pürnamäsa? Or is it addressed to

man in general?

The Pūrvapaksa view on this question is as follows:—"On account of the Context, the prohibition of threatening and other acts should be taken as appertaining to the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa,—the meaning being that 'at the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa the Brāhmaṇa should not be threatened, or hurt, or wounded so as to fetch blood;—other methods should be employed to win him over; it is for this reason that they win him over by means of the Anvāhārya',—such is the sense of the prohibition, deduced from the Context."

In answer to this, we have the following Siddhānta:—In the case of 'Shannu' (i.e. the Prohibitions in question), it has to be taken away from the Context;—why?—because it applies to all conditions; that is, the Prohibition contained in the text refers to the Brāhmaṇa in all conditions;—and it does not mean that the threatening is not to be done by the Brāhmaṇa when engaged in the performance of the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.

Objection—"But, from the Context, it is clear that it appertains to the

Darsha-Pürņamāsa."

Answer—True; that is so, from the Context; but from Syntactical Connection it is clear that it appertains to the threatening person (in general); and Syntactical Connection is more authoritative than Context.

Objection—"But as in the case of the yawning person, the prohibition in question could find place in the Context itself."

We say—no. As in that case a result will have to be assumed; while in the case of the Siddianta, the result is already definitely declared, and there is the injunctive affix also present—'Shatēna yātayāt—Sahasrēna yātayāt—Sahasrēna yātayāt—Sanayam lokam prajāniyāt'.

From all this it follows that details like the Prohibition of Threatening and the like have to be taken away from the Context.

ADHIKARANA (7): The prohibition of conversation with a woman in her courses appertains to Man in general.

SŪTRA (18).

Inasmuch as the woman in her courses has already been removed previously [from the sacrifice, the Prohibition cannot appertain to the sacrifice; it must appertain to Man in ordinary life].

Bhāsya,

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—"One should not converse with a woman in her courses, nor should one 'eather food'" (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 1. 5-6).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this a prohibition of conversation with a woman in her courses during the performance of the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa sacrifices? Or is it meant for man at all times?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is that in view of the *Context*, the prohibition should be taken as pertaining to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices.

Against the Pūrvapaksa, we have the following Siddhanta—The 'conversation with a woman in her courses' meant here should be taken away from the Context :--why ?--because such a woman has already been removed previously. It is declared (in Taitti. Bra. 3. 7. 1. 9) that-'If the wife of a man happen to be untouchable on the preceding day, he should remove her and then proceed with the performance of the sacrifice'. Conversation with the sacrificer's wife is carried on by the Adhvaryu priest at the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa sacrifices, during which conversation he says to her 'O wife, wife! this is thy region' (Mai. Sam. 1. 4. 3); it is this conversation which is likely to be carried on that could be a subject of prohibition :--but when, in the event of the wife being in her courses, she has been already removed on the preceding day, there could be no possibility of any conversation with her being carried on by persons who are performing the sacrifice after having removed her; how then could there be any likelihood of their conversing with her, which should have to be prohibited ?-For these reasons, 'the conversation with a woman in her courses' (which is prohibited by the text in question) should be taken away from the Context.

SŪTRA (19).

Also because there is prohibition of 'intercourse'. $Bh\bar{a}sya.$

There is prohibition also of 'eating her food'—'one should not eat her food; rubbing her body is the woman's food' (Taitti, Sam. 2. 5. 1. 6). and this 'rubbing' stands for 'intercourse'; hence the sentence 'one should not eat her food' means that 'one should not have intercourse with her'; and there is no possibility of this 'intercourse' in connection with the Context (i.e. in course of the performance of the Darsha-Pürnamäsa sacrifice);—from this also it is definitely concluded that the Prohibition (of conversation, and also of intercourse) should be taken away from the Context and treated as appertaining to Man in general.

ADHIKARANA (8): The 'wearing of gold' and such details appertain to Man in general.

SUTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT WHICH DOES NOT OCCUR IN THE 'CONTEXT' OF ANY PARTICULAR SACRIFICE SHOULD APPERTAIN TO MAN IN GENERAL; BECAUSE IT DIFFERS ON THAT POINT FROM THOSE OTHERS (THAT OCCUR IN PARTICULAR CONTEXTS).

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

Without reference to any sacrifice, there is the text—' Taemāt swarnam, etc.' (Taitti. Brā. 2. 2. 4. 6) ['For this reason bright gold should be
worn, thereby one's enemy becomes un-bright (pale)']; and again 'Suvāsasā
blavitavyam rūpamāva bibharti' ['One should be well-dressed, thereby he
acquires beauty'].

In connection with such texts there arises the question—Does what is laid down here apportain to the *Context* (of a sacrifice) or to Man in general?

The apparent conclusion on this question is that 'that which does not occur in the Context of any particular sacrifice should appertain to Man in general; because on that point it differs from those others that occur in particular Contexts' (Sū.). That is to say, what is laid down in texts like those under consideration must appertain to Man in general;—why?—because 'from those others' that occur in particular contexts, it is different, on the point that it does not occur in any particular Context. In fact, what does not occur in any particular Context appertain to all Contexts; as on account of its not occurring in any particular Context, it could not be connected with any one Context; hence such details must appertain to Man in general.

SŪTRA (21).

[Pūrvapakṣin's objection (a)]—"But inasmuch as no substance is mentioned, the text should be taken as auxiliary (to the Aunihotra and other sacrifices),"

Bhāsya.

The particle 'tu' denies the view set forth in the preceding Sūtra.

"What is laid down in the text in question cannot appertain to Man in general; it must be auxiliary (appertaining) to the Aymihoira and other sacrifices.—Why so 2—Because no substance is mentioned; neither a substance (offering material) nor a deity is mentioned in the text, by virtue of

which it could be assumed that the term 'bhāryam' in the text stands for 'should be offered in sacrifice';—and when no substance or deity is found, the root 'bhr' (in 'bhāryam') must be taken as denoting 'to wear', and

hence standing for some sort of purification; and purification is possible only when the thing purified is auxiliary to a sacrifice, not otherwise. Hence what is laid down (i.e. the wearing of gold) should be taken as auxiliary (appertaining) to the Agnikolva and other acts."

SŪTRA (22).

[PÜRVAPAKŞIN'S OBJECTION (b)]—"SECONDLY, BECAUSE OF ITS CONNECTION WITH THE VEDA."

Bhāsva.

The text under consideration occurs in that section of the Veda which is called 'Adhvaryawa' ('Pertaining to the Adhvarya'), which, as denoting connection with the Veda, is applicable only to what is auxiliary to a sacrifice; as it is only what is auxiliary to a sacrifice that 'pertains to the Adhvaryu Priest',—and not anything pertaining to Man in general; as a matter of fact, the Adhvaryu Priest is the performer of only such acts as the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa and other sacrifices along with their auxiliaries, as also the acts that are auxiliary to those sacrifices.—For this reason also the acts like those under consideration should be taken as pertaining to sacrifices."

SŪTRA (23).

[PÜRVAPAKŞIN'S OBJECTION (c)]—" THIRDLY, ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS CONNECTION OF A SUBSTANCE."

Bhāşya.

"Further, the statement 'swarnam bhāryam' ('gold should be worn') is one in which the substance is the principal factor, as is clear from the sense of the objective (implied in the phrase 'swarnam bhāryam'). The wearing of this substance 'gold' being purificatory in character, such purification would serve a useful purpose only if the wearing laid down were auxiliary to a sacrifice; it would serve no such purpose if it appertained to Man in general."

SŪTRA (24).

[Answer to Purvapaksin's objections]—In reality there
must be some connection between the acts under consideration and a result; just like the connection
(of other things with particular results);
It must therefore be regarded as an action
(accomplishing the purpose of Man in
General); such is the opinion of
Attishävana.

Bhāṣya:

In reality, acts like those we are discussing must have some connection with a result; i.e. they must appertain to Man in general. If the act (of

wearing) appertained to (were purificatory of) the gold, or to the clothes, it would be entirely useless.

Opponent—"But with the purified 'gold' and the purified 'clothes', the sacrifice would be accomplished (so that it would not be useless)."

Answer—It is not so. What is auxiliary to the gold could not help the sacrifice; and the act in question cannot be taken as auxiliary to the sacrifice, because neither 'Direct Assertion' nor any other means of know-ledge points to any such auxiliary. Thus we conclude that acts like those under consideration are connected with results—such as the one spoken of in the sentence 'His enemy becomes pale'.

Opponent—"But this ('his enemy becomes pale') only mentions a present fact (not a future result)."

Answer-True, that is so. But in order to save the passage from uselessness it becomes necessary to seek out its connection with some injunction of results; and rather than hunt out any other connection, it is much simpler to make some modification in the words occurring in the same sentence.-Why so ?-Because its syntactical connection with that modification would be directly perceptible, while that with any other sentence would be indirect and not perceptible. And the only modification that would be needed would be-(1) not to attach any significance to the Present Tense (in the word 'bhavati' in the sentence 'His enemy becomes pale'), and (2) to determine the exact import of the connection (between the act of wearing gold and the result expressed in the sentence 'His enemy becomes pale'). For these reasons sentences like the one in question should be taken as laying down the Primary sacrifice (to which the wearing of gold would be an auxiliary, leading to a particular result), just as the Prajapati-Vratas ('one should not look at the rising sun' and so forth) are connected with the result spoken of in the sentence 'By this one becomes absolved from sin', -so it should be understood to be the case with the act under consideration.

From all this it follows that the act of wearing gold appertains to Man in general.

Adhikarana (9): The 'Jaya' and other Homas are subsidiaries to actions laid down in the Veda.

SŪTRA (25).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"WHAT IS NOT MENTIONED IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY PARTICULAR ACTION MUST BE SUBSIDIARY TO ALL ACTIONS, AS THERE CAN BE NO SPECIFICATION."

Bhāsya.

[We now proceed to consider the special relationship of such factors as are clearly indicated by Syntactical Connection to be subsidiary to actions in general—Tantravärtika—Trans., p. 1387.]

The cases to be considered in this connection are the 'Jaya' and other oblations which are known to be connected with sacrifices in a general way, such as we find in the following texts—'If one desires to succeed in a transaction, he—(a) should offer at it the Jaya and other oblations,—(b) should offer the 'Rāṣprabhy oblations,—(c) should offer the 'Abhyātāna oblations' (see Taitti. Sari. 3. 4. 6. 2). [Here every one of these three oblations is laid down as to be offered at any sacrifice where one desires prosperity. (a) The 'Jaya' is the name given to the oblations offered with the mantra 'Chitaācha svāha, etc.' (Hiranyakeṣi-Gṛhyasūtra, 1. 3. 9); (b) 'Rāṣrabhyt' is the name given to the oblations offered with the mantra 'Rūṣāād, etc.' (Vājasa. Sari. 18. 38);—and (c) 'Abhyātāna' is the name given to the oblations offered with the mantra 'Agnirbhūtānām, etc.' (Taitti. Sari. 3. 4. 5. 1).]

In regard to these oblations there arises this question:—Are they auxiliary to (to be performed in connection with) actions of all kinds,—such as land-cultivation and the like? Or only to those actions that are laid down in the Veda,—such as the Agnihotra and the rest? That the oblations in question are auxiliary to other acts (and not independent actions by themselves) is clear from the fact that they are clearly recognised (through the opening words of the text quoted) as being connected with certain transactions, and also from the fact that no separate results are mentioned as following from them (the only result mentioned being the success of the transaction in connection with which they are performed).

The Pūrvapakṣa view on this question is that "the oblations in question should be taken as auxiliary to actions of all kinds, because the text speaks of no specification".

SŪTRA (26).

[Siddhānta]—In fact, being of the nature of 'Homa' (oblation into fire), they should be restricted (to the Vedic sacrifices); because of their connection with the 'Āhayanīya' (sacrificial fire).

Bhāsya.

It is not right that the oblations in question should be taken as auxiliary to all kinds of actions, including even land-cultivation and the like. In fact, these are of the nature of 'Homa' (Oblation into Fire), and as such should be restricted; because in Homas, the connection of the Sacrificial Fire is essential; as is made clear in such texts as 'when one offers oblations into the Sacrificial Fire then does his desired object become fulfilled' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 10. 5);—from this it follows that the oblations in question can be auxiliary to only such acts as are connected with the Sacrificial Fire.—Now, as a matter of fact, such acts as land-cultivation and the like are not connected with the Sacrificial Fire; in fact they are not connected even with the 'Gārhapatya' (Domestic Fire), out of which the 'Āhavanīya' or Sacrificial Fire could be obtained.—From all this it follows that the 'Jaya' and other oblations are not to be offered in connection with such acts as land-cultivation and the like.

SŪTRA (27).

They should be regarded as auxiliary (to Vedic saorifices),
—Also because of the name.

$Bh\bar{a}$ şya.

For the following reason also we hold the view that the oblations are subsidiary to Vedic actions.—Why?—Because of the names; that is, the 'Jaya' and the other oblations in question have been laid down in that section of the Veda which has been named 'Ādhvaryava' ('pertaining to the Adhvaryu Priest'), and hence they should be offered by the Adhvaryu priest. In the case of land-cultivation and such acts, there is no Adhvaryu priest; so that if the oblations in question were offered at these acts, they would be offered by one who is not an Adhvaryu; and this would be contrary to the indication of the Name.—From this also it follows that the oblations in question are subsidiary to Vedic acts only.

ADHIKARANA (10): The prescribed 'Isti' is to be performed in connection with the 'acceptance' of the gift of a Horse at a Vedic sacrifice.

SŪTRA (28).

[PCRVAPAKŞA]—"THE SACRIFICE SHOULD BE PERFORMED ON THE
'ACCEPTANCE' OF THE ORDINARY HORSE-GIFT, AS IT IS THIS
'ACCEPTANCE' THAT WOULD BE SINFUL; AND AS FOR THE
'ACCEPTANCE' OF THE VEDIC HORSE-GIFT, NO SINFULNESS COULD ATTACH TO THAT, AS IT IS SANCTIONED
BY THE SCRIPTURES"

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

[Here 'acceptance' stands for 'giving'.—See next Adhikarana.]

There is a sacrifice called the 'Ashvapratigrahēşti' (Sacrifice performed in connection with the acceptance of a Horse-gift), enjoined in the text—
'Varuno vā ētam gṛḥṇāti yoʻshvam pratigṛḥṇāti; yāvaloʻshvān pratigṛḥṇiyāt
gavato vāruṇān chatuṣkapālān nirvapēt' (Taitti. Sain. 2. 3. 12. 1) ['Varuṇa seizes him who accepts the gift of a horse; as many horses one may receive in gift, so many offerings on four pans should be made to Varuṇa'].

In regard to this there arises the question.—Is this expiatory sacrifice to be performed at the 'acceptance' of the Horse-gift in ordinary life, or at the acceptance of the Horse-gift sanctioned by the Veda?

Question—" When is it the 'acceptance of the horse-gift' in ordinary life? and when is it the 'acceptance of the horse-gift' sanctioned by the Veda?"

Answer—When in ordinary life, one receives the gift of a horse, either on asking for it, or even without asking,—it is a case of 'acceptance of the horse-gift in ordinary life';—and it is a case of 'acceptance of the horse-gift sanctioned by the Veda', when one receives 'a thousand horses' as the sacrificial fee prescribed for the Paundarika sacrifice, or when one receives a horse at the Jyotisloma where 'the horse, cow, etc.' have been prescribed as the sacrificial fee.

The ordinary notion being that as the expiatory sacrifice itself is a Vedic sacrifice, it must be performed in connection with the gift sanctioned by the Veda,—we have, against it, the following Pūrnapakṣa view:—"The sacrifice should be performed at the 'acceptance' of the ordinary Horse-gift, as it is this 'acceptance' that would be sinful; the sinfulness of the acceptance is clearly asserted in the sentence 'Varuna (Dropsy) seizes him who accepts the gift of a horse';—this descriptive text must refer to a case where there is sin (in the acceptance); and this sinfulness is possible only in cases where the gift of a horse is 'accepted' in ordinary life at the hands of a Shūdra or some other sinful person; hence inasmuch as this sinfulness is possible only in the case of an ordinary Horse-gift, it follows that the

expiatory sacrifice should be performed only at such an 'acceptance' in ordinary life .- Objection-' The descriptive text just quoted is meant, not to qualify the occasion for the expiatory sacrifice, but only to commend the expiatory sacrifice.' - Answer-It could be so only if the sacrifice served the purpose of removing the sin; the sacrifice however is meant to save one from Varuna (i.e. Dropsy); and this is possible only in ordinary life: as it is only in ordinary life that Dropsy actual seizes a man. In the case of the acceptance of the Horse-gift sanctioned by the Veda, on the other hand, such would not be the case; because that this gift should be accepted (at the sacrifice) is sanctioned by the scriptures—i.e. by direct injunctive texts. If there were sin in such an 'acceptance', then it could never be enjoined as something that should be done; because what tends to bring about sin is something that should never be done .- Objection-' Even in the case of the acceptance of the horse-gift sanctioned by the Veda, there is sin if it is accepted from a person from whom gifts should never be accepted.'-Answer-That might be so if the expiatory sacrifice were to be performed by the person accepting the gift; as a matter of fact, however, it is to be performed by the person who makes the other person accept the gift (i.e. the giver of the gift), as we shall explain under the next Adhikarana. For all these reasons, it should be taken as established in the present Adhikarana that the expiatory sacrifice in question should not be performed at that 'acceptance of the Horse-gift' which is sanctioned by the Veda."

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—THE TEXT (SPEAKING OF VARUNA SEIZING THE MAN) SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ONLY COMMENDATORY; AS NO SUCH SEIZURE IS ACTUALLY FOUND TO TAKE PLACE; HENCE THE EXPLATORY SACRIFICE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS TO BE PERFORMED IN CONNECTION WITH THE GIFT AT A SACRIFICIAL PERFORMANCE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not the correct view to take that "the sacrifice in question should be performed by one who, in ordinary life, accepts the gift of a horse from a Shūdra or from some other sinful person". The person accepting the gift has been spoken of as 'seized by Varuna', i.e. one who is attacked by Dropsy, one whose abdomen becomes distended on account of the accumulation of fluid within; this is a disease known in common parlance as 'Jalodara' ('Water in the Abdomen', Dropsy):—and certainly the text could not be meant to assert that the 'acceptance of the gift of a horse' in ordinary life is the cause of the said disease; nor can this (cause of the disease) be taken as enjoined by the text itself. Thus we conclude that there is no 'seizure' by Dropsy, following from the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift.

Opponent—"The term 'varuna' stands (not for the disease of dropsy, but) for sin,—in the etymological sense of the term—'varuna' being derived from the root 'vr' to hinder' or 'hide'."

Answer—This argument would involve the unnecessary trouble of abandoning the well-known signification of the term; because, even, in the said etymological sense, 'Varuna' would be that which hinders,—and such a Varuna' oduld seive a man also at the acceptance of the gift at a sacrifice. Even if the 'hindrance' ('varuna') be taken as consisting in the trouble involved in the keeping, feeding and general care (of the horse received in gift), there would be nothing to justify the view that this applies only to the case of the ordinary horse-gift [as the horse received at a Vedic sacrifice has to be kept and fed and cared for exactly in the same manner as that received in ordinary life]:—and yet the recourse to the etymological explanation would set aside the well-known signification of the term (to no purpose).

For these reasons the text in question must be taken as purely commendatory; the commendation consisting in the likening of the expiatory sacrifice to freedom from dropsy, the sense being that 'the result brought about by the sacrifice is as desirable for the performer as freedom from dropsy is for the man seized by dropsy'; the 'acceptance' of the gift being likened to the 'attack of dropsy' and the 'sacrifice' to the 'freedom from dropsy'; the sense thus comes to be that 'just as for the man attacked by dropsy it is necessary to take measures for its cure, so is it necessary for the man accepting the gift to perform the sacrifice'.

Thus for all these reasons, the expiatory sacrifice should be taken as to be performed in connection with the gift at a sacrificial performance. Because if it were applicable in the case of the ordinary gift, it would be necessary to assume a result for it; in the case of the gift at a sacrifice on the other hand, the expiatory sacrifice would be an auxiliary to that sacrifice at which the gift of the horse has been accepted; this will mean that the expiatory sacrifice has to be taken as syntactically connected with the text laying down the entire procedure of that other sacrifice (at which the gift is received), on the ground of the two being directly connected (as shown above); and this would certainly be much simpler than the assumption of a syntactical connection, which is not direct, with a declaration of the result (assumed to follow from the expiatory sacrifice performed in connection with the ordinary gift).—Thus it is only right that the expiatory sacrifice should be performed in connection with the gift of a horse sanctioned by the Veda.

ADHIKARANA (11): The 'Vāruṇt Iṣṭi', prescribed in connection with the gift of a Horse is to be performed by the giver of the horse.

SŪTRA (30).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE SACRIFICE IS NOT PRESCRIBED [FOR THE GIVER], AS THE ACTION [OF 'GIVING'] IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT [FROM THE ACTION OF 'ACCEPTING' IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH THE SACRIFICE IS PRESCRIBED]."

Bhāsya,

In connection with the text 'Yāvato'shvān pratigṛhnīyāt tāvato vāruṇān chatuṣkapālān nirvapāt' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 3. 12. 1) ['As many horses one receives in gift, so many offerings on four pans he should make to Varuṇa'],—we have learnt (in the preceding Adhikaraṇa) that the sacrifice herein prescribed is to be done in connection with the gift of a horse at a Vedic sacrifice. Now, there arises the question—Is this sacrifice to be performed by the acceptor, i.e. the person to whom the horse is given, or by the person who makes the other accept the gift, i.e. the person by whom the horse is given?

On this question, we have the following Pairvapakea:—"The sacrifice is not prescribed for the giver, as the action of 'giving' is different from the action of 'accepting'; that is, as a matter of fact, the sacrifice in question has not been prescribed for the person making the gift, and we clearly understand it as laid down for the person who does the acceptance of the gift, by the text—'as many horses one receives in gift so many offerings on four pans he should make to Varuna'. Hence the conclusion is that the sacrifice should be performed by the Priest who accepts the gift of the horse."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY THE PERSON EMPLOYING THE PRIESTS, AS IS CLEARLY SHOWN BY INDICATIVES.

Bhāṣya.

The sacrifice is to be performed, not by the person accepting the gift, but by the person who makes the person accept it:—"why?"—because this is clearly shown by indications.—"What is the indicative that shows it?"—The 'indicative' consists in the connection between the words that follow and the words that have gone before; that is to say, there is the text (Taitti Sain. 2. 3. 12. 1), (a) 'Prajāpatir varuağu ashvamanayat' ['Prajāpati presented a horse to Varuna'], where Prajāpati is spoken of as the giver and Varuna as the receiver of the Horse:—(b) then follows the sentence Sa svām devatām ārchhat' ['He lost the divinity within himself']

which needs to be construed with the foregoing sentence, so that the pronoun 'sa' ('he') stands for Prajāpati (of the preceding sentence), and the two sentences become syntactically connected. The pronoun 'he' is taken as standing for Prajapati, as it is in the same case as the word ' prajapatih' (in the preceding sentence)-and it is not taken as standing for Varuna, as it is not in the same case as 'varunāya' (in the preceding sentence); -(c) next follows the sentence 'Sa paryadiryata' ['He became torn (afflicted with disease)']; here also the pronoun 'he' stands for Prajāpati mentioned before,-and the sentence becomes syntactically connected with the first sentence:—(d) next comes the sentence—'Sa ēvaitam vāruņam chatuskapālam apashuat' ['He perceived the cake baked on four pans dedicated to Varuna'], where again 'he' stands for the same Prajāpati; -then it goes on, 'Sa niravapat' ['He offered it'], -again 'he' is Prajāpati; -then, 'Tato vai sa varunapāshāt amuchyata' ['thence he became freed from the clutches of Varuna'],here also 'he' is Prajāpati. The sentence 'Varuna seizes him' is the statement of the reason; the sense being-'Because Prajāpati, on giving a horse to Varuna, became afflicted with disease, therefore the person who receives (i.e. gives) a horse is seized by Varuna, and becomes afflicted with disease'; -and 'because Prajapati became free by offering the Vāruna sacrifice, therefore the man who gives a horse should offer the Vāruna sacrifice.'-In this manner the performance of the Vāruna sacrifice by the giver of a horse becomes commended by the verb 'should be performed'.-From this it follows that when a man gives a horse, he should offer the Vāruna sacrifice.

Objection—"What is actually asserted in the text is that the person who accents the gift of a horse should offer the sacrifice."

Answer-If such were the meaning, then the opening of the passage would be asserting one thing and its concluding portion something quite to the contrary; so that the opening as well as the conclusion would both be meaningless. Hence we have either to assume a different meaning for the opening sentence, in accordance with what is said in the concluding sentence, or assume a different meaning for the concluding sentence, in accordance with what is said in the opening sentence; that is, either the opening sentence 'Prajapati presented a horse to Varuna' will, in accordance with what is said in the concluding sentence, have to be taken to mean that 'he received the horse from Varuna',-or, in accordance with what is said in the opening sentence, the concluding sentence, 'He who receives a horse' will have to be taken to mean 'one who gives a horse'.-- Under the circumstances, it is what comes first that is to be respected (kept intact), as there is nothing to contradict it (at the time of its appearance), -whereas what comes later has to be taken in an indirect sense by reason of a contrary idea having already appeared on the scene; -this according to the maxim, 'That which comes first is to be accepted, as its injunction comes first, as in ordinary practice' (Mīmānsā-Sūtra 12. 2. 23).

Further, if the statement that 'Prajāpati presented a horse to Varuşa', were taken to mean that 'he received it from Varuşa', many incongruities would be involved in such an interpretation. On the other hand, the word 'receives' is capable of somehow expressing the idea of giving; because the

man who does an act,—as also the man who, even indirectly, helps in the accomplishment of the act,—both can be regarded as the 'doer' of that act; for instance, when a man arranges for the ploughing of a field, he is spoken of as 'ploughing the field with six ploughs', even though he may not do the actual ploughing at all; and this because it is he who enables the act to be done and hence 'does' it;—in the same manner, in the case in question, the man who enables the acceptance to be done is he who gives it;—and hence the man giving the horse can be spoken of as 'accepting' it. Thus, it is after full consideration that it has been decided that it is the person giving the horse who is spoken of as 'accepting' it (in the text under consideration); and it is for him that the performance of the Vāruņa sacrifice has been prescribed.

[Kumārila offers other interpretations of this and the preceding Adhikarana; for which see Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 1407–1410.]

ADHIKARANA (12): Cooked 'Charu' is to be offered to Soma-Indra on the occasion of vomiting the Soma drunk at a Vedic sacrifice.

SŪTRA (32).

[PÜRVAPAKṢA]—" THE CASE OF THE VOMITING OF THE SOMA DRUNK IS SIMILAR [TO THAT OF THE HORSE-GIFT]."

Bhāsya.

There is the text—'Somaindram charum nirvapēt shyāmākam somavāminah' ['Cooked shyāmāka rice should be offered to Soma-Indra, on bebalf of one who vomits Soma'' (cf. Teitti, Sain. 2, 3, 2, 7).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this cooked rice to be offered to Soma-Indra, on the occasion of vomiting the ordinary Soma-drink or on that of vomiting the Vedic Soma-drink?

Question—"What is ordinary Soma-drink? and what is Vedic Soma-drink?"

Answer—The Vedic Soma-drink is the Soma drunk at the Jyotistoma and allied sacrifices; and it is ordinary Soma-drink when Soma is drunk for seven or ten days for the purpose of securing the equilibrium of the bodily humours.

On the question stated, we have the following Pūrvapaksa:-" The case of the vomiting of the Soma drunk is similar to that of the Horse-gift. That is to say, the sacrifice in question is to be offered in the case of the ordinary vomiting, not in that of the Vedic vomiting. The words 'is similar' refer to the Pūrvapaksa view (of Adhikarana 10); the sense being that-just as in the case of the Horse-gift, the expiatory sacrifice was declared (in the Pūrvapaksa) as to be performed at the acceptance of the Horse-gift in ordinary life, on the ground of its performance having been laid down in connection with an evil effect (the attack of dropsy),-in the same manner, in the case in question also, we find the sacrifice mentioned in connection with an evil effect in the text 'one who drinks Soma (and vomits it) becomes weak in his sense-organs and in vigour'; -now it is only in ordinary life that the Soma being regularly drunk for the purpose of securing the equilibrium of the bodily humours, if the drink is lost by vomiting, the equilibrium of the humours becomes lost; so that it is only in this case that the 'weakening of the sense-organs' becomes possible (as the result of the vomiting). In the case of Soma drunk during a Vedic sacrifice, as the drinking is done simply in obedience to the scriptural injunction (and not for any special purpose), there could be no evil effect (resulting from the vomiting); because in this case, the Soma-drinking is done simply in obedience to the injunction that 'the remnant of the Soma at a sacrifice should be drunk'; and so long as this 'drinking of the Soma' is done, there can be no evil effects; so that even though the man might vomit the Soma drunk, yet the enjoined act of Soma-drinking will have been duly accomplished, and the scriptural injunction will have been duly acted upon; and hence there could be no evil effects. For these reasons, we conclude that the offering to Soma-Indra should be made when the Soma drunk in ordinary life is vomited."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE OFFERING SHOULD BE MADE AT THE (VOMITING OF THE SOMA DRINK AT THE) VEDIC SACRIFICE; AS IT IS ONLY AT THIS THAT IT CREATES AN EVIL EFFECT; AS REGARDS THE (VOMITING OF THE SOMA DRUNK IN) ORDINARY LIFE, AS IT IS DONE FOR A VISIBLE PURPOSE, THERE COULD BE NO EVIL EFFECTS.

Bhāsya.

The offering in question can be made only at the vomiting of the Soma drunk at a Vedic sacrifice, not at that of what is drunk in ordinary life.—Why?—Because it is only at this that it creates an evil effect; in connection with the vomiting at a Vedic sacrifice, we find its evil effect described in the text—'He becomes weak in the sense-organs and in vigour.' In the case of the ordinary Soma-drinking on the other hand, as it is done for the purpose of securing the equilibrium of the bodily humours, there would be no evil effects resulting from the vomiting: in fact, it is for the very purpose of vomiting it that they drink Soma in ordinary life.

Even if we take the text just quoted ('He becomes weak, etc.') to be purely commendatory, the only reasonable hypothesis would be that the offering is to be done on vomiting the Soma drunk at a Vedic sacrifice; as it is only by this means that we could avoid the necessity of assuming a distinct result (for the offering to Soma-Indra). [Under the Siddhānta, this assumption is not necessary because the offering forms part of the Vedic sacrifice and thus helps in the bringing about of the result of that sacrifice itself.]

ADHIKARANA (13): The offering of Cooked Rice to Soma-Indra is to be made only when the 'Vomiting' of the Soma-drink is done by the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (34).

[PÜRVAPAKṢA]—"THE OFFERING SHOULD BE MADE IN ALL CASES (OF VOMITING), AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[In connection with the offering of Cooked Rice to Soma-Indra, at the vomiting of Soma drunk at a Vedic sacrifice, there arises the question as to whether the offering is to be made when the vomiting is done by the sacrificer? or when it is done by the priests? Or when it is done by both?] On this question we have the following Pārvapakṣa:—"The sacrifice consisting of the offering of cooked rice to Soma-Indra should be performed at all cases of vomiting—by the Priests and by the sacrificer.—Why?—Because we find no distinction made—such as that 'it should be offered at the vomiting done by such and such a person, and not at that done by such and such another person';—for this reason it should be performed in all cases of vomiting Soma."

SUTRA (35).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—IN REALITY THE OFFERING SHOULD BE MADE WHEN THE VOMITING IS DONE BY THE SACRIFICER; AS IT IS FOR HIS SAKE (THAT THE WHOLE SACRIFICE IS PERFORMED).

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

The offering should be made at the comiting done by the sacrificer;—
why?—because it is for the sake of the sacrificer that the sacrifice is performed;
that is to say, the sacrifice at which the Soma is vomited is performed
'for his sake',—i.e. for the sake of the sacrificer; consequently the offering
to Soma-Indra should also be made for his sake. As a matter of fact,
what is declared in the text under consideration (regarding the offering to
be made to Soma-Indra) is for the benefit of the Soma-vomiter, and that
alone benefits the Soma-vomiter which is capable of benefiting the sacrificer,—
not what is done for the Priest; as the sacrifice at which Soma is vomited
is not done for the sake of the Priests. [If the expiatory offering were made
on the vomiting by the Priest, then that sacrifice could not be performed
in the Fire kindled for the sacrificer, in which the main sacrifice is being
performed.]

The following might be urged here—"When the Adhvaryu Priest or the Holr Priest would vomit the Soma, their own priests could make the expiatory offering in their fires (not in the fire set up for the sacrifice that is performed for the sake of the sacrificer)." In that case, there would be two possibilities:—(1) the expiatory offering would (be made on behalf of the vomiting priests, and hence through other priests and in other fires, and as such) not form part of the main sacrifice at which the Soma has been vomited; or (2) the expiatory offering would not be made on behalf of the vomiting priests, Adhvaryu and Hotr.—Of these two alternatives, if (according to the first alternative) the Adhvaryu and other priests were to have the expiatory offering made by distinct priests of their own, then on account of the former occupying, as they do, a very subordinate position at the whole performance, could not obtain the fruits of the action; and what would be done on behalf of the priests could not benefit the sacrificer at all. For these reasons, we conclude that the expiatory offering should not be offered at the vomiting by the priests.

SŪTRA (36).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES (TO THE SAME EFFECT).

Bhāsua.

There is a text indicative of the fact that the offering is to be made on behalf of the voniting Sacrifleer.—"How?"—The text is—'Somapithēna vā ēṣa vyrdhyatē yaḥ somam vamati' ['If one vomits Soma, he is ruined'];—this means that when the Soma loses its sanctity (by the vomiting) the sacrificial performance of the Sacrifleer becomes defective and thereby he is ruined;—now this 'ruin' could never be that of the Priest. If it were meant to apply to the case of vomiting by the Priests, then the form of the text speaking of the vomiting would have been ('that sacrifleer is ruined) whose priests vomit the Soma', not 'he who vomits the Soma',—From all this also we conclude that the offering (in question) to Soma-Indra should be made when the Soma is vomited by the sacrifleer.

ADHIKARANA (14): Out of the 'Cake baked on Eight Pans' dedicated to Agni, only 'two slices' are to be offered.

SŪTRA (37).

[Pchvapakṣa]—"The entire substance should be offered, as it is meant for that purpose."

Bhāşya.

There are the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa sacrifices; in connection with these, we read— Yadāmēyo'sfākapālo'māvāsyāyām paurnamāsyāhāhāchyuto bha-ati' ['The Cake baked upon eight pans dedicated to Agni is never absent at the Amāvāsyā and 'the Paurnamās' sacrifices' | (Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 3. 3).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the entire substance (cake) to be offered to Agni? or only a little is to be offered and a little is to be retained?

On this question we have the following Pārvapakṣa:—"The entire substance should be offered;—why?—because it is meant for that purpose; the injunction on the point is that 'The Cake should be made āgnēya (dedicated to Agni)'; hence the whole of it should be offered."

SUTRA (38).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS WHAT IS LAID DOWN AS TO BE OFFERED IS A 'SLICE,' THERE MUST BE A REMNANT.

Bhāṣya.

'Niravadāna' stands for 'nişkṛṣya avadāna', i.e. 'offering after being sliced out'; and it is this 'sliced offering' that is laid down in the text, 'Out of the substance, one should make two slices for offering'; there is another text also, to the effect that 'one should offer into the Fire an offering consisting of two slices.'—From all this it is clear that only 'two slices' have to be offered and the rest is to be retained.

SÜTRA (39).

[OBJECTION]—"WHAT IS LAID DOWN IN THESE TEXTS IS ONLY THE METHOD (OF MAKING THE OFFERING); IN REALITY THE WHOLE OF THE SUBSTANCE IS MEANT TO BE OFFERED."

Bhāsya.

"It is not meant that only 'two slices' should be offered; what is meant is that 'the substance to be offered should be prepared (sanctified) by slicing it twice'; so that all that is enjoined by the texts quoted is that

'the substance to be offered should be sliced twice'; and it is not meant that what is not 'sliced twice' should not be offered. Hence the only right course to adopt is that the whole of the Cake should be offered,—none other."

SŪTRA (40).

[Answer]—The offering should be done once only, as the action (of 'offering') will have been accomplished (by that simple offering); specially as the substance is only subservient (to the act of 'offering').

Bhāşya.

Answer-When the substance to be offered has been declared to be that which is qualified by 'double slicing', then by the offering of that 'doublesliced' substance, all that is declared has been accomplished, and in reality there is no substance left (of what has been declared to be meant to be offered); and hence the offering should not be repeated. - Why so ?- Because the substance is meant only to subserve the purpose of accomplishing the offering; and it is not that the substance must be brought into contact with the offering. If it were incumbent upon us to bring the substance into contact with the offering, then, it might be conceded that, even after the 'double-sliced' substance has been offered, there is some of the substance left which should be brought into contact with the act of offering; so that for this purpose the offering may have to be repeated. As a matter of fact, however, the act of offering is there, not for the purpose that the substance may be brought into contact with it,-but in reality it is the substance that is subservient to the offering; i.e. the substance is taken away only for the purpose of accomplishing the act of offering. Consequently, when the offering has been accomplished (by the offering of the 'doublesliced' cake), and the man's purpose has been fulfilled, it is not necessary that the primary act (of offering) should be repeated, simply for the sake of the substance (that may have been left after the 'double-sliced' offering has heen made).

Question—"Why should the substance be regarded as not predominant, and hence not necessitating the repetition of the act of offering?"

Answer—Because the result follows from the offering; and also because of the maxim that 'when an already accomplished entity is spoken of along with an entity still to be accomplished, the former is to be taken as mentioned for the purposes of the latter'.—Nor does the substance accord any perceptible help to the offering.—From all this it follows that a remnant is to be kept after the 'double-sliced' substance has been offered.

It has been argued that—"in view of the substance being spoken of (in the text) as 'āgnēya' (dedicated to Agni),—it must be admitted that the whole of it should be offered (to Agni)".—But in this view, the connection of the whole substance with the offering would be based upon Inference; that of the 'double-sliced substance', on the other hand, is based upon the directly perceived text.—Further, the nominal affix ('dhak', in the term 'āgnēya' 'dedicated to Agni') would be applicable also when the whole of the sub-

stance is not offered,—in the sense that 'the substance to be offered to Agni is to be taken out of the Cake' (which, on that account is called ' $\bar{a}gn\bar{e}ya$ ', 'dedicated to Agni'). ' $\bar{A}gn\bar{e}ya$ ' is a generic term, while the term 'double-sliced' in the sentence 'the double-sliced substance is to be offered' is a particular term (and there is thus no incongruity in the term ' $\bar{a}gn\bar{e}ya$ ').

From all this it follows that some portion of the substance is to be retained.

SŪTRA (41).

Also because we find the 'remnant' spoken of (in the Veda). $Bh\bar{a}sva.$

We actually find the 'remnant' (of the Cake) spoken of in such texts as—'One should slice the Idā out of the remnant', 'one should make the Svietakrt offering out of the remnant'; [which is a clear indication of the fact that only a portion of the Cake is to be actually offered to Agni, and a portion is to be retained as the 'remnant' to be used for various purposes].

ADHIKARANA (15): The 'Svislakrt' offering is to be made out of the Remnants of all the substances used at the Sacrifice.

SŪTRA (42).

[PURVAPARȘA]—"INASMUCH AS THEY ARE NOT THE MOTIVE FOR THE ADMITTING OF THE SUBSTANCES, THE REMNANT-OFFERINGS SHOULD BE MADE OUT OF A SINGLE SUBSTANCE; SPECIALLY AS THE REMNANT IS ONLY A SECONDARY PACTOR."

Bhāsva.

There are the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices; at these there are some doings with the remnants of the offering-substances,—such doings, for instance, as the offerings of the 'Iḍā', the 'Prāshitra' and the 'Sviṣṭakṛt'.

In regard to these there arises the question—Are these doings to be done with the remnants of each of the substances offered at the sacrifice ? or with the remnant of only one of them ?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapaksa-" Inasmuch as they are not the motive for the admitting of the substances, the Remnant-offerings should be made out of a single substance ;-that is to say, what may be done with the Remnants does not tend to admit the substances [i.e. substances are brought into a sacrificial performance, not because the Remnant-offerings have to be made out of them, but because the main sacrificial offerings are made out of them, and the offering of the Remnant is only for a secondary purpose]; if the substances had come in simply for the purpose of the remnant-offerings being made out of them, then, without doubt, the Remnantofferings would have been made out of all the substances used; as a matter of fact, however, the substances are brought in for a different purpose (i.e. for the purpose of the making of the main sacrificial offerings); and as such they need not necessarily be used for purposes of the remnant-offerings; in fact, on account of all the substances being near to hand, the remnantofferings may be made out of any one of them; because the remnant is only a means of the offerings (and hence a secondary factor)."

SŪTRA (43).

[Pürvapakṣa concluded]—" Also because the embellishment is accomplished (by a single offering)."

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

"As a matter of fact, the embellishment of the primary act (which is the sole purpose of the offering of Remnants) is accomplished by a single Remnant-offering; in view of this fact, offerings should not be made out

SUTRA (44).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE MADE OUT OF ALL THE SUBSTANCES, BECAUSE THE MOTIVE IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN ALL, AND BECAUSE THE EMBELLISHMENT IS FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUBSTANCES.

Bhāşya.

In reality, the Remnant-offerings should be made out of all the substances (used at the sacrifice);—why?—because the motive is equally present in all; i.e. the reason that there is for the making of the remnant-offering out of one substance is present in the case of all the substances;—hence a remnant has to be secured of all; that substance of which no remnant is secured, remains deprived of that embellishment which is brought about by the offering.—For all these reasons remnant-offerings should be made out of all the substances.

SÜTRA (45).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES.

Bhāşya.

We find texts also indicative of the same conclusion; e.g.—'Dēvā vāi sviṣtakṛtamabruvan havyam no vaha iti; so'bravīt varam vṛṇai; bhāgo me'stviti; vṛṇīsvēti tē' bruvan; so'bravīt uttarārdhādēva mahyam sakṛt sakṛda-vadadyāt' [The deities said to Sviṣtakṛta- oarry to us our offerings'; he said—'I would ask for the boon that I may receive a share of the offerings'; they said—'Do ask for it';—he said—'One should make an offering to me, one by one, out of the latter half'];—here the term 'sakṛt' has been repeated; which shows that the offerings have to be made out of every one of the Remnants.

ADHIKARANA (16): In the event of the Remnantofferings being made out of a single substance, they should be made out of the first Remnant.

SŪTRA (46).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" IF THE REMNANT-OFFERING IS TO BE DONE OUT OF ONLY ONE SUBSTANCE, ONE MAY DO AS ONE LIKES (OFFERING IT OUT OF ANY SUBSTANCE HE LIKES), AS THERE CAN BE NO DISTINCTION AMONG THEM.

Bhāşya.

This is a hypothetical discussion; the question being—In case the remnant-offerings were to be made out of a single substance [which we have just decided cannot be done]—what is to be done? can the offerings be made out of any one of the substances one likes? or are they to be made out of the first one?

The Pūrrupakṣa view is that—"it may be made out of any substance one likes; —why?—because we do not find any ground for distinction among them; hence there can be no hard and fast rule as to the substance out of which the single offering is to be made."

SŪTRA (47).

[Siddhanta] - In reality, the offering should be made out of the first substance, because of its priority in time.

Bhãsya.

The Remnant-offerings should be made out of the remnant of the first (i.e. principal) substance; why?—because of its priority in time. As it is the first in point of time, if one were to make the offerings out of it, there would be no absence of the requisite conditions; so that when the conditions would be there, it is only right that what is conditional on those conditions should be done; as regards the second and other substances, on the other hand, when the offerings would have been once made out of the first substance, the necessary conditions would cease to exist; and hence the offerings would not be made out of these.—For all these reasons, the offerings should be made out of the remnant of the first substance.

Adhikarana (17): The division of the cake is for the purposes of 'Eating'.

SŪTRA (48).

[PÜRVAPARŞA]—" INASMUCH AS WE DO NOT FIND ANY MENTION OF 'EATING', THE TERM INDICATING 'GIVING' SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE SENSE OF 'INDUCEMENT FOR SERVICE'."

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa, we read—'Idam brahmanah, idam hotuh, idamadhvaryoh, idamagnīdhah ['This is for the Brahman-priest, this for the Hoty-priest, this for the Adwaryu-priest, this for the Agnīd-priest'] (Taitti. Brā. 3. 3. 8. 8). [The Cake having been divided into four parts, each part is assigned to each of the four principal priests, with the words herein prescribed.]

In regard to this there arises the question—Is this assignment of shares for the purpose of inducement for willing service? or for the purpose of 'eating'?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"the assignment of shares is for the purpose of inducement for willing service:—why?—because we find no mention of the 'eating'; we find no such word as 'it should be eaten'; and it is as wrong to do what is not enjoined in the Veda as to omit what is enjoined:—and we find that the parts are given to those who have rendered service (at the performance);—hence it follows that the assignment in question is for the purpose of inducement for willing service."

SŪTRA ·

[PÜRVAPAKŞA concluded]—"ALS RECAUSE IT HAS BEEN EULOGISED AS SUCH."

Bhāṣya.

"The assignment of shares in question we find eulogised as the sacylicial fee', in the text—'Egā vai darshapūrņamāsaņordakṣiṇā'; from this also we conclude that (like the sacrificial fee) this assignment also is for the purpose of inducement for service."

SŪTRA (50).

[SIDDHANTA]—THE ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS BEING FOR THE PURPOSE OF 'EATING': BECAUSE AS REGARDS THE SUB-STANCE (CAKE), THERE IS EQUALITY (BETWEEN THE PRIESTS AND THE SACRIFICER, IN SO FAR AS THE OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBSTANCE IS CONCERNED).

Bhāsya.

The assignment of shares must be taken as being for the purpose of 'eating';—"why?"—because there can be no 'giving' in the case.—

"Why not?"—Because it is only the owner of a thing that can give it, not one who is not its owner.—"Why is there no ownership in this case?"—Because as a matter of fact, the substance (Cake) has been already dedicated by the sacrificer to a particular Deity with the terms 'this is for such and such a deity'; and when a thing has been so dedicated to a deity, cultured people no longer treat it as their own. Consequently if the sacrificer follows this custom of cultured people, he could not have any ownership over the cake (so dedicated). And thus [since he has no ownership over it, it cannot be given away by him, and] it cannot therefore serve the purpose of securing the services (of the priests).

It has been argued that-"nowhere do we find any such expression as that the shares should be eaten, and there is as much harm in doing what is not enjoined as there is in omitting to do what is enjoined".—Our answer to this is as follows: -When the sacrificer pronounces the words 'this for the Brahman-Priest' and so forth (when assigning the parts of the Cake), some sort of connection is established between the shares and the Brahman and other priests; -in this connection, either the shares would benefit the Brahman and other priests, or the Brahman and other priests would benefit the shares :- as a matter of fact, however, we do not find any perceptible benefit being conferred by the Brahman and other priests upon the shares; -on the other hand, it is possible for some benefit to be conferred on the Brahman and other priests by the shares when these latter are eaten ;hence we conclude that the assignment of the shares is for the purpose of eating .-- "What is the benefit (that could be conferred by the shares on the priests)?"-When the Priests have their hunger satisfied by the eating of the Cake, they acquire the strength necessary for the completing of the remaining part of the sacrificial performance.

SŪTRA (51).

As for the eulogising of 'giving' (as being the sacrificial fee), that is due to the assignment.

Bhāşya,

As regards the eulogising of the assignment of shares as 'the sacrificial fee', this is due to the fact of 'assignment', which is common (to the assignment of the shares of the Cake and the assignment of shares in the sacrificial fee); hence the eulogy would be applicable to the assignment of shares in question, even when it is not for the purpose of securing the service (of the Priests).

ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA V.

ADHIKARANA (1): The 'Remnant-offerings to Svistakrt and others should not be done out of Clarified Butter.

SŪTRA (1).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE REMNANT-OFFERING SHOULD BE MADE OUT OF CLARIFIED BUTTER ALSO; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH ALL SUBSTANCES."

Bhāsua.

I.We now proceed to deal with the exception to the general law propounded in 3.44 of the last $P\bar{d}da$ —that the Remnant-offerings are to be made out of all the substances used at the sacrifice— $Tartxaa\bar{a}ritka$.]

In connection with the Darsha-Pürnamäsa, we read—"Uttarürdhät svistakṛtē samavadyati' ['Offers to Sviṣtakṛt out of the latter hali'] (d. Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 6. 5); and again—"Idāmupahvayati' ['He invokes the Idā'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 7. 3); and similarly other doings with Remnants.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are the Sviş fakrt and Ldā offerings to be made out of the remnant of the Clarified Butter used at the Unāmshu-vāja—or not?

On this question we have the following Pürvapalsa-"The said acts are to be done;—why?—because it has been laid down in connection with all substances; that is, inasmuch as all the substances are mentioned in a common context, the remnant-rites should be performed out of all of them. Further, the term 'all' has been actually used in this connection, in the text 'Tadya' sarvēbhyo havirbhyah samavadyati' ['One offers it out of all the offering-substances'].—From all this it follows that the remnant-rites are performed out of the Clarified Butter also."

SŪTRA (2).

[Purvapakṣa continued]—" Also because of the reason [of the offering, being applicable to all substances].

Bhāṣya.

"The reason for the Rennant-offerings to Svistakrt has been described in the text—'The deities said to Svistakrt—please carry our offerings; he said—I would ask for the boon that shares at sacrifices may be assigned to me; they said—ask for it; then Svistakrt said—People should offer to me out of the latter half';—the reason that is described in this commendatory passage applies equally to Clarified Butter and other substances.

Consequently the remnant-offerings should be made out of Clarified Rutter."

SŪTRA (3).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA continued]—"(THIRDLY), BECAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH ONE SACRIFICE, THE TERM 'SAMAVATTA' ('CONJOINTLY SLICED') IS FOUND."

Bhāṣya.

"In connection with the 'Cooked Rice' dedicated to Aditua at the Prāvanīva sacrifice, we find the text 'Agnavē svistakrtē samavadyati' ['For Agni-Svistakrt, one should offer what has been conjointly sliced 'l (Taitti. Brā. 1, 7, 4, 4). As a matter of fact, when an offering is made out of a single substance—Āiya (Clarified Butter) for instance, it is spoken of by means of the word 'avaduati' (slices, for offering), and when the term 'samavaduati' ('slices conjointly') is used, it means that it is a mixed offering consisting of portions 'sliced' out of more than one substance. -Such being the case and the meaning of the text being that the offering to Agni-Svistakrt should consist of what has been 'conjointly sliced', the procedure adopted at the Prauaniua sacrifice would be correct only if (in addition to the portion sliced out of the Cooked Rice) a 'slice' were also cut out of the Clarified Butter,—the use of which at the Prāyanīya would come in (from the Upāmshuyāja, of which the Prāyanīya is a 'modification') under the general law (that 'the modification is to be performed in the same manner as the Original Archetype'),—as it is only thus that there would be an offering consisting of the pieces 'sliced conjointly' (out of the two substances, Cooked Rice and Clarifted Butter). If this were not done (and if no portion of the Clarified Butter were sliced out for offering), then the only 'slice' cut out for offering would be from the single substance, Cooked Rice, and if this were what is meant, then the term used in the text would have been 'avadyati' (simply 'slices out for offering', not 'samavadyati', 'slices out conjointly', as we actually find it). [For this reason also the Remnantoffering should be made out of the Clarified Butter.]"

SŪTRA (4).

[PÜRVAPAKȘA concluded]—" LASTLY, BECAUSE A COMMENDATORY DECLARATION RELATING TO THE OFFERING TO 'SVIȘȚAKRT' ACTUALLY REFERS TO THE CLARIFIED BUTTER."

Bhāsya.

We have the following commendatory declaration relating to the offering to Sviştaler, which refers to the Clarified Butter contained in the Dhruvā-vessei:—'Avadāya uvadāya dhruvām pratyabhighārayati, eviştalerītā avadāya na dhruvām pratyabhighārayati, na hi tatah param āhutim yakeyan bhavati' ['After each offering, one should pour back the Butter-remnant into the Dhruvā vessel; but after having made the offering to Sviştalerīt,

he need not pour back any remnant into the *Dhruvā*-vessel; as there is no other offering to be made after the offering to $Sviytakr^t$.]—This passage explains the purpose for which the remnant is poured back into the vessel,—and this purpose clearly is that another offering is going to be made out of the remnants thus collected in the *Dhruvā*-vessel; this is further confirmed by the statement that after the offering to $Sviytakr^t$, there is to be no such pouring back, as after that, there are no other offerings to be made.—All this goes to show that there is pouring back of the Clarified Butter into the vessel only for the purpose of making the remnant-offering to $Sviytakr^t$. [Thus it is clear from this also that the remnant-offering has to be made out of the Clarified Butter.]"

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THIS (REMNANT-OFFERING OUT OF THE CLARIFIED BUTTER) COULD NOT BE DONE, AS THERE CAN BE NO 'REMNANT' IN THIS CASE; AND THIS ABSENCE OF 'REMNANT' WOULD BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT ALL THE CLARIFIED BUTTER WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN UP (BY THE OTHER OFFERINGS).

Bhāsya.

It is not possible that there should be Sviştakrt and Idā-offerings made out of the Clarified Butter contained in the Dhruvā-vessel.—"Why?"—Because there can be no remnant in this case.—"Why cannot there be a remnant in this case?"—Because all the Clarified Butter would have been taken up (by the main offerings).

SŪTRA (6).

What may have been left in the Dhruvá-vessel cannot be treated as a 'remnant', as the butter in that vessel is meant for several purposes in common.

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"The Clarified Butter that had been secured for the *Upāmshuyāja*,—out of that some would be left over in the *Dhruwā*vessel; and this could be treated as the 'remnant' (out of which the offering to *Swistakrt* could be made)."

That cannot be; as what is contained in the Dhruvā is meant for several purposes in common,—for instance, for being offered at the Upāmshuyāja and for several other purposes; in fact Clarified Butter is required for all those actions where the sacrifice is performed by means of that Butter; and at whatever action Clarified Butter has to be used, at each one of these it has to be brought in and 'prepared'. Hence the Clarified Butter in the Dhruvā vessel is meant for all these several purposes. In fact this is clearly indicated by the Vedic text also—'Sarvasmai vā yayñāya

arhuate und dhruvauam aiuam' f' The Clarified Butter in the Dhruva is what is brought in for all sacrifices '] (Taitti. Brā. 3. 3. 5. 5).—" What if it is so?"-If the Clarified Butter collected in the Dhruvā for the purpose of the Unamshuvaja is meant for several purposes in common,-then, even after the completion of the Upāmshuyāja, there would be other purposes to be served by it; hence it cannot be regarded as something to be 'disposed of' (as no longer required); it is only when a thing has served all its purposes and is only causing confusion by remaining there, that it has to be 'disposed of'. In some cases, when a thing has to be 'disposed of', it is declared that it should be 'disposed of' in such and such a manner. When however a thing brought in has still some use, it cannot be regarded as to be 'disposed of'. Consequently after the Upāmshuyāja has been performed, and even after the offering to Svistakrt has been made, the Clarified Butter left in the Dhruvā cannot be treated as 'remnant' and as such, something to be 'disposed of '-[and the offering of the remnant is nothing more than a 'disposal' of what is no longer required].-As analogous to this we have the case where rice for several persons has been cooked in a single vessel,-if one of them has eaten out of it, what remains in the vessel is not treated as 'remnant' (or leavings) to be given away to dependants; because it has still got to serve other purposes (i.e. the remaining persons are still there to eat it). Exactly similar is the case of the susbstance. Clarified Butter, left after the Unamshuvaja [which, having been got together for use at several actions, cannot, after the completion of the Upamshuyaja only, be treated as 'remnant' and 'disposed of 'as such by being offered as 'remnant-offering'l.

Says the Opponent—"[If the Clarified Butter in the *Dhruvā*-vessel cannot be offered as 'remnant', then] there would a 'remnant' of Clarified Butter in the *Juhū*, as in the *Cups*, i.e. as there is of *Soma* in the Ladles and Cups, according to injunctions."

In answer to this, we have the following Satra-

SŪTRA (7).

What has been collected in the Juhö-vessel is all connected with a particular oblation.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

It has been explained that there can be no 'remnant' of the Upāmshuyāja in the Dhruvā, because the Clarified Butter got together for this sacrifice is meant in common for several actions.—Now the question is put—"why cannot the remnant-offering be made out of the Clarified Butter left in the Juhū-vessel,—in the same manner as there is remnant (of Soma) in the ladle where it had been taken up for being offered into the fire? "—Our answer to this is that what has been collected in the Juhū-vessel is all connected with a particular oblation, and hence (as the whole of it will have been offered away) there would be no 'remnant' in it.

SŪTRA (8).

"IT MAY BE AS IN THE LADLE",—IF THIS IS URGED [THE ANSWER WOULD BE AS IN THE FOLLOWING SUTRA].

Bhāsya.

This argument, urged by the opponent, has got to be refuted. (This is done in the following Sūtra)—

SŪTRA (9).

That cannot be; because (in the case of the Soma), there is an infringement of an injunction (if all the Soma is offered away), and also because it (the pouring of the Soma into the cups and vessels) is meant to be only a preparation of an offering-material. [For these two reasons, the whole of the Somajuice is not offered away.]

Bhāṣya.

The case of the Clarified Butter in the Juhū is not analogous to that of the Soma in the cups and vessels. In the case of the latter [if all the Soma were offered away in oblations], there would be an infringement of the injunction 'Somasyāgnērvīhūtyanwaṣatharoti' (Aitarēya Brā. 3. 5). [which lays down an oblation to be offered later on].—Then again, in regard to the pouring of the Soma into the cups and vessels, all that such texts as—'Aindravāyavam grhvāti' ['should hold the cups dedicated to Indra-Vāyu'] lay down is the mere holding,—not holding accompanied by offering as oblations; and all that is meant by this holding is that the Soma is prepared as an offering-material.—[For these two reasons, there is no offering of all the Soma in the cups and vessels]; [and hence 'remnant' becomes possible].—In the case of the Clarified Butter on the other hand, what is laid down is the offering of it as an oblation, in such texts as 'Chaturgrhūtam juhoti' (Taitti. Sam. 5. 1. 1. 1)—[Hence in this case all the Butter in the Juhū is offered away; and hence there can be no remnant.]

SŪTRA (10).

THE TERM 'ALL' REFERS TO WHAT IS THERE; AS WHAT IS LAID DOWN CAN PERTAIN ONLY TO SUCH THINGS AS ARE IN EXISTENCE.

Bhāsya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 1) that—" the text has laid down that the slicing is done for offering out of all substances' [and hence the remnant-offering should be done out of the Clarified Butter also]."—Our answer to this is as follows:—What is declared in the text refers to only such 'remnants' of substances as are there already, and not to all substances without any qualification; the meaning thus is that 'the slicing is to be done out of such remnants as are already there'; just as when it is said 'all the rice', or 'all the Brāhmaṇas have eaten'—the term 'all' refers to such rice and such Brāhmaṇas, as may be there (and it cannot refer to all the rice, or all the Brāhmaṇas, in the world);—similarly in the case in question ('all substances' stands for all those of which remnants may be actually there) [and as there is no remnant of the Clarified Butter, there could not be any remnant-offering out of its].

SŪTRA (11).

THE INDICATIVE TEXT REFERS TO THE MIXTURE OF GENUSES.

Bhāsya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 3) that "the use of the term 'conjoint (mixed) slicing' would not be applicable if no slicing for offering were made out of the Clarified Butter, brought in in accordance with the general law that 'the medification is to be done in the same manner as the original sacrifice'.' "The answer to this is as follows:—Even though there may not be any remnant-offering out of the Clarified Butter, the term 'mixed slicing' would be quite applicable, as referring to the particular genuses,—i.e. as referring to the genus 'rice' and the genus 'Clarified Butter' [as mixed up in the 'Cooked Rice', in which there is both 'Rice' and 'Clarified Butter'; hence when a slice is cut out of this 'Cooked Rice', there is a mixed slicing' of both Rice and Butter; this mention of 'mixed slicing' therefore cannot indicate the possibility of a slicing out of the pure and simple Clarified Butter by itself,—It is possible to take the term in this sense, as what is stated is a mere reiterative declaration, and it is open to us to take such a declaration in any sense that may be reasonably suitable.

SŪTRA (12).

THE LAST TEXT (QUOTED BY THE PURVAPAKSIN) ONLY MEANS
THAT THE VESSEL SHOULD NOT BE ENTIRELY EMPTY.

Bhāşya.

It has been argued above (under Sū. 4) that—"there is a text which indicates that there should be pouring back of Clarified Butter into the Dhruvā [and there would be this 'remnant' available for making the remnant-offering]."—The answer to this is that the Butter that may be thus poured back is not for the purpose of making the remnant-offering to Sviştakıt, because there would be no 'remnant' at all in the case; as has been already explained (under Sū. 5). Hence the meaning of the text quoted under Sū. 4 is as follows:—'Under the impression that no more oblations are going to be offered out of it, the Dhruvā should not be emptied,'

—if there were another oblation to be poured out of the *Dhrwal*, then, in the event of more clarified butter being poured back into the *Dhrwal*, the *Dhrwal* would be empty. What the sentence 'no more oblations are going to be offered out of it' means is that so long as there is an oblation still to be offered out of the *Dhrwal*, it should not be emptied (and it should continue to be refilled by pouring back Butter into it); but if no butter were poured back into it after each offering, the *Dhrwal* would become empty; and it should not become empty [so long as there is another oblation to be offered out of it]; but as soon as there remains no other oblation to be offered out of it, what would be the use of pouring back any more Clarified Butter into it?

Adhikarana (2): At the 'Sākamprasthāyya' also there is to be no 'remnant-offering'.

SŪTRA (13).

AT THE 'SĀKAMPRASTHĀYYA' SACRIFIĆE ALSO, THE OFFERING TO SVIŞTAKRT SHOULD BE AS IN THE AFORESAID CASE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa, we read—'Sākamprasthāyyēna yajēta' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 4. 3).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the remnant-offering connected with Svistaket and Ida to be made at this sacrifice, or not?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "the offering is to be made;—why?—because the Sākamprashāyya is a modification of the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa (at which the said offering is made, and the modification has to be performed like its original archetype)."

In answer to this we have the following Siddkānta:—The said offering is not to be made at the Sākumprasthāyya:—why?—because there is no remnant, there being no remnant on account of the whole of the substance having been taken up (Sū. 5).—"How is that?"—In connection with the sacrifice in question, we read—' Ājyabhāgābhyāni pracharyāgnēyēna cha purodāshēna agnīdhēr srucham pradāya saha kumbhībhirabhikrānan āha' [' After having made the offerings of Clarified Butter and the Cake dedicated to Agni, making over, to the Agnidhra Priest, the ladles and taking the Kumbhīs with himself, he goes forward and says....'] [which makes it clear that after the main Butter-offerings have been made, there is none of the Butter left there].—Thus the conclusion is that there are to be no remnant-offerings at the Sākumprasthāyna.

Adhikarana (3): There are to be no 'Remnantofferings' at the Sautrāmanī sacrifice.

SŪTRA (14).

AT THE SAUTRAMANT SACRIFICE ALSO [THERE ARE TO BE NO 'REMNANT-OFFERINGS'] OUT OF THE CUPS.

Bhāsya.

There is the Sautrāmanī sacrifice, in connection with which certain 'cups' (of Soma-juice) are mentioned as dedicated to Ashvins, to Sārasvarī and to Indra. This sacrifice is the 'modification' of a sacrifice (Jyotistoma) at which the 'remnant-offerings' are to be made:—consequently, according to the general law that 'the modification is to be performed in the manner of its original archetype', it would appear to be necessary to make the 'remnant-offerings' connected with Swigtart and Ida.

Now there arises the question—Are the 'remnant-offerings' to be omitted at the Sautrāmanī sacrifice, or not?

The Pūrvapaksa view is that, in accordance with the general law (referred to), the remnant-offerings should be made (not omitted).

In answer to this, we have the following Siddhānta—At the Sautrā-manī sacrifice also there are to be no remnant-offerings out of the cups (Sū.).—The particle 'cha' ('also') serves to apply to this case all that has been urged in the foregoing two Adhikaranas.—"Why should there be no such offering?"—Because there is no remnant, the absence of remnant being due to the whole of the substance having been taken up (Sū. 5).

At this sacrifice also, they proceed to offer oblations with the cups—
for which purpose cups of milk and cups of wine are taken up; and all the
substance that is contained in these cups is taken up and verbally dedicated
to their respective deities; as is laid down in the text—'Grhūān grahān rivija
ādadatē, āshvinamadhvaryuh, sārasvatam brahmā, aindram pratiprasthātā
['The Priests take up the cups—the Adhvaryu takes up the cup dedicated to
the Ashvins; the Brahman takes up that dedicated to Sarasvatī, and the
Pratiprasthātī takes up that dedicated to Indra'.] Thus the whole of the substance is taken up by these oblations; that the substance is to be offered
in oblations is also laid down in the text—'Ultarē' ynau payograhān jūhvatī,
daksinē'ynau surāgrahān jūhvatī.' ('They offer the cups of milk into the
Northern Fire, and the cups of wine into the Southern Fire').

SŪTRA (15).

THE MENTION OF 'REMNANT' ALSO IS TO BE TAKEN AS IN THE PREVIOUS CASE.

Bhāṣya.

This same conclusion (arrived at under Sū. 5) is supported by the mention of 'remnant', in the text - 'He should keep back a little, he should

not offer up the whole' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 8. 6. 2); this prohibition of the offering of the whole would be explicable only if (without this prohibition) there were a possibility of the whole being offered. And it is on account of a distinct declaration that the 'remnant-offering' to Sviştakyt is not to be made at this sacrifice, out of the remnant that has been kept back (in accordance with the prohibition just quoted); because a different use is laid down for that remnant in the text 'Brāhmaṇam parikrīnīyāt uchchhēṣanasya pātāram' (Tai. Brā. 1. 8. 6. 2.) ['He should engage a Brāhmaṇa who should drink the remnant'] [by whom the remnant is to be drunk, and not used as an offering to Sviṣtakṛt]. There is a similar use laid down for another remnant of the same kind in the text—'Shatāṭṛṇāyām vikṣārayamti' ['They pour it into a hundred-holed jar']. (Taitti. Brā. 1. 8. 6. 4.)

ADHIKARANA (4): At the 'Sarvaprstha' Sacrifice, the 'Remnant-offering' should be made only once.

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THOUGH THE SUBSTANCE IS ONE, THE 'REMNANT-OFFERINGS' SHOULD BE MADE WITH EACH OF THE ACTS (THAT GO TO MAKE UP THE SARVAPRṢŢHA SACRIFICE).

Bhāṣya.

[We have dealt with cases where there is no 'remnant-offering' to be made. We are no now considering a case where there is a peculiarity regarding the remnant-offerings.]

There is the 'Sarvapṛṣtha' sacrifice [consisting of several oblations offered to Indra in his various aspects]—spoken of in the texts—'Indrāya rathantarāya', 'Indrāya vairāpāya', 'Indrāya shā-kvarāya'. [Taitti. Sam. 2. 3. 7. 2];—at this sacrifice, the Cake is the substance used in connection with all these several oblations in common.

In regard to this there arises the question—Is the remnant-offering to Sviştakrt to be done with each of these oblations? Or, only once?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that, in view of the general law that 'the modification is to be performed in the same manner as its original Archetype', the offering should be made with each oblation,—even though there is only one substance common to all the oblations,—as each oblation is a distinct act by itself."

SŪTRA (17).

[SIDDHANTA]—INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO DIVISION (OF THE SUB-STANCE, AMONG THE SEVERAL OBLATIONS), THERE MUST BE A COMMON 'REMNANT' FOR ALL [SO THAT THERE CAN BE ONLY ONE OFFERING OF THE 'REMNANT').

$Bh\bar{a}$ sya.

We assert that the 'remnant-offering should be made only once': because there is no division of the substance among the several oblations; as a matter of fact, portions of the Cake are not divided among the several oblations; all that is said is that 'the remnant-offering to Svigtakri should be made out of the latter half of the Cake',—and of the Cake, there is only one 'latter half'; so when an offering is made out of this 'latter half', it cannot be distinguished from the remnant of which oblation the offering has been made, and from the remnant of which it has not been made.—Similarly in the case of the Idā offering also.—From all this it follows that the 'remnant offering' should be made only once.

Adhikarana (5): In the case of the cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu, there should be two 'Eatings' of the Remnant.

SŪTRA (18).

In the case of the cup dedicated to Indra-Vayu, there should be an 'Eating of Remnants' in connection with each oblation,—by virtue of the direct injunction.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

[There are two ways of 'disposing of' the remnants of sacrificial materials:—
(1) offering them into the Fire, to Svietukrt, and (2) eating them. We have hitherto dealt with the offering of remnants; we are now going to deal with the eating
of remnants. In the natural order this present Adhikarana should have come after
the next—where the general question of the eating of Soma-remnants is dealt with,
—yet the author has brought in this first, because, in a way, it is an exception to
the foregoing Adhikarana.]

There is the Jyotistoma sacrifice, laid down in the text—'Jyotistomāna swargalāmo yajāta'; [at this sacrifice, several cups and ladles are used; each cup is dedicated to a distinct deity, and offered as such; and the remmant left in the cup after the offering has been made, is subsequently 'eaten' (see next Adhikarana); one of these cups is dedicated jointly to the two deities Indira and Vāyu]; in regard to this cup dedicated to Indira-Vāyu there arises the question—Is the eating of the remnant in this cup to be done once, or twice?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "since the eating is meant to be an 'embellishment' for the Soma, it should be done once only".

As against this, the Siddhānta is that in the case of the cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu, the eating should be done twice;—why?—By virtue of the direct injunction; we have the following injunction—'Out' of the cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu, one should eat twice, and should make two Vagat-kāra offerings';—and no burden can be too heavy to be borne by a direct injunction [hence in spite of all the arguments urged in the foregoing Adhi-karana an exception has to be made in the case of the cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu].

Adhikarana (6): In the case of 'Soma', there must be 'Eating of Remnants'.

SŪTRA (19).

[Pürvapakṣa]—"In the case of Soma, there is no 'Eating', as there is no injunction to that effect".

Bhāşya.

In connection with the *Jyotistoma*, there are several *Soma-oblations* laid down.—In regard to these, there arises the question—Is the remnant of these *Soma-oblations* to be eaten, or not?

The Purvapaksa view is that "there is no eating, in the case of Soma;—why "—because there is no injunction to that effect; and in the absence of an injunction it cannot be known for certain that there should be 'eating'; hence the conclusion is that the remnant of Soma-oblations should not be eaten".

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE 'EATING', BECAUSE WE FIND A TEXT WHICH, THOUGH HAVING A DIFFERENT APPLICATION, IS INDICATIVE OF THE EATING.

Bhāşya.

There should be 'eating'; as there is the following text, which, though having a different application, indicates the 'eating'—'Sarvatah partitumanishvinam bhaksayati bhaksjiäpyäyitämshchamasīn daksjinasyānaso' valambē sādayanti' (see Taitti. Sam. 6. 4. 9. 4-5) ['He takes round the cup dedicated to the Ashvins and eats it; after the cups have been eaten and refilled, they deposit them on the prop of the eart to the south'].—Unless there were 'eating' of Soma in general, such particular cases of 'eating' as are mentioned in this text could not be spoken of.

SŪTRA (21).

In fact, the texts are direct injunctions, as they speak of what is not already known; hence the 'Eating' would be in accordance with direct injunctions.

Bhāşya.

Objection—"What has been cited (in support of the eating) is only an indicative; it is necessary to point to an injunction of it."

Answer—The texts that are cited as 'indications' may be treated as injunctions: For instance, the text, 'Sarvatah parihāramāshvinam bhak-sayati, etc.' (cf. Taitti. Sam. 6. 4. 9. 4) actually enjoins a particular form of

eating; as this is something not already known, the sentence cannot be taken as a mere reiterative reference to the 'Eating'. In fact, if the text were taken as enjoining something not already known, it would serve a distinctly useful purpose. Thus then, there should be 'Eating' of Soma, only in cases in connection with which it is mentioned in the texts; and in this there would not be any improper extension of the practice of eating.

Adhikarana (7): The 'Soma-remnant' should be eaten by the Priests holding the Cups.

SŪTRA (22).

OUT OF THE CUPS, THERE MUST BE 'EATING', BECAUSE OF THE NAMES (GIVEN TO THE CUPS),—THE APPLICATION OF THE NAMES BEING BASED UPON THE FACT (OF 'EATING' BEING DONE OUT OF THEM. BY THE PRIESTS).

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma, we read—'Praitu hotushchamasah, pra brahmanah, prodgātṛṇām, pra yajamānasya, prayantu sadasyānām' ['Let the Hoty's cup come forward, also the Brahman's cup, the Udgātṛs' cup, the Yajamāna's cup, and the Sadasyas' cup'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is eating (of Soma) to be

done by these cup-owners, or not?

The Pūrvapaksa view is that "it should not be done; as it has just been pointed out that there should be no undue extension of the practice of eating".

On this we have the following Siddhānta—Out of the cups, there should be 'eating';—why?—because of the names given to the cups;—i.e. the names 'Hotushchamasah' (Hotr's cup), 'Brahmanashchamasah' (Brahman's cup), 'Udajātushchamasah' (Udgāty's cup) clearly indicate that the particular cup is called 'hotushchamasah' because the Hotr Priest eats (literally 'sips', 'chamati'), shall eat, or has eaten, out of that cup; if the Hotr Priest did not eat (or sip) out of it, it could not be 'hotushchamasah'; and from this it follows that he does eat out of it. [Similarly with the other names.]

Says the Opponent—"In what way does this 'indicative' (of the 'eating') operate?"

It is operative through competency, we say. What the direction says is that 'the Hotvekchamasa should come forward'; now if the Hoty did not cat (chamēt) out of it, then no such thing as the 'hotvekchamasab' (Hoty's cup) would have the competency to 'come forward'.—It would not do if the Hoty Priest were to 'eat' rice or some such thing, as the cup in question is called the 'Soma-chamasa', 'Soma-cup'. Then again (the name cannot be regarded as indicative of ownership, because) as a matter of fact, the cup is the property, not of the Hoty priest, but of the Sacrificer; all that the Hoty priest can do is to 'eat' out of it (by virtue of which it is called his 'chamasa', cup).—Further, if Soma is 'eaten' out of the cup [and not some other thing, like Rice], then alone is it possible for further oblations to be offered with that cup; because Soma is a sacred substance, hence the eating of it does not pollute the cup, and it is possible to offer subsequent oblations with it.—"[In the case of other substances, Rice and the like also] it would be possible to offer oblations with a cup that is polluted, on the strength

of texts enjoining the offering of the oblations."—But any such text could set aside the prohibition of using polluted cups only if there were no other way of eating out of the cups and also offering the oblations, without using polluted cups; as a matter of fact, there is such a way, if the 'eating' out of the cup is of Soma (not of Rice or any such thing) [whereby, on account of the peculiar sanctity attaching to the Soma, the cup is not polluted, and hence the offering of the subsequent oblations with it does not go against the prohibition of using polluted cups].—From all this it follows that the Soma should be eaten by those priests who hold the cups.

Says the Opponent—"[In the case of the eating of Rice and such things also] people could have recourse to *scraping* the cup and such other means (for removing the impurity attaching to the cup on account of the eating of Rice, etc.) [and then the cup, thus purified, could be used in offering the oblations]".

In that case the relationship (of the cup to the eating Priest) having ceased (by reason of the scraping of the portion touched by the eater's lips), the cup would no longer be the same cup, it would become a totally different object.

It is for this reason (that like the priests, the sacrificer also should eat the Soma out of the cup named after him) that the following text forbids, the eating of Soma by a non-Brāhman sacrificer—'Sa yadi rājanyam vaishyam vā yājayēt, sa yadi somam bibhakṣayiṣēt nyagrodhastibhirāhrtya tāh sampiṣya dadhani unmṛjya tamasmai bhakṣam prayachchhēt, na somam' (Aita. Brā. 7. 30) ['If he officiates at the sacrifice performed by a Kṣattriya or a Vaishya,—and the sacrificer wishes to eat Soma, the priest should fetch the shoots of the banyan-tree, pound them and mix them up with curd, and then offer this to the sacrificer for eating, and not the Soma'];—this text clearly shows that there shall be omission of the eating of Soma (in the case of the non-Brāhmana sacrificer); now this fear of the non-Brāhmana sacrificer eating Soma [without which there could be no prohibition] could be possible only if, as a rule, Soma were meant to be eaten out of the cups by persons after whom the cups are named.—From all this we conclude that there must be eating of Soma by these persons out of the cups named after them.

Adhikarama (8): The Soma is to be eaten by the 'Udgātr' (chanting) priests together with the 'Subrahmanya' Priest.

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKŅA (A)]—" ONLY ONE PERSON SHALL EAT OUT OF THE 'UDGĀTR'S CUP,'—BECAUSE SUCH IS THE DIRECT ASSERTION."

Bhāsua.

There is the Jyolistoma sacrifice laid down in the text 'Jyolistomēna svargakāmo yajēta';—in connection with this sacrifice, we read 'Pratiu househohamsah.....pra udgātṛrām'.—It has been decided in the foregoing Adhikarana that the eating out of the Cups is to be regulated by their names [i.e. the Hotr is to eat out of the 'Hotr's cup', the Brahman, out of the 'Brahman's cup' and so on].—Now in connection with the cup named 'Udgātṛrām chamasah', 'the cup of the Udgātṛs', there arises the question—[There being only one priest of the name of 'Udgātṛ'] is the one Udgātṛ priest alone to eat out of this cup ?—or all the Priests ?—or all the Sāmavēdin priests, except the Subrahmanya Priest ?—or all the Sāmavēdin priests along with the Subrahmanya?

(A) On this question, we have the following view as the first Pūrvapaksa (A)-" The one Udaatr priest alone is to eat out of it :- because such is the Direct Assertion; -i.e. the Udgatr priest is the only person who is mentioned in the name of the cup-which has been called in the text as 'Udgātrrnām chamasah', 'the cup of the Udgātrs' .- 'But in the text we have the Plural number, which means that several persons should eat.'—The answer to that is that it is true that the Plural number is found in the text, but that number appears as pertaining to the noun-base 'Udgatr'; under the circumstances, if significance were meant to be attached to the Plural number, then it would denote the plurality of Udgatr Priests; as a matter of fact, however, there is only one Udgatr Priest; -consequently, even though directly mentioned, the plurality could not bring about different (several) Udaātr Priests:—hence it must be concluded that no significance is meant to be attached to the Plural number.—Then again, the notion that several persons should eat out of the cup could be got at only by Inference.—' How ?' -It would be got at by means of the following inferential reasoning:-The Plural number is applied only to such noun-bases as denote several individuals,-in the case in question we find the Plural number applied to the base 'Udgātr',—hence verily the cup must belong to several (Udgātrs).— This is a purely inferential process. On the other hand, the fact that there is only one Udgatr priest,-not even a second or a third-is directly perceptible. Perception is always more authoritative than Inference. Hence the cup belongs to-and is to be eaten out of,-by only one person, and that person, the one Udgatr priest."

SŪTRA (24).

[PÜRVAPAKȘA (B)]—" OR, ALL [THE PRIESTS SHOULD EAT OUT OF THE CUP]; BECAUSE THERE IS AN INDICATION OF ALL."

Bhāsya.

(B)—"Or, all the priests should eat out of the *Udgātṛ-cup*. If the *Udgātṛ* priest were the only one person to eat out of it, then the presence of the plural number (in 'udgātṛṛnām') would have to be regarded as a mistake; specially as such plurality is neither referred to nor predicated.—'In the event of all the priests eating out of the cup, the presence of the name of the *Udgātṛ*-priest (in '*Udgātṛṛnām chamasah*') would have to be regarded as a mistake'.—Our answer to that is that the term '*Udgātṛṛnām*' may, in that case, be taken in a figurative sense, as standing for 'the *Udgātṛ-priest* and the rest'."

SŪTRA (25).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA (C)]—" OR, THE HYMN-CHANTERS ALONE [SHOULD BAT OUT OF THE CUP]; AS THE INDICATION IS OF THESE ALONE, SPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF THE PLURAL NUMBER."

Bhāṣya.

(C)—Says the Opponent to the Pārvapakṣa (B)—"It is not right that the cup should be eaten out of by several persons.—Why ?—Because the connection of the term 'Udgātr' with 'Chamasa' is indicated by a directly perceived 'sentence';—again, the connection of the Plural Number with the term 'Udgātr' is shown by 'Direct Assertion';—no other Priest has any connection with the Plural Number;—hence it is not right that the cup should be eaten out of by several persons including the Udgātr as well as others (as held by Pūrvapakṣin B)."

It is in answer to this that we have the third Pūrvapakṣa (C):—"As a matter of fact, the term 'Udgātr' is capable of expressing Plurality (and taking the Plural Number), through the particular action,—that of chanting,—the term 'Udgātr' in the Plural literally denoting chanters (Udgāyanti iti Udgātrah).—"Who are these several chanters (who are spoken of by the term 'Udgātrah).—"Who are these several chanters (who are spoken of by the term 'Udgātrah).—"Who are these several chanters. (Thus by reason of the presence of the Plural Number, we conclude that the term 'Udgātr' (with the Plural Number) is meant to stand for those in whom the inferred action (of chanting) is present. In this manner, both the Plural Number and the term 'Udgātr' become explicable.—For these reasons we conclude that the cup is to be eaten out of by the hymn-chanters."

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ÎN FACT, ALL (THE FOUR SĂMAVEDIN PRIESTS, SHOULD EAT OUT OF THE CUP); BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL EQUALLY CONNECTED WITH THE (SĂMA) VEDA; AND IT IS FOR A SPECIAL REASON THAT THE NAME (' UDGĀTR') IS RESTRICTED TO ONE ONLY (OF THE SAID FOUR SĂMAVEDIN PRIESTS).

All the Samavedin priests-i.e. the three named above (Prastotr, Udgatr and Pratihartr) along with the Subrahmanya Priest-should eat out of the cup. -" How so ?"-In answer to this, it will not be right to sav-' because they are connected with chanting' :--why so ?--because connection with 'Udgana' (chanting) is something quite different from connection with 'Gana' (singing),-' Udgana' (chanting aloud) being something different from 'Gāna' (singing): 'Gāna' is mere singing, secular as well as Vedic, while the other, 'Udaāna', derived from the root 'Gai' (to sing) and the prefix 'ut', is well-known as the name of a particular phase of Sama-chant; now the person who does this Sama-chanting and is therefore called the 'Udgatr' is one only, and there are not several persons of this name. Thus then, it will not be right to say that there shall be several Udgatr priests, as all are equally connected with 'Sama-chanting' .- "What then is the correct answer to the question why all the four Samavedin priests should eat out of the cup?"-The correct answer is that they are all equally connected with the Sama-veda. In this sense an exposition of the Veda is called 'audaātra', and several functions are also called 'audaātra'; so that one who studies the Audgatra exposition, or performs the Audgatra functions, is called the 'Udgatr' .- "How so?"-It is well-known that the function of the Udgatr is called 'audgatra'; and from this it is clear that Udgatr is the performer of the Audatra functions. Thus then, if a man knows what Udaātr is, he at once says, even though it is not explained, that the function pertaining to that Udgatr is 'audgatra'; commonly, if one knows the meaning of the term 'audgatra', he at once says that the performer of the audgātra functions is the 'Udgātr', even though he may not be told so. For instance, if a man knows the person named Udamegha, he at once calls his child 'audamēahi' even without being told so; and conversely if one knows Audamēghi, he at once recognises his father to be Udamēgha, even without being told.—Thus then the application of the name 'Udgatr' is possible on the basis of the presence of the 'audgātra' functions; and it is in this sense that the name ' Udgatr' is applicable to all the four-Prastotr, Udaātr. Pratihartr and Subrahmanua. In this manner, both the name "Udgatr' and the Plural Number (in 'Udgatrrnam') become: explained; and there is no other objection to this view.

From all this it follows that all the four priests connected with the *Audgātra' functions should eat out of the Udgātr-Cup.

In cases where there is some special reason, Udgātr priests are to be taken as exclusive of the Subrahmanya Priest; just as in the sentence 'Being eated, the Udgātr priests hymn with the Sāman', the term 'Udgātr' is applied to those only who sing hymne land not to all who perform the

Audgātra functions],—in the same manner we have the sentence 'Ud-gātāro nāpavyāharēyuḥ uttamāyām ēsottamā', where the name 'Udgātr' has been taken to be exclusive of the Subrahmanya Priests.

[Kumārila does not accept this as the Siddhānta; according to him the Siddhānta view is that the eating should be done by all the Sāmavedin Priests—with the exception of the Subrahmanya; i.e. the Subrahmanya is not to eat the Soma.—See Tantravārtika, Trans., pp. 1466-1467.—Mandana Mishra accepts Kumārila's view].

ADHIKARANA (9): The 'Grāvastut' Priest also eats the Soma.

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" FOR THE GRĀVASTUT PRIEST, THERE IS TO BE NO 'EATING', AS NO SUCH 'EATING' HAS BEEN LAID DOWN".

Bhāsya.

At the Jyotistoma sacrifice there is an assistant to the Holr Priest, named 'Grāvastuu' ——In regard to him there arises the question—Is he to eat the Soma or not?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "the Grāvastut is not to eat the Soma;
—why?—because 'eating' for him has nowhere been declared'.

This statement that "eating for the Grāvastut has nowhere been declared" has been made by the Pūrvapaksin under the impression that the Cup-bearing Priests only are entitled to eat out of the 'Hāriyojana' cup. ['Hāriyojana Cup" is that cup which is taken up with the Mantra 'Harirasi hāriyojanah, etc.—Vāja. Sam. 8. 11.]

SŪTRA (28).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—HE SHOULD CERTAINLY EAT OUT OF THE 'HĀRI-YOJANA' CUP; AS THE CUP HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE CONNECTED WITH ALL (THE PRIESTS).

Bhāsya.

We think that the *Grāvastut* is one who should eat out of the 'Hāriyojana' cup; this is what has been thus declared—"The cup-bearing Priests
eat out of the other cups according to the cup held by each—hence of this
Hāriyojana, they are all anxious to partake"; from this it follows that if
'all' are desirous of partaking of the 'Hāriyojana' cup, the *Grāvastut* Priest
also should partake of it.

SŪTRA (29).

[Objection]—"In reality it is the cup-bearing Priests that should eat (out of the 'Hariyojana cup'),—

BECAUSE OF JUXTAPOSITION".

$Bh\bar{a}$ şya.

The particle ' $v\bar{a}$ ' ('in reality') serves to deny the view that has been expressed under Sū. 28.

The objection is as follows:--" It is not right that the Gravastut should eat out of the 'Hāriyojana Cup'; because the persons entitled to eat out of that cup are the cup-bearing priests, not all the priests (as declared under Sū. 28).- 'How do you get at this idea?' -There can be no doubt that what the text quoted lays down is a division among the cup-bearing priests; as in the passage quoted, the opening clause says-' The cup-bearing priests eat out of the other cups according to the cup held by each of them,'and having thus referred to the 'eating' by the Cup-bearing Priests. it goes on to add, 'hence all of them are desirous of partaking of the Hariyojana Cup';-these two clauses form parts of a single sentence (and are syntactically connected) -as is indicated by the presence of the term 'atha' ('hence'), which must refer to what has gone before; and in the phrase 'sarva ēva', ('all of them'), the clear implication of the particle 'ēva' is that the term 'all' stands for all those who have been spoken of in the preceding clause :-- from all this we conclude that the first clause, 'the cup-bearing priests eat out of the other cups according to the cup held by each', forms 'one sentence' (i.e. is syntactically connected) with the second clause—'hence all of them are desirous of partaking of the Hāriyojana Cup'. Thus then, the text quoted should be taken as laying down a division among the Cupbearing Priests, who are the persons spoken of in 'juxtaposition' to the whole sentence: the sense of the whole sentence being that 'in the case of the other cups, the cup-bearing Priests eat according to the cup held by each of them, but all of them eat out of the Hariyojana Cup '."

SUTRA (30).

[Answer]—In reality, however, the 'eating' should be taken as referring to all,—such being the sense of the injunction; the mention of the 'cup-bearing priests' is only for the purpose of eulogising (the 'Häriyojana' Cup).

Bhāsya.

The particle 'tu' ('in reality') sets aside the view just set forth (under Sū. 29). It is not right to take the text to mean that 'only the cup-bearing priests eat out of the Hāriyojana Cup'; because as a matter of fact, all the priests are enjoined to eat;—the words being 'Sarvā bhaksa-yanti' ('all eat'), which cannot be taken to enjoin the 'cup-bearing Priests' only to eat. As in that case the sentence would have to be taken as laying down two connections (of the Hāriyojana Cup; one with 'all', and the other with the 'cup-bearing priests only'); the interpretation put upon the passage therefore must be a different one.

"What is that different interpretation?"

The first clause, 'The cup-bearing Priests eat out of the other cups, according to the cup held by each', is a mere reference to the well-known fact that 'the cup-bearing Priests eat, and that they eat in accordance with the cup held by each' [this fact not standing in need of being enjoined]

in the present passage, having been already enjoined elsewhere]; and the second clause lays down (what is not already known) that 'out of the Häriyojana Cup, all the Priests eat',—not only the cup-bearing Priests.

"What would be the advantage of this interpretation?"

The first advantage would be that the term 'all' would be taken in its natural sense of all priests, and not in its restricted sense (as referring to the cup-bearing priests only). The second advantage would be that it would not be necessary to take the single sentence as laying down two unknown connections.—For these reasons, this interpretation is certainly better than the one suggested (under So. 29).

Then, as regards the mention of the 'cup-bearing priests' (in the first clause),—it only serves to 'culogise',—that is, extol,—the Hāriyojana Cup; that is to say, the cup-bearing priests have been mentioned only for the purpose of extolling the Hāriyojana Cup.

"In what way is it extolled?"

The sense of the eulogy is as follows—'So excellent is the Hāriyojana cup that all the priests desire to eat out of it, while of the other cups, each is eaten out of by only one priest,—these latter therefore are not so excellent, being inferior to the Hāriyojana Cup'.

ADHIKARANA (10): The function of pronouncing the syllable 'vasat' entitles one to eat the Soma-remnant.

SŪTRA (31).

One is entitled to eat (Soma) also by virtue of pronouncing the syllable 'vaşat'.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"Is the eating of the Soma to be determined only by the name (given to the cups) [as explained under Sū. 22]?"

Answer—No; one is entitled to eat Soma also by virtue of pronouncing the syllable 'vaşat'; i.e. the pronouncing of the syllable 'vaşat' is also a ground for eating Soma.—"How so!"—We know this from a Shruti-text, which says—'The pronouncer of the syllable vaşat is the first to eat';—as this 'eating by the pronouncer of vaşat' is not something already known, this text cannot be taken as enjoining merely the first place to be accorded to it; in fact it should be taken as enjoining the eating as qualified by priority.

[It is the *Hotr* priest who pronounces the syllable 'vasat'; and in accordance with this Adhikarana, he should have an additional share of the Soma to be eaten, by virtue of that pronouncing.]

ADHIKARANA (11): The 'offering of oblations into fire' and the 'extracting of the Soma-juice' also entitle one to eat Soma.

SŪTRA (32).

Also by virtue of 'offering libations into fire' and 'extracting the Soma-Juice'.

Bhāsya.

'Offering of oblations into fire' and 'extracting of Soma-juice'these also are grounds for the eating of Soma .- 'How?' -- We have the text— Havirdhānē grāvabhirabhisutya, āhavanīyē hutvā, pratyanchah parētya sadasi bhaksan bhaksayanti' ['In the Havirdhana Room, having extracted the Some-juice by means of stones, and having offered an oblation into the sacrificial fire, they turn back into the Assembly Room and eat their shares '1 (cf. Taitti, Sam. 6, 2, 11, 4).—This text cannot be taken as laying down merely the order of the actions mentioned, -i.e. the 'eating' is to come after the ' offering of the oblations into fire ' has been done; -- firstly, because the 'eating' itself has not yet been recognised as to be done [and until that is done, its position in the order of sequence cannot be laid down :- and secondly, if the sentence were taken as laying down the order of the 'eating' in relation to each of the two acts of 'offering oblations into fire' and 'extracting the Soma-juice', -as expressed by the two terms 'having extracted the Soma-juice' and 'having offered the oblations into fire',then, there would be syntactical split. - Further, the order is already recognised by the very nature of the acts concerned; [i.e. until the juice has been extracted there can be no 'offering of it into the fire', and until the 'offering of the juice into fire ' has been done, there can be no eating of its remnant]; as until the use of a substance has been accomplished, it cannot be 'disposed of' [and 'eating' of the Remnant is only a disposal of it] .--Nor can the text quoted be taken as laying down the two acts of 'offering oblations into fire' and 'extracting the Soma-juice' as subsidiary to the 'eating'; because as a matter of fact, the 'extracting of the Soma-juice' is for the purpose of 'offering oblations into fire', and this 'offering of oblations into fire' is for the purpose of securing a particular reward.-Hence the text should be taken as laying down the 'eating' for the persons who do the 'extracting of Soma-juice' and the 'offering of oblations into fire',-the sense being that those who 'extract the juice' and 'offer the oblations into fire' should eat the Soma.

Adhikarana (12): The pronouncer of the syllable 'vaṣaṭ' and others should eat Soma out of the Cup belonging to others.

SŪTRA (33).

[PÜRVAPAKSA]—"BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT SPECIFIC DECLARATION WITH REGARD TO THE 'CUPS', THE INDEFINITE (GENERAL) DECLARATION MUST APPLY TO OTHER CASES".

Bhāsya.

There is the text—'Prain hotushchamasah, pra brahmanah, pra udgātṛṛṇām'. ['May the Hotṛ's Cup come forward, also the Brahman's Cup and also the Cup of the Udgātṛs'.]

In connection with this, there arises the question—(a) Those who offer the oblations into the fire, (b) those who do the extracting of the Somajuice, and (c) those who pronounce the syllable 'vasat' [who have been shown in the foregoing adhikaranas to be entitled to the 'eating of Soma'], are these to eat out of the cups or not?

On this question, we have the following Pūvapaksa:—"They are not to eat out of the cups, because the eating out of the cups has been declared specifically with regard to the Cup-bearing Priests—in such definitely specific texts as 'Praitu hotushchamasah, etc.'; as regards the 'eating' by those who do 'the offering of oblations into fire' and those who do 'the extracting of the Soma-juice', it has been spoken of only in a general (indefinite) declaration (to the effect that 'they also are entitled to the eating')—(Question)—"All the Soma that is to be 'embellished' (by the eating) being contained in the cups, out of which the Cup-bearing Priests are to eat it,—where would there be another occasion when the 'eating' could be done by those others who do 'the offering of oblations in fire' and others? That is, where would there be the indefinite and general occasion (when those others would eat the Soma]?"—(Answer)—That occasion would be in other cases,—i.e. in cases where the Cup-bearing Priests would not be there."

SŪTRA (34).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE ('EATING' OUT OF THE CUPS BY THE OTHER PRIESTS); BECAUSE THE GROUNDS FOR IT ARE PRESENT (IN THEIR CASE ALSO); AND THERE IS NO RESTRICTION IN REGARD TO THE CUPS,—THE TEXT ONLY MAKING AN AFFIRMATION REGARDING THE PERSONS WHO ARE TO DO THE 'EATING' (OUT OF THE CUPS).

Bhāşya.

The 'pronouncer of the syllable vasat' and the others also are to 'eat' out of the cups; because the texts lay down the grounds for their 'eating'; they do not forbid them.

Objection—"But, inasmuch as the Cup-bearing Priests have been specifically and directly mentioned as to eat out of the cups, the others would naturally become excluded."

Answer—There is no restriction in regard to the cups, the text only making an affirmation regarding the presons who are to do the eating out of the cups:—that is to say, the words of the text—'Praitu hotushchamasah, etc.' cannot be taken as prohibiting (excluding) 'the pronouncer of the syllable vasat' and others; because the words are affirmative and injunctive, not negative and prohibitive.—From this it follows that 'the pronouncer of the syllable vasat and others also are to eat out of the cups'.

SŪTRA (35).

Also because we find others also mentioned in connection with the Cups.

Bhāsya.

There is a text which speaks of persons other than the Cup-hearing Priests as being connected with the cups—'Chamasāmhchamasādhvarquē prayachpathati, tān sa vaṣaṭhartīē harati' ['He hands over the cups to the Cup-hearing Adhvarqu, and he carries them to the Pronouncer of the syllable vaṣaṭ']; now it is only his own cup that could be carried to the 'pronouncer of the syllable vaṣaṭ';—and there would be no sense in the several cups being carried to him if 'the Pronouncer of the syllable vaṣaṭ' and others (offerers of oblations into fire and extracters of Soma-juice) also were not to eat out of those cups.—From this also it follows that all these also are to eat out of the Cups.

Adhikarana (13): The 'Hotr' Priest is the first to eat the Soma-remnant.

Bhāsya.

Question—"In a case where several priests eat out of the vessel, what is the order in which they shall eat?"

In answer to this question we have the following Adhikarana,—of which the Pūrvapakṣa is set forth in the following Sūtra:—

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF SEVERAL PRIESTS EATING OUT OF ONE VESSEL, THE ADHVARYU SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO EAT; AS THAT IS THE NATURAL ORDER."

Bhāsya.

"It is the turn of that priest to eat first in whose hands the Soma is [and as the vessel containing the Soma is in the hands of the Adhvaryu, it is his turn to eat it first]."

SŪTRA (37).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE HOTR PRIEST SHOULD EAT FIRST,—
AS SUCH IS THE INDICATION OF THE MANTRA-TEXTS.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

In reality, the Hoty Priest should eat first,—because such is the indication of the mantra-texts. We have such mantra-texts as—(a) 'Hotushchit pūrvē haviradyamāshata' (Rgyēda 10. 94. 2), and (b) 'Hotēva nah prathamah pāhi' (Rgyēda 5. 43. 3) [where the meaning of (a) is—'It is only the pounding stones that obtain the Soma-juice before the Hoty Priest', i.e. no other person gets it before him; and that of (b) is—'Please drink first (of this Soma), like the Hoty priest'].

SŪTRA (38).

ALSO BECAUSE SUCH IS THE DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

We have the declaration that—'The first eating is by the Pronouncer of the syllable Vasat' [and it is the Hotr priest who is this Pronouncer].— It would not be right to argue that "this is a mere declaration; and as it declares several factors [(1) the pronouncing of the syllable, (2) the eating, and (3) the priority], no significance need attach to the priority ":—it

will not be right to argue thus, because it is this priority that is not already known from other sources [the other factors being already known]; and hence in regard to this priority, the text cannot be taken as a mere reiterative reference; it must be taken as an injunction. As for there being several factors mentioned, it is not difficult for a sentence to enjoin several factors when it makes use of a compound to do so.

SŪTRA (39).

Also because of the order of sequence among the grounds (of 'Eating').

Bhāşya.

Among the various functions that have been declared as entitling the priests to eat the Soma,—the first to be performed is the 'pronouncing of the syllable Vaaat', which is done by the Hotr;—then comes the 'offering of oblations into Fire', which is done by the Adhvarju;—and by virtue of this order of sequence among the 'grounds of eating', the same order should be followed in what is done on the basis of these 'grounds', and consequently in the order of eating also.

Adhikarana (14): The Soma is to be 'eaten' after Invitation.

SŪTRA (40).

THE 'EATING' IS TO BE DONE AFTER ONE HAS BEEN INVITED TO DO SO :—SUCH BEING THE DIRECT DECLARATION.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

Now arises the question—When several persons 'eat' the Soma out of a single vessel, must they receive an invitation to eat before eating? Or they may or may not seek invitation?

The Pūrvapakṣa being that—"it would be much simpler if no invitation were to be sought for",—the Siddhānta is that one should eat it only after having sought and obtained the invitation to do so.—Why so?— Because such is the direct declaration—'Soma should not be drunk unless one has been called to drink it'; where 'calling', stands for 'inviting',

This Sūtra is meant to be introductory (to what follows in the following Sūtra).

ADHIKARANA (15): The request for permission to eat should be conveyed by means of Vēdic words.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$,

It has been concluded that the eating should be done only on invitation.—Now arises the question.—Is this request for permission to be conveyed by means of words of common parlance? Or by means of Vēdic words?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "there can be no restriction regarding this (one may use the Vēdic words or any other words)".

Against this, we have the Siddhanta in the following Sutra.

SÜTRA (41).

THE INVITATION SHOULD BE SOUGHT BY MEANS OF THE MANTRA
'UPAHUTA UPAHVAYASVA'; SUCH BEING THE INDICATION (OF THE MANTRA ITSELF).

$Bh\ddot{a}$ şya.

The Mantra mentioned is indicative of 'request for permission'; and on the strength of this indication, it has been declared to be what should be used in making the request for invitation; because mantras are generally employed on the basis of their indicative power. When this mantra has been thus laid down as to be used, words of common parlance naturally become excluded.

ADHIKARANA (16): The answer to the 'Request for Invitation' should be given by means of Vedic words.

SŪTRA (42).

WHEN REQUEST FOR INVITATION IS MADE, THE ANSWER SHOULD BE BY MEANS OF SUCH WORDS (OF THE MANTRA) AS MIGHT CONVEY THAT SENSE.

Bhāsya.

We have learnt that the request for invitation is to be conveyed by means of the mantra 'Upahāta upahvayasva'.—Now there arises the question as to the form of the answer to the request. Is the answer to be by ordinary words? or by means of this same mantra?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "this Vēdic mantra having been used in conveying the request for invitation, the answer should be by means of some other words, and those of common parlance".

In answer to this, the Siddhānta view is that 'to the invitation, the answer should be by means of this same mantra'.

Objection—"The word 'Upahvayasva' (meaning 'invite me please') is indicative of the question (request) [as such, it cannot be used for the answer to the request]".

Answer—The word that precedes the word 'upahvayasva'—i.e. the word 'upahūtah' ('you are invited')—is the one that indicates the answer, and hence can be used as the answer.

Objection—"In that case, the order of the words is wrong; the request should come first, then the answer".

Answer—On the strength of the meaning conveyed by the word, the word, though occurring first in the text, would be used as the answer; for the meaning of the word (being of the nature of 'Direct Assertion') is always more authoritative than 'order'.

[Hence the request for invitation is to be made with the word 'upak-vayasva', and the answer with the word 'uphūtah'.]

ADHIKARANA (17): Request for Permission is necessary in the case of men eating out of the same Vessel.

SŪTRA (43).

It should be done only among persons eating out of the same Vessel; as it is only in their case that there is congregation.

Bhāsya.

There arises this further question—Should the request for permission be made to any person at random? Or to only one who is to eat out of the same vessel?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"as nothing particular is said on this point, the permission may be sought from any person".

In answer to this, we have the following Siddhanta: - The request for permission should be made only among those who are to eat out of the same vessel.—Why?—Because the request for permission is, in this case, subsidiary (to the act of eating); and the form of this request is that, when one wishes to do what is to be done by another, he prefers his request to that other person, with the words 'please permit me'; -or when one wishes to eat with another person, he makes the mind of this other person favourable towards his joining.—All this is not possible in the case of persons eating out of different vessels; because in that case, one man does not wish to do what should be done by another :- nor, at dining together, does one join another in the eating of the same thing (in case they are eating out of different vessels). On the other hand, in a case where the Soma-juice contained in a single vessel has to be 'embellished' (by 'eating'), the most equitable division is that the shares should be equal; -but if they proceed to drink it without dividing it equally, it is possible that one drinks what should have been drunk by another; hence in such cases there is need for the request for permission (to drink), in some such form as 'The proper thing to do is that you drink one half and I drink the other,-but it is just possible that I may drink more or less than my proper share, please, therefore, permit me to drink'. Or again, the man may make the request for permission, saying 'it is possible that in drinking out of the same vessel as yourself, I may disturb your peace of mind '.- From all this it follows that the request for permission is to be made only in the case of persons eating out of the same vessel.

Adhikarana (18): The Sacrificer himself should also eat the Soma.

SŪTRA (44).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"On the transference of the 'Yājyā', the 'Eating', like the 'appointment', does not become transferred."

Bhāsya.

There is the Jyotistoma sacrifice; in course of it certain sacrifices are offered to the Seasons;—in connection with which we read—'Yajamānasya yājyā, so'bhiprēsyati hotarētadyajēti, svayam vā niṣadya yajati' ['The Yājyā mantra (which is ordinarily recited by the Hotr priest) is recited by the Sacrifice;—he says to the Hotr priest—Please offer this sacrifice (to the seasons),—or he sits and offers the sacrifice himself'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—In the event of the sacrificer himself offering the sacrifice [and reciting the $Y\bar{a}jy\bar{a}$], is he to eat the Soma or not?

On this question, there is the following Pūrvapaksa-" Even though the Yājyā has been transferred (from the Hotr to the Sacrificer), yet the eating should not be similarly transferred (from the Hoty to the Sacrificer), -the eating should still be done by the Hotr, and not by the Sacrificer .-Why so ?-Because the reciting of the Yājyā-mantra is something quite different from the eating; and the transference of one thing need not involve the transference of another thing ;-just as on the transference of the Soma Yājyā (from the Hotr), his 'appointment' (as Hotr Priest) does not become transferred from him. -so also in the present case [the transference of the Yājyā does not mean the transference of the Eating].—[Objection]—'The direction is that the syllable vasat is pronounced along with the reciting of the Yājyā; so that where there is reciting of the Yājyā, there is the pronouncing of the syllable vasat, -and where there is pronouncing of the syllable vasat, there is eating of Soma'.—It is not so, we reply; the syllable 'vaşat' is not a constituent part of the Yājyā-mantra; hence the nonrecital of the Yājuā does not mean the non-pronouncing of the syllable vasat.-As for the direction that 'the syllable vasat is pronounced along with the reciting of the Yājyā',—even when the Yājyā is recited by another person (the sacrificer), the pronouncing of the syllable vasat may still be done by the Hotr [and even so the pronouncing of the syllable vasat will have been done along with the reciting of the Yājyā]; specially as the transference of the Yājyā is done in obedience to the distinct injunction to that effect; not so the transference of the syllable 'vasat'; and things that are done according to injunctions should be done strictly in accordance with the injunction; and, as a matter of fact, there is injunction in regard to the transference of the Yāivā only."

SÜTRA (45).

[SIDDHANTA]—In reality, there should be 'bating' by the sacrificer, because there is transference (to him) of the ground (for 'eating').

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

In reality, there should be 'eating' by the Sacrificer :- why ?-because there is transference, to him, of the ground for eating. The 'ground for eating' is the pronouncing of the syllable 'vasat',-this pronouncing is transferred to the Sacrificer when the Yājuā is transferred to him; as there is the text that 'the syllable vasat is pronounced along with the Yājyā' .-- "But it has already been pointed out that at the time the Yājyā is being recited by the Sacrificer, the Hotr may be pronouncing the syllable 'vasat' [and even so the pronouncing will have been done along with the reciting]" .-This is no answer at all. Because, we have the rule that the sacrifice should be performed 'without rest' (interruption); -and the sacrifice is completed with the pronouncing of the syllable 'vasat', not by the Yājyā only; -consequently, till the pronouncing of the syllable 'vasat', the sacrificer should not rest; -if this pronouncing of the syllable 'vasat' however, were done by some one else, then during that time the sacrificer would be resting; so that he would not be offering the sacrifice; and yet what he has been enjoined to do is to offer the sacrifice, not merely to recite the Yājyā-mantra; as the injunction is that 'he himself should sit and offer the sacrifice', which enjoins the offering of the sacrifice with all its accessories.

SŪTRA (46).

AS FOR THE 'APPOINTMENT', THERE IS NO TRANSFERENCE OF IT, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ALREADY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the Pēirvapakṣin that "there can be no transference of the eating, just as there is no transference of the Appointment".—Our answer to that is that the Appointment is not transferred, simply because it cannot be transferred; having been already accomplished, how could it be transferred from the Hoty? In fact, if the Appointment were done in connection with the Sacrificer, affer the lapse of its prescribed time, it would be most defective; and what is defective cannot accomplish its purpose. Nor can the Appointment come in (for the Sacrificer) by the general law that 'the modification should be performed in the same manner as its original Archetype'.—It might be argued that "if that be so, then it comes to this that what can be done is brought in by that general law, and what cannot be done is not brought in ";—our answer is that that is only natural. What a text enjoins is something not already known,—and it has to be done precisely as it has been enjoined; if in a certain case

it cannot be done, then it should be done in a case where it can be done; it should never be done where it would be defective.—It is for these reasons therefore that, while the non-transference of the Appointment is only right and proper, there can be no non-transference of the Bating [and the Bating, therefore, has to be done by the Sacrificer, in the case in question].

Adhikarana (19): The 'Fruit-mixture' (Phala-chamasa) is a 'modification' of the sacrificial offering.

SŪTRA (47).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE FRUIT-MIXTURE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A CONDITIONAL 'MODIFICATION' OF THE SOMA TO BE BATEN; SUCH BEING THE DIRECT ASSERTION (OF THE VEDIC TEXT)".

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Jyotiştoma, we read—'Sa yadi rājanyam vaishyam vā yājayēt, sa yadi somam bibhakṣayiṣēt, nyagradhastibhirāhṛtya, tāḥ sampiṣya, dadhani unmṛjya, tamasmai bhakṣam prayachchhēt, na somam.' ['If one officiates at a sacrifice for a Kṣattriya or a Vaishya,—and if these latter wish to eat Soma, the Priest shall fetch banyan-shoots, pounder them and mix them up with curd,—and offer this to him to eat, not the Soma'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the 'Fruit-mixture' a 'modification' (i.e. substitute) for the *Soma to be eaten*? Or for Soma to be offered?—i.e. is the *Fruit-mixture* meant to be eaten? Or is it meant to be the substance offered at the sacrifice?

The Pürvapaksa view is that "the Fruit-mixture should be regarded as a conditional 'modification' of the Soma to be eaten; as thus taken, it becomes syntactically connected with the 'eating' which is directly mentioned in the text quoted—'offer this to him to eat'; in the text we do not find any such expression as that 'with this fruit-mixture he should offer the eacrifice'.—From this we conclude that the Fruit-mixture is a substitute for the Soma to be eaten''.

SŪTRA (48).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY IT SHOULD BE TREATED AS A 'MODIFICA-TION' (SUBSTITUTE) FOR THE SOMA TO BE OFFERED AT THE SACRIFICE; AS THE 'CONSECRATION' ('EMBELLISHMENT') IS ALWAYS MEANT FOR WHAT IS TO BE OFFERED.

Bhāsya.

The Fruit-mixture should be regarded as a substitute for what is to be offered; i.e. one should offer the Fruit-mixture at the sacrifice.—Why so?—The 'eating' of the Soma is meant to be a 'consecration' ('embellishment') of the Soma; so that if the Fruit-mixture is to be eaten, then that 'eating' must be a 'consecration' (embellishment) of the Fruit-mixture; and this 'consecration' would be purposeless, if the Fruit-mixture were not to be used anywhere else (besides the ating).—If 'eating' were the principal factor, then there would be no sense in the reiterative reference

that is made to Soma, in the concluding words of the text 'not Soma'.—
On the other hand, if the Fruit-mixture were a substitute for the Soma to be offered, then there would be some sense in the 'consecration' of that mixture.—From all this, it follows that the Fruit-mixture should be regarded as a substitute for the substance to be offered.

Says the Opponent—"When there is no connection (in the text) between the Fruit-mixture and the verb 'to sacrifice', how can it be regarded as a substitute for the substance to be offered at a sacrifice?"

Answer—The connection with the verb 'to sacrifice' is there.—How !—What the text says is—'If one sacrifices on behalf of a Kşatiriya or a Vaishya he should pounder banyan-shoots and offer it to him to eat';—it is clear that the substance described here is meant to be used at this sacrifice; as otherwise, if it were meant solely for the purpose of being eaten, then there would be no connection between the first and the second parts of the passage quoted. If it had been meant that the Soma should be 'consecrated' by being eaten, then the expression used (in connection with the Fruit-mixture) would have been 'he should consecrate the banyan-shoots'—From this it follows that the connection (of the mixture) intended primarily is not with the eating, and it should be connected with the sacrifice; as it is the sacrifice that is the subject-matter of the whole Context; and hence, there would be no incongruity in this connection.

Objection—"Inasmuch as the text contains the words 'Tamasmai bhakeam prayachchāt' ['should offer him to est'], it is clear that the mixture in question should be taken as the means of accomplishing the 'eating', not the sacrificing,—by reason of the close proximity of the term 'bhakea' ('to eat')'".

Answer—Even though the connection (between the mixture and the eating) is expressed by the words of the text, yet, finding that such a connection does not serve any useful purpose, we declare that the connection (of the mixture) lies with the sacrificing, which is the subject-matter of the context.

Question—"How then is the mixture to be connected with the eating? [as, certainly it cannot be denied that the mixture is actually meant to be eaten]."

That the substance used in the sacrifice should be eaten follows from the general Injunction itself,—and in this way the mixture secures its connection with the eating. In fact, the connection with eating also implies connection with the eating. In fact, the connection with eating also implies connection with the sacrifice; because it is only when the substance is offered in sacrifice that it comes to be 'bhakea' (something to be eaten at the sacrifice). Hence the declaration in the text that the mixture is to be eaten naturally implies that it is to be offered at the sacrifice; thus then, the words 'tama-smai bhakeam prayachchhēt' ['should offer it to him to eat'] should be taken to mean 'tamasmai bhakeam kuryāt' ('should make the mixture a substance to be eaten by the sacrificer at the sacrifice'], i.e. should deal with it in such a manner as to make it a bhakea, a substance to be eaten at the sacrifice; as a matter of fact, it is only when it is offered at the sacrifice that it becomes a substance to be eaten at the sacrifice.—From this it follows 'that the mixture in question should be offered at the sacrifice.

[Kumārila deals with this Sūtra somewhat differently.—See Tantra-vartika—Trans., pp. 1492-1495.]

SŪTRA (49).

Also because of the mention of the 'oblation into the Fire'.

Bhāṣya.

In fact we have an injunction laying down a particular 'oblation into the Fire' (as to be offered out of the mixture in question)—'Yadā anyāmshchamasān juhvati alhaitasya darbhatarumakēnopahatya juhoti' ['When they offer oblations into the Fire out of other Cups, they cover this cup containing the Fruit-mixture with a fresh shoot of Kusha-grass and offer an oblation out of it into the Fire']. It is only if the mixture were meant to be used as a substance to be offered in the sacrifice, that there could be any occasion for the prescribing of the detail in connection with the oblation that it is to be covered with 'the fresh shoot of Kusha-grass'. From this also it is clear that the mixture in question is to be offered at the sacrifice.

SŪTRA (50).

Also because it is spoken of as coeval with the Cups (of Soma).

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

We have the text—'Yadā anyāmshchamasān unnayanti athainam chamasamunnayanti' ['At the time that they hold up the other cups, they raise this cup (containing the Fruit-mixture) also']. It is only if the mixture were meant to be offered in sacrifice that there would be any occasion for the cup being held up; not so if it were only meant to be eaten.—For this reason also the mixture should be offered at the sacrifice.

SŪTRA (51).

LASTLY, BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES.

$Bhar{a}$ şya.

For the following reason also we conclude that the mixture should be offered at the sacrifice?—"For what reason?"—Because we find indicatives:—"What is this indicative?"—It is found in the reference to the prohibition of Soma that we have at the end of the text—'He should offer the mixture, not the Soma, for eating'; this non-eating of the Soma would be possible only if the mixture were the substance offered at the sacrifice [if the substance offered at the sacrifice were Soma, then there would be no avoidance of the eating of the Soma, as what is to be eaten is the 'remnant of the substance used at the sacrifice']. From all this we conclude that the mixture in question should be taken as to be offered at the sacrifice.

ADHIKARANA (20): In the case of the cups at a Kṣattriya's Sacrifice also, the Brāhmanas are to 'attend upon' (eat out of) them.

SŪTRA (52).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE CHARACTER OF THOSE 'APPROACHING'
THE CUP SHOULD BE REGULATED BY THE CASTE (OF
THE SACRIFICER)."

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Dashapēya sacrifice, which is a part of the Rājasūya sacrifice, we read—'Shatam brāhmaṇāh soman bhakṣayanti, dashadashaikaikachamasamanuprasarpanti' ['A hundred Brāhmaṇas eat the Soma, ten persons shall approach each of the cups']

In regard to this there arises the question—In a case where the 'cup' has been prepared for a Ksattriya sacrificer, should also the persons 'approaching' the Cup be Ksattriyas? or should they be $Br\bar{a}hmanas$?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapaksa:—"They must be Kṣattriyas;—why?—because the sentence 'Ten persons shall attend upon each Cup' lays down the number of persons 'approaching' the cup; this number 'ten' being laid down in connection with the Kṣattriya caste,—the caste 'Kṣattriya' remains the constant factor; hence the ten Kṣattriyas should 'approach' the cup;—so that among the 'hundred', there would be Kṣattriyas as well as Brāhmaṇas [ten being Kṣattriyas and the rest Brāhmaṇas],—the mention of the number 'hundred' being a mere reiterative reference, so far as the ten Kṣattriyas are concerned; and the sentence 'a hundred eat the Soma' also being very much like a reiterative reference.—From all this it follows that Kṣattriyas should 'approach' [i.e. eat out of] the Cup prepared for the Kṣattriya sacrificer.—Some people urge here the following objection—'It would be very wrong for Brāhmaṇas and Kṣattriyas to eat out of the same cup'.—But there can be no harm in this, as it has been declared that in the case of Soma, there is no 'pollution' at all."

SŪTRA (53).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE BRAHMANAS; THE VEDIC TEXT BEING EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO BOTH.

Bhāṣya.

The persons 'approaching' the cup prepared for the Ksattriya sacrificer shuld be Brāhmaṇas;—why?—because, by Direct Assertion, the Injunctive text 'a hundred Brāhmaṇas cat the Soma' lays down the number 'hundred' as pertaining to Brāhmaṇas: thus there being these 'hundred Brāhmaṇas'.

(who are to eat the Soma), what the second sentence 'Ten persons, etc. etc.', does is to lay down that when these hundred Brāhmanas proceed to 'approach' (i.e. eat out of) the cups, the number for each cup should be ten'; hence the meaning is that of the 'hundred Brāhmanas', ten Brāhmanas should 'approach' the cup prepared for the Ksattriya sacrificer.

[Kumārila does not approve of this presentation of the Adhikarana (*Tantra-vārtika*—Trans., p. 1500): he has explained it in a different manner; for which see *Tantra@ritka*—Trans., pp. 1502-1504.]

End of Pāda v of Adhyāya III.

ADHYĀYA III.

PADA VI.

ADHIKARANA (1): The injunction regarding the 'Sruva' being made of 'Khadira-wood', and such other injunctions, should be taken as appertaining to the Primary Sacrifice (Archetype).

SŪTRA (1).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" THE IMPLEMENTS MUST APPERTAIN TO ALL SACRIFICES,
BECAUSE THEY DO NOT OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY PARTICULAR
SACRIFICE [I.E. IS ISOLATED].

Bhāṣya.

[We have dealt so far with such accessories as are amenable to one or more out of the six means of cognition,—Direct Assertion, Indicative Power, Syntactical Connection, Context, Order and Name; —we now proceed to discuss those that are not amenable to any of these means of cognition.]

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the following isolated injunctions—(a) 'Yasya khādirah sruvo bhavati sa chhandasāmēva rasēnāvadyati sarasā asya āhatuayo bhavanti '[' If one uses the Sruva of Khadira wood, he sacrifices with the very essence of the Vedas, all his oblations become juioy']:—(b) 'Yasya parpamayi juhūrbhavati na sa pāpam shlokam shrnoti' ['He whose Juhū is made of Palāsha wood hears no evil word'] (Taititi. Sara. 3. 5. 7. 1), and such others.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do the two things that are laid down here—i.e. 'that the *Sruva* should be of *Khadira* wood' and 'that the *Juhū* should be made of *Palāsha* wood'—find place in (appertain to) the *Primary* sacrifice (Archetype) only? or in the Archetype as well as in the Ectype?

On this question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—"The injunctions appertain to all sacrifices, because they do not occur in the Context of any sacrifice;—i.e. such injunctions should appertain to the Archetype as well as the Ectype;—why?—because they do not occur in the context of any particular sacrifice (i.e. they are isolated); that is, they are not found under any such context as deals with any particular sacrifice; and on the strength of Syntactical Connection (of the injunctive texts themselves), they must appertain to all sacrifices".

SUTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE ARCHETYPE ONLY, AS ONLY THUS THERE WOULD BE NO (SUPERFLUOUS) REPETITION.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

In reality, all those implements that are prescribed without reference to any particular sacrifice are to find place in the Archetypal Sacrifice;—why?—because it is only thus that there would be no superfluous repetition; that is, it is only when they are related to the Archetype that needless repetition is avoided.—"What is the harm if there is repetition?"—Impossibility, we answer; that is to say, if something finds place in the Archetype as well as the Ectype, it must find place in the Archetype;—but what finds place in the Archetype comes into the Ectype on the strength of the general law (that 'the Ectype is to be done in the same manner as the Archetype');—hence (for the purpose of being connected with that thing) the Ectype does not stand in need of any such isolated injunction as the one under consideration;—from which it follows that such an injunction cannot lay down anything for the Ectype. It is for this reason that we say that what is enjoined is for the Archetype only.

SUTRA (3).

[Says the Pürvapakşin]—" But, inasmuch as the thing in question finds place in the Ectype on the strength of the Injunction itself,—what comes to it under the general law must be things other than what comes to it through the injunction under consideration".

Bhāşya.

[Says the Pūrvapakṣin]—"We still say that since the injunction in question does not occur in the context of any particular sacrifice, it must appertain to both the Archetype and the Ectype under the argument that the thing enjoined would come into the Ectype under the general law (that the Ectype is to be done in the same manner as the Archetype),—our answer is that (it is the other way about), when the thing has already come into the Ectype by virtue of the isolated Injunction to that effect, it does not stand in need of that thing coming to it under the said general law. Hence what the general law can bring into the Ectype will be all other details except the one that has come into it already through the isolated injunction under consideration.—Then again, the fact that the Sruma (at all sacrifices including the Ectype) is to be of Khadira wood is laid down directly by the perceptible Injunction under consideration, while if it were to come into the Ectype through the general law, that would at best be only

an inference; and Perception is always more authoritative than Inference.

—For all these reasons we conclude that the isolated Injunction (which does not occur in the context of any sac. i.e.) appertains to both the Archetype and the Ectype."

SŪTRA (4).

"If it is urged by the Siddhāntin that—'In view of a perceptible fact [the general law is to be treated as more authoritative than the isolated Injunction]'—[then our answer would be as in the next Sütral."

Bhāsya.

"The Siddhantin might argue as follows :- 'If the isolated Injunction were more authoritative than the general law (that the Ectype is to be done like the Archetype), then a thing having come into the Ectype by virtue of that Injunction, it would not stand in need of the general law; so that when all the needs of the Ectype will have been supplied in this manner, there would be no application of the general law at all; -- and under these circumstances, there would be no possibility of our finding the Prayajas performed at the Ectype (at which the Prayājas come in from the Archetype only by virtue of the general law); but in fact, we do actually find the Prayājas at the Ectype, as is indicated by the text Prayājē prayājē krsnalam juhoti' [At each Pravaja one should offer the oblation of a gold piece into the fire 'l (Taitti, Sam. 2. 3. 2. 3).—On the other hand, if the general law is more authoritative than an isolated Injunction, then the perceived fact (of the Prayajas being present at the Ectype) becomes plainly explicable.-From all this we conclude that the isolated injunction apper. tains to the Archetype only.'

"Our answer to this argument of the Siddhantin would be as follows :--

SŪTRA (5).

[PÜBVAPAKŞIN'S REJOINDER]—"THAT CANNOT BE; AS THE ISOLATED INJUNCTION LAYS DOWN ONLY ONE THING".

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

"The isolated Injunction in question cannot appertain to the Archetype only; it must appertain to all sacrifices; for the simple reason that it does not occur in the context of any particular sacrifice. It has been argued that if the Ectype has all its needs fulfilled by the isolated injunction, there can be no application of the general law. But this is not right; because the isolated Injunction does not render the general law unnecessary; in fact, it is only when the Sruva has come into the Ectype by virtue of the general law,—that the fact of its being made of Khadira-vood is laid down by the isolated injunction; so that if the general law were not there (to admit the Sruva

into the Ectype), the isolated Injunction would not be applicable at all [as there would be nothing that could be of Khadira-wood];—nor can the isolated Injunction be taken as prescribing the use of the Sruva and also the fact of its being made of Khadira-wood,—why ?—because the Injunction lays down only one thing; the injunction that 'he who uses a Sruva of Khadira-wood, etc.' lays down only one thing; and it does not lay down the Sruva, as well as the fact of its being made of Khadira-wood; all that the text does lay down is the fact of its being made of Khadira-wood with regard to the Sruva which latter has already come in (by the general law).—Thus then there is use for the general law, which lays down all those other details which are not laid down by the directly perceptible isolated Injunction.—From all this it follows that the isolated Injunction appertains to both the Archetype and the Ectype."

SŪTRA (6).

"IT MIGHT BE URGED (BY THE SIDDHANTIN) THAT 'THE INJUNCTION IN QUESTION [IS ENTIRELY LIKE THAT OF THE INJUNCTION OF OTHER ACCESSORIES OF THE ARCHETYPE]';—[OUR ANSWER TO THIS WOULD BE AS SET FORTH IN

THE NEXT SUTRA]."

Bhāsya.

"The Siddhāntin may argue as follows:—'The Injunction in question is just like the other injunctions bearing upon the Archetype. For instance, the accessories of the Archetype are laid down in detailed as well as in abbreviated form; for instance, when it is said "offers the five Prayājas", it is in an abbreviated form; but when the same is said in the form "Samidho yajati, etc." (Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 1. 1) [where all the Prayājas are separately named], it is in a detailed form;—in the case under consideration also, when it is said "He whose Sruva is made of Khadira-wood, etc. etc.", it is in a detailed form; but when it is said "He whose Sruva is of this shape", it is in an abbreviated form.—Such is the kind of injunction that we find in connection with the Archetype.—Now the injunction also pertains to the Archetype. This is a pure inference from the Universal to the Particular.—From all this it follows that the isolated injunction appertains to the Archetype.

"Our answer to this reasoning is as follows:-

SŪTRA (7).

[Pürvapakşin's answer to the Siddhāntin's argument in Sü. 6]—" It is not so; as it is a case of simple . Similarity."

Bhāṣya.

"It cannot be as explained above. Such inferences from the Universal to the Particular as have been put forward above do not prove anything;

all that is true is that there is some similarity between the injunctions bearing upon the Archetype and the Injunction under consideration; there is nothing to prove that this latter pertains to the Archetype.—Then again, in connection with the Ectype also, there are accessories enjoined in detailed and abbreviated forms; for instance—when it is said that 'there are three oblations into the fire' (Taitti. Sain. 2. 3. 9. 3), it is in an abbreviated form; and when the injunction proceeds to lay down the mantras with which these oblations are offered,—such as 'Amanamasyāmanasya devāh, etc.' (Taitti. Sain. 2. 3. 9. 3], it is in a detailed form.—Thus it is found that isolated Injunctions are similar also to the injunctions bearing upon the Ectype.—From all this it follows that what is put forward by the Siddhāntin (under Sū. 6) is no reason for holding that what is enjoined in the isolated injunction should find place in the Archetype."

[Of Sūtras 6 and 7, Kumārila has suggested a second interpretation—see Tantravārtika—Trans., pp. 1509-1510.]

SŪTRA (8).

[SIDDHANTIN'S FINAL ANSWER TO THE PÜRVAPAKŞA]—IN REALITY,
THERE BEING A CONFLICT OF OPINION IN REGARD TO THE ECTYPE,—
INASMUCH AS WHATEVER IS LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL
LAW APPLIES IN ITS ENTIRETY (TO THE ECTYPE),—WHAT
IS ENJOINED IN THE ISOLATED INJUNCTION

ENJOINED IN THE ISOLATED INJUNCTION

MUST APPERTAIN TO THE ARCHETYPE.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The particle 'tu' ('in reality') rejects the view set forth above, What we hold is that the isolated Injunction does not pertain to all sacrifices (Archetype as well as Ectype); -why ?-because whatever is laid down by the general law applies in its entirety to the Ectype; i.e. the general law brings to the Ectype the entire procedure, and the needs of the Ectype and its resultant Apūrva cannot all be fulfilled by the isolated Injunction; specially because it is evident from Syntactical Connection that what is laid down in the isolated Injunction (i.e. being made of Khadira-wood) is in connection with the implements, and not with the (ectypal) sacrifices (directly); and these sacrifices stand in need of help from the Archetype, through the clear indication of the General Law; and hence it is with the Archetype that they become syntactically connected. Thus it is that what can supply all the needs of the Ectype are the accessories of the Archetype, not any isolated Injunctions. It is necessary therefore that the General Law should be brought into operation:—and when the General Law becomes operative. there is no need for the application of the isolated Injunction. In fact, in the absence of 'Context' or any other indicative of connection, even though the isolated Injunction were operative, it could not become connected with the Ectype. For these reasons the isolated Injunction can have no connection with the ectypal action. - Thus then, there being a conflict of opinion in regard to the 'mukhya', the sacrifice in question,-i.e. the Ectype,-as to whether it is supplemented by the isolated Injunction, or by the archetypal accessories,—it follows, on the strength of the General Law, that it is supplemented by the archetypal accessories; and under the circumstances, the isolated Injunction cannot apply to it.—From all this it follows that the isolated Injunction pertains to the Archetype.

Adhikarana (2): The number 'seventeen' connected with the 'Sāmidhēnī' mantras appertains to the Ectype: Exception to Adhi. (1).

SŪTRA (9).

On account of the peculiarity of the Context, the number must pertain to the Ectype; as it would be incompatible (with the accessories of the Archetype).

Bhāsya.

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, the extent of the Sāmi-dhēnī Mantras is thus declared—'Saptadasha Sāmidhēnīranubrūyāt' ['one should recite the seventeen Sāmidhēnī Mantras'] (Aita. Brā. 1. 1).

[The mantras beginning with 'Pra vo vājā abhidavad '—Rgveda 3. 27. 1—are called 'Sāmidhēni',' Kindling', because they are recited at the time of kindling the Sacrificial Fire. The number of these is eleven; but in connection with their recitation, several numbers—15, 17 and so forth—are found to be laid down; these numbers are made up by some of the same mantras being repeated twice or thrice.]—

In regard to this there arises the question—Does this injunction (of the number 'seventeen') pertain to the Archetype or the Ectype?

On this question, we have the *Pūrvapakṣa* view that, "in accordance with the principle of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the number 'seventeen' should appertain to the Archetype; and that as 'fifteen' is the number definitely prescribed in connection with the Archetype, there should be an option [i.e. one may recite either seventeen or fifteen Sāmidhēnī Mantras]".

Against this Pūrvavaksa, we have the following Siddhanta: - Injunctions like the one under consideration should appertain to the Ectype: -why? -because the Archetype has all its requirements fulfilled by the number 'fifteen' .- "But we have already pointed out that there would be an option (between 'fifteen' and 'seventeen')."-On account of the peculiarity of the Context, there can be no option between 'fifteen' and 'seventeen' (in regard to the Archetype); specially because the two injunctions differ entirely in their character; [the 'fifteen' being enjoined in the special context of the Archetype itself, while 'seventeen' is enjoined in an isolated injunction].—As regards the Ectype, however, the admission of the number 'fifteen' into it would be based upon Inference (on the strength of the general law that 'the Ectype is to be done in the same manner as the Archetype '), and this number therefore would be set aside by the directly perceived Injunction of the number 'seventeen', which therefore would find place in that Ectype. In this manner there would be no needless repetition either (as was found in the foregoing Adhikarana) and the Injunction of the entire performance would thus become summed up, without any needless repetition [such as was found in the preceding Adhikarana].—From all this it follows that Injunctions like the one we have been considering appertain to the Ectype.

[Kumārila is not satisfied with this presentation of the *Adhikarana*; he proposes a somewhat different interpretation, see *Tantravārtika*—Trans, pp. 1515-1516.]

Adhikarana (3): Accessories like the Milking Vessel appertain to the Archetype: An exception to the foregoing Adhikarana.

SŪTRA (10).

ALL THAT IS 'CONDITIONAL' SHOULD FIND PLACE IN THE ARCHETYPE;
THIS CHANGE OF THE ORIGINAL BEING DUE TO THE
MENTION OF THE SPECIAL CONDITION.

Bhāsya.

In connection with the *Darshapūrnamāsa* it is laid down—'If the sacrificer is desirous of acquiring cattle, water should be carried in the milking vessel.'—Similarly in connection with animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*, we find the following declaration, in reference to the sacrificial post—'If one desires Brahmic glory, he should make the sacrificial post of *Bilva* wood' [Taitti. Sam. 2. 1. 8. 1].

In regard to such texts, there arises the question—In regard to (conditional) injunctions, like these, there arises the question—Should they find place in the Archetype or in the Ectype?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "they should find place in the Ectype; because the requirements of the Archetype have been fulfilled by means of (a) the other vessel (Chamasa, cup, which is enjoined specially in regard to the Archetype, Darshapūrpamāsa (in the case of the first text), and (b) (in the case of the second text) the other Sacrificial post (i.e. that made of Khadīra wood, which is enjoined specially in connection with the Archetype, Jyotiş toma) [which leaves no room for the 'milking vessel' and the 'Bilva wood'].

In answer to this Pūrvapaksa, we have the following Siddhānta—What is conditional pertains to the Archetype; because it has been enjoined with special reference to the condition; (b) the Sacrificial Post made of Khadira or Palāsha or Rohitaka has been enjoined in a general way (without reference to any conditions or circumstances) (in connection with the Juotistoma); (a) so also has the 'Cup' been enjoined (in connection with Darshapūrnamāsa, as to be used for keeping water near the Ahavanīva fire); while (b) the Bilva wood (for the Post) and the Milking Vessel (for the carrying of water) have been laid down with reference to special conditions (that of (a) being desirous of 'Brahmic glory' and of (b) being desirous of obtaining Cattle); and a special Injunction always sets aside a general one. As regards 'Context', that is common to all actions (Archetype and Ectype): the presence of the 'condition', however, is something very special; -and what comes into a sacrifice through the general injunction does so only indirectly, by having recourse to indirect indication [the general term being taken as indirectly standing for the special thing; on the other hand, what

comes through a special injunction does so through the perceptible Direct Assertion;—and Direct Assertion is always more authoritative than Indirect Indication;—and what is perceptible is more authoritative than what is not-perceptible.—For these reasons the articles enjoined are to find place in the Archetype only [and at the Ectype, the Cup shall always be used for the keeping of water, as is going to be decided under 8. 1. 24].

Adhikarana (4): The 'Fire-installation' is not auxiliary to the 'Pavamāna' Sacrifice.

SŪTRA (11).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—" On account of the 'Context', the Fire-installation must be regarded as auxiliary to the Sacrifice (Pavamāna)."

Bhāsya.

[Hitherto we have been dealing with Injunctions admittedly 'isolated', not occurring in the context of any particular sacrifice; we are now going to deal with an Injunction which, though apparently occurring in the context of a particular sacrifice, has to be treated as an 'isolated' one.]

There are the Pavamāna sacrifices spoken of in the texts—'Agnayē aṣṭākapālam nivvapēt—Agnayē pāvakāya—Agnayē shuchayē' [Taitti. Sam. 2. 2. 4. 2];—in the 'context' of these same sacrifices, we find the injunction that 'During the spring, the Brāhmana shall install the fires' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 2. 6).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the Fire-installation for the purpose of (auxiliary to) the Pavamāna sacrifices, or not?

On this question, the Pārvapakṣa view is that—"Fire-installation is for the purpose of the Pavamāna sacrifices;—why?—on account of the context; that is, it is found to be spoken of in the context of these sacrifices, and hence it must be regarded as being subservient to their purpose".

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS IN REALITY, THE PAVAMĀNA SACRIFICES THEMSELVES ARE PERFORMED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE 'FIRE'.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

As a matter of fact, the Pavamāna sacrifices are performed for the purpose of (consecrating) the Fire. If the Fire were for the purpose of (auxiliary to) the Sacrifice, then the Fire-installation, as auxiliary to the Fire, could be regarded as helping the sacrifices; but the sacrifices in question (Pavamāna) do not bring about any results; so that the Fire-installation (if auxiliary to those sacrifices) would also be useless.—"But why should the Pavamāna sacrifices be regarded as auxiliary to the Fire?"—Simply because they serve no purpose at all, while the Fires serve a distinctly useful purpose.—Though the sacrifices are to be accomplished, yet they could be performed for the purpose of the Fires which are accomplished entities; [though ordinarily it is the accomplished entity that serves the

purpose of what is yet to be accomplished].—From all this, it follows that Fire-installation is not auxiliary to the Pavamāna sacrifices.

SŪTRA (13).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATION.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

There is an indicative text which shows that the Pawamāna sacrifices are performed for the purpose of the Fires.—" What is that indicative text?"—It is as follows—'Jīryati vā ēṣa āhitah pashuvyadagniḥ, tadētānyēva agnyādhēyasya havīmṣi samvatsarā nirvapēt, tēna vā ēṣa na jīryati, tēnainam purnarnavam karoti, tanna sūkṣmum' (see Taitti. Sam. 1. 5. 7. 3) ['The Fire that has been installed droops; hence these offerings should be made at the end of a year, in connection with the Fire-installation; by this the Fire does not droop; it makes it fresh, and it is no longer small'], [where the offerings, by which the Pavamāna sacrifices are meant, are clearly spoken of as helping the Fire that has been installed].

Adhikarana (5): The Fire-installation is auxiliary to all Sacrifices.

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE INJUNCTION OF 'FIRE-INSTALLATION' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THE ARCHETYPE,—JUST LIKE OTHER ISOLATED INJUNCTIONS"

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the 'Fire-installation' referred to in the foregoing Adhikarana, there arises the question—Is the Fire-installation auxiliary to the Archetype only, or to all sacrifices?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "it is auxiliary to the Archetype only;—why?—just like other isolated injunctions; i.e. just for the same reason for which other isolated injunctions pertain to the Archetype (see Sū. 10, above)".

SUTRA (15).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—IN REALITY, THE FIRE-INSTALLATION IS AUXILIARY
TO ALL SACRIFICES, BECAUSE IT 'HAS ITS OWN TIME'

[or, according to Tantravārtika, p. 1530, 'has
been enjoined by itself independently'].

Bhāşya.

In reality the 'Installation' should be taken as auxiliary to all sacrifices.—"What is the meaning of this?"—The meaning is that the 'Installation' is for the sake of the Fire which is used at all sacrifices. As a matter of fact, this 'Installation' has not been enjoined in reference to the Archetypal Sacrifices; nor is there any 'Direct Assertion', or 'Indication', or 'Syntactical Connection', or 'Context', or 'Order', or 'Name',-which points to the 'Installation' being an auxiliary to any particular sacrifice. As regards the 'other isolated injunctions', as applied to any particular factor, it is only after its auxiliary character has been recognised by some other means, that we proceed to consider whether the factors are auxiliaries to the Archetype or to the Ectype; hence in their case it is only right [that they should be taken as auxiliary to the Archetype on the grounds set forth under Sū. 10].-In the case in question, however, there are no grounds for believing that the 'Installation' is auxiliary to any sacrifice; hence it is regarded as being done for the sake of the 'Fire', not for the sake of any 'action' (sacrifice); and as the 'Fires' are for the purpose of all sacrifices (as shown under 3. 7. 39), we declare that the 'Installation' also must be for the purpose of (and auxiliary to) all sacrifices. [This is going to be definitely established under 11. 3. 2.1

Further, the 'Installation' has got its 'own time' definitely laid down (in the injunction 'The Bråhmana should install the Fires during the spring'). This should not have been so laid down (if the installation were auxiliary to any particular sacrifice); for (if it were auxiliary to the Jyotistoma), it would have to be performed whenever the Jyotistoma is performed;—and this could not always be the 'spring'; similarly (if it were auxiliary to the Dursha-Pūrnamāsa) it should have to be performed whenever the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa are performed;—and this would be either the Moonless Day or the Fullmoon Day [not the 'spring'].—On the other hand, if the 'Installation' is not auxiliary to any such Archetypes, then it would not be done necessarily at the performance of those Archetypes; and in that case, a separate injunction of the time for it would be only right and proper.—For these reasons the 'Installation' cannot be regarded as auxiliary to any particular Archetype.

Adhikarana (6): The Pavamāna Sacrifices should be offered in the unconsecrated Fire.

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE CONSECRATED FIRE SHOULD COME INTO THE PAVAMĀNA SACRIFICES FROM THE ARCHETYPE,—JUST AS THE PRAYĀJAS DO.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

There are the Pavamāna sacrifices laid down in the texts—'Agnayē pavamānāya, etc.' (Taitti. San. 2. 2. 4. 2).

In regard to these there arises the question—Are the *Pavamāna* sacrifices to be offered in the Fire that has been consecrated by means of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices, or in one not so consecrated?

On this question, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa—"To the Pava-māna sacrifices, the Fire sanctified by means of the Pavamāna sacrifices should come in from the Archetype;—why?—on the strength of the general law (that 'the Ectype should be performed in the manner of the Archetype');—just as the Prayājas do; i.e. just as the Prayājas come into the Pavamāna sacrifices by virtue of the general law, even so would the Fires sanctified by the Pavamāna sacrifices also come into them?

SŪTRA (17).

[SIDDHÄNTA]—IN REALITY IT CANNOT BE SO; AS THE PAVAMÄNA SACRIFICES THEMSELVES ARE FOR THE VERY PURPOSE OF CONSECRATING THE FIRES.

$Bh\bar{a}$ şya.

In reality at the Pavamāna sacrifices themselves, there can be no consecration of the Fires by means of those same sacrifices.—Why?—Because the Pavamāna sacrifices themselves are for the very purpose of consecrating the Fires; i.e. when the Pavamāna sacrifices are performed, they are performed for the purpose of consecrating the Fires; what is brought in by virtue of the general law is what is auxiliary to the Archetype; [i.e. it is only an auxiliary to the archetypal sacrifice, Darsha-Pūrņamāsa, that can come into its eetypes];—the consecration done by means of the Pavamāna sacrifices is for the sake of the Fires; it is not an auxiliary to the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa; hence it cannot be brought in by virtue of the general law.—Further, by their very nature, the Pavamāna sacrifices need an Archetype which is devoid of the consecration brought about by those sacrifices; for the simple reason that the Pavamāna sacrifices have not been enjoined as to be performed at the time (of the sacrifice which would be the Archetype of

those sacrifices), [these sacrifices would therefore not be there at all]. [From all this it follows that the *Pavamāna* sacrifices are to be performed in Fires which have undergone the simple consecration of 'installation', and which have not undergone the further consecration through the *Pavamāna* sacrifices—*Trantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1533-1534.]

Adhikarana (7): The 'Upākarana' and other rites are to be performed_only in connection with the 'Agnīsomīya' animal.

SÜTRA (18).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA (A)]—" WHAT IS LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH ANIMALS SHOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL THE ANIMALS, AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT."

Bhāsya.

At the Jyotistoma sacrifice, there are three animals—(1) the Agnisomiya, mentioned in the text 'Yo ākṣito yadamişomiyam pashumālabhatē' (Taitti. Sain. 6. 1. 11. 6), (2) the Savaniya, and (3) the Anubandhya. There are also certain details to be performed in connection with the animals, such as—(a) Upākaraṇam [Touching the animal with the two mantras beginning with 'Prajāpatērjāyamānāḥ, etc.' (Taitti. Sain. 3. 1. 4. 1) and 'Imam pashum, etc.' (Ibid.)], (b) Upānayanam [Bringing forward], (c) Akṣayā-bandhaḥ [Tying with a rope], (d) Yūpā niyojanam [Fettering to the Sacrificial Post], (e) Sanjāapanam [Suffocating to death], (f) Vishasanam [Dissecting], and so forth.

In connection with these details there arises the question—Are these to be performed in connection with all the three animals—Agnisomiya, Savaniya, and Anubandhya? Or with the two, Agnisomiya and Savaniya? Or with the Agnisomiya only?

The Purvapaksa view (A) is as follows:—"They should be performed in connection with all the three animals, as there is no difference in the context.—What is this non-difference?—It is this, that all the animals have been spoken of in one and the same context, that of the Jyotistoma; and as all of them are mentioned in that same context, all the details laid down in connection with the animals become connected with all the three animals, and there can be no differentiation among them."

In answer to this Pūrvapakṣa (A), we put forward the following view which is Pūrvapakṣa (B):—"All these details should belong to the Savaniya animal only. The injunction regarding the animals could appertain equally to all the animals only if there were no distinction in regard to their context; as a matter of fact, however, there is a distinction in their context, inasmuch as the details relating to the animals have been laid down in the sub-context dealing with the Savaniya animals, in the following text—
'Agnēyaḥ pashuragniṣṭomē ālabhyaḥ, āgnēyo hyagniṣṭomaḥ; aīndrāgnaḥ pashurukthyē ālabhyaḥ, aindrāgnāni hyukthāmi; aindro vṛṇiḥ sodashini alabhyaḥ, aindro vai vṛṣṇiḥ aindraḥ sodashī; sārasvaiī meṣī atirātrē ālabhyā, vāy vai sarasvaiī (Shatapatha Brā. 4. 2. 5. 14),—and so on, all the details relating to the animals are laid down. From this it follows that, on account of this special context, the details should be performed in connection with the Savaniya animal only,"

[In answer to this Pūrvapakṣa (B), we have the following Sūtra, which sets forth a view which has been regarded as Pūrvapakṣa (C).]—

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKSA (C)]—" ON ACCOUNT OF ITS POSITION, [THE DETAILS SHOULD BE PERFORMED] IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREVIOUS (AGNISOMIYA) ANIMAL ALSO."

Bhāsya.

"It has been asserted that on account of the Context, the details should be taken as to be performed in connection with the Savaniya animals. This we accept; but we have to add that on account of Position, they should be performed in connection with the Agnisomiya also; as the details are laid down in connection with the Aupavasathya (Fourth) Day, whose position in the order of sequence is the same as that of the Agnisomiya. Hence the details should be performed in connection with both (the Savaniya as well as the Agnisomiya)."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDANTA]—According to some Vedic Texts, [The 'Savaniya' animals are spoken of] in connection with the following day; in that case, its mention in connection with the previous day is to be taken as meant for the purpose of laying down certain accessory details.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

According to some Vedic Recensions, the Savaniya animals are spoken of in connection with the following day; and in view of this, the text quoted is to be taken as laying down certain accessory details .-- "What is that accessory detail for the purpose of laying down which there is the Text (that speaks of the Savaniya as connected with the previous day)?"-The answer to this is as follows-Having named the animals, the Text goes on to say- Yathā vai matsyo'vidito janamavadhunutē ēvam vā ētē aprajāāyamānā janamavadhunvatē' ['Just as an unknown fish strikes and shakes a man in water, in the same manner these animals if unknown strike and shake the people'];—then there arises the question—in what way are the Some-extractions to be connected with the animals ?--and it is in answer to this that the 'extraction of the omentum' is laid down as the accessory detail (connecting the Soma-extraction with the animals); so that it is for the purpose of laying down this accessory detail (of the 'extraction of the omentum') that we have the text (speaking of the Savaniya animal in connection with the previous day); as it is only thus that this text becomes syntactically connected with the 'extraction of the omentum'.

[&]quot;What if it is so?"

Well, if it is so, then the details laid down in connection with the animals cannot be taken, on the strength of 'Context', as pertaining to the Savaniya animals,—they have to be taken as pertaining to the Agnisomiya animal only, on the strength of 'Order' (Position).

Question—"Which is that text which speaks of the Savaniya in connection with the 'following day'?"

Answer—The text is—'Āshvinam graham grhītvā trvṛtā yūpam parivīya āgnēyam savanīyam pashumupākaroti'.

The Siddhanta position may be thus explained (see Saddarshanachintanika. pp. 997-998)—First of all, the context of the Savaniya animals being first and foremost is found in only some recensional texts, not in all: under the circumstances, the force of the 'Context' loses all its force......The aim of the Context is to lay down for the first time how the 'extraction of the omentum' of the animal is to be done, and how it is to be prepared for offering in sacrifice; and it is only incidentally that the Savanīya animal is mentioned; and why this animal has been incidentally mentioned is to be thus explained. As a matter of fact, the work to be done on two days is all described together, -i.e. what is to be done on the following day is described along with what is to be done on the previous day. For instance, first of all the Agnīsomīya animal is prepared and killed and its omentum extracted; next the Savaniya animal is to be prepared and killed and the Soma-juice is to be extracted ;-but this latter is done on the 'following day', called the 'Sutyāha'; while the Agnīsomīya animal is prepared and killed and its omentum extracted on the day previous to this, which previous day is called the Aupavasathya day [described in Shatapatha-Brā. 1. 1. 1. 7, as the day on which the Vishvēdēvas come to dwell with the sacrificer in the hope that he will offer sacrifices to them on the following day]. It is clear from this that the Agnisomiya animal is dealt with first,—then the Savaniya animal.—The Savaniya animal is mentioned in the Context of the Agnisomiya animal, simply for the purpose of laying down the details of the 'extraction of the omentum' of the Savanīya animal. That the Savaniya animal is to be dealt with on the following day is clear from the text quoted ' Ashvinam graham grhītva, etc.']

SŪTRA (21).

[Objection]—"What the text quoted ('Āshvinam Graham, etc.')

does is to enjoin the time for what has been transferred

by the 'Extraction of the omentum'";—if this is

urged [by the Pūrvapakṣin, then the answer is as

given in the following Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

[Says the Pūrvapakṣin]—"It is not right to assert that, on the strength of 'Order', the details in question should be taken as pertaining to the Agniṣomiya animal; because in reality, on the strength of the 'Context', they should be taken as pertaining to the Savaniya animal. As a matter of fact, when the Savaniya is mentioned in connection with the previous day, it is mentioned for being enjoined, and all that the text speaking of the 'Ishvina' (i.e. the text quoted by the Siddhāntin, 'Ashvinam graham, etc.' as indicating the connection with the following day) does is to lay down

the particular detail of Time.—"How?"—Well, the text lays down the time for what has been 'transferred' by the 'extraction of the omentum'. In fact, the 'extraction of the omentum having been laid down in connection with the Morning Extraction of Soma-juice, the killing of the animal (from which the omentum has to be extracted) also naturally falls on the same day; but the exact time for it not being known, the text quoted 'Ashvinam graham, etc.' lays down the precise time only.—As for 'tying of the threefold rope round the sacrificial post', this is mentioned only by way of reference to what has been already laid down elsewhere; if it were not so, then the text quoted would contain the injunction of the said 'tying of the rope' and also the injunction of the 'Upākarama' of the Savaniya animal; and in this way, there would be a syntactical split.—For these reasons the details in question should be taken as pertaining to the Savaniya animal only."

["If the Siddhantin thinks that there is no 'Context' of the Savanīya, he is very much mistaken; because as a matter of fact, the original appearance of the Savanīya animal is due to the previous sentence 'Agnēyamajam, etc.' (see Text quoted under Sū. 18); then the sentence 'Vapayā pracharanti' transfers the 'extraction of the animal's omentum' to a subsequent occasion; and lastly, the exact time for it being still unknown, the sentence Ashvinan graham, etc.' lays down that time. That is to say, the sentence 'Vapayā prātaḥsavanē pracharanti 'transfers the principal detail—that of Extraction of the omentum to a subsequent occasion; and inasmuch as the accessories must follow their Principal, the other details, such as killing and the rest, also become transformed to the subsequent occasion. But with all this, there still remains an uncertainty as to the exact time, and then the time 'immediately following upon the holding of the Ashvina Cup' comes to be laid down by the sentence 'Ashvinam graham, etc.'. Thus it is this last sentence which serves the purpose of laying down the accessory detail of Time. If this sentence were not taken as laying down the time for the killing, etc. of the Savaniya animal, it would have to be taken as laving down the time for (1) the 'Tying of the Rope round the Post', (2) the Upākarana of the animal, and (3) the sacrifice with all its material, Deity, etc.; and this multiplicity of enjoined things would cause an objectionable syntactical split.....The sense of the Bhasya comes to be this-If it were not as explained by the Pūrvapakṣin, then the sentence 'Ashvinam graham, etc.' would have to be taken as laying down, in regard to the 'Tying', something in connection with which the 'threefold rope' and the particular time could be enjoined; and the phrase 'upākaranasya cha' (Bhāsya) means that the time laid down would be for the Upākarana also. Hence, inasmuch as this text is found to serve the purpose of laying down the necessary accessories, it has to be admitted that there is a 'Context' pertaining to the Savaniya animals .- Tantravartika-Trans., pp. 1541-1542.7

SŪTRA (22).

[Answer to the Pūrvapakṣin's objection]—That cannot be; as what is transferred is only a part of the animal.

Bhāşya.

It cannot be as it has been urged by the $P\bar{u}rvapaksin$; in reality, on the strength of the 'Order', the details in question must be taken as pertaining

to the Agnisomiya animal. As for the mention of the Savaniya in connection with the time at which the Ashvina Cup is taken up,—that is for the purpose of actually enjoining the Savaniya itself; if it were taken as laying down accessories of the Savaniya, then there would be a syntactical split; not so when it is taken as enjoining the Savaniya itself. It is not possible for the text 'Ashvinam graham, etc.' to be taken as laying down the time for what has been transferred by the 'extraction of the omentum'; because the omentum is only one part (of the animal); and hence it could transfer only those details which come after the preparation of the omentum, and not the Upakāraṇa of the animal (which comes before the 'extraction of the omentum').

SŪTRA (23).

[Objection]—"[The transference] may be due to the nature of the business itself"—if this be urged [then our answer would be as given in the following Sütra].

Bhāşya.

Says the Opponent—"[If the transference could not be due to the 'extraction of the omentum'], then it could be due to the nature of the business,—and for the Savaniya thus transferred, the time would be taken as enjoined by the sentence 'Ashvinam graham, etc.'. This 'nature of the business' is indicated by the text—'Muspinā pidhāya vapoddharanam āsila a vapāhomāt' [Covering the extracted omentum with the first, he should sit there till the omentum is offered into the Fire']; now if the 'extraction of the omentum' were done on the previous (i.e. fourth) day and if it were offered into the fire on the following (i.e. the fifth) day, then it would mean that the man would have to keep the omentum covered with his fist and sit down continuously for two days; and certainly no one could do this; for it would be necessary for him to find time to take his food and have some rest, etc.'

SŪTRA (24).

THAT CANNOT BE; AS WHAT IS SUGGESTED WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF THERE WERE AN INCONGRUITY IN THE VEDIC TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested by the Pinvapaksin is not possible. It could be so only if the doing of the 'Extraction of the omentum' on the previous day and the offering on the following—involved an incongruity in the Vedic text;—as it is however, there is no such incongruity in the Veda; as it is quite possible to 'cover the omentum' with a fistful of grass, or a fastful of leaves [in which case there would be no such incongruity as that of the man having to remain sitting for two days, etc.].

Objection—"But the text contains the word 'āsīta', which means that the man should remain sitting".

Answer—The root 'ās' does not always mean to sit; in fact it is also used in the sense of neutrality or indifference (rest); as we find in such assertions as 'Grhyāni parigrhya āstē', 'Kṣetrāni parigrhya āstē' ['Having received the household utensils, he rests', 'Having received lands, he rests'], where the root 'ās' denotes something which is not—sitting, i.e. cessation of activity (resting). In the text in question also, this same sense would be applicable—the man, having covered the ornentum with a fistful of grass or of leaves may (rest) remain inactive.—From all this it follows that the text speaking of the time of the holding of the Ashvina Cup serves to enjoin the Savaniya; so that the details regarding the animals do not appear in the 'Context' of the Savaniya animals, and as such, they cannot be regarded as pertaining to the Savaniya animals.

SŪTRA (25).

Thus then, by virtue of its 'position', the details in question must appertant to the previous (i.e. Agnişomiya) animal,; specially as the consecration (brought about by the said details) is meant for the sake of that animal.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

It has been seen that there is no 'Context' of the Savaniya animals;—such being the case, for reasons already stated before (in Sū. 19),—i.e. on account of its 'position',—the details should appertain to the previous—i.e. the Agnisomiya—animal;—specially as the consecration (brought about by the details in question) is for the sake of the Animal-sacrifice, not for the Jyotistoma sacrifice. In the event of its being for the sake of the Jyotistoma sacrifice, and the odifference among the three animals (as regards the admissibility of the details in question to one or the other). As a matter of fact, however, the animal-sacrifices also, being not already enjoined elsewhere, have the capacity of admitting the details in question,—and as such it is these to whom the 'Context' belongs.—For these reasons, on the ground of 'Order' (Position), the details in question should be regarded as appertaining to the Agnisomiya animal.

SŪTRA (26).

Also because we find indicatives.

Bhāşya.

For the following reasons also we conclude that the details relating to the animals appertain to the Agnisomiya animal.—"For what reason?"—
Because we find indications; i.e. there is a text indicative of the same idea:
'Vapayā prātahsavanē charanti, purodāshēna mādhyandinē savanē' ['The omentum is to be offered at the Morning Extraction, and the Cake at the

Midday Extraction '] :- this text speaks of the 'animal-offering' (in the shape of the omentum) and the 'Cake' [and as such indicates that the details in question should appertain to the Agnisomiya animal only .-- If it did not do so, and if the details belonged in common to all the three animals for even two of them-adds the Tantravartika, then there would be this difficulty that the 'Cake' (mentioned in the text just quoted) could not have any connection with the Savaniya animal; because the 'Cake' has been regarded as consecratory of the two deities, Agni and Soma conjointly (not of Agni singly, which is the deity of the Savaniya); and by reason of this special capacity of the Cake (to consecrate the joint deities), it would naturally connect itself with the Agnisomiua animal (which also is connected with the same two deities jointly), and not with the Savaniya (which being related to Agni only) can have no connection with the two deities Agni and Soma jointly. This same fact is also indicated (by the text quoted).-From this also, it follows that the details in question should appertain to the Agnisomiya [and the details accruing to the Savaniya would be only such as would come to it under the general law-says Tantravartika].

SŪTRA (27).

THE TEXT [SPEAKING OF THE 'COVERING OF THE HOLES'] IS NOT INJUNCTIVE; IT IS PURELY DECLARATORY.

Bhāṣya.

This Sūtra is in anticipation of a few words from the Opponent, who savs-"The Cake-offering [which serves the purpose of consecrating the two deities Agni-Soma may not apply to the Savaniya animal; but] as serving the purpose of 'covering up the holes' [as mentioned in the Vedic text .- 'Susiro vā ētarhi pashuh, etc.'] (it may find a place with the Savaniva animal)".- [It is in answer to this that we have the Sūtra which means that what is suggested is not possible; because the text quoted is not injunctive, it is purely declaratory; that is, the text does not enjoin the 'Cake-offering' for the purpose of 'covering the holes'; in fact, it is only a declaration, as has already been explained [under pada ii, of Discourse I, where it has been shown that such passages as are argumentative, setting forth a reason for a certain thing, cannot be regarded as injunctive]. Consequently the 'Cake-offering' must be treated as serving the purpose of consecrating the deities; and on that account, it is only when the Cake-offering appertains to the Agnisomiya animal that it is possible for it to be found at the time of dealing with the Savaniya animal (which follows after that of the Agnisomiya), and not on the ground that it appertains, in common, to both (the Agnīsomiya and the Savanīya).-From all this it follows that the details relating to the animals appertain to the Agnisomiya animal only.

ADHIKARANA (8): Details like the 'Fetching of the Branch' appertain to both 'Milkings'.

SUTRA (28).

[PÖRVAPAKŞA]—"BETWEEN THE TWO 'MILKINGS' THAT WHICH IS SIMPLY BOILED (AND NOT MADE INTO CURD) SHOULD BE UNCONNECTED (WITH THE DETAILS),—BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE TIME."

Bhāsya.

[In connection with the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa, the cows are milked twice] there is one milking in the previous evening and another milking in the morning.—There are also certain accessory details laid down in connection with 'milking'—such as 'fetching the branch' (for driving the calf away from the cow), 'bringing in of the cow', 'making the milk of the cow flow', 'milking' and so forth.

In connection with these, there arises the question—Are these details to be performed in connection with the Evening-milking only, or with both milkings?

On this the Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"Between the two milkings, that which is simply boiled (and not made into curd, i.e. the morning milking) should not be connected with the details;—why?—because the 'Fetching of, the Branch' and other details have been laid down in the same 'order' as the Evening-milking, in connection with the Aupavasathya (i.e. Previous) day; on the same (previous) day is the Evening-milking also done.—Hence on the strength of 'Order', the details relating to the milking should be performed in connection with the Evening-milking only [this milk being made into curd used on the following day"].

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY [THE DETAILS APPERTAIN TO BOTH MILKINGS]
BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE 'CONTEXT' AND
THE INJUNCTION OF THE TIME APPLIES TO THE ACTION
ALONG WITH ALL THE DETAILS.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

The 'Context' is common to both; it belongs as much to the curd as to the milk; and 'Context' is more authoritative than 'Order' (on which latter the Pūrvapāksa view is based); therefore the details laid down in connection with milkings should appertain to both milkings.—Further, it is not that the Evening-milking is laid down as to be done on the previous day;—"when then?"—as a matter of fact, it is laid down as to be done

on the following day.—"How so?"—The text bearing on the subject is as follows—"Aindram dadhi amāvāṣyāyām, aindramayayh amāvāṣyāyām."
['The Curd dedicated to Indra, on the Amavāṣyā day; the milk dedicated to Indra, on the Amāvāṣyā day?] (Taitti. Sain. 2. 5. 4. 1); wherein both the milkings are enjoined as to be done along with all details on the Amāvāṣyā day. Even so, however, the evening-milking is done on the previous day by reason of the exigencies of the case; i.e. it is the very nature of the curd that it starts (with the milking) on the previous day and is finally made up on the following day. Thus it is not true that the details have been laid down in the 'Order' of the Evening-Milking (which is the premise upon which the Pārvapakṣa is based).—From all this it follows that the details in question appertain to both Milkings.

Adhikarana (9): Details like 'placing', 'washing' and the rest appertain to all three 'Extractions'.

SŪTRA (30).

Similarly the vessels are to be taken as laid down in connection with other 'Extractions' also.

Bhāṣya,

There is the Jyotistoma sacrifice laid down in the text—'Jyotistomēna svargakāmo yajētu' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 5. 2.).—In reference to this sacrifice, ten vessels,—the 'Aindravāyava' (Dedicated to Indra-Vayu) and the rest, are laid down in connection with the Morning-Extraction [there being three 'extractions' of the Soma-juice, in the morning, in the evening and at midday]; in regard to these vessels certain details have been prescribed, such as—(a) 'Upoptē anyē grahāḥ sādyantē, anupoptē dhruvāḥ', ['The other vessels are placed on a raised ground, the Dhruvā vessel is placed on ground not raised'], and (b) 'Dashāpavitrēna graham sammārṣṭi' ['Cleanses the vessel with the hem of the garment'].—Apart from these ten, there are other vessels, laid down in connection with the Midday Extractions and others again in connection with the third (Evening) Extraction.

Now, in regard to the vessels used at the Midday Extraction and those used at the Evening Extractions there arises the question—should the details (of *Placing* and *Cleansing*) be performed in connection with all vessels? or only in connection with those (ten) that are used at the Morning-Extraction?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "the Details should be performed only in connection with those used at the Morning Extraction, not with any others; because it is in the 'Order' (Position) of the Morning Extraction that the Details have been laid down."

On this we have the following Siddhānta—To other Extractions than the Morning one,—i.e. to the Midday Extraction and at the third Extraction—also, the injunction of the vessels (and what is to be done to them) is applicable, in the same manner as in the previous Adhikaraṇa. That is, the 'Context' is one and the same for all the three Extractions,—and it is in that same 'Context' that the details in question have been laid down;—through 'Syntactical Connection' also, the details are connected with every one of the vessels (used at the three Extractions);—and both 'Syntactical Connection' and 'Context' are more authoritative than 'Order'.—Hence it follows that the details laid down in connection with the vessels appertain to all the vessels that are used at the three Extractions.

Adhikarana (10): The 'Threefoldness of the Rope' pertains to all animals.

SŪTRA (31).

THE ROPE ALSO [PERTAINS TO ALL], SPECIALLY AS WE FIND INDICATIVES TO THAT EFFECT.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

At the Jyotistoma, the Agnīṣomīya is one of the animals used, as laid down in the text—'Yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhīta' (Taitti. Sarh. 6. 1. 11. 6);—in connection with this we find mentioned the 'Rope', as also certain details relating to the Rope, in the text—'The Rope is threefold; it is made of Kusha-grass; it should be made of well-beaten grass'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these details appertain in common to the Rope of the Agnisomiya animal, as well as to that of the Savaniya animal? Or to the rope of the Agnisomiya animal only?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "through the Context', they should appertain to the Rope of the Aynīṣomīya animal only".

Against this, we have the following Siddhanta:—The details appertain in common to both (the Rope of the Agnisomiya as well as the Rope of the Savaniva) :- why ?-because we find indicatives to that effect,-the indicative text declaring—' Āshvinam graham grhītvā trvritā yūpam parivīya āgnēyam pashumupākaroti'. ['Taking up the vessel dedicated to the Ashvins, and covering the Post with the threefold rope; one touches the animal dedicated to Agni, i.e. the Savaniya animal]; wherein the Rope is indicated as to be used for the 'Covering' of the Post for the Savaniya animal; and this indication would be possible only if the Rope and its details were common to both the animals. If it appertained to the Agnisomiya animal only, then it would have become excluded from the 'Covering' of the Post in connection with the Savaniya animal, which 'covering' is different from the 'covering' done in connection with the Archetype; then again, the 'covering of the Post' done in connection with Savaniya is totally different from the 'covering' done at the Archetype, and yet we find 'threefoldness' mentioned in connection with it.-How so ?-Well, we find the text-' Taking up the vessel dedicated to the Ashvins, and going out, he covers the Post'; -such being the case, if the Rope did not appertain in common to the Agnisomiya and the Savaniya, then it would follow that the 'Covering' (in connection with the Savaniya) should be done with a piece of cloth; and yet the text indicates the Rope (by the mention of 'threefoldness') .-Hence it follows that the Rope is common to both the animals :- and when the Rope is common, the details relating to it should also be common.-Thus it is that the fact of the Rope being common to both is shown by the indicative text.-" But what is the reason here (apart from the indicationin support of the Siddhānia)?"—The reason is that through 'Context', the Rope and its details should appertain to the Post of the Agnisomiya animal only, while through 'Syntactical Connection', they should appertain to every Post (connected with the Agnisomiya as well as the Savaniya animal).

ADHIKARANA (11): Details like 'Placing' should be done to the 'Amshu' and the 'Adābhya' also.

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" WHAT IS ENJOINED AT A DISTANCE CANNOT BE CONNECTED WITH THE OTHER DETAILS, BECAUSE OF NON-PROXIMITY".

Bhāsya.

There are certain vessels 'enjoined at a distance' from the Jyotistoma (i.e. in a totally different context),—such, for instance, as the vessels Ainshu and Adābhya, which have been enjoined in the section dealing with the Aupasada-Anwākyā (which is a section far removed from the section dealing with the Jyotistoma).

In regard to these vessels (Amshu and Adābhya), there arises the question—Should the details (Placing, Cleansing, and so forth) laid down in connection with vessels used at the Jyotistoma be performed in connection with the Amshu and the Adābhya, or not?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"The said details are not to be formed in connection with the Amshu and the Adābhya,—because of non-proximity; in the case of the 'boiling' laid down in the text—'One boils what is dedicated to Mitra-Varuṇa,' (Tai. S. 6. 4. 8. 2)—we find that boiling is done only to that cup which is dedicated to Mitra-Varuṇa, and not to all the cups; in the same manner, all the details under consideration should be done to those vessels only that are mentioned in the same Context (of the Jyotistoma), and not to all vessels."

SŪTRA (33).

In reality, the vessels not mentioned in the same Context also should be connected with the details in question; as those vessels also are of use at it (the Jyotistoma sacrifice); specially as what is auxiliary to a sacrifice must apply to all that is of use at that sacrifice.

Bhāşya.

A vessel like the Arishu and Adabhya, even though not mentioned in the same Context (of the Jyotistoma), should be connected with the details in question;—why?—because 'Syntactical Connection' is more authoritative than 'Context'.

Objection—"If these details were performed elsewhere (in connection with another sacrifice), they could not help the Jyotistoma, in any way".

Answer—They would certainly help the Jyotistoma,—because the Ansku and the Adābhya are of use at it;—i.e. they are of use at the Jyotistoma. Then again, the details relating to the vessel is of the nature of 'auxiliary', and as such, through the vessel, they would help the Jyotistoma; and as many vessels would be serviceable at the Jyotistoma,—to all these the details in question should appertain.—From this we conclude that the details laid down in connection with the vessels should be performed in connection with the Anshu and the Adābhya also.

SŪTRA (34).

THERE COULD BE RESTRICTION ONLY IF THERE WERE A DIRECT

Bhāṣya.

What has been said by the Pūrvapaksin (under Su. 32) in regard to the 'boiling' of the milk in the vessel dedicated to Mitra-Varuna is quite right. so far as that case is concerned; as in that case there is the direct declaration (to the effect that the 'boiling' is to be in connection with that particular vessel),-and hence this direct declaration sets aside the indication of the 'Context' and restricts the boiling in its scope. In the case in question, however, it is quite the reverse; in the case cited it is the indication of the 'Context' that the boiling should be done to all the vessels, while the restriction of it to a particular vessel is done by the direct declaration contained in the 'Sentence' quoted ;-while in the case in question, the connection of the details with all vessels is directly declared by the 'Sentence'. and it is the indication of the 'Context' that restricts it to particular vessels. [And as 'Sentence', i.e. 'Syntactical Connection', is always more authoritative than the 'Context'] it follows that the details in question are to be performed even in connection with those vessels (the Anshu and the Adābhya) which are not mentioned in the same 'Context' with them.

Adhikarana (12): The qualifications of the 'Chitrini' and other Bricks are auxiliary to the Fire and hence should be connected with the details laid down for the Fire-altar.

SŪTRA (35).

SIMILARLY, EVEN THOSE THAT ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE SAME 'CONTEXT' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AUXILIARY

TO THE FIRE.

Bhāṣya.

Without any reference to the Fire, we have the texts—(a) 'Chitrini-rupadadhāti, bajrinirupadadhāti' ['He puts in bricks with figures, he puts in bricks with the mark of the thundor-bolt'] (Taitti. San. 5. 7. 3. 1);—(b) 'Bhātāṣṭakā upadadhāti' ['He puts in well-baked bricks'] (Taitti. San. 5. 6. 3. 1).—Then, there are certain qualifications of Bricks laid down in the context (of the Fire-altar), such as—'Bricks should be made entire and not black'; 'one should smear the bricks with ashes'.

Now, there arises the question—Should these latter qualifications be applicable in those bricks that are not mentioned in the same Context, or not?

On this the Pārvapakṣa view is that—"The qualifications should not be applicable to them;—why?—because of non-proximity (remoteness)".

The Siddhānta view is that the bricks like those in question should be regarded to be as much an auxiliary to the Fire (altar) as the vessels have been found (in the preceding Adhikarana) to be to the Jyotisiona sacrifice; because here also 'Syntactical Connection' is more authoritative than 'Context'; and also because the bricks in question also are used for the building of the Fire-altar. [Consequently, the quelifications laid down in the Context of the 'Fire-altar' should be present in the Chitrini and other bricks also, though these are not mentioned in the same Context.]

ADHIKARANA (13): Such details as 'Measuring out', 'Fetching', 'Purchase' and 'Juice-Extraction' etc. are applicable to the case of Soma only.

SŪTRA (36).

THE 'CONDITIONAL', NOT BEING EQUAL TO THE 'NORMAL', CANNOT HAVE THE SAME DETAILS APPERTAINING TO IT.

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma, we read—'Sa yadi rājanyam, etc.' I' If one should sacrifice for the Kṣattriya or the Vaishya, and he wishes to eat Soma, one should collect banyan-shoots, pound them and mix them up with curds, and offer this to him to eat, not Soma'].—In connection with the Jyotistoma again, there are certain details to be performed in regard to the Soma,—such as 'Measuring out', 'Fetching', 'Purchasing', 'Juice-Extraction' and so forth.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Do these details appertain equally to the *Soma* and the 'Fruit-mixture'? Or do they appertain to the *Soma* only, the 'Fruit-mixture' being only a 'Modification' of the *Soma*?

The purpose of this Adhikarana is to determine whether or not these details are to be performed by such persons (Ksattriyas and Vaishyas) as may be desirous of having their sacrifice complete in all its details.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that "the details are equally applicable to both the Soma and the Fruit-mixture; as the 'Context' is the same".

The Siddhanta however is as follows: - Things like the 'Fruit-mixture' are 'conditional', due to certain special circumstances; and hence it cannot have the same details appertaining to them .- Why so ?- Because it is not equal to what is 'normal'; i.e. the 'Fruit-mixture' is not equal to the Soma; inasmuch as Soma has been enjoined as the 'normal' substance, to be used in all cases, while the 'Fruit-mixture' is only 'conditional' (its use depending on the circumstance of the sacrificer being a Ksattriva or a Vaishya, and then too only for the sole purpose of being 'eaten', the offerings, in this case also, being made of Soma-juice itself),-" What if it is so?"-If it is so, then, inasmuch as the details in question also have been enjoined as 'normal' (to be done in all cases), they cannot be performed as if they were only 'conditional' (to be done only under special circumstances).-If they were treated as common (to both the Soma and the Fruit-mixture), then it would mean the injunction of something wholly irrelevant.-Further, if the Fruit-mixture, being conditional, were to take in the details laid down in connection with Soma,—then those details, being common, would have to be regarded as repeated twice.—From all this. it follows that the Fruit-mixture cannot have all the details appertaining to it.

Adhikarana (14): The details laid down in connection with the Principal Substance should appertain to its Substitute also.

SŪTRA (37).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—" The substitute also should be treated similarly"

Bhāsua.

A substitute is laid down for cases where the principal substance is not available; e.g. if the Vrihi Corn (which is the principal substance prescribed for making the Cake) is not available. Nivära Corn is used in its place.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the details laid down in connection with *Vrīhi* equally applicable to the *Nīvara*, or not?

The Pūrrapaksa view is that—"the substitute is to be treated similarly; that is, just as the conditional (fruit-mixture) cannot have applicable to it those same details that are prescribed for the normal (Soma),—so the substitute also; as the substitute also is not equal to the Principal.—'What is the inequality?'—The inequality consists in this that the details have been prescribed in reference to the Vrihi, not in reference to the Nīvāra; what happens is that the details are directly enjoined in reference to the Vrihi, and if they are applied at all to the substitute, it is only on the basis of Presumption."

SŪTRA (38).

[Siddhānta]—Not so; in fact, it should be treated like the Principal substance; as the purpose served by both is one And the same.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

It is not right to say that the substitute is not to be treated like the Principal; in fact, it should be treated exactly as it has been laid down (in connection with the Principal); because in this case, the relation between the two substances is not that of the root-substance and its modification.—
Why?—That the details laid down in connection with the Vrihi are adopted in the case of a particular Vrihi Corn, is due to the fact that it has the 'character' of 'Vrihi',—and when the Nivāra is declared to be a substitute for Vrihi, it does not mean that the 'character' of 'Nivāra' takes the place of the 'character' of 'Vrihi' (as it happens in the case of the root-substance, Milk, and its modification, Curd); hence the relation between the two cannot be that of the root substance and its modification.—"How then do the details laid down for the Vrihi become applicable to the Nivāra?"—Our answer to this is that those individual Vrihi grains which are distinguished by the

character of 'Vrīhi', are actually present in the Nīwāra grains (that are taken up as the substitute for Vrīhi); and it is for the sake of these that the details in question are applied; so that the injunction of these details applies equally to those grains of Nīvāra as also to the other grains of Vrīhi.—" What is the equality between the two?"—The equality lies in the fact that both the grains are distinguished by the character (or shape) of 'Vrīhi'.—For these reasons the details are to be applied equally to both (the Principal substance Vrīhi and its substitute, Nīvāra).

[In this connection, see Su. 6. 3. 27, where we are taught that the substitute must be like the Principal, in shape; so that if the shape of the Vrihi is present in the Nivāra, in this sense the Nivāra can be spoken of as 'distinguished by the shape of Vrihi'; this is what is meant by saying that the "Vrihi distinguished by the character of 'Vrihi' is present in the Nivāra'.

SŪTRA (39).

Also because it is not something authorised by the scriptures.

Bhāsya.

For the following reason also the substitute cannot be regarded as a modification of the Principal.—For what reason i—The reason is that the substitute (Nivāra) comes in on account of the need; that is, when the principal substance becomes spoilt, there is need for a substance to be used at the sacrifice, and it is in fulfilling this need that the Nivāra is brought in (on the ground of its resemblance to the principal, Vrīki) [and it is not that the Nivāra is actually laid down by the scriptures as to be used]; but the said need cannot justify the idea that the genus 'Nivāra' comes in in the place of the genus 'Vrīki'.—For this reason the substitute cannot be regarded as a 'modification' of the Principal substance which is enjoined by the scripture as the one to be used.

ADHIKARANA (15): In the case of those 'substitutes' also which are actually enjoined by the scriptures, the details laid down in connection with the 'Principal' should be performed.

SUTRA (40).

THE SECONDARY SUBSTANCE IS MENTIONED FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESTRICTING (THE SUBSTITUTE).

Bhāsya.

[It having been explained in the preceding Adhikarana that the Substitute, not laid down in the scriptures, is to be treated like the Principal] now the question that arises is—Is the Substitute that is actually laid down in the scriptures to be treated like the Principal—or not? For instance, we have the text—'If one cannot obtain Soma, he should extract the juice of the Putka' (P. U. Brā. 9. 5. 3) [where the Putka is actually laid down as the substitute for Soma,—and the question is—Is the Putka to be treated like the Soma?]

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—" it is not to be treated like the Principal substance; because its case is entirely different from the Substitute that is not mentioned in the scriptures".

The Siddhanta is as follows: - The secondary substance is mentioned for the purpose of restricting the substitute. The meaning is that in this case also the substitution is due to need: Soma not being there, the substance that should have to be used would be something resembling Soma, and what the text quoted does is to restrict the substitution to the Putika which bears some resemblance to the Soma, and what is meant is that this Putika is the only one thing that may be used in the absence of anything more like the Soma; what is meant being that when in the place of the enjoined Principal substance, something else closely resembling it should have been used, what is actually substituted is something different even from this latter (which resembles it to a smaller extent); and it is not substituted as a means to the accomplishment of the sacrifice. [All that is meant is that, in the event of the Soma not being available, the Putika is the substance that may be brought in, as possessing some of the properties of the Soma. See, in this connection, Su. 6. 3. 16, 17. Says the Tantravārtika-Trans., p. 1568-The Putika cannot be regarded as forming part of the sacrifice in the manner in which the Soma is; it is brought in only as the substratum of some of the properties of Soma; hence even though it is mentioned in the Veda, it should be dealt with in the same manner as the substitute has been dealt with in the foregoing Adhikarana.]

ADHIKARANA (16): Details like the 'Dīkṣanīyā Iṣti'— Initiatory Sacrifice—appertain to the Agniṣṭoma.

SŪTRA (41).

[PÖRVAPAKŞA continued]—"THE FORMS ARE TO BE TREATED
ALL ALIKE, AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF
'CONTEXT'."

Bhāşya.

There is the Jyotistoma sacrifice; of this four Forms have been spoken of—viz.: (1) Agnistoma, (2) Ukthya, (3) Sodashi and (4) Atirātra. In connection with this sacrifice certain details are prescribed—such as the Initiatory Sacrifice and the like. [In reality, there are seven Forms of the Jyotistoma, these four, and Atyagnistoma, Aptoryamā and Vājapēya. It is by way of illustration that only four have been mentioned.]

In regard to these, there arises the question—Have these details been prescribed in connection with the entire *Jyotistoma* in all its forms? or only in its *Agnistoma*-form?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"All the Forms are to be treated alike;
—why?—because there is no difference of Context; there is no difference in
the Context of the several Forms, whereby it could be determined that the
details appertain to the Jyotistoma in its Agnistoma-form only; hence the
Forms should be treated all alike".

SŪTRA (42).

[Pürvapakṣa concluded]—"They are spoken of also as if they were similar."

Bhāṣya.

In the context where they are mentioned, the Forms are spoken of as if they were similar; for instance, there is the text—' Yadi agnisjomo juhoti, yadi ukthyah paridhimanakti, yadi airātrah ētadēva yajurjapan havirdhānam pratipadyēta' ['If it is the Agnisjoma, one offers the libation into Fire;—if it is the Ukthya, he anoints the bounding sticks;—if it is the Airātra, he goes to the Havirdhāna cart, repeating this same Yajus'];—here we find the several Forms mentioned separately, which shows that the details here mentioned appertain to the Jyotisjoma in all its forms; and it follows from this that the details that may be found to be mentioned in common (not in reference to any one form specifically) should also appertain to the Jyotisjoma in all its forms. If the details were not meant to apply equally to all [and applied to the Jyotisjoma in general], then it would appertain to the Agnisjoma

form only (as being the first); and in that case there would be no need to mention the Agnistoma in the passage quoted; as even without such mention, the Agnistoma would become connected with the details all the same. As a matter of fact, however, we find the passage speaking of the Jyotistoma in all its forms; from which we conclude that the Context belongs to the Justistoma in all its forms .- Further, we find the text- 'Aanēvamajamagnistomē ālabhēta, aindrāgnam dvitīyamukthyē, aindram vrsnim trīvam sodashini' ['At the Agnistoma, one should kill the goat dedicated to Agni; at the Ukthya, one should kill the second animal dedicated to Indra-Agni: at the Sodeshan one should kill the third ram dedicated to Indra']; the mention of the 'second' and the 'third' would be explicable only if all the three were dealt with alike.-If the Forms were regarded as secondary modifications, then, inasmuch as there would be no one such detail with each,-for instance, the Aindragna at the Ukthuathat would bar the applicability, to the same Form, of all the other details, the Agneya, etc.; while, if in accordance with the passage just quoted we should have only the Agneya goat at the Agnistoma,—the Agneya and the Aindragna goats, as the second, at the Ukthya,—and the Agneya, the Aindragna and the Aindra Vreni, as the third, at the sodashini. - Thus at the Ukthua, there would be two causes—the Agnistoma-chant and the Ukthya-chant,-and as the corresponding effects we would have the Amena animal and the Aindragna animal:—and thus the mention of the 'second' becomes quite explicable.-Similarly at the Sodashin and the Atiratra-also.-If, on the other hand, there were the relation of original and its modification, the connection of the Agneya,—which would come into the Ukthya only by virtue of the general law of admitting into the modification of all the details of the original,-would have to be set aside by the directly-asserted 'Aindragna' and the rest; and in that case the mention of the 'second' and the 'third' would not be explicable.--From all this we conclude that the Initiatory sacrifice and other details appertain to the Juotistoma in all its forms.

SŪTRA (43).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THE (LATER) FORMS ARE MERE MODIFICA-TIONS, BEGAUSE THEY ARE ASSOCIATED WITH SPRCIFIC DESIRABLE RESULTS, AND THIS ASSOCIATION IS AS CONSTANT AS THE MOST CONSTANT FACTOR IN THE WHOLE SACRIFICE.

Bhāsya.

It is not right that all the Forms should be treated alike; in fact the later Forms, *Utilitya* and the rest, should be treated as mere 'modifications' of the first Form (*Agnistoma*). As a matter of fact, the Initiatory Sacrifice and the other details relating to the *Jyotistoma* have been laid down on the basis of the *Agnistoma* which has been treated as the basic Form (without which there could be no *Jyotistoma* at all). -" How do you get at this idea?"-This idea is derived from the fact that the Ukthya and the other Forms have been laid down as associated with specific desirable results, in such texts as-(a) 'When one desires cattle, he should take up the Ukthya', (b) 'When one desires strength, he should hynn with the Sodashin', and (c) 'When one desires offspring, he should offer for him the Atirātra sacrifice'; -- and when an accessory associated with a specific desire is enjoined, it can find place in the sacrifice only after modifying that accessory which forms a constant factor in the sacrifice (where it is performed in its constant form, without reference to any particular desirable result) .-- "Why?" -- Because in such cases, the particular desirable result follows from the particular accessory (associated with that result); for the text says that 'one should take up the Ukthya if he desires cattle', not 'if he desires the Jyotistoma', or 'if he desires the Ukthya'; and the meaning of the injunction is that 'he should take up the Ukthya so that cattle may come to him '.- "In what manner would this be done?" -As for that, from the fact that this injunction being in close proximity to the injunction of the constant element of the sacrifice (Jyotistoma), it follows that the procedure of this latter would be adopted in the performance of what has been enjoined as to be performed with a view to particular results (for instance, the Ukthya).

Question—"But how is it ascertained that the said Procedure really appertains to the constant element in the sacrifice, and not to that factor which is associated with a desirable result? Or that it does not appertain in common to both?"

Answer-Whenever a desirable result follows from the use of a certain accessory, it does so only when the accessory is used while the action leading to that result is being performed, not otherwise ;-as for the procedure, that procedure is adopted which happens to be in proximity to the action; and when the question arises as to whether this procedure appertains to the means of accomplishing the act (i.e. the accessory), or to what is to be accomplished (i.e. the action).—it cannot but be taken as appertaining to the latter (i.e. what is to be accomplished); because unless it appertains to what is to be accomplished, it can have no connection with the means of accomplishment: as a matter of fact, the form in which a particular procedure is prescribed is - By this process, one should make such and such a thing the means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished'; and there is no method or process possible by which anything could be the means of accomplishing an action until the action is being accomplished. Thus then, if one were to attribute the Procedure to the means of accomplishing, he must admit that it appertains to that also which is to be accomplished .- Now in the case in question the Jyotistoma sacrifice is what is to be accomplished, and the various Forms are the means of accomplishing it; hence it becomes established that the Procedure appertains to the Jyotistoma.

Question—"But why cannot the Procedure appertain to both [the Jyotistoma and the Forms] in common?"

Answer—Because the Procedure is prescribed as a constant factor; so that whenever the *Jyotistoma* is performed, the *Initiatory Sacrifice* (which forms part of the Procedure) must be performed. The Form 'Ukthya',

on the other hand, is to be performed at the Jyotistoma, only if the performer happens to be one who desires cattle. Thus then, though the details of Procedure (comprising the Initiatory Sacrifice) must be performed at the Juotistoma always, yet the Ukthya and the other Forms are to be performed only on a certain occasion [when the performer happens to desire the result with which the particular Form is associated].-Such being the case, if the details which are to be always performed at the Justistana were regarded as appertaining to the Ukthua and other Forms,—this would be a contradiction in terms, the two being entirely incompatible; in fact. if the details have to be done in connection with the Juotistoma always. then they cannot appertain to the Ukthya and other Forms [as these are not invariable concomitants of the Jyotistoma; and if they appertain to the Ukthya and other Forms, then they cannot be such as should be performed at the Jyotistoma always;—the two are entirely incompatible. -It is for this reason that the Procedure (comprising the Initiatory Sacrifice and other details) cannot be taken as appertaining to both (the Juotistoma and the Forms).

Further, if what is ephemeral (variable) were declared to be constant (invariable),—then that declaration of the constant factor would itself be rendered ephemeral (variable)! and thereby that declaration would become set aside!

From all this it follows that the details in question appertain to the *Jyotistoma* only, in its Constant form (the *Agnistoma*), and not to the *Ukthya* and other Forms which are associated with the desire for particular results.

SŪTRA (44).

FURTHER, ON ACCOUNT OF REPETITION, THE DETAILS SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE ORIGINAL (ARCHETYPE).

Bhāşya.

Says the Opponent—"The Agnistoma Form also is found mentioned as leading to a particular result."

True; there are two Agnistomas spoken of—one, constant (essential) and the other, associated with the desire for a certain result; and by virtue of these two texts (speaking of the two Agnistomas), the idea would be that it is the constant Agnistoma itself which leads to the said result; and even so, the 'constant' character of the Agnistoma would remain unaffected;—and| in this way also the Initiatory Sacrifice and other details would appertain to the Jyotistoma in its constant form, Agnistoma.

SŪTRA (45).

THE COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE IS MERELY VERBAL.

Bhāsya.

It has been argued (by the Pūrvapaksin, in the Bhāsya on Sū. 42) that "the reference to the Ukthya and the Atirātra as the 'second' and the

*third' respectively can be justified only if all the Forms be regarded as to be treated alike,—not otherwise".—But it is merely a verbal statement that the animal laid down in connection with the Ukhya as to be dedicated to Indra-Ayni is the second, and that laid down in connection with the Sodashin as to be dedicated to Indra is the third; and this statement cannot be treated as indicative of the fact that all the Forms have to be treated alike.

SÜTRA (46).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE NEGATION OF THE INDICATIVES OF THE FOREGOING.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the Ukthya and other Forms should be regarded as 'modifications' of the Agnistoma (which should be regarded as the 'original' or 'archetype' of all the other Forms).—"For what reason?"—Because of the negation of the indicatives of the foregoing,—which we find in the sentence—'If it is the Agnistoma, one offers the oblation into the Fire; if it is the Ukthya, one anoints the bounding sticks and does not offer the oblation into the Fire',—this negation of the 'offering of the oblation into the Fire' would not be there [i.e. it would have no meaning, if the Ukthya were not a 'modification' of the Agnistoma]. [The meaning of the sentence is that the Ukthya shall take in all the details of the Agnistoma, with the single exception of the 'oblation into Fire'; and this relation between the two is possible only when one, the preceding one, is the original archetype of the following one,]

Though, on the strength of the declaration ('If it is the Agnistoma, etc. etc.,' quoted under Sū. 42), it would seem that when certain conditions are present, all the Forms are to be treated alike, yet—

SUTRA (47).

THE MENTION OF THE ONE FORM IS DUE TO THE PECULIAR CHARACTER.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

It has been argued (under Sū. 42) that "in the passage, 'Yadyagnistomals, etc. etc.' there is mention of the Forms as if they were all
similar".—The answer to this is that what is relevant has been spoken of
through what is not relevant [i.e. the irrelevant accessory has been introduced
as if it were relevant, through the mention of a relevant action to which
the accessory belongs—says Tantravaïrtika); and in this case the mention
(in this passage) of the Agnistoma (whose presence is already indicated by
the Context) should be taken as a reference to what is already known.

[According to Kumārila, the objection met here is based upon the presence of the conditional 'yadi', 'if', in the passage; the sense of the objection being

that "it is not right that the constant (Agnistoma) and the variable (Ukthya, etc.) should be mentioned in the same passage—each one of them with a conditional clause relating to the details of procedure". The sense of the reply is that even so, as the several Forms are enjoined in the Veda in close proximity, there is nothing illogical in stating the possibility of certain details of procedure, which can belong to the constant Agnistoma only, finding place in the variable Ukthya, etc., also.]

The following note given in the Saddarshanachintanikā, on the basis of the Bhāttadīpikā, is of importance:-There are, properly speaking, only four, not seven, Samsthas or 'Forms' of the Jyotistoma sacrifice-(1) Agnistoma, (2) Ukthya, (3) Şodashin, and (4) Atirātra. In the course of an extensive sacrifice, some hymns are recited, and by a peculiar adaptation of these hymns, when one Hymn was completed, it was regarded as the completion of a 'Form'. The term 'Samstha' or 'Form', stands for the place where one stops. In the Agnistoma-Form, there are twelve hymns, the twelfth and the last being the Agnistoma-humn, by virtue of which the Form itself is called 'Agnistoma'. This is both constant (indispensable) and variable (optional); though the Form (sacrifice) is one and the same. - As regards the Ukthua-Form, it consists of the whole of the Agnistoma-sacrifice with three hymns in addition to the Agnistomahymns,-The Sodashi-Form comprises the Ukthya-sacrifice and it concludes with the Sodashi-hymn.-Lastly, the Atiratra-Form consists of the Sodashi-sacrifice, and at it twelve additional hymns are recited three times during one night, and then a hymn named 'Ashvina' is recited last .- Atyagnistoma, Vajapēya, and Aptoryama, -which are the other three Forms attributed to the Jyotistoma - are all included in the four described above, though they have been separately dealt with in the Smrtis. When the Agnistoma is performed after the reciting of the Agnistoma, Ukthya and Sodashi stotras, it becomes known as the 'Atyagnistoma'.-When the Sodashi sacrifice is performed after the performance of the Atvāgnistoma and the recital of the Vājapēya-hymn, it becomes known as the Vājapēya-sacrifice. -When the performance of the Atiratra-sacrifice is followed by the recital (three times) of twelve hymns, and at the fourth time, three additional hymns are recited, it becomes known as the Aptoryamā sacrifice.-For a Ksattriya, the Atyāgnistoma is indispensable, the Ukthya and other Forms are optional.]

ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA VII.

Adhikarana (1): Details like 'Varhi' (grass) appertain to the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa as well as to their subsidiaries.

SŪTRA (1).

[PGrvapakṣa]—" Because of the particular Context, that which is* not connected (with anything incompatible with the Context) should appertain to the Primary Sagrege:"

Bhāsya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; at which *grass* is laid down as to be used, and certain details are laid down as to be performed in connection with the *grass*; similarly there is the 'altar' and certain details relating to the 'altar'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these things, grass and the rest, and the details laid down in connection with them, appertain to the Primary Sacrifice only? Or to the Primary Sacrifice as well as its subsidiaries?

On this question, the Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"Because of the particular Context, that which is not connected with anything incompatible with the Context should appertain to the Primary Sacrifice;—that is to say, the accessories and details like those in question should appertain to the Primary Sacrifice;—why?—because of the particular Context; i.e. 'Context' belongs to the Primary Sacrifices, not to the subsidiaries,—and the details in question are connected with a particular Context,—hence it follows that they must appertain to the Primary Sacrifice."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ÎN REALITY, THEY SHOULD APPERTAIN TO ALL; BECAUSE THE 'AUXILIARY CHARACTER' OF THINGS IS NOT DETERMINED BY 'CONTEXT'.

Bhāṣya.

The details in question should, in reality, be taken as appertaining to 'all'—i.e. to the Primary as well as the Subsidiary; as in this case the

^{*} The word 'asamyuktam', 'not connected', means that, even though 'Syntactical Connection' indicates the connection of the 'offering-material' and the 'grass', yet there is no connection with anything incompatible with the Context. That is to say, in the case in question, the terms 'offering-material' and 'grass' are quite capable of being taken in connection with the Context, and are not 'unconnected' with it.—Tantavavärkia—Trans., p. 1596.

auxiliary character cannot be determined by 'Context'; in fact, the character of the 'auxiliary' consists in being of use; so that, that which is of use to anything is its 'auxiliary';—in the case in question, the details are of use to all the Primary and Subsidiary Sacrifices.—"How do you know that?"—We know it from the sentence—'Vēdyām havinṣi āsādayati' ['Keeps the offering-materials on the Altar']; here through this sentence—ie. 'Syntactical Connection'—we learn that this refers to all offering-materials; and it is through 'Context' that it would refer to that offering-material only which is used at the Primary Sacrifice. Under the circumstances, 'Syntactical Connection' being more authoritative than 'Context', it follows that offering-materials in general are to be kept on the grass ['on the altar', 'vēdyām', would appear to be the reading demanded by what has gone before; but the two manuscripts also read 'rarhigi' as in the printed text.]

Says the Opponent—"If the Context is set aside by Syntactical Connection (and the details in question are not confined to the actions mentioned in the Context), then the said details would become applicable to grass in ordinary use also [and will not be confined to grass used at sacrifices].—"What is the harm if it be so?"—The objection to that is that the details would have to be performed everywhere (wherever there may be any grass at all)!"

Answer—Certainly, the indication of the Context is duly honoured in that the details are taken as to be confined to the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifices only; so that they could not be performed in connection with things in ordinary use.

Opponent—"If that is so, then, inasmuch as the Subsidiary Sacrifices are not included under the connotation of the name 'Darsha-Pūrņamāsa, the details could not be performed at those subsidiaries."

Answer—Though it is true that the subsidiaries are not denoted by the term 'Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa', yet they are of use at the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifices; so that the details performed in connection with the subsidiaries, would be of use to the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifices.—For these reasons then, the details in question should be performed at the Primary Sacrifice (Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa) as well as its subsidiaries.

SŪTRA (3).

[Objection]—"In that case they should appertain to those other sacrifices also which are in close proximity [being enjoined in texts not far removed from the Context in Question]."

Bhāşya.

Objection—"In that case, the details in question should be performed with grass used at the Pindapity-sacrifice also; this sacrifice also is performed on chopped grass [and chopping is one of the details that we are considering]; and hence the grass is of use at this sacrifice also;—consequently

this sacrifice (Pinda-pitr-yajña) also should be connected with the details in question which have been enjoined in close proximity to it (though not under the same Context)."

SŪTRA (4).

[Answer]—That cannot be; as the sentence laying down the details in question is appurtenant to the Darsha-Pürnamäsa.

Bhāsya.

The grass used at the Pindapitryajña could not take in the details in question; as there is a single sentence dealing with the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa along with the details; hence it follows that the details are of use at the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa;—and what is of use at the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa can find place in those sacrifices only, not at any other sacrifice; consequently these details could not appertain to the Pindapitryajña.

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES.

Bhāsya.

There is also a text indicative of the same conclusion—'Sa vai dhruvāmēvāgrē bhighārayati, tato hi prathamāvājyabhāgau yakṣyan bhavati'—where
it is shown that the 'abhighāraṇa' (Pouring) is for the purpose of the
first two 'Āruabhāga-offerings'.

[The text quoted shows that the 'Pouring' enjoined in the text 'The butter left after the performance of the Prayājā he pours over the offering-materials' is connected with the Primary as well as its subsidiaries; as thus alone would there be any justification for the order of sequence laid down in the text quoted, which means that 'the first pouring should be done over the Dhruvā-vessel',—why '—'because out of that he is just going to offer the two Ājyabhāga-sacrifices';—this reason could have some sense only if 'pouring' were meant to be done also to the offering-material used at the Ājyabhāga-sacrifice (subsidiary);—otherwise the 'pouring' would be done over the Dhruvā only for purposes of the Upānshvyāja (primary) only; and in that case, as there would be no subsequent 'pouring', there would be no sense in the reason green—'because he is going to offer the Ājyabhāga-sacrifice';—from all this it follows that the details in question appertain to the Primary as well as its subsidiaries.—Tantravārtika.]

ADHIKARANA (2): The 'Embellishments' (Samskāras) of the 'Master of the Sacrifice' (Sacrificer) appertain to the 'Primary' Sacrifice.

SŪTRA (6).

What is laid down in connection with the 'Master' should, in reality, appertain to the Primary Sacrifice; as he is related to the result.

$Bh\tilde{a}sya.$

In connection with the *Jyotistoma*, there are certain 'embellishments' laid down,—such as shaving of the head and beard, keeping of the '*Payovatas*' and certain other austerities.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these appertain to the Primary and the Subsidiaries? Or to the Primary only?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"they appertain to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries,—in accordance with the principle of the foregoing Adhikaraṇa".

The Siddhanta is as follows:-These embellishments have been laid down in connection with (i.e. for) the 'Master' (i.e. the Sacrificer), -consequently they should appertain to the Primary Sacrifice,-Why?-Because he is related to the result; that is, the relation of the Sacrificer with the Sacrifice is this that the Sacrifice gives (supplies) the transcendental result, and the Sacrificer obtains it .- Objection -- But there is the other relation also between the two-the Sacrifice is something to be accomplished (performed), and the Sacrificer is one who accomplishes (performs) it."-[That may be so, but] as a matter of fact, when a person is spoken of (in connection with the injunction of a Sacrifice), it is only for the purpose of indicating to whom the result (of the Sacrifice) would accrue. He does not bring about the Sacrifice: the Sacrifice itself becomes related to being (existence).—" Why, then, should the result (of the Sacrifice) accrue to the person who performs it?"-The embellishments are spoken of as 'embellishing'; so that what they do is to bring about, in the person 'embellished', the capacity to accomplish his purpose; -now the 'purpose' of the person is to obtain the result, -not (merely) to accomplish the Sacrifice. Thus then, those embellishments that pertain to the person render the person capable of obtaining the result,not capable of accomplishing the Sacrifice. - Says the Opponent :- "If they do not bring about the capacity to accomplish the Sacrifice, how then can they be regarded as accessories of the Sacrifice ? "-Our answer to this is that they are so regarded because they render assistance to the Sacrifice in accomplishing its own purpose. -- "What is the purpose of the Sacrifice?" -It is that the performer should obtain the result.-From all this it follows that the embellishments of the Sacrificer appertain to the Primary Sacrifice only.

[As a matter of fact, it is the result of the Primary Sacrifice, not that of the Subsidiaries that accrues to the Sacrificer; because the Subsidiaries only serve the purpose of helping the Primary in bringing about its result, and they do not themselves bring about any result accruing directly to the Sacrificer.—Tantravārtka.]

ADHIKARANA (3): Accessories like the 'Saumika-Vēdi' appertain to the Primary, as well as to the Subsidiaries.

SŪTRA (7).

[Purvapaksa]—"Because of the mention of the 'desire to do'
[The accessory in question should be taken as

Appertaining to the Primary only !"

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma, we read—'Sattrimshatprakramā prāchi, chaturvimshattragrāva, trimshat jaghamāna—iyati shakṣyāmahā'' (see Taitti. Sam. 6. 2. 4. 5) ['Thirty-six steps towards the east, twenty-four on the front, and thirty at the back; in a court-yard of this size we can work'].—[This court-yard is called the Saumika-Vēdi, 'the Court-yard of the Soma-sacrifice', comprising the entire area covered by the Sadas, Assembly Room, the Havirdhāna, and the other places needed for the Sacrifice.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does this 'Court-yard' appertain to the Primary and the Subsidiaries':—Or to the Primary only?

The Pürunpäksa view is as follows—"Because of the mention of the 'desire to do' it should be taken as appertaining to the Primary.—'Where is the desire to do (spoken of)?'—It is spoken of in the phase 'in this court-yard we can work'; the assertion that 'in this court-yard we can work'; the assertion that 'in this court-yard we can work' is said in regard to what is desired to be done;—and what is desired to be done is the Primary Sacrifice, not its subsidiaries; because what brings about the desired result is the Primary, not its subsidiaries.—An Opponent says—'If the subsidiaries are not desired to be done, why then are they done at all?'—Our answer to this is that even though not desired to be done, that is to say, even though they themselves are not desired to be done, yet, what happens is that through these subsidiaries, which themselves are not desired to be done, something else is desired to be done;—and it is thus that those subsidiaries also come to be performed.—The Court-yard thus must appertain to what is desired to be done; and hence it must appertain to the Primary Sacrifice."

This Pūrvapakṣa remains unanswered for the present.

[The answer, representing the Siddhānta is stated later on, under Sū. 9.—
reason for this postponement of the statement of the Siddhānta appears to lie in the fact that the statement of the Pārvapakṣa of the next Adhikaraṇa, set forth in Sū. 8, is analogous to that of the present Adhikaraṇa set forth in Sū. 7; and therefore the Sūtra-kāra has set forth the two Pārvapakṣas in the two consecutive Sūtras 7 and 8, and then set forth the two corresponding Siddhāntas also in the two consecutive Sūtras 9 and 10.]

Adhikarana (4): 'Touching' appertains to the Primary and the Subsidiaries.

SŪTRA (8).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"SO ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE NAME [THE ACCESSORY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS APPERTAINING TO THE PRIMARY]."

Bhāsya.

There are the two Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices, in connection with which we read—'Chaturhotrā paurṇamāsimabhimṣhēt, panēnhahotrā amā-vāsyāyām' ['At the Purṇamāsī, he should touch the substance with the Chaturhotā-mantra (Mai. Sain. 1. 9. 1), and at the Amāvāsyā he should touch the substance with the Panēnhahotā-mantra' (Ibid.)].

In regard to this there arises the question—Does the 'Touching' herein laid down appertain to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries?—Or to the Primary only?

The $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$ view is that "it appertains to the Primary;—the two terms 'paurnamāsī' and 'amāvāsyā' are names of the two Primary Sacrifices; hence the 'Touching' must appertain to the Primary Sacrifices only".

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA OF ADHIKARAŅA (3)]—IN FACT THE RESULT IS DECLARED TO FOLLOW FROM THE PRIMARY ALONG WITH THE SUBSIDIARIES;

THE 'DESIRE TO DO' ALSO SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO BOTH.

Bhāşya.

This is the $(Siddh\bar{a}nta)$ answer to the $P\bar{u}rvapakşa$ (Sü. 7) that was left unanswered.

It has been argued that—" what is 'desired to be done is the Primary, not the subsidiaries, and hence the 'court-yard' must appertain to the Primary".—This however is not right; because 'the Result has been declared to follow from the Primary along with the subsidiaries'; i.e. as a matter of fact, what we learn from the Veda is that the Result follows from the Primary along with its subsidiaries; hence what is 'desired to be done' must be the Primary along with its subsidiaries. Even though the subsidiaries (by themselves) may not be 'desired to be done', yet there is no doubt that they have to be performed in the 'Court-yard'; as otherwise the Primary with its subsidiaries would not have been performed in the 'Court-yard';

SŪTRA (10).

[SIDDHÁNTA OF ADHIKARANA (4)]—INASMUCH AS WHAT IS LAID DOWN
IS AN ACCESSORY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAID
DOWN FOR ALL.

Bhāşya.

It has been argued that—"inasmuch as the terms 'paurnamāsī' and 'amāvāsyā' are names of sacrifices, the Touching should be taken as to be done to the offering-materials used at the Primary Sacrifice only", -This is not right: because there should be Touching of the offering-materials to be used at the Subsidiary Sacrifices also .- Why ?-Because what is laid down is an accessory : i.e. in fact, when Touching is laid down, it is as an accessory.—'What is that which lavs it down?'-It is the statement which declares that Touching is an accessory.—Then again, what the two words 'paurnamasim' and 'amavasuam'-ending with the Accusative ending-express is that 'the Touching should be done for the sake of the Paurnamasi sacrifice' and that 'the Touching should be done for the sake of the Amavāsyā sacrifice'; consequently the Touching should be done in connection with every one of those acts where, being done, it would help the Paurnamäsi or the Amäväsyä sacrifice;—and as a matter of fact, the Touching would help these two sacrifices whenever it is done in connection with any action that may be related, either directly or indirectly, to the Paurnamāsī or Amāvāsuā sacrifice.—From all this it follows that the Touching should be done to the offering-materials used at the Primary as well as the subsidiary sacrifices.

ADHIKARANA (5): The 'Initiation' and the 'Sacrificial Fee' appertain to the Primary Sacrifice.

SŪTRA (11).

THE 'INITIATION' AND THE 'SACRIFICIAL FEE' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS APPERTAINING TO THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE,—SUCH BEING THE DIRECT ASSERTION

Bhāsya.

In connection with the *Jyotistoma*, 'Initiations' are mentioned—' *Tisro dikṣāh*' ('There are three *Initiations'*];—the 'Sacrificial Fee' also is mentioned—' *Tasya dvādashashatam dakṣiṇā*' ['At it 112 forms the *Sacrificial Fee*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Do the Initiation and the Sacrificial Fee appertain to the Primary and the Subsidiaries? Or to the Primary only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"as the men engaged in the sacrifice are related to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries, the Initiation and the Sacrificial Fee also should appertain to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries".

The Siddhānta view however is as follows:—The Initiation and the Sacrificial Fee should be taken as appertaining to the Primary;—why?—because of Direct Assertion; we find Direct Assertions to the effect, such as 'Dikşāh somasya, dakṣināh somasya' ['The Initiations pertain to the Somasacrifice, the Sacrificial Fees pertain to the Somasacrifice']; and no burden is too heavy for Direct Assertion; [i.e. when there are Direct Assertions in the Veda to the effect that the accessories in question appertain to the Primary Sacrifice, no other arguments to the contrary can have any force].—Thus it is that, on account of the Direct Assertions to that effect, the Initiation and the Sacrificial Fee must be taken as appertaining to the Somasacrifice (Primary).

SŪTRA (12).

Also, because we find texts indicative of the absence (of Initiation and Fee, at the subsidiaries).

Bhāşya.

There is a text which actually indicates the absence of the Initiations at the Subsidiaries.—How so?—There is the text—'Adhvaryo yat pashunā ayākṣīh atha kā asya dīkṣā; yat ṣad-hotāram juhoti ṣā asya dīkṣā' ['O Adhvaryu, when you performed the Nirudha-Pashu-Yāga, what was the Initiation at it 1—The Initiation at it consisted of the offering of the Sad-hot oblation'];—which shows that there is no Initiation at the Nirūdhapashu-Yāga (which

is a subsidiary); [since it is declared that the purpose of the 'Initiation is served by a certain oblation,—which means that there is no real Initiation at it].—From this it follows that there is no Initiation or Sacrificial Fee at the Subsidiary Sacrifices. [Read 'nāngānām' as in several manuscripts.]

ADHIKARANA (6): The 'Altar' is not an accessory of the Sacrificial Post.

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṣA]—" FOR THE SAME REASON, THE ALTAR IS AN ACCESSORY OF THE SACRIFICIAL POST."

Bhāsya.

At the Jyotiştoma sacrifice, one of the animals killed is the Agnişomiya, spoken of in the text 'Yo dikşito yadagnişomiyam pashumālabhēta' ['Being initiated, one kills the Agnişomiya animal'] (Taitti. Sarn. 6. 1. 11. 6); in connection with this there is a post (to which the animal is tied); in reference to this Post, there is the text—'Yajro vai yūpah; yadantarvēdiminuyāt tamnirdahēt, yad vahirvēdi anavaruddhah syāt; arahamantarvēdi minoti ardham vahirvēdi, avaruddho bhavati, na nirdahati' ['The Post is thunderbolt; if one were to measure (or, plant) it inside the altar, it would burn him; if he were to measure it outside the altar, it would not be firmly fixed; therefore he should measure half of it inside the altar and half outside; so that it may be firmly fixed and also not destroy him'].

[In order to ascertain the size of the hole in which the Post would be fixed, it is necessary to measure the post; the text speaks of the measuring as to be done balt inside the altur and half outside.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—When it is said that the measuring is to be done 'inside the altar', is it the altar laid down as an accessory of the Post? Or is the phrase 'half inside the altar and half outside the altar' meant only to indicate the exact spot (the middle point), where the Post is to be measured?

Question—"In what way would the altar be regarded as an accessory of the Post? And in what way could the words be taken as indicative of the exact spot?"

Answer—If the words were intended to lay down the connection of the 'half' of the Post and the 'inside' of the Altar,—i.e. to convey the idea that 'the Post should be connected with the Altar in this manner',—then the Altar would be an accessory of the Post. On the other hand, if the meaning intended were that 'the exact spot for measuring the Post should be that on being placed where, half of the Post should lie inside the altar, and half outside',—then the words would be taken as indicating the exact spot.

The Pürvapaksa view on this question is as follows:—"For the same reason, the Altar is an accessory of the Post; that is, just as the Initiations and the Sacrificial Fee are accessories of the Primary Sacrifice,—similarly, when the Post has to be measured, at the time of measuring half of it should be inside the altar [so that clearly the altar becomes an accessory of the Altar].—In this interpretation, the direct connotation of the term 'vēdi'

('altar') is followed, whereas, in the other case, the term 'altar' would be taken as indirectly indicating the spot; and as between Direct Denotation and Indirect Indication, if there is a doubt as to which should be accepted, it is Direct Denotation that should be accepted as the more logical of the two. For this reason, the Altar should be regarded as laid down as an accessory of the Post."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS ONLY THE SPOT THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN
AS INDICATED BY THE WORD ('INSIDE THE ALTAR'); AS IT
OCCURS IN THE SAME SENTENCE WITH WHAT (ACCORDING TO THE PŪRVAPAKSA) IŠ NOT ENJOINED.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

In reality, the term 'vedi' ('altar') indicates only the spot, and it does not lay down the altar as an accessory of the Post-why ?-because it occurs in the same sentence with what is not enjoined. That is to say, the words 'Ardhamantarvēdi minoti ardham vahirvēdi' ('He measures it half inside the altar and half outside') are clearly perceived as forming one sentence (one syntactical unit); now if they are taken as indicating the spot (i.e. the spot where the inside and the outside of the altar meet,the spot, that is, on being placed where half of the post lies inside the altar and half outside),-then the whole forms part of what is enjoined [both the inside and outside being taken as helping to indicate the exact spot];on the other hand, if the altar, be taken as enjoined (by the phrase 'inside the altar') as an accessory of the Post,-then, in that case, the 'outside the altar' would be something that is not enjoined; the fact of the altar being an accessory of the Post having been laid down by the mention of the 'inside of the altar', the mention of the 'outside of the altar' would serve no useful purpose at all .- Says the Opponent :- "The words 'outside the altar' also would serve the purpose of laying down the outside also as an accessory of the Post" .- But in that case there would be a syntactical split.-Hence we conclude that if the altar were taken as laid down as an accessory of the Post, then the words 'outside the altar' should not be there at all. On the other hand, if the words are taken as indicating a spot, then as what is indicated is a particular spot, the presence of the words 'outside the altar' becomes necessary; for if these words were not there (and there were only the words 'inside the altar'), then it would follow that the Post may be placed on any spot inside the altar. When, however, the words 'outside the altar' are also there, then the exact spot meant to be indicated becomes indicated as that on which, if the Post is placed at the time of measuring, half of it lies inside the altar and half cutside the altar. And as this exact spot could not be indicated without the words 'outside the altar', it is necessary that these words should be there.-From all this it follows that the words should be taken as indicating a particular spot.

Adhikarana (7): The 'Havirdhāna' Cart is not an accessory of the 'Sāmidhēnī' verses.

SŪTRA (15).

[PÜRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE EXPRESSION 'SÄMIDHENISTADA-NVÄHÜH' ['THEY RECITE THE SÄMIDHENI VERSES NEAR IT'], SPEAKS OF THE 'HAVIRDHÄNA' CARTS, THESE (CARTS) ARE ACCESSORIES OF THE SÄMIDHENI VERSES."

Bhāşya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma we read—'Uta yat sunvanti sāmi-dhēnistadanvāhāḥ' ['They recite the Sāmidhēni verses near that one of the two Havirdhāna earts by which they extract the Soma-juice']; this means that 'one should associate with the Sāmidhēni verses that one of the two Havirdhāna earts near which they extract the Soma-juice'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—In this text, is the Havir-dhāna cart enjoined as an accessory of the Sāmidhēnā verses,—the sense being that 'the Sāmidhēnā verses should be recited as associated with the Havirdhāna cart'? Or does the mention of the Havirdhāna cart only indicate the place for the reciting of the Sāmidhēnā verses?

On this, the Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"The Havirdhāna is enjoined here as an accessory of the Sāmidhēnī verses,—the sense being that 'one should associate with the Sāmidhēnī verses that cart near which they extract the Soma-juice'; thus, on account of the direct assertion that 'the Sāmidhēnī verses should be recited as associated with the Havirdhāna', this direct assertion becomes honoured only if the Havirdhāna cart is regarded as an accessory of the Sāmidhēnī verses; if it were not so [i.e. if it were not so regarded], then it would have to be taken as indirectly indicating the place; [and Direct Assertion is more authoritative than Indirect Indication].—From all this, it follows that the Havirdhāna cart is an accessory of the Sāmidhēnī verses."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHANTA]—IT IS THE PLACE ONLY (THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS INDICATED BY THE TEXT); AS THE CART IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED TO SERVE THE PURPOSES OF THE SOMA.

$Bhar{a}$ şya.

The purpose served by the text under consideration is the indicating of the exact spot; the sense being that 'the Sāmidhēnis should be recited on the spot where they extract the Soma-juice'; [as regards the Hawirdhāna Cart] it is actually perceived to serve the purposes of the Soma; as a matter of fact, it is laid down that 'one should keep the Soma in the Hawirdhāna Cart to the south', which shows that the Cart is to be got there for the purpose of keeping the Soma. As for the Sāmidhēni verses, they also have to

be introduced for the purpose of 'kindling the Fire'.—Now all that the text under consideration says is that- 'For the purpose of kindling the Fire, the Sāmidhēnī verses should be introduced as associated with that Havirdhāna Cart near which they extract the Soma-juice'; and from this we learn nothing as to whether the Sāmidhēnī verses, on being associated with the Havirdhana Cart, confer any benefit upon the latter,-or the Havirdhana confers a benefit upon the Sāmidhēnis.—What we say is that the Sāmidhēni verses do not confer any benefit upon the Havirdhana Cart. What the text under consideration enjoins is, not that 'the Sāmidhēnī verses should be recited', but that they are to be associated with a particular Havirdhana. Then again, nothing that is not actually enjoined as such can be an accessory to anything (at a sacrificial performance);—there is no such injunction as that 'the Havirdhana should be brought in for the purpose of being associated with the Sāmidhēnī verses' .-- "What then is it that is asserted in the text under consideration?"-What is asserted is the association of the Sāmidhēnī verses with a particular Havirdhāna Cart; so that all that is enjoined is some sort of connection (of the Sāmidhēnī verses) with the Havirdhana Cart ;—as for the Havirdhana Cart, it has nowhere been laid down as having any connection with the Sāmidhēnī verses; for this reason the text under consideration could not be taken as reiterating (or referring to) that connection (of the Havirdhana Cart) .- "With what then is the Havirdhana Cart connected ? "-As a matter of fact, it is actually perceived to serve the purpose of the Soma, and we do not perceive any purpose served by the cart for the Sāmidhēnī verses.—It is the place with which the Sāmidhēnī verses are connected (by virtue of the text under consideration); we find that the place where the Hotr-priest (who is to recite the Sāmidhēnī verses) is 'on the other side of the Altar'; now this place 'on the other side of the Altar' may be close either to the southern or to the northern Havirdhana Cart; hence it becomes necessary to specify (as that text does) the place 'near that Havirdhana Cart where they extract the Soma-juice' [as that where the Sāmidhēnī verses have to be recited].—From all this it follows that when the text under consideration speaks of the Havirdhana Cart, it is for the purpose of indicating the place.

Says the Opponent—"Why cannot the text be construed to mean that 'the Sāmidhēni verses are to be connected with that Havirdhāna Cart near which they extract the Soma-juice'?"

That is not possible. As in that case, two connections would be the objects of injunction, viz. (1) connection with Havirdhāna in general, and (2) connection with a particular Havirdhāna; and this would involve a syntactical split. Hence such a construction is not admissible.

SŪTRA (17).

THE NAME ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāşya.

The name also points to the same conclusion that we have arrived at by means of reasonings,—i.e. that the Havirdhāna serves the purposes of (and hence is an accessory of) the Soma.

[The term 'havirdhāna' literally means 'that which holds the offering-material, which is Soma'; from which it is clear that the eart is an accessory of the Soma; if the cart were an accessory of the Sāmidhēnī verses, its name would have been 'Sāmidhēnī-dhāna'.—Tantravārtika.]

Adhikarana (8): The details of a sacrificial performance may be performed through the agency of other persons.

SŪTRA (18).

[PÖRVAPAKŞA (A)]—"THE RESULT MENTIONED IN THE SCRIPTURES
ACCRUES TO THE ACTUAL PERFORMER, AS IS CLEAR FROM
THE SCRIPTURES THEMSELVES; CONSEQUENTLY THE
"SACRIFICER" HIMSELF SHOULD CARRY ON THE
ENTIRE PERFORMANCE."

Bhāsya.

[We are now going to consider the cases of conflict between 'Name' on the one hand, and 'Direct Assertion' and the rest on the other;—the main question to be determined being, in what way and how far such names as 'hota' (Person), 'hautram' (Action), serve the purpose of indicating the actual performers of actions.—But before taking up this question, a preliminary question has to be settled: It is only when there are several persons as performers of the actions occurring during the performance of a sacrifice, that there can be any question as to which person will perform which act. If all the actions were to be performed by the Sacrificer himself, then no such questions could arise, as there would be no room for any other performers.—Tantrawārtika.]

As instances to be considered here, we have the several sacrificial performances—(a) 'Desiring heaven, one should offer the Agnihotra'; (b) 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices'; (c) 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the Jyotistoma'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are all such sacrifices to be performed entirely by the 'Sacrificer' himself?—Or is it the (Principal) Act of Dedication (and Appointment) alone that must be done by the Sacrificer himself, and the rest of the details either by the Sacrificer or by others?—Or the rest of the details must be done by others?

On this question, the Pūrvapaksa view (A) is as follows:—"The Sacrificer himself should carry on the entire performance.—'Why?'—Because, as a matter of fact, the result of an action accrues to a person only when he performs the act himself.—'How do you know that?'—It is clear from the scriptures themselves; that is, the fact that the result of an action accrues to a person only when he performs the act himself is indicated by scriptural texts.—'Which is that text?'—It is the text—'Desiring heaven one should perform a sacrifice',—where the person desiring heaven is mentioned, the meaning of the text being that 'becoming the performer of the sacrifice, one should attain Heaven'; so that it is only when the man is the performer of the entire act, along with its subsidiaries, that he obtains the result. Hence it follows that the Sacrificer himself should carry on the entire performance."

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—" INASMUCH AS 'DEDICATION' IS THE PRINCIPAL ACT, THAT MUST BE DONE BY THE 'SACRIFICER' HIMSELF, HE BEING THE PRINCIPAL PERSON CONCERNED; AS FOR THE OTHER ACTS, THEY MAY BE DONE BITHER BY THE SACRIFICER HIMSELF OR BY ANOTHER PERSON'

Bhāsya.

"Among the acts (making up a sacrificial performance), predominance attaches to the act of 'Dedication'.—Why?—Because, he who performs the 'dedication' performs the entire sacrifice.—How so?—'Dedication' consists in the appointment (of priests), the securing of their services on payment; and when they have been 'won over' by this 'dedication', they perform all the acts; so that when a man has done the said 'dedication', all the acts (done by the priests) are really done by that man himself.—From this it follows that the act of 'Dedication' is one that must be done by the Sacrificer himself, the other details may be performed either by the Sacrificer himself or by any other person."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY, ANOTHER PERSON SHOULD [PERFORM THE DETAILS]; BECAUSE THE 'SECURING OF PAID AGENTS' HAS BEEN ACTUALLY ENJOINED, AND THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF THE 'SACRIFICER' HIMSELF.

Bhāsya.

Of the rest of the details, another person should be the performer;why ?--because the 'securing of paid agents' has been actually enjoined; from among the various methods of securing the services of men, the one method specified by the scriptures is 'payment for services'; from which it follows that all the details are to be performed by persons whose services have been secured by 'payment for services'; -- and any such 'payment for services' would be impossible in the case of the Sacrificer (who could not make a payment to himself); -so that, if he himself were to perform any of the details, that would have been performed by one whose services had not been secured by 'payment'; and to that extent the injunction of securing 'paid agents' would have to be regarded either as futile or as serving only some transcendental purpose.-From all this it follows that all the other sacrificial details (with the sole exception of 'Dedication') should be performed by other persons engaged as 'paid agents'; but the 'Dedication' should be done by the Sacrificer himself, and in this way all the rest also become performed by himself.

Adhikarana (9): The number of Priests engaged at a Sacrifice is limited.

SŪTRA (21).

[PORVAPAKSA]—" AS REGARDS THE PRIESTS TO BE ENGAGED, THEIR
NUMBER WOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF EACH SACRIFICE; HENCE THERE CAN BE NO RESTRICTION
REGARDING THEIR NUMBER; SPECIALLY AS THERE IS
NO SPECIFICATION (IN THE SCRIPTURES)
RECARDING IT."

Bhāsya.

"In regard to the actions to be done by the priests that have been engaged, there can be no limitation regarding their number;—why?—because there is no specification; i.e. in regard to the number of persons officiating at sacrifices, we do not find any specification anywhere in the scriptures; in fact their number would be determined by the requirements of each sacrifice; i.e. the sacrificer should engage as many priests as may be able to perform all the details of the prescribed procedure."

SŪTRA (22).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the priests should be engaged in accordance with their names; as it is under these names that their respective duties have been severally assigned in the Veda.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

In fact, the number of priests engaged should be as many as the duties that have been laid down as to be performed by the several performers named in the Veda. The texts naming such performers (priests) are the following:—'(1) First of all, the Adhvaryu-priest does the distribution;—(2) the Pratiprasthātr-priest offers the Manthin-offering;—(3) the Nēṣtṛ-priest brings up the sacrificer's wife;—(4) the Unnētṛ-priest fills the cups;—again, (5) the Pratiotṛ-priest introduces the chant;—(6) the Udgātṛ-priest does the chanting;—(7) the Pratihartṛ-priest sings the Pratihāra chant;—(8) the Subrahmanya-priest recites the Subrahmanyā Mantra;—(9) the Hotṛ-priest recites the Prātaranuvāka hymn;—(10) the Maitrāvaruna-priest gives directions and recites the Puronuvākyā;—(11) the Achchhāvāka-priest recites the Yājyā;—(12) the Grāvastut-priest recites the Grāvastut-priest recites the Grāvastut-priest recites the Grāvastut-priest recites the performance with this, there is need for just so many priests; hence for the performance of the duties assigned to each of them, these must be engaged. Apart from the acts herein

enumerated, there is none other that is to be performed; even though there may be some not mentioned in the above texts, yet they would be only such as would be already indicated by the names of the Priests—[e.g. the actual pouring of the oblations into Fire, i.e. Homa, is to be done by the Hotr-priest].—From this it follows that only these Priests—twelve in number—are to be engaged.

SŪTRA (23).

[OBJECTION]—"AS ONE AND THE SAME PERSON MAY HAVE SEVERAL
DUTIES [THE ENUMERATION OF DUTIES CANNOT DETERMINE
THE EXACT NUMBER OF PRIESTS TO BE ENGAGED]",—
IT THIS BE URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS
IN THE FOLLOWING SÜTRA].

Bhāsya.

"If it is asserted that only so many priests should be engaged (as have been mentioned in the texts quoted above),—that cannot be right; because as regards the names of priests mentioned in the text,—what happens is that when a priest makes up his mind to perform a certain function he receives the priestly title with which that function is associated; so that it is possible for a single person to perform several functions and thereby become entitled to several priestly titles. Thus then (the enumeration of the priestly titles and the priestly functions not affording the basis for determining the exact number of Priests to be engaged) there can be no restriction regarding their number."

SŪTRA (24).

[Answer]—That is not possible; because it is in the originative injunction (of the priests, that their distinct titles are mentioned).

Bhāşya.

What has been urged (regarding a single man performing several functions and thereby acquiring several titles) is not possible; because in the very originative injunctions laying down the Priests to be employed, we find that each priest, while still being brought into existence [i.e. before he begins to function], is given a distinct title; for instance, we read—'He appoints the Brahman-priest; he appoints the Hotr-priest; he appoints the Udgātr-priest; he appoints the Adhvaryu-priest' and so forth; [where each priest is given his title along with the appointment];—from this it is clear that in the performance of the Sacrifice there is need for priests of this kind, and hence they must be engaged. And inasmuch as the necessity of engaging the priests is dictated by the requirements of the sacrifice, the passage quoted is to be taken merely as describing the appointment of the

priests, not as an injunction (of engaging them)*;—nor can it be taken as a mere reiteration, as there is no need for such reiteration. As a matter of fact, it is not necessary for the Veda to declare in so many words that 'so many priests should be appointed'; as such a declaration would serve no useful purpose; and yet the passages quoted are capable of indicating the particular number (of priests to be appointed); hence the text is to be taken as pointing out just that number (of priests) which it indicates.

From all this it follows that sixteen† officiating Priests are to be appointed. This is the number of priests required at the Soma-sacrifice (*Jyotistoma*), as also at the *Darsha-Pārṇamāṣa*.

^{*} The Tantraūītika (Trans., p. 1622) takes exception to this remark. It concludes that 'the number is laid down, at the very outset, by the Injunction of the appointments themselves'.

[†] These sixteen Priests are the following:—(1) Adhvaryu—who does everything that is laid down in the Yajurveda; he has the following three assistants, (2) Pratiprashatr, (3) Nāṣṭṛ; and (4) Uhnāṭṭ;—(5) Brahman—who supervises the performance of all the details connected with all the three Vedas;—he has the following three assistants—(6) Brahmanāhehhāmsin, (7) Agnīt, and (8) Potṛ;—(9) Udajūt;—who does all the Soma-singing; he has the following three assistants—(10) Prastoṭr, (11) Prathartr, and (12) Subrahmanya;—(13) Hoṭr—who does the Shamsana (reciting of hymns); he has the following three assistants—(14) Mātrā-varuna, (15) Achchhāvāka, and (16) Grāvastut.—These are the sixteen Priests to be 'appointed' by the 'Sacrificer', who forms the seventeenth 'priest',—See below Stūtras 3. 7. 33 to 3. 7. 38.

Adhikarana (10): The 'Chamasādhvaryus' (Cup-bearing Priests) are distinct from those mentioned in the preceding Adhikarana.

SŪTRA (25).

The 'Chamasādhvaryus' [are different from the aforesaid Priests], as they are named after those.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

At the *Jyotistoma*, there are employed priests called 'Chamasādhvaryu' as laid down in the text 'One should appoint the Chamasādhvaryus'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these *Chamasādhvaryu* Priests included among those mentioned in the foregoing *Adhikarana*? Or are they different from them?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"the exact number of priests having been already described in the foregoing Adhikaraṇa, the Chamasādhvarṇus must be included among those".

The Siddhānta is that the Chamasādhvaryus should be different from those mentioned before;—why?—because they are named after those; that is, these Chamasādhvaryus are found to be named after those enumerated in the foregoing Adhikarana,—in such texts as—'The Chamasādhvaryus related to the priests working in the middle', 'the Chamasādhvaryus related to the Hotrakas' [where it is clear that the Chamasādhvaryus are subordinate to, and hence different from, the other priests].

Objection—"Those same priests that have been mentioned before may also be Chamasādhvaryus."

That cannot be; because they are mentioned along with those,—for instance, in the text 'Madhyatakkārinām chamasādhvaryavah' ['The Chamasādhvaryus related to the priests working in the middle];—the Genitive ending (in 'madhyatakkārinām') can be justified only if there is 'some relationship (between the Chamasādhvaryus and the other priests); and hence as they are found to be named after the other priests, it follows that they have for their master (they are subordinate to) those priests, not to the Sacrificer; and what we have declared to be the Siddhānia is that the Chamasādhvaryus are different from those priests that have been appointed by (and are subordinate to) the Sacrificer; and hence it follows that the priests for performing the functions of the Chamasādhvaryu are not to be appointed by the Sacrificer; they are to be appointed by the (other) priests.

Further the very originative injunction of the Chamasādhvaryus makes them entirely distinct; it says—'One should appoint the Chamasādhvaryus'.

Adhikarana (11): There should be several 'Chamasādhvaryus'.

SUTRA (26).

Inasmuch as in their originative injunction, they are spoken of as 'several' [there should be several Chamasādhvaryus].

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the aforesaid *Chamasādhvaryus*, there arises the question— Is there no restriction as to their number,—they may be one or two or several? —Or must they be several?

The Pūrvapakea view is that "there is no restriction".

The Siddhānta is that they should be several;—because in their originative injunction they are spoken of as several; that is, in the injunction which lays down the engagement of these priests, we find the plural number used—'Chamasādhvaryavaḥ'; 'Chamasādhvaryus'; hence it follows that there should be several Chamasādhvaryus.

Adhikarana (12): The number of 'Chamasādhvaryus' should be 'Ten' only.

SŪTRA (27).

[THE NUMBER OF THESE PRIESTS] SHOULD BE 'TEN', BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIONS TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotistoma* there are priests called 'Chamasādhvaryu', and it has been explained that there should be several of these priests. Now there arises the question—How many are they to be?

The Pürvapaksa view is that—"they should be three, on the strength of the plural number in the word speaking of these priests (in their originative injunction) [according to Sütra 11. 1. 43)".

The Siddhanta is as follows:-The number of these priests should be 'Ten', because we find indications to that effect; i.e. there should be Ten Chamasadhvaryus; we find an indication to this effect in a text occurring in connection with the Dashapeya sacrifice, which is a 'modification' of the Jyotis toma—' Dasha chamasādhvaryavo, dasha dasha ēkaikam chamasamanusarpanti, ētasmāt kāranāt dashapēyo bhavati' ['There are ten Chamasādhvaryus; ten men follow each cup; that is why the sacrifice comes to be called Dashapeya, Drunk-by-Ten']; the declaration herein made clearly indicates that the number of Chamasadhvaryus should be ten; if they were to be three only, then that would not be compatible with the text quoted; beyond the number 'three' too, unless the number were precisely 'ten', it would not be compatible with the text; hence it follows that their number should be Ten only; as the number of their masters (in the shape of the major priests) also is Ten, there could be no need for more Chamasadhvaryus; for this reason also the exact number 'Ten' is accepted as the right one; and when the number 'Ten' is admitted, every number lower than that becomes included. For this reason also the number of Chamasādhvaryus should be Ten only.

ADHIKARANA (13): The 'Shamitr' (Slaughterer of the Animal) is not distinct from the Major Priests.

SŪTRA (28).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE SHAMITR ALSO [SHOULD BE A DISTINCT PRIEST], BECAUSE OF THE DISTINCT NAME."

Bhäsya.

There is a priest called 'Shamitr', mentioned in the text—'Shamitāram upanayīta' ['One should bring up the Shamitr'].

In regard to this priest, there arises the question—Is this Shamitr only one of the priests already spoken of above (Adhvaryu and the rest)?—Or is he distinct from them?

The view that appears to be most plausible is that he should be one among those already described, as it is those alone that have been named in the text speaking of the appointment of priests.

Against this however we have the following Pūrrapaksa view:-"The ' Shamitr's ould be a distinct priest, because of the distinct name; as a matter of fact, we find a distinct name for this priest-the statement being to the effect that 'the priest bearing this name (Shamitr) should perform this work (of slaughtering the animal) '; hence it follows that a priest of this name should be engaged. By reason of the mention of this additional priest, it also follows that there should be an increase in the number of priests mentioned before. From all this it follows that the Shamity-priest is distinct from the Adhvaryu and other priests.-Then again, we find the text—' Klomā chordhvam vaikartanancha shamituh, tad bhrāhmanāva dadvāt yadyabrāhmanah syāt' ['The liver and the upper quarter belongs to the Shamitr Priest; one should give it to a Brāhmana if he be a non-Brāhmana'] (Ai, Brā, 7, 1); the possibility of the priest being a non-Brāhmana herein mentioned is not applicable to any Major Priest [as all Major Priests must be Brahmanas]. [This also indicates that the Shamitr is distinct from the Major Priests.1"

SŪTRA (29).

[Siddhāntā]—In reality [he cannot be distinct from the others];

Because of the 'Context', and also because there is no

Originative injunction (speaking of his appointment).

Bhāşya,

It is true that there appears to be an increase in the number of priests (by the mention of the Shamitr and his functions); but this does not pertain to the 'appointment' of the priests; [i.e. there is no text speaking of the Shamitr as one of the priests to be 'appointed']. As regards the incongruity

involved (in the naming of the priest and the assigning of his functions, and yet not laying down his 'appointment'),—that can be explained on the basis of the fact that one of the Major Priests themselves would perform the said functions also (in addition to his own duties; and also become entitled to the name 'Shamitr').

As regards the possibility of being a 'non-Brāhmaṇa' spoken of in the text quoted by the Pūrvapakṣin,—that refers to the Sacrifler (not to the Shamitr),—the meaning being that 'if the Sacrifler happen to be a non-Brāhmaṇa (the liver, etc., of the animal should be given to a Brāhmaṇa]'.

Says the Opponent—"The words of the text if he happen to be a non-Brāhmaṇa' clearly refer to the Shamitr priest, who has been spoken of in the preceding sentence."

Our answer to this is that the name 'Shamity' is meant to be applied in its etymological sense of 'one who does the slaughtering'; and as such it is applicable to the other priests also [anyone of them who does the 'slaughtering' becomes the 'slaughterer', 'Shamity'].—Further, the functions of the Shamity have been mentioned in the section dealing with the functions of the Adhvaryu; from which it follows that those functions also are to be performed by the Adhvaryu is of that, by reason of performing the function of 'slaughtering', the Adhvaryu himself becomes the Shamity (slaughterer).—For these reasons we conclude that the possibility of being a non-Brāhmaṇa must refer to the Sacrificer, though he has not been spoken of in the sentence.

[The Tantravārtika remarks that, it is on account of the Priest performing such questionable acts as slaughtering that the 'priestly functions' have come to be spoken of disparagingly,]

Adhikarana (14): The 'Upaga' Priest is not distinct from the others.

SŪTRA (30).

THE UPAGA PRIESTS ALSO [ARE NOT DISTINCT], BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIONS TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāsya.

At the Jyotistoma there are some priests called 'Upaga'; in regard to these, the Pirrapakṣa view is that—"because there is a distinct name, it means that these priests are in addition to the number of other priests, and hence they should be distinct from the Adhearyu and the rest".

The Siddhānta is that they should be some among those same priests.—
"How so?"—Because all the priests to be engaged have been duly enumerated in the originative injunction, and because the name 'Upaga' is meant to be applied in its etymological sense [of one who does the 'Upagāna', the supplementary singing].—An indication of this we find in the text—'Na adhvaryurupagāyet' ['The Adhvaryu should not do the supplementary singing']; if the Upaga priest were someone totally distinct from the Adhvaryu and the rest, then, there could be no such prohibition in regard to the Adhvaryu; as in that case, there would be no possibility of the Adhvaryu doing the work [and no Vedic text prohibits what is impossible]. Thus then, inasmuch as the text prohibits the act for the Adhvaryu, we conclude that the Upaga is one out of those same priests (Adhvaryu and the rest) who have been spoken of in the originative injunction.

Adhikarana (15): The 'Soma-vendor' is distinct from the Priests.

SŪTRA (31).

THE VENDOR (OF SOMA) IS DISTINCT (FROM THE PRIESTS); AS THE ACT (OF SELLING) IS NOT ENJOINED.

Bhāsya.

[At the Jyotistoma] there is the man who sells Soma.

In regard to him there arises the question—Is this Soma-vendor one out of the Adhvaryu and other priests? Or is he distinct from them?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"he must be one from among the priests; as it is only these that have been described as priests officiating at a sacrifice".

The Siddhānta is as follows:—The vendor of Soma should be distinct from the priests; as a matter of fact, the act enjoined as part of the performance is the buying of Soma,—not its selling; the latter comes in only as implied in the action of buying.—The Adhvaryu and other priests are engaged for performing the details laid down in connection with the Jyotistoma sacrifice;—the act of selling is not among those laid down in connection with the Jyotistoma;—hence [as this act of selling could not be done by the Adhvaryu and other priests] it follows that the Soma-vendor is not one of these priests.

Adhikarana (16): All the men engaged in a sacrificial performance are not entitled to the title of 'Rtvik' (Priest).

SŪTRA (32).

[PÜRVAPAKṢA]—'' INASMUCH AS THEY TAKE PART IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SACRIFICE, THEY ARE ALL EQUALLY ENTITLED TO THE TITLE OF 'RTVIK' (PRIEST)."

Bhāṣya.

The question that arises now is—Are all the persons mentioned in connection with the *Jyotistoma* sacrifice to be regarded as 'Priests'?—or only some of them?

The Pūrvapaksa view is as follows:- "All of them are to be regarded as 'priests': --why ?--because they take part in the performance of the sacrifice: as a matter of fact, all these men take part in the accomplishment of the sacrifice ;-i.e. all of them 'perform the sacrifice (yajanti) at the proper time (rtau)':--and those who 'perform the sacrifice at the proper time' (rtau yajanti) are 'Rtviks' (Priests) [in the etymological sense of the term 'rtvik'] :- nor do we find any ground for any such differentiation among the men taking part in the performance as that 'these alone are Riviks because they perform the sacrifice in the proper time, and not those others'. Hence the title of 'priest' (Rtvik) belongs to all of them equally .-It might be argued that there is an actual preclusion (of all but seventeen) mentioned in the text- Saumyasya adhvarasya yajñakratoh saptadasha rtvijah' ['At the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there are seventeen priests 'l .- Our answer to this is that Preclusion is beset with several objections. The text quoted therefore has to be taken as a purely commendatory declaration."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY, THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THERE IS PRECLUSION (OF ALL EXCEPT 'SEVENTEEN').

Bhāṣya.

In reality, all the persons engaged in the performance cannot be 'Priesta';—why !—because there is Preclusion of all except seventeen;—we have the text—'Saumyasya adhvarasya yajñakratoh saptadasha ṛtvijah' ['In the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there are seventeen priests'];—now this text cannot be an Injunction, as most of the seventeen have been already enjoined elsewhere;—nor can it be a mere reiteration, as such a reiteration would be useless;—under the circumstances, if it were not a Preclusion, then it would be wholly meaningless.

Objection—"But Preclusion is open to the objection that it involves (1) the abandoning of the real meaning of the sentence, (2) the assumption of a different meaning, and (3) the rejecting of what has been already got at."

Answer-(1) As regards the 'abandoning of the real meaning', there is nothing wrong in this, as what is accepted also forms part of that meaning.-(2) As regards the 'assumption of a different meaning', in that also there can be nothing wrong, as that meaning also is actually cognised.-"How so?"-There being many persons engaged in the sacrificial performances who might be regarded as 'Priests', the text speaks of 'seventeen priests'; this serves to indicate the connection of the title 'priest' with seventeen persons only, not with the rest ; -so that the idea that we obtain is that the title of 'priest' being one to which several men might be regarded as entitled, all but seventeen men are precluded. Then there arises the question-Does the text serve to establish the connection of the 'seventeen' persons with the title, or to preclude the other persons from connection with the title? As a matter of fact, the connection of the seventeen persons being already known from other sources, the assertion of that same would be useless; hence we conclude that the text is meant to preclude persons other than these 'seventeen'.

Says the Opponent—"Even if those besides the seventeen were excluded (by the text quoted), there could be no real exclusion of them. Because, even so, they do not cease to be those who 'perform the sacrifice at the proper time' (riau yajanti); and so long as they 'perform the sacrifice at the proper time', they cannot cease to be 'Riviks' (Priests)."

Answer—It is true that they do not cease to be entitled to the title of 'priest' merely on account of the exclusion; but, on the strength of the preclusive text, they cannot be employed in the work of a 'priest'.—"What is the work of a priest?"—The Priests fast,—the Priests are 'appointed',—the Priests are given the Sacrificial Fee.

Says the Opponent—"How is it that some of those who are entitled to the title of 'priest' are not to be employed on the work of priests?"

Answer—As a matter of fact, the title of 'priest' is of two kinds,—one based upon the 'performance of sacrifice at the proper time', and another based upon 'appointment' and 'receiving support (in the shape of Fees)'.

—In the case under question, it would be futile to take that title which is based upon the 'performance of sacrifice'; hence we take that based upon 'appointment' and 'receiving support.'

Opponent—"In this way, there is a vicious circle: those alone are to be 'appointed' who are 'priests', and those alone are 'priests' who are 'appointed':—this certainly involves a vicious circle."

Answer—The injunction that 'one should appoint the priests' does not mean that 'those who are already priests should be appointed'; what it means is that 'they are to become priests by being appointed'; it is only when such is the meaning that the Accusative ending, in such texts as 'Adhvaryum' vrnits' ('should appoint the Adhvaryu priest') becomes justifiable,—and thus alone does the 'appointment' come to serve a perceptible purpose (of securing the 'priesthood' of the person concerned).

If someone were to ask—"How can a man become an Adhvaryu merely by the wish of the person (appointing him)?"—we would say—yes, he does become so.—"But how?"—Well, when the text lays down that 'such and such an entity is to be brought about under such and such a title' [e.g. 'a person is to be brought up who bears the title of Priest'],—and it is found that no such entity with the said title is there,—the conclusion is that when it does not exist, it has to be brought into existence, if it is capable of being brought into existence; e.g. when it is laid down that 'one should offer the oblation with the Juhū,—if the Juhū is not there, it is brought into existence. Similarly in the case in question also,—when it is found necessary to connect the title 'Priest' with certain persons,—and it is open to the Sacrificer to connect any one without any restriction,—then it is that such texts as 'Adhvaryum vṛnūtē' serve to supply the restriction that 'the connection of the title should be brought about by appointment'.—
Thus there is no vicious circle at all.

From all this it follows that the declaration that 'there are only seventeen priests' contains a preclusion; so that there are only seventeen persons who are to be made 'priests' by means of the prescribed preparatory rites (such as Appointment and the like).

SŪTRA (34).

[Objection]—"The (preclusive) text quoted may be taken only as stating one alternative",—if this is urged, [then our answer is as in the following Sütra].

Bhāşya.

If the Opponent urge that—"the text which speaks of seventeen priests may be taken as a commendatory declaration stating only one alternative view [the other view being that there are Twenty-seven priests—the seventeen major priests and the ten Chamasādhvaryus; or that all persons engaged in the performance are 'priests', only that seventeen of these are superior to the rest]",—this has to be refuted [and this is done in the following Sūra].

SŪTRA (35).

THAT CANNOT BE RIGHT; AS THERE IS NO MENTION AT ALL OF ALL (THE PERSONS ENGAGED).

Bhāşya.

What has been suggested cannot be right; in the Context there is no mention at all of all persons engaged in the performance, in reference to whom the preclusive text (speaking of 'seventeen priests') could be taken as a commendatory declaration (selecting for commendation seventeen men from among all those engaged in the performance). It is only when a higher number has been mentioned, that the mention of the lower number

can be taken as commendatory; as the 'twelve pans' having been mentioned, when we find the assertion regarding 'eight pans', we take the latter to be commendatory. In the case in question however, there is no mention of any higher number; hence the preclusive text cannot be taken as a commendatory declaration.

ADHIKARANA (17): The 'seventeen Priests' are the 'Brahman' and the rest, who are mentioned in the texts dealing with 'Initiation' and the 'Sacrificial Fee'.

SŪTRA (36).

In reality, there is restriction (of the title 'Priest'), based upon texts dealing with the 'Sacrificial Fees'.

Bhāşya.

It has been established that there are seventeen priests.—We now proceed to consider which are these seventeen.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"there is no knowing [it cannot be determined which these seventeen are]".

The Siddhānta is as follows—In reality, there is restriction of the title 'priest', based on the texts dealing with the Sacrificial Fees;—the application of the title should be restricted on the basis of connection with the Sacrificial Fees;—the is laid down that 'the Sacrificial Fee is to be paid to the Priests'; and after having laid down this general injunction, a few particular persons—like the Brahman-priest—are specifically named in the texts laying down the order in which the Fee is to be paid to those engaged in the performance;—such, for instance, as 'He gives it to the Agnit, then to the Brahman, then to so and so' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 6. 10). From this it follows that those that are specifically named in these texts are the real. 'Priests', any others besides these cannot be called 'priests';—the title being restricted by the Sacrificial Fees.

SŪTRA (37).

Also because the Initiation of these (Priests) alone has been laid down after the declaration that they are 'Sacrificers'.

Bhāṣya.

Having declared that 'Those that are Priests are sacrificers', the Veda goes on to speak of the Initiation of the Brahman and the rest, in the text that lays down the order in which these are to be 'initiated'—viz. 'Having initiated (1) the Sacrificer, the Adhvaryu initiates (2) the Brahman, then (3) the Udgātr, then (4) the Hotr; then the Pratiprasthātr initiates (5) the Adhvaryu, and then the Halfers [those entitled to half the Fee],—viz. (6) the Brahman,—(7) the Prastorr, who is assistant to the Brahman,—(7) the Prastorr, who is assistant to the Hotr;—then the Nēstr initiates the (9) Pratiprasthātr, and then the

Thirders [those entitled to one-third of the Fee],—viz. (10) the Agnidh, who is assistant to the Brahman,—(11) the Prathlarty, who is assistant to the Udgātly,—and (12) the Achchhāvāka, who is assistant to the Hotr;—then the Unnētly initiates (13) the Nēṣtly, and then the Fourthers [those entitled to, one-fourth of the Fee]—viz. (14) the Potr, who is assistant to the Brāhman,—(15) the Subrahmanya, who is assistant to the Udgātly,—and (16) the Grārastut, who is assistant to the Hotr;—then (17) the Unnētly is initiated by some other Brāhmana, or by a Religious Student deputed for that purpose by his Teacher.—Now all these Initiations are 'embellishments' for the Sacrificers. From this also it follows that the seventeen persons entitled to be called 'Priests' are the Brahman and the rest mentioned here.

Adhikarana (18): The 'Master' forms the 'Seventeenth' of the Priests.

SŪTRA (38).

The Master of the House is to be regarded as the Seventeenth 'Priest', on the basis of the similarity of functions.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

It has been stated above that there are 'seventeen Priests', and that these are the Brahman and the rest.

Now there arises the question—[As the text enumerating the Initiations has named only sixteen persons]—Who is the seventeenth? Is it some member of the Assembly? Or the Master of the House (the Sacrificer)?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"Some member of the Assembly should be the seventeenth; as it is only such a person who would be a vorker (a servant), the other is the Master,—and it is only a worker that can be engaged on payment; the Priests are all engaged on payment;—hence it follows that the seventeenth 'Priest' should be some member of the Assembly. Further, there are texts speaking of the 'sadasya' (member of the Assembly,) of a 'Cup' belonging to him, as also his 'appointment';—and it is a Priest that is to be 'appointed', not the Master himself. For these reasons the seventeenth Priest must be some member of the Assembly."

In answer to the above, we have the following Siddhanta: - The Master of the House is to be regarded as the seventeenth 'Priest', on the basis of the similarity of functions; it is the Master that should form the seventeenth of the Priests :- why ?-because of the similarity of functions ; that is, persons who perform the sacrifice become known as 'Priests';-the Master of the House is certainly one who performs the sacrifice; -hence he must be a 'priest'; on the ground that the function of 'performing the sacrifice' belongs to him in common (with the Priests).-As regards the argument that-"the texts speak of the 'member of the Assembly', of the 'Cup' belonging to him, and also of his 'appointment', and hence this seventeenth should be some member of the Assembly ",-our answer is that when the texts speak of the 'member of the Assembly', they speak of the Brahman Priest, and the 'Cup' and the 'appointment' also that they speak of are of the same Brahman Pricst; and he is called 'sadasya' (member of the Assembly), because he is really one of the persons present in the Sacrificial House.-From all this it follows that the Master is the seventeenth of the ' priests '.

Adhikarana (19): (A) Each of the Priests is to perform only those functions that have been named after him.— (B) The Fires serve the purposes of all Sacrifices.

SŪTRA (39).

(A)—[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE PRIESTS SHOULD PERFORM ALL THE FUNC-TIONS, AS THEY ARE ENGAGED FOR THAT PURPOSE."—(B)—THE FIRES SERVE THE PURPOSES OF ALL THE SACRIFICES, AS THEY HAVE THEIR OWN TIME.

[Having dealt with the number and character of *Performers*, we now proceed to consider the question of the employment of these performers in the various performances.]

Bhāṣya.

We have seen that at the *Jyotistoma* there are seventeen Priests, including the Master of the Sacrifice.—(A) The question that arises now is—Are all the Priests to do all that is to be done by men (in connection with the sacrificial performance)?—Or is there any restriction (differentiation and distribution of functions)?

—(B) There is another question also—Are the three Fires (Gārhapatya, Datsināgni, and Ahavanīya) to be used in connection with all that can be done with the help of Fire?—Or is there some restriction (as to what is to be done with which Fire)?

The Pūrvapaksa view on Question (A) is that—"all the Priests should perform all the functions, as they are engaged for that purpose; that is to say, having been appointed for the purposes of the sacrificial performance, they should do all that is to be done by men". [The Siddhānta of this question is stated in Sū. 40, below.]

(B) As regards the Fires, it is the Siddhānta that is set forth in the Sütra, and this is as follows:—All the Fires should be used in connection with all the actions that can be done with the help of Fire; because the Fires are needed by all those actions. The particle 'sva' is a reference to the Fires; the meaning being that the Fires are to be used in connection with all sacrifices, as they have their own time [that is, they have been enjoined in relation to their own time, and not to the time of any particular sacrifice; and hence they may be used whenever they are required]. We have understood this (as the final Siddhānta).

[In the Bhāşya on this Adhikarana, specially on Sū. 39, there is a confusion; it is made clear in the Tantivavitika (Trans., pp. 1643-1646).—The Sūtra 39 contains two distinct statements—the first part is the statement of a Pārvapaķea, and the second part, the statement of a Sūddhānta. The question regarding this Sūddhānta (relating to the Fires) is—Are the three consecrated Fires to be used in connection with the Primary Sacrifice only? Or with the Primary as well as the Substitutes?—The Pārvapaķea is that "they should be used at the Primary

Sacrifice only, for the simple reason that they have not been laid down in the context of any sacrifice (according to Sū. 3. 6. 2).—The Siddhānta is that the Fires should be used in connection with the Primary as well as with the Subsidiary sacrifices, because they have been laid down independently by themselves—having their own time.—As regards Question (A), in regard to the Priests, the Pūrvapakṣa is stated in the first part of Sū. 39 and the Siddhānta in Sū. 40.]

SUTRA (40).

[SIDDHANTA OF ADHIKARANA 19(A)]—THERE SHOULD BE A RESTRICTION
(AND DISTRIBUTION) OF FUNCTIONS (AMONG THE PRIESTS), ON
THE BASIS OF THEIR NAMES; AS IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE
THAT (DISTINCT) NAMES HAVE BEEN
ASSIGNED TO THEM.

Bhāsua.

On the basis of the particular names given to particular priests, there should be a restriction of functions; only the functions that have been named after a certain priest should be performed by that Priest; as it is only thus that a useful purpose would be served by the naming of the functions (after the Priests); that is, the functions named 'Adhvaryava' should be performed by the Hotr-priest,—those named 'hautra' should be performed by the Hotr-priest,—those named 'Audgātra' should be performed by the Udgātr-priest.

Adhikarana (20): In some cases the distribution of functions among the Priests is not strictly in accordance with their name.—Exception to the preceding Adhikarana.

SŪTRA (41).

THE INDICATION (OF THE PARTICULAR PRIEST TO PERFORM A PARTICULAR FUNCTION) IS DONE BY DIRECT INJUNCTION AS
ALSO BY SPECIFIC NAME.

SPECIFIC NAME.

Rhāsva.

Question—Is this a universal rule (to be followed in all cases) that a function is to be performed by the Priest after whom it is named?

[Pūrvapakṣa—"Yes".]

Siddhānta—It is not so; because as a matter of fact, the indication of the particular Priest to perform a particular function is done by Direct Injunction and also by specific name (not always by the generic names 'Adhvaryawa', 'Hautra', and 'Audgātra').—As an example of indication by Direct Injunction, we have the text 'Taemāt maitrāvarunaḥ prēsyatichānuchāha' ('Therefore the Maitrāvaruna gives directions and recites the Puronuvākyā'] (Taitti Brā. 3. 12. 9. 5);—[where the two functions of giving directions and reciting are specifically assigned to the Maitrāvaruna Priest, though the giving of directions falls within those functions that have been called 'Adhvaryava', and as such should have been performed by the Adhvaryu; similarly the reciting is a function falling within those called 'Hautra' and as such should have been done by the Hotr priest.—But in view of the Direct Injunction quoted, both these are done by the Maitrāvaruna Priest).

Similarly as instances of specific names given to acts indicating their performer, we have the names 'potriyā' and 'nēstriyā', [which are given to certain actions, which under the general rule would have been done by the Brahman and the Adhvaryu respectively, but, which, by virtue of these special names, are done by the Potr and the Nēstr respectively].

These are exceptions to the general rule that the performers of functions are indicated by the names given to the functions.

SŪTRA (42).

Similarly we find indications also to the same effect. $Bh\bar{a}sva.$

We have the text—'Hotuh prätaranuväkamanubruvata upashrnuyāt' ['He may listen to the Hotr reciting the Prätaranuväka'], which, occurring

under the section dealing with the functions of the Hotr and hence called 'Hautra', indicates the Hotr-priest as the performer of the act of Reciting.—Similarly there is another indicative text—'Udgithah udgātrnām rchah, pranavah ukthashamsinām, pratihārah adhvaryūnām' ['The Udgitha is for the Udgātr-priests, the verses and the Pranava of the Ukthashamsins, and the Prutihāra of the Adhvaryus'], which indicates a differentiation of functions by means of specific names.—The following is another indicative text—'Yo va'dhvaryoh svam vāda svavānēva bhavati, ētat vā'dhvaryoh svam yadāshrāvayati' ['He who understands the Adhvaryu's own thing becomes endowed with wealth; this is the Adhvaryu's own thing that he urges the Agnāth to direct the Hotr to recite'] (Taitti. Sam. 3. 1. 2. 3), which indicates the particular performer by means of a specific name.

ADHIKARANA (21): The 'Reciting' and the 'Directing' are to be done by the Maitrāvaruna, only when they are done concurrently.

SŪTRA (43).

[Porvapakṣa]—"The 'Directing' and the 'Reciting' are to be done (in all cases) by the Mattrāvaruṇa; as such is the Injunction."

Bhāsua.

It having been established that the indication of performers by Name is saide by Direct Injunction, we now proceed to consider the question as to whether it is set aside wholly, or only in part.—Tantraväritka.]

At the Jyotistoma sacrifice, there is the Agnisomiya animal, spoken of in the text—'Yo diksito yadagnisomiyam pashumālabhēta' ['The initiated person who sacrifices the Agnisomiya animal'] (Taitti. Sath. 6. 1. 11. 6). In connection with this animal, there is the text—'Tasmāt maitrāvarunaḥ presyati chānuchāha' ['Therefore the Maitrāvaruna priest gives directions and also recites the Purōnuvākuā'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the Maitrāvaruna priest to do all the Reciting and all the Directing that is done? Or only in that case where the direction is contained in what is recited [i.e. where both are done concurrently through the same words]?

The Purvapaksa view is that "all recitings (and all directings) are to be done by the Maitrāvaruṇa, as there is no ground for differentiation; as a a matter of fact there are no grounds for any such differentiation as that 'this Reciting, and not that, is to be done by the Maitrāvaruṇa'; hence it follows that the Maitrāvaruṇa is to do all the Reciting and Directing that is to be done [though these functions, as included under the name 'Hautra', should have been performed by the Hotr-priest'.

SŪTRA (44).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE INJUNCTION APPLIES TO THE 'RECITING' OF THE 'PURONUVĀRYĀ' ONLY; AS IT IS THIS THAT IS ACCOM-PANIED BY THE DIRECTION.

$Bh\bar{a}$ şya.

In reality, it is only the Puronwākyā that is to be recited by the Maitrāvaruna;—why?—because the Maitrāvaruna comes in as the reciter only in cases where the Reciting and Directing are done together; in cases where there is mere reciting of the Anwākyā, the Maitrāvaruna does not come in at all; nor in cases where there is Directing only;—it is only where the two come together that the *Maitrāvaruna* comes in;—hence it is only in connection with cases where the two are done together that we have the declaration in the text—'the Maitrāvaruna directs and recites', '*Maitrāvarunah prēsyati chānuchāha*',—where the repetition of the particle 'cha' indicates that the reference is to cases where the two acts are done together.

[The Puronwakya verse ends with the Imperative word 'yaja' ('please sarifice'), which contains the directing which is done when the Puronwakya is recited,—thus the two acts of Reciting and Directing being done together.]

SŪTRA (45).

Also because we find the Hote priest mentioned in connection with the reciting of the 'Prataranuvaka'.

Bhāsya.

For the following reason also we think that all Reciting is not to be done by the Maitrāvaruna.—For what reason?—Because the Veda indicates the Holy in connection with the reciting of the Prātaranuvāka.—How is this indicated?—There is the text—'Yatra hotule prātaranuvākamanubruvatale upaskrņuyāt tadā adhvaryurynhvīyāt' ['When he hears the Hoty reciting the Prātaranuvāka, the Adhvaryu should hold the cup.'].—From this it follows that all reciting is not to be done by the Maitrāvaruṇa.

Adhikarana (22): The 'Chamasa-homa' is to be performed by the Adhvaryu.

SUTRA (46).

[Pörvapakṣa]—" The 'Chamasa-oblations' are to be offered by the Chamasadhvaryus,—by reason of the Name."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

There are the Chamasādhvaryu priests. In regard to these, there arises the question—Are the Chamasa-oblations to be offered by the Chamasādhvaryus? or by the Adhvaryu?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"the Chamasādhvaryus should offer them;—why?—because they are named 'Chamasādhvaryu', which indicates that in regard to the Chamasas, they perform the functions of the Adhvaryu; hence (the offering of oblations being the function of the Adhvaryu) it follows that the Chamasa-oblations should be offered by the Chamasādhvaryus'.

SŪTRA (47).

In reality, the Adhvaryu should offer the oblations, because of the Law relating to him.

Bhāşya.

In reality, the Adhvaryu should offer the oblations; because the Law is that all the functions that are called 'Adhvaryua' should be performed by the Adhvaryu;—and the offering of oblations (into Fire) is an 'Adhvaryuu—'But by reason of the specific name 'Chamasādhvaryu' (which connects the priests of this name with the Chamasādhvaryu' (which connects the priests of this name with the Chamasādhvaryus [the indication of the specific name setting aside that of the generic name 'Adhvaryava'].''—That cannot be, we reply;—these priests are called 'Chamasādhvaryu' in the sense that they 'function like the Adhvaryu in regard to the Chamasas'; which can only mean that 'if the Adhvaryu offers the Chamasa-oblations, the Chamasādhvaryus also may offer them'; in fact, if the oblations were offered by the Chamasādhvaryus, and not by the Adhvaryu.—From this it follows that the Chamasādhvaryus are not to offer the Chamasa-oblations.

SŪTRA (48).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND 'ANOTHER' PRIEST MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'CHAMASA'.

Bhāsya.

We find that in connection with the Chamasa, the Veda speaks of a priest other than the Chamasadhvaryu.-" How so?"-We have the text-'Chamasāmshchamasādhvaryavē prayachchhati, tān sa vasatkartrē harati', from which we learn that someone else offers the oblation and hands over the Chamasa to the Chamasādhvaruu.—"How is this deduced?"— What we understand the text to mean is that when the Chamasādhvaryu offers it to the Vasatkartr, he does so with the view that the Vasatkartr will eat out of it: which implies that the Chamasa is handed over to the Chamasadhvaryu, after the oblation has been offered out of it; -and that the person who hands it over to him is the person who has offered the oblation ;--from which it is clear that the man offering the oblations is other than the Chamasādhvaryu.-Then again we have the text-' Yo vā adhvaryoh svam vēda svavānēva bhavati, srugvā adhvaryoh svam, vāyavyamasya svam, chamaso'sya svam', where the Chamasa is spoken of as the 'sva' (property) of the Adhvaryu;as a matter of fact, however, the Chamasa is the property of the Sacrificer, not of the Adhvaryu; hence when the text speaks of the Chamasa as the 'property' of the Adhvaryu, what is meant is that the Chamasa-oblations are to be offered by the Adhvaryu.

SŪTRA (49).

It is only in cases of incapacity (of the Adhvaryu) that the Chamasadhvaryus could be regarded (as entitled to offer the oblations in question).

$Bh\bar{a}$ şya.

 $\it Question-$ "How then is the name ' $\it Chamas\bar{a}dhvaryu$ ' to be accounted for ? "

Answer—They should be regarded as entitled to after the oblations in cases of incapacity; that is, in cases where, on account of being otherwise engaged, the Adhvaryu is unable to offer the oblations, the Chamasādhvaryus would be the persons to offer them, by virtue of their name.

Adhikarana (23): The 'Shyēna' and the 'Vājapēya' sacrifices are to be performed by several classes of priests,—not by single class of priests.

SŪTRA (50).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—" ON ACCOUNT OF THE VEDIC INJUNCTION (NAME),—
IN CASES WHERE THE ACTIONS HAPPEN TO BE MENTIONED IN
A PARTICULAR VEDA,—THEY SHOULD BE PERFORMED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT VEDA ONLY,—
AS IN THE FOREGOING CASE."

Bhāṣya.

We find the Shyēna sacrifice mentioned in the Veda named 'Audgātra', (i.e. Sāmaveda) and the Vājapēya sacrifice in the Veda called 'Adhvaryava'. (i.e. Yajurveda).—In regard to these, there arises the question—Are all the details in connection with the Shyēna to be performed by the Udgātr (Sāmavedin) priests alone,—and all the details of the Vājapēya, by the Adhvaryu (Yajurvedin) priests alone?—or in both cases, the details are to be performed by several classes of priests?

On this question, the Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"On account of the Vadic Injunction,—i.e. on account of the Name—it should be as in the foregoing case; i.e. just as on the strength of the name 'Adhvaryava' all the details mentioned in that section are performed by the Adhvaryu,—in the same manner, in cases where the actions happen to be mentioned in a particular Veda, they should be done in accordance with that Veda only; that is to say, when a sacrifice is laid down in a Veda named after a certain priest, all the details in connection with that sacrifice should be performed by that same priest; as therein the sacrifice is enjoined along with all its accessory details.—From this it follows that all the details of the Shyēna (which is laid down in the Audgātra i.e. Sāmaveda) should be performed by the Udgātr priest, and all the details of the Vājapēya (which is laid down in the Ādhvaryu priest."

SÜTRA (51).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THEY BOREOW THE DETAILS (FROM THE PRIMARY ARCHETYPES), THEY SHOULD IN REALITY BE PERFORMED ALONG WITH THEIR ACCESSORIES, AS EQUIPPED WITH THEIR OWN DETAILS, ON THE BASIS OF THE GENERAL LAW; THE INDICATION (OF THE NAME)

CAN BE ACCEPTED ONLY IN OTHER CASES,

WHERE THERE ARE NO CLEAR

INJUNCTIONS, Bhāşya.

Inasmuch as they borrow the details from the Primary Sacrifices, —the sacrifice should be performed as equipped with its own details,—i.e. accompanied by all the accessories that come into it by virtue of the general law (that 'the modification should be performed in the manner of the Primary'),—and along with its accessories;—this is what we learn from the Veda itself.—Now as regards the two sacrifices in question, they are both 'modifications' of the Jyotistoma, and as such they stand in need of those accessories that are already there in the Jyotistoma;—and at the Jyotistoma there are several Priests performing the details;—so that the case in question also has to be taken as connected with those same several priests.

Objection—"The indication by the Name is something direct, while the implication of the General Law is only an indirect means of knowledge, being purely inferential in character [so that the latter should not override the former]."

Answer—It is true that indication by the Name is a direct means of knowledge; but after all it is only an ordinary (secular) means of knowledge; so that in this case also, it is necessary to infer a Vedic text and then make it, bear upon the case in question; while in the case of indication by the General Law (that 'the modification should be performed in the manner of the Primary'), what is brought to bear upon the case in question is a Vedic text which is actually perceived even though found in a remoter context, on the basis of which text, the sacrifice in question (i.e. the modification) becomes connected with the directly cognised procedure of the Primary Sacrifice. It is for this reason that the General Law is stronger (than Name and overrides it).

As regards the argument that—"on the strength of Name [all the details should be performed by a single priest]",—the answer is that the indication by Name can be accepted only in regard to other cases, where there are no clear injunctions;—that is to say, in the case of such details as do not come into the sacrifice by virtue of the General Law, the matter may be determined by indications of the Name. For instance, in connection with the Shyëna, we find it laid down that 'they pierce with thorns', and [as there is no such Piercing done at the Primary Sacrifice, the name of the performer of this act cannot be brought in from the Primary, under the General Law] this Piercing will be done by the Udgāt priest (as indicated by the name 'Audgātra');—similarly in connection with the Vājapēya, it is laid down that 'they offer it with the Ūṣapuṭa' (Shatapatha-Brā. 5. 2. 1. 16), and this offering will be done by the Adhvaryu (as indicated by the name 'Ādhvaryava'). [The 'Ūṣapuṭa' is the cup prepared out of leaves of the Ashvattha tree with dust taken from barren land, ūṣa.]

End of Pāda vii of Adhyāya III.

ADHYĀYA III.

PADA VIII.

ADHIKARANA (1): The 'purchasing' of services is the function of the Master of the Sacrifice.

SŪTRA (1).

THE 'PURCHASING' IS THE FUNCTION OF THE MASTER; AS THE PERFORMANCE IS FOR HIS PURPOSE.

Bhāsya.

There is the act of 'purchasing',—i.e. securing the services of Priests on the payment of certain Fees, such as 'twelve and hundred' at the Jyotistoma, the 'Anvāhārya' (Cooked Rice) at the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa and so forth [vide Taitti. Sam. 1. 7. 3. 1].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the Priests to be 'purchased' by the Adhvaruu or by the Master?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"on the strength of the Name ('Ādh-varyava', under which the 'Purchasing of Priests' is included), it should be done by the Adhvaryu".

The Siddhānta is as follows:—The 'purchasing' is the function of the Master;—why !—as the performance is for his purpose; i.e. it is the Sacrifice (Master of the Sacrifice) who desires to obtain the results [that are to follow from the performance of the Sacrifice];—in ordinary practice, when a man desires to obtain certain results from the performance of an act, he has to do that act himself;—if he 'purchases' (secures on payment) the services of other persons (to help him in the performance), he is regarded as doing it himself. Under the circumstances, if he were not to do the 'purchasing' [and if it were done by someone else], he would not be doing the main act himself.—From all this it follows that it is the Master that does the 'purchasing'.

SŪTRA (2).

IT COULD BE DONE BY OTHERS IN A CASE WHERE THERE IS A DIRECT DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāsya.

Question—Is then this the universal rule [that the 'purchasing' should be done always by the Master]?

Answer—Not so; it could be done by others in a case where there is a direct declaration to that effect. In a case where there is a direct declaration as to the person who is to do the 'purchasing' [i.e. to make payments for services rendered],—the 'purchasing' has to be done in accordance

with that declaration; e.g. there is the declaration—'Ya ātāmistakāmupadadhyāt sa trīn varān dadyāt' ['He who puts in this brick should give
three excellent things (cows)'] (Taitti. Sam. 5. 2. 8. 2). [Here the Parasmaipada ending in the word 'upadadhyāt' indicates that the 'placing'
of the bricks is to be done by a person other than the Master,—and it is
asserted that it is this same person that should give the 'three cows' to the
priest, in payment of services rendered by him.—So that in this particular
case, the 'purchasing' is done by a person other than the Master.]

[Sūtra (2) which embodies an exception to Sūtra (1), has been taken as a distinct Adhikarapa by itself—by Mandana Mishra and by Mādhavāchārya. Kumārila has included it under the first Adhikarapa, as above.]

Adhikarana (2): The 'Shaving of the Head' and other 'Embellishments' pertain to the Master of the Sacrifice.

SŪTRA (3).

[PURVAPAKŞA]—"INASMUCH AS THE EMBELLISHMENTS ADD TO THE CAPACITY OF THE PERFORMING PERSON, THEY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED (TO PERSONS) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VED (NAME),—JUST LIKE THE PERFORMING OF THE SEVERAL FUNCTIONS."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Jyotistoma, we read—'Kēshashmashrā vapatā; dato dhāvatē, nakhāni nikṛntatē, snātī' ['He shaves his head and beard, cleanses his teeth, pares his nails, and bathes'] (Taitti. Sarh. 6. 1. 1. 2).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the Embellishments like those here described to be done by the Adhvaryu or by the Sacrificer (Master)?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"They should be done by the Adhvaryu; as a matter of fact, Embellishments should be restricted in accordance with the Veda,—i.e. on the basis of Name,—just like the performance of functions by individual persons; that is, just as the other details are performed by that priest who bears the name that is given to the Vedie Sections under which these details are laid down [e.g. the Adhvaryu performs the functions laid down in the 'Adhvaryuava' Section of the Veda],—in the same manner, the Embellishments [should be performed by persons whose names are borne by the Vedie Section laying down the Embellishments]."

SŪTRA (4).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE EMBELLISHMENTS, LIKE THE PRINCIPAL ACTION, MUST PERTAIN TO THE SACRIFICER, AS HE IS THE PRINCIPAL PERSON CONCERNED.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the acts in question should be done by the Sacrificer;—why?—because he is the principal person concerned.—"What is the meaning of his being the principal person?"—The result of an action is always understood to be one that is aimed at by the performer of that action; hence what the Embellishments do is to bring about, in the person performing them, the capacity to perform the main act. No person, who seeks to bring about in himself the said capacity by the performance of a certain act,

ever secures the services of other persons for the performance of that act; in fact, he secures the services of others for the purpose of obtaining certain desirable things; the act that brings about a capacity in a person should always be done by that person himself; as is found in the case of the Principal Action; that is to say, as a matter of fact, all those Principal Actions which tend to produce results in the Person, are always performed by the Sacrificer himself; similarly in the case in question also [as the Embellishments in question also tend to bring about a capacity in the Sacrificer, they should be performed by the Sacrificer himself.

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE WORDS OF CERTAIN TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

We find such texts as—'Tamabhyanakti, sharēṣikayā'nakti' ['He anoints him', 'he anoints him with the arrow-stick'], where the verb is found in the Parasmaipada form, which clearly indicates that it is someone else that does the anointing for the Sacrificer [and the Anointing is an 'Embellishment'].

SŪTRA (6).

Further, the action in question has been spoken of as a subordinate factor.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the Pürvapaksin) that "the Embellishments should be restricted on the basis of Names, in accordance with the Veda". -But this is not right; because the action in question has been spoken of as a subordinate factor. As a matter of fact, we accept the Name as the determining factor only in cases where the action appears as the predominant factor.-i.e. as one for the performance of which the services of certain persons (priests) have to be secured; it is only in the case of such an action where the Men are subordinate to, and subserve the purposes of, the Action, which is the predominant factor that its performer is taken to be determined by the Name (of the Vedic Section in which the injunction of the action is found).-In the case of the Shaving of the Head and other Embellishments [which appear as subordinate to, and subserving the purposes of, the Man ,-if they were taken as related to (and pertaining to) the priests, then such a relation would have to be assumed, as in that case [the actions not standing in need of any such connection, being already connected with the Sacrificer]-those Embellishments would come in only as serving some transcendental purpose; while in the case of those acts (sacrificial details) as bear directly upon the sacrificial performance, their connection with those persons (priests) is already established (by the fact of their standing in need of performers; and hence it has not got to be assumed); —[the connection of the Embellishments with the Sacrificer is also one that is already established by the fact of their being spoken of as subordinate to, and subserving the visible purpose, cleanliness, of the Sacrificer];—and so long as an established relationship is possible, there can be no justification for the assuming of an unestablished one.—From all this it follows that in a case where the Man is the predominant factor [and the action is subordinate to him]. Name cannot be the determining factor (in the indication of the Performer for it).

SŪTRA (7).

ALSO BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN IN REFERENCE TO THE RESULTANT 'APURVA'.

Bhāsya.

By the term 'Chodanā' (in the Sūtra) we mean the resultant Apūrva (of the Primary Sacrifice); so that what the Sūtra means is that the Embellishments in question have been laid down in reference to the resultant Apūrva; and as it is not possible for them to be done by themselves without a material substratum (the thing to be embellished, without which there can be no Embellishment), they are taken as to be done to such things—and they could be done to, and be connected with, things remote from themselves, only if it were not possible for them to be done to, and be connected with, a thing in close proximity to them; and when it is possible for them to be done to a thing in close proximity to themselves, they should not be done to remoter things, as they will have their requirements fulfilled by being done to the nearer thing.—For this reason also the Embellishments should pertain to the Sacrifter (who is in close proximity to them).

SŪTRA (8).

On account of inequality, they could not be applicable equally [to all the persons].

Bhāṣya.

This Sūtra is to be taken as following upon a few words to be supplied [as embodying an argument answered by the Sūtra]; these words being—
"Why cannot the Embellishments be taken as applicable equally (to both, the Sacrificer as well as the Priests)? When they have not been laid down in special reference to any particular person, they should be applicable to every person".

The answer to this is that the Injunction of the Embellishments cannot apply equally to all persons.—"Why?"—Because of inequality; i.e. all the persons are not equally circumstanced in regard to the injunction in question.—"What is the inequality?"—The inequality lies in the fact that the Embellishments have been enjoined for the Sacrificer, not for the Priests.—"But how do you know that they are enjoined for the Sacrificer?"—From

the fact that when a man desires to accomplish an end by an act, he should do that act himself (see Sū. 3. 7. 18) .- "But as they are not enjoined in special reference to any particular person, they should be taken as enjoined for the Priests also."-We are of opinion that, as they cannot serve any useful purpose in connection with the priests, they cannot be taken as enjoined for them .- "Why is no useful purpose served by them in connection with the Priests?"-If they were done by (and to) the Priests, they would be acts that are neither done nor got done by the Sacrificer; for the simple reason that the services of the Priests have not been secured for the performance of those Embellishments; -- and if they were done by the Priests themselves, then they could not in any way benefit the person who stands in need [of aids to the fulfilment of the Sacrifice and the resultant Apūrva] :- and thus they would be entirely useless. This is the reason why they cannot be taken as enjoined for the Priests; - and this is what constitutes the 'inequality' (spoken of in the Sūtra) .- From all this it follows that the Embellishments cannot apply equally to all the persons.

Adhikarana (3): The Penances are to be performed by the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (9).

PENANCES ALSO [ARE TO BE PERFORMED BY THE SACRIFICER]; BECAUSE
THEY HELP IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE RESULT;—AS
IN ORDINARY LIFE.

Bhāşya.

Certain Penances are found to be enjoined—' He does not eat for two days', 'he does not eat for three days', and so forth.

In regard to these there arises the question—Are the Penances to be performed by the Priests? Or by the Sacrificer?

The $P\bar{u}rvapaksa$ view is that—"The Penances should be taken as to be performed by the Priests,—on the basis of the name [' $\bar{A}dhvaryava$ ', of that section of the Veda where the Penances are enjoined]".

The Siddhanta is as follows:-The Penances should be performed by the Sacrificer :--why ?--because they help in the accomplishment of the result; i.e. the Penances are performed with a view to the accomplishment of the result; as a matter of fact, a man obtains the results of a sacrifice only when he is equipped with Penances .- "How do you know this?"-The performance of Penances is painful; - pain is the direct consequence of sin ;-sin is an obstacle in the accomplishment of the result of sacrifices;sin is in fact conducive to evil, and so long as there is sin, no good can come about ;-hence it is necessary to remove it. Both Merit and Demerit are destroyed by the experiencing of their effects; hence it is that for the experiencing of pain as the result of sin, religious Penances are prescribed; the idea being that the pain experienced in the performing of the Penance is the effect of the sin (meant to be destroyed).-In this way the Penance comes to have a visible purpose, and no invisible (unseen) purpose has to be assumed.—Thus then, the (obstructing) sin having been destroyed by the experiencing of its effect (pain suffered in the performance of the Penance), the sacrifice becomes free from obstruction and thus brings about its result. [It is in this way that Penances help in the accomplishment of the Result.] -And the accomplishing of the result is what is to be done by the Sacrificer, not by the Priests. From this it follows that the Penances are to be performed by the Sacrificer.

SÜTRA (10).

THERE IS ALSO A SUPPLEMENTARY DECLARATION POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāsya.

This same conclusion is indicated by a supplementary declaration, which is to the following effect—' Yadā vai purusē na kinchana antarbhavati

yadā asya kṛṣṇam chakṣuṣo nashyati—atha mēdhyatamaḥ' ['When there is nothing inside the man, and when the pupil has disappeared, then is honst fitted for a sacrifice'],—which means that when he is fasting, then is he 'fit for mēdha' ('mēdhya'); now 'mēdha' is sacrifice, and 'sacrifice' consists in giving away; so that what the supplementary declaration quoted means is that 'by the Penance, the man is rendered fit for giving away'; and the person who gives away things is the Sacrificer (not the Priests).—From this also it follows that Penances are to be performed by the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (11).

It can be done by others, when there is an injunction to that effect.

Bhāsya.

Question—"Is it then the universal rule that all penances should be performed by the Sacrificer?"

Answer—No; it can be done by others when there is an injunction to that effect, i.e. when there is an injunction to that effect, then it should be done by the Priests; e.g. there is the injunction—'All the Priests fast' (in which case the fasting has to be done by the Priests).

SŪTRA (12).

Also because the Penance is a subordinate factor, the question of its performer cannot be determined by the name of the Vedic Section.

$Bh\bar{a}$ sya.

It has been argued that "on the basis of Name ('Adhvaryava', of the Vedic Section where the Penances are prescribed), the Penances should be taken as to be performed by the Priest (Adhvaryu)".—The answer to this is that, because the Penance is a subordinate factor, its performer cannot be determined by Name; as Name is regarded as the determining factor only in cases where the Man is the subordinate factor [which is not so in the case in question].

Or, the Sūtra may be explained in the following manner-

[By a second interpretation of this Sūtra, the Bhāṣya makes a separate Adhikaraṇa of it, which is as follows]—

Adhikarana (4): The 'Red Turban' and other similar details pertain to all the Priests.

SUTRA (12).

INASMUCH AS THEY ARE SUBORDINATE ACCESSORIES, THEIR CONNECTION
CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY THE 'NAME' OF THE
VEDIC SECTION

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

(a) In connection with the Shyēna sacrifice, we read—'Lohitoṣṇiṣā lohitavasanā rtwijaḥ pracharanti' ['Red-turbaned and red-clothed priests move about';—(b) similarly in connection with the Vājapēya sacrifice, we read—'Hiranyamālina rtwijaḥ pracharanti' ['Gold-necklaced priests move about'].

In regard to these there arises the question—(a) At the Shyëna, is it only the Udqdir priests who are to be 'red-turbaned' and (b) at the Vdjapbya, only the Adhvaryue who are to wear the golden necklace? Or, at both sacrifices, all the priests are to wear it?

The Pürvapakṣa view is that—"(a) On the strength of Name ['Aud-gātra' of the Veda where the Shȳðna is prescribed], the Udgātr priests alone are to wear the Red-turban at the Shȳðna,—and (b) on account of the Name ['Ādhvaryava' of the Veda where the Vājapēya is prescribed], the Adhvaryu priests alone are to wear the golden necklace at the Vājapēya".

The Siddhānta view is as follows:—Inasmuch as the things in question are subordinate accessories, their connection cannot be determined by the name of the Vedic Section; that is to say, being red-turbaned is a subordinate accessory,—so also is being gold-necklaced;—and the Man (Priest) is the predominant factor;—hence it follows that the Red Turban and the Gold-necklace are meant to be accessories (or appurtenances) of the Man, and not as something to be done; consequently the Man must be regarded as the predominant factor.—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then, there is the principle already accepted, that in cases where the Man is the predominant factor, the Name cannot be the determining factor in indicating the performer of the action concerned.

Further, from the fact of the articles being spoken of as the accessories of man, it follows that what is laid down pertains to all the men (concerned); because as a rule, whenever an accessory is laid down in close proximity to the predominant factors (of which it is an accessory), it means that it is laid down in connection with each one of the predominant factors;—and this all-round connection having been indicated by Direct Declaration,—how could it be restricted by a Name, even if there were a name !—From all this it follows that at each of the two sacrifices (Shyēna and Vājapēya), the accessory details like those under consideration are to be adopted by all the priests.

Adhikarana (5): The 'desire for rain' pertains to the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (13).

Similarly, the 'Desire' also [pertains to the Sacrificer]; BECAUSE IT IS HE THAT IS CONNECTED WITH THE PURPOSE (OF THE PERFORMANCE).

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

In connection with the Jyoiistoma, we read—'Yadi kāmayāt varṣēt parjanyah nichaih sado minuyāt' ['If he desire that Parjanya should rain, he should measure out the Assembly on low ground'].

In regard to this there arises the question—Is the 'Desire' mentioned here that of the Priest? Or of the Sacrificer? What the question means is—Who is the nominative to the verb 'kāmayēt' ('should desire')—is it the Adhvarup priest, or the Sacrificer?

The Pūrvapaksa view is that—"The desire should be taken as that of the Priest, because of the Name (of the Vedic Section); the indication of the Name is that the Person who is eager to obtain results from the sacrifice is the Adhvaryu priest, who is the person spoken of in the Context [after whose name the Section of the Veda has been named as 'Adhvaryava']; hence it is the Adhvaryu who is taken as syntactically connected with the verb 'minuyāt' ('should measure out');—from all this it follows that the 'desire' spoken of is that of the Priest.'

The Siddhanta is as follows: - Desire also should be like the Penance; that is, the Desire pertains to the Sacrificer .- "Why so?" -- Because it is he that is connected with the purpose of the performance; that is to say, it is understood that the Sacrificer is connected with the 'purpose' -i.e. the Result-of the Sacrifice as performed along with its accessory details.—Then again, in the case of the text 'Jyotistomēna svargakāmo yajēta' ['Desiring Heaven, one should perform the Jyotistoma Sacrifice'] the particular ending (Atmanepada in 'yajeta'),-makes it clear that the desire for 'heaven' is that of the Sacrificer; in the case in question, the peculiar ending (Parasmaipada) in 'minuyāt' makes it clear that the Adhvaryu is to do the measuring out for the sake of someone else (i.e. the Sacrificer). -It has been urged that-"by reason of Syntactical Connection (of the verb 'should desire') with the person appearing in the Context as the seeker for result [the Desire should pertain to the Adhvaruu]".—But even with this Syntactical Connection the sentence could be explained as 'In the event of the Sacrificer being desirous (of rain), the Adhvaryu should measure out, etc.'

SŪTRA (14).

IT CAN PERTAIN TO OTHERS, ONLY WHEN IT IS SPOKEN OF AS SUCH.

Bhāşya.

In a case where it is spoken of as such, the desire may be taken as pertaining to the Priest. For instance, there is the text—'Udata ātmanīvā vajamānāya vā yam kāmam kāmayatē tamāgāyati' ['The Udata' priest sings out that result which he desires for himself or for the sacrificer'].—Now here, if the term 'ātmanē' ('for himself') were to mean 'for the sacrificer', then there could be no justification for the adding of the term 'yajamānāya', or of the term 'vā';—hence it follows that by reason of the (separate) mention of the 'Sacrificer', the Udatar priest should be taken as speaking of himself (as desiring results).

ADHIKARANA (6): The Mantras beginning with 'Āyurdā' and the like are to be recited by the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (15).

THE MANTRAS ALSO WHICH ARE NOT CONNECTED WITH ANY ACTION,
ARE LIKE 'DESIRE' [I.E. THEY ARE CONNECTED
WITH THE SACRIFICER].

Bhāşya.

The Mantras that are meant to be considered here are those like the following—'Ayurdā agnā āyur mā dāhi', 'Varchodā agnā asi varcho mā dāhi' ['O Agni, you are the bestower of longevity, bestow longevity upon me']. [The Mantras are laid down as to be simply recited, not in connection with the performance of any sacrificial details.] (Taitti. Sam. 1. 5. 5. 4.)

In regard to these there arises the question—Are these to be recited by the Priest? Or by the Sacrificer?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"On account of the name (of the Vedic Section in which these Mantras occur), the Mantras should be taken as to be recited by the Priest".

The Siddhanta is as follows:-These Mantras should be like what has gone before; that is like 'desire' [they should be taken as connected with the Sacrificer; it is only thus that there would be justification for the presence in the Mantra of the term expressive of the speaker himself [i.e. the pronoun 'mē']. In the expressions 'bestow longevity upon me' and 'bestow glory upon me',-the terms 'longevity' and 'glory' stand for the result expected to follow from the performance undertaken,—the sense being 'O Fire, please accomplish the result of my action'.-- Now the result expected to follow from an action is spoken of only for the purposes of encouragement; and the person who is encouraged by it is the Sacrificer, no one else. As a matter of fact, the Fire (that is addressed in the Mantras) has not been kindled for the sake of the result that is to accrue from the performance to the Priest: as this result (being in the shape of the Sacrificial Fee payable to him) is already an accomplished entity; in fact, the Fire has been kindled for the sake of the result that is to accrue to the Sacrificer ; this result is not yet an accomplished entity, and is therefore to be spoken of as to be hoped for; and this encourages the Sacrificer and thereby tends to save the performance from becoming defective. Even when the Priest is encouraged by the prospect of (the Fee which is) an accomplished entity. he is so encouraged only in the performance which is to bring its reward to the Sacrificer; but the presence of the term expressive of the speaker himself could not be justifiable if the reciting were done by the Priest; the term expressive of the speaker himself retains its direct natural meaning only when the words are recited by the Sacrificer.-From all this it follows that the Mantras in question should be recited by the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (16).

Also because we find the Mantras being recited during the absence (of Fire).

Bhāsua.

As a matter of fact, we find similar Mantras being addressed during the absence of Fire,-when the man is away from home (and his Fire);-the Mantra being 'Iha ēva san tatra santam tvā agnē, etc.' ['While remaining here. I address thee, O Agni, who art there, etc.'] [where the words of the Mantra itself clearly indicate that the speaker is away from the Firel. man away from the Fires can never be a 'Priest': as the term 'priest' denotes one who is actually engaged in the sacrificial performance [and this can only be when the Fires are there]. As regards the Sacrificer, however, it is possible for him to be away from the Fire and still remain the 'Sacrificer': because it is possible for him to go away from home after having made suitable arrangements for his Agnihotra (daily offerings to his Fires); -then again, it is quite possible for a man living away from home to give away (dedicate) things (for being offered at a sacrifice).—The Mantra just quoted ('Iha ēva san. etc.') is just such a Mantra as is addressed to the Fire by one who is away from home; -this is indicated by the words of the Mantra itself, which, therefore, indicate that the Mantra is to be addressed by the Sacrificer:—and from this it follows that all Mantras of this kind are to be recited by the Sacrificer.

Adhikarana (7): Mantras occurring in two sections of the Veda are to be recited by both persons.

SŪTRA (17).

A MANTRA MENTIONED IN TWO PLACES IS TO BE RECITED BY BOTH
PERSONS; AS THE REPETITION OF THE MANTRA
MUST HAVE SOME PURPOSE.

Bhāsya.

There are the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices; in connection with these we find certain Mantras that are mentioned in two places—one in the section (Adhvaryava) dealing with the functions of the Adhvaryu, and then again in the section (Yūjamāna) dealing with the functions of the Sacrificer:—For instance, (a) the Mantras with which the Clarified Butter is taken up—Paāchānām vā vālānām yantrāya dhartrāya gṛhnāmi (Taitti. Sam. 1. 6. 1. 2) and so on, and (b) the Mantras with which the two Srucass are arranged—Vājasya mā prasavēna (Taitti. Sam. 1. 1. 13. 1) and so on.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are such Mantras to be reted by both (the Sacrificer and the Adhvaryu)? Or by the Adhvaryu alone?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"on the basis of Name ('Ādhvaryava'), the Mantras should be taken as connected with the Adhvaryu''.

The Siddhānta is as follows:—Both should recite the Mantras in question;—why?—because the repetition of the Mantra must have some purpose. Inasmuch as the Mantras have been named after both the persons, it follows that both are reciters of them; hence both should recite the Mantras;—the Adhvaryu reciting them with the intention of doing what is indicated by the words of the Mantras,—and the Sacrificer reciting them with a view to avoid carelessness and mistakes.

ADHIKARANA (8): The 'learned' Sacrificer alone is to be made to recite the Mantras.

SŪTRA (18).

It is only the learned man that is to be made to recite the Mantra; as the illiterate man is not entitled (to perform sacrifices).

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Vājapēya sacrifice, we read—(a) 'He makes the Sacrificer recite the Klṛpti Mantras' [The Mantras beginning with the words 'Ayuryajňēna kalpatām, etc.'—Vājasnēya Sam. 9. 21—are called 'Klṛpti Mantras'], and (b) 'He makes the Sacrificer recite the Ujjisatī-mantras [i.e. the Mantras beginning with the words 'Agnirēkākṣarēna'—Vājasa. Sam. 9. 31].

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are all Sacrificers, the learned as well as the illiterate, to be made to recite these? Or the learned ones only?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"both the learned and the illiterate should be made to recite the Mantras, as no distinction has been made between them".

The Siddhanta is as follows:—The learned alone should be made to recite the Mantras; -why ?-because the illiterate man is not entitled to perform sacrifices; as a matter of fact, the illiterate man is not entitled to perform sacrifices, for the simple reason that he has not the requisite capacity. -"At the time of the performance, he would learn the Mantras and then recite them; and having thus acquired the necessary capacity, he would be entitled (to the performance)."-That cannot be,-we say. Because the performance of sacrifices has been laid down as coming after the Veda has been studied, and the study of the Veda is not included under the text laying down the performance of sacrifices .- "How so ?"-Because it is without reference to any act or performance that it has been enjoined that 'the Veda should be studied'. And when we have this independent injunction of the study of the Veda, it cannot be assumed that the injunction that the Veda should be studied is expressed by such sentences as 'one should offer the Agnihotra'. Because all that this latter sentence lavs down is the offering of the Agnihotra libations, -and it follows that only one who has studied the Veda is entitled to perform the act,-not one who is entirely ignorant of the Veda .-- "By knowing how much of the Veda does a man become entitled to perform sacrifices?"-By knowing that much which, on being known, supplies him with the requisite capacity to perform the sacrifice as laid down in the scriptures. Thus it is only the man who knows that much of the Veda is entitled to the performance of a sacrifice.

Objection—"But the injunction that we have is that 'one should study the Veda', which means that the whole of the Veda is to be studied; so that by reading up merely a part of the Veda one cannot become entitled to the performance of a sacrifice."

Answer-The Veda has to be studied for the purpose of knowing all about sacrifices; such being the case, when one is going to perform a particular sacrifice, the knowledge of any other sacrifice could not serve any visible purpose; consequently in determining whether one is or is not entitled to the performance of any particular sacrifice, no heed need be paid to his knowledge of any other sacrifice; because for the knowledge of that other sacrifice, it would be necessary to study that portion of the Veda which deals with that sacrifice. With all this however, the study of the whole Veda has been enjoined, for the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of all the sacrifices one by one.-Hence we conclude that when a man knows all about the details of any one sacrifice he becomes entitled to the performance of that sacrifice. Under the circumstances, a man who is ignorant of the details of the sacrifice will not be able to perform that sacrifice at all: how then could there be any possibility of his being made to recite the Mantras ?- From all this it follows that it is right to say that it is only the learned person that should be made to recite the Mantras.

[Kumārila's remarks on this are interesting—'Such being the case, the knowing of the branches of knowledge other than the Veda proper would be very far from necessary for the due performance of sacrifices. But so far as the knowledge of the Self is concerned, inasmuch as without that knowledge one could not take up the performance of any sacrifice at all [as a sacrifice is always performed with a view to some benefit expected to accrue to the Person after the death of the physical body], it must be regarded as necessary for the performance of all sacrifices'.—Tantravārtika, Trans., p. 1678.]

Adhikarana (9): The twelve 'Double Acts' are to be done by the Adhvaryu.

SŪTRA (19).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—" Inasmuch as they are spoken of under the name 'Yājamāna' ['Pertaining to the Sacrificer'], the actions should be performed by the Sacrificer."

Bhāsua.

There are the Darsha-Pūrņamāsa sacrifices, in connection with which twelve actions (forming Six 'Couples') have been laid down—'He lets loose the calf; puts the boiling pot on the fire;—threshes the cour; strikes the pestle and mortar with Shamyā;—spreads out the flour; puts the baking pans on the fire;—bakes the cake; heats the clarified butter;—brings the Stambayajus and takes it up; touches the altar;—girds the loin of the Sacrificer's wife; collects the Prokṣuŋā and also the clarified butter;—these are the twelve Dvandvas (Double Acts) at the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa'. [Taitti. Sam. 1. 6. 9. 3-4.]

In regard to these actions, there arises the question—Are these to be done by the Adhvarna, or by the Sacrificer?

[This doubt arises from the fact that in the first place, every one of these acts is found to be enjoined in its proper place among the acts styled 'Adhvaryava',—
and then subsequently again they are spoken of under the name 'Yājamāna', where it is laid down that 'one should offer the sacrifice only after having accomplished all these acts'. As named 'Ādhvaryava', they should be done by the Adhvaryu; while as named 'Yājamāna', they should be done by the Yajamāna, Sacrificer. They cannot be done by both, like the reciting of the mantras dealt with under Sū. 3. 8. 17.—Bhāttaātpikā.]

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"Inasmuch as they are spoken of under the name 'Yājamāna', the actions should be performed by the Sacrificer: that is to say, by reason of their being given the specific name 'Yājamāna', it follows that they are to be performed by the Sacrificer; just as it is in the case of actions named 'Potriya' and 'Nēṣḥriya' [where by reason of these names, the acts are taken as to be performed by the Potr and the Neṣḥr priests respectively]".

SŪTRA (20).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the Adhvaryu [should perform them];
As he is engaged for the purpose (of performing such
actions); as regards the Name ('Yājamāna'), its
indication is to be accepted only in so

FAR AS IT HAS THE SUPPORT OF REASON.

Bhāsya.

In reality, the Adhvaryu should perform these actions; because it is for the performance of such actions that his services are secured; this

fact we deduce from the Name, inasmuch as all these details are found laid down in the section called ' $\dot{A}dhaaryava$ '; while what is mentioned in the section called ' $\dot{Y}\bar{a}jam\bar{a}na$ ' is only the 'coupling' of the actions,—his 'coupling' consisting in bringing together two actions.—Now if the Adhvarya were to perform the actions, and the Sacrificer were to bring them together,—this would be absolutely impossible. Hence what has to be done is that, on the ground of its being a subordinate factor, the idea of 'coupling' has to be set aside (ignored),—in accordance with the principle going to be enunciated under Sū. 12. 2. 25.—From all this it follows that the actions in question are to be performed by the Adhvarya.

As regards the argument that—"on the basis of the Name ('Yājamāna', the actions should be performed by the Sacrificer)",—this has got to be refuted; and the refutation is this:—The indication of Name is to be accepted only in so far as it has the support of reason; and in this case the only reasonable deduction that we could make from the Name 'Yājamāna' would be that 'in regard to these actions, the Sacrificer should say to the Adhvaryu—these actions have to be turned into couples—please therefore do this and that (naming the actions under consideration). In the case of a few of the actions under consideration, the permission of the Sacrificer has to be obtained (by the Adhvaryu); and as regards these, the name 'Yājamāna' may be due to this fact; but even so all notion of any transcendental result following from this should have to be given up.

It has been argued that—"as it is in the case of the names 'potriya' and 'negtriya', so should it be in the present case also".—The answer to this is that in the case of the names mentioned, it is only right that the actions should be done by the priests indicated; because the actions are indicated by the names as pertaining to the particular priests. In the case in question however, the conditions are different—the 'coupling' pertains to the Sacrificer, while the actions themselves pertain to the Adhearyu; hence there is no incongruity.

Adhikarana (10): The Hotr-priest should recite the 'Karana-mantra' assigned to the Adhvaryu.

SŪTRA (21).

When there is an impossibility (of reciting both), it is the
'Karaṇa-mantra' that should be recited (by the Hotr),
because of the peculiar relationship (between
the Hotr and the Mantra connected with
the Adbivaryu); as for the other Mantra,
someone else, from among the priests,
may recite it,—who may have a
special reason for doing it.

Bhāsya,

At the Jyotistoma, there is the Agnisomiya animal; for the tethering of this animal there is a sacrificial Post, round which a rope is entwined: and in connection with this entwining of the rope, there are two mantras recited-one, by the Adhvaryu, which is the 'Karana-mantra' (i.e. the Mantra by means of which the Entwining is done), and the other, by the Hotr, which is descriptive of the Entwining while it is being done,-the former being the Mantra beginning with 'Parivīrasi' (Taitti. Sarn. 1. 3. 6. 2), and the latter, the Mantra beginning with 'Yuvāsuvāsāh' (Rgveda 3. 8. 4).—The Kundapāyināmayana sacrifice is a 'modification' (or Ectype) of the Justistoma, and hence it takes in the said two Mantras by virtue of the general law (that the Ectype is to be done in the manner of the Archetype); and in regard to the two Mantras as to be used at this Kundanāvināmavana, there arises a doubt .- "What doubt can there be (and why)?"-At this sacrifice, there is a curtailment of the number of priests by reason of the declaration that at this sacrifice 'he who is the Hotr is also the Adhvaryu', so that [it being not possible for the two Mantras to be recited simultaneously, one by the Adhvaryu and the other by the Hotr, as there is no Adhvaryu at all] there arises the question-When the Hotr (who is also the Adhvaryu) is going to recite the Mantrais he to recite the Karana-mantra which (at the Jyotistoma) is recited by the Adhvaryu (i.e. the Mantra 'Parivirasi, etc.')? or the other Mantra descriptive of the Entwining while it is being done, which (at the Juotistoma) is recited by the Hotr?

The Pürvapaksa view is that "there can be no hard and fast rule on this point [i.e. it is open to the Hot; to recite either the one or the other]".

The Siddhinta is as follows:—There being an impossibility of both being recited, it is the Karana-mantra that should be recited by the Hot; that is, he should recite the mantra 'Parivirasi, etc.', which (at the Jyotistoma) is recited by the Adhvarya.—and not the mantra 'Yuvāsuvāsāh, etc.', which

is descriptive of the Entwining being done, and which (at the Juotistoma) is recited by the Hotr .- "Why so?" -Because of the peculiar relationship (between the Hotr and the mantra recited by the Adhvarya at the Justistoma): that is to say, there are two relationships borne by the Hotr—the first one is his relationship to the mantras connected with the Hotr (at the Juotistoma). which relationship, in the case of the Kundapāvināmavana, is indirect, being based upon the general law (that 'the Ectype is to be performed in the manner of the Archetype'), -and the second one is his relationship to the mantras connected with the Adhvaryu (at the Jyotistoma), which relationship is direct, being based upon the direct assertion that 'at the Kundapāvināmayana, one who is the Hotr, is also the Adhvaryu':—now this last assertion enjoins the Hotr, directly, to perform the functions of the Adhvaryu; and this perceptible Injunction is more authoritative than the one inferred (on the basis of the general law relating to the Archetype and the Ectype).—From all this it follows that the Hotr should recite the Karana-mantra, 'Parivirasi, etc.', which is connected with the Adhvaryu.

Question—"Who then would recite the mantra ('Ywnāsuvāsāh, etc.') which is connected with the Hoty, and the reciting of which by the Hoty is impossible under the circumstances?"

Answer—As for the other mantra, someone else, from among the priests, would recite it, who may have a special reason for doing it. That is to say, another priest, an assistant of the Hoty, may recite the other mantra,—any of them who may not be otherwise engaged at the time or to whom some sort of predominance might attach at the time.

Adhikarana (11): One who does the 'Directing' is different from one who carries out the directions.

SUTRA (22).

THE DIRECTINGS ARE TO BE DONE BY A DIFFERENT PERSON, BECAUSE DIRECTIONS ARE ALWAYS ADDRESSED TO OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

There are the Darsha-Pürnamäsa sacrifices; in connection with these the act of Directing has been laid down,—such directing for instance as—
'Bring the water-vessels;—place fuel and grass;—cleanse the Sruks;—
gird up the loin of the Sacrificer's wife;—come up with clarified butter'.

In connection with these directions, there arises the question—Is the person doing the directing the same as the one that does the acts directed to be done? Or is the director different from the person carrying out the directions?

The Pūrvapaksa view is as follows:--" The person directing and the person carrying out the directions are one and the same. - Why so ?- Because of the name ['Adhvaryava' under which both are included; hence both the acts are to be done by the Adhvaryu .- 'But the directing of one's own self is most incongruous.'-The answer to this is that it will not be a direction: we shall explain the Imperative Ending (Lot) as expressing the idea that the time for the action denoted by the root has arrived [i.e. the sentence 'bring the water-vessels' means 'it is time for the vessels to be brought up'].-Says the Opponent-'Even if the idea expressed be that the time has arrived, the use of the Second Person (in the verb) is restricted to the presence of such correlatives as 'you' and the like; and certainly there can be no mixing up of the First with the Second Person'. -The answer to this is as follows-The Second Person is restricted to the presence of such correlatives of 'you' only when the idea of 'you' is meant to be expressed; for instance, when the idea meant to be expressed is that 'the time for your doing the act has arrived', then alone the verb is to be used in the Second Person, -and it does not take either the First or the Third Person. When however all that is meant to be expressed is that 'the time for doing the action has arrived',-and not 'your doing', or 'my doing',-then the verb is not to take the Second Person, simply in accordance with the presence of such correlative words as 'you' and the like.—Nor is it possible for both these ideas to be meant to be expressed at the same time-that 'the time for the action has arrived' and that 'it is time for your doing it ';-as this would involve a syntactical split. Thus then there are only two possibilities-(I) the fact of the time for action having arrived being already known, the idea intended to be conveyed may be that 'it is your time to do the act',-or (2) the idea of 'your time' being already known, the idea intended to be conveyed is that 'it is time for the doing of the act'.—Now what is required to be declared (by a Vedic Injunction) is the time for the doing of the act,—not the time of 'you'; there is a useful purpose served by the remembrance of the time for action;—it is already known that 'the action is to be done' [hence there is some use in speaking of the time for it]; the object 'you', on the other hand, is not known as that 'it is to be done'.—From all this it follows that, on the basis of Name, the Adhvaryu alone is to do the directing as also to carry out the direction."

In answer to this we have the following Siddhānta:—The person doing the directing should be different from one who carries out the direction.—Why !—Because directions are always meant for others, as a matter of fact, a direction can be addressed only to another person, never to one's own self.—"We have already explained that the words would mean that 'the time has arrived'."—Our answer to that is that so long as it is possible for the Imperative word to be taken as a direction, it cannot be right to take it as expressing the idea that 'the time has arrived'; because in this latter case it has to be held that the idea of 'you', though clearly comprehended, is not meant to be expressed. In the case in question we find that it is possible to take the word as a direction; hence it must be a direction;—and if it is a direction, then it is established that what is directed to be done is something different [and should be done by another person].

ADHIKARANA (12): The 'Directing' and the 'carrying out of the Direction' are to be done by the Adhvaryu and the Agnidh respectively.

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" THE ADHVARYU SHOULD CARRY OUT THE DIRECTIONS; AS THIS IS SHOWN (BY VEDIC TEXTS)."

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

After the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing Adhikarana, there arises the further question—Is the Adhvaryu to direct the Agnidh? Or the Agnidh is to direct the Adhvaryu?

The apparent view appears to be that as nothing is specifically laid down, there can be no restriction as to who should direct whom.

As against this prima facte view, we have the following Pūrvapakṣa:—
"The Adhearyu should be the person who carries out the direction;—why?—because this is shown by Vedic texts; we have the following text indicative of the same conclusion—'Tirpahcham sphyam dhāruyīt, yadanvancham dhārayēt vajre vai sphyo vajrēna adhvaryum kṣinvīta' ['He should hold the Sphya obliquely; if he holds it horizontally, the Sphya, being the thunderbolt, he would destroy the Adhvaryu with the thunderbolt'] (cf. Taitti. Brā. 3. 2. 10. 1); this passage shows that the Sphya is in the hand of the person who does the directing; and the assertion that 'he destroys the Adhvaryu with the thunderbolt' indicates the Adhvaryu to be other than the person directing. From this it follows that it is the Agnidh who should direct the Adhvaryu.'

SŪTRA (24).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—IN REALITY THE TERM ['ADHVABYU', OCCURRING IN THE TEXT QUOTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'SPHYA'] IS TO BE TAKEN IN THE FIGURATIVE (INDIRECT) SENSE [AS STANDING FOR THE 'AGNIDH' PRIEST],—ON THE BASIS OF THE SIMILARITY OF THEIR FUNCTIONS.

Bhāşya.

It is not right that "the Agnidh does the directing, and the Adhvaryucarries out the direction"; the right view is that the Adhvaryu should direct the Agnidh, is in this way the directing as well as the carrying out of the direction would be done by the Adhvaryu [in the sense that the carrying out of the direction being done under his direction, it can be regarded as done by himself, though indirectly]; and this would be in keeping with the name 'Adhvaryava' [under which both the sets are included]. In this way then the Adhvaryu would be the predominant person.—" Where would his predominance lie?"-It lies in the fact that everything is to be done by him, on the basis of the Name (' Adhvaryava').—As regards the argument that "we find the Adhvaruu actually spoken of (in the text just quoted, regarding the holding of the Sphua) as the person carrying out the directions",-our answer to this is that it is true that we find him so spoken of : but when we come to think of it, we do not find any authority for the Adhvaryu being regarded as the person carrying out the directions (given by others); hence this view must be wrong; in fact, a view in support of which there is no authority, must be treated as an illusion; e.g. the notion in regard to shell that it is silver .- On the other hand, there is authority for the view that the Agnidh is the person to carry out the directions (given by the Adhvaryu); hence the Agnulh is the worker; and in the text quoted (in connection with the holding of the Sphua), the term 'adhvaruu' is really found to be used in the sense of the worker (and not of the Adhvaryu Priest), and hence in a figurative sense; so that it is the Agnidh priest who is spoken of as 'Adhvarm' on the ground that he is the person who will work out the details laid down in the Adhvaryara section of the Veda (under the direction of the Adhvaryu) .- From all this it follows that the directing is the function of the Adheavyu and the carrying out of those directions is the function of the Aanidh.

ADHIKARANA (13): The results spoken of in the 'Karanamantras' accrue to the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (25).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—"THE RESULT SPOKEN OF IN THE 'KARANA-MANTRAS' ACCRUES TO THE PRIEST; AS THEN ALONE CAN THE MENTION OF IT SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE.

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Darsha-Pürnamäsa, we read—'Mamägnë varcho vihovëşvastu—tit pürvamagnim grhnāti' ['Saying—O Agni, may glory be mine in contests—he first takes hold of the Fire'] ['Taitti. Sain. 4. 7. 14. 1). [Nyāyamālavistara explains the meaning as 'may that reward be mine which is endowed with the glory of excellent oblations'. The translation has adopted the meaning assigned to the mantra in the Bhāṣya itself—see below.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—The reward that is asked for,—does it accrue to the Priest or to the Sacrificer?

The Pūrvapaksa view is as follows:—"It pertains to the Adhvaryu Priest only.—Why?—Because this view is in keeping with the direct meaning of the text; any other view would necessitate the attributing of an indirect meaning to the text,—i.e. the self of the speaking Priest (expressed by the word 'mama', 'mine') would have to be taken as standing for the Sacrificer. From this it follows that what is asked for is a reward accruing to the Priest,—'What would be the meaning of the text in that case?'—The sense is—'If the Fire is held in this piece of fuel, the performance of the sacrifice will be possible, and thence, at all contests, in all cases of competition, I shall be glorious';—this is an assertion made by the Adhvaryu, and thereby he becomes encouraged."

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—IN REALITY, IT ACCRUES TO THE MASTER (SACRIFICER),— BECAUSE IT IS FOR HIS SAKE [THAT THE ACTION IS PERFORMED].

Bhāşya.

The reward spoken of accrues to the Sacrificer, because it is for his sake that the action is performed; as a matter of fact, the entire sacrifice, along with all its accessories and subsidiaries, is performed for the sake of the Sacrificer,—as is clear from the particular (Atmanēpada) ending [in the injunctive word 'yajēka' contained in the injunction 'Jyviskomēna

svargakāmo yajēta', 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice']. As a matter of fact, the purpose for which the sacrifice along with its accessories is performed is the accomplishment of the result desired by the Sacrificer,—not the glory or fame of the Adhvaryu, however well equipped the latter may be.—"What if that is so?"—If that is so, then the mention of the Result indicates that the Result should be brought about (worked for); that is to say, in the case in question, the fact that the Anvādhāna (Supplementary Laying) of the Fire should be performed becomes indicated by the mantra cited, only if it speaks of a result accruing to the Sacrificer,—not if it only speaks of the glory of the Adhvaryu priest.—From this it follows that what is asked for in the mantra is a result accruing to the Sacrificer.

Question—"In that case, why should not the mantra be recited by the Sacrificer himself?"

Answer—By virtue of the name ('Ādhvaryava'), the Supplementary Laying (Anvādhāna) of the Fire is a function of the Adhvaryu;—and as this Supplementary Laying of Fire is done by means of the said mantra, the mantra also comes to be regarded as 'Ādhvaryava' (i.e. recited by the Adhvaryu); and it is the Adhvaryu that is referred to in the mantra (by the term 'mama', 'mine'); hence it is that the mantra is recited by the Adhvaryu. In the phrase 'may glory be mine', it is the sacrificer's glory that is spoken of (by the Adhvaryu) as 'mine', figuratively; just as though the victory in a battle has accrued to the king, yet the soldiers speak of it as 'our victory'.

SŪTRA (27).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIONS TO THE SAME EFFECT.

Bhāsya.

There is an indicative text also, pointing to the same conclusion.—
There is the text—' Yām vai kānchana rīvija āṣhṣamāshāsatē yajamānasya
eva sā' ['Whatever benediction the Priests ask for, it verily accrues to the
Sacrificer'],—where it is shown that the benediction is for the Sacrificer.
—For this reason also we declare that the result that is spoken of accrues
to the Sacrificer. The purpose served (by this mention of the reward) is
exactly as pointed out in the Pūrvapaksa [i.e. it serves to encourage the
person concerned].

Adhikarana (14): Such results spoken of in the 'Karanamantras' as are helpful in the performance accrue to the Priest.

SŪTRA (28).

THE RESULT THAT IS HELPFUL IN THE PERFORMANCE ACCRUES TO THE PRIEST; AS EVEN SO, IT SERVES THE PURPOSE OF THE SACRIFICER.

Bhāsya.

It has been understood that the results spoken of in the 'Karanamantras' accrue to the Sacrificer .- The question that arises now is-Is this the universal rule [Is it always so] ?- The answer is-No: in some cases. the result spoken of accrues to the Priests; -i.e. in those cases where the result in question is helpful in the performance; for instance, there is the mantra- 'Aqnāvisnū māvakramisam vijihāthām māmā santāptam (Taitti. Sam. 1. 1. 12. 1). [This mantra is recited at the Darsha-Pürnamäsa. by the Adhvaruu, while he is holding near his navel the two Ladles filled with clarified butter; the meaning of the mantra is-' O Agni-Visnu, in the shape of the two Ladles, by holding you near my navel, I have not failed in my duty towards you,-may you not be separated from me, and may you also save me from becoming subject to heat and suffering', -Here, the result spoken of is freedom from the effects of heat:-now if this result accrues to the Adhvaryu Priest, and he does not suffer from heat, then he can perform his functions at the sacrifice in the proper manner. and the proper performance of the sacrifice thus secured is beneficial to the Sacrificer.—Thus in this case the result spoken of is one that accrues to the Priest.

SŪTRA (29).

Also where there is a direct assertion [to that effect].

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

Also in a case where there is a direct assertion to that effect, the result is to be taken as accruing to the Priests.—For instance [at the Jyutiştoma] under the southern Havirdhāna Cart, there are four one-span-mouthed holes, removed from each other by one Prādesha (six inches) [joined together at the bottom];—the Adhvaryu puts his hands into these, and says to the Sacrificer 'What is there in this?',—the other (i.e. the Sacrificer) says 'Prosperity';—then the Adhvaryu says—'May it accrue to both of us together'. [These questions and answers are embodied in the mantra 'Kimatra—bhadram—tannau saha', which occurs in Taitti. Sam. 1. 3. 2. 1.]—Now here we find

that there is a direct assertion to the effect that the result spoken of (Prosperity) accrues to the Adhvaryu as well as the Sacrificer:—the phrase 'tannau saha' clearly referring to both the persons, the Adhvaryu and the Sacrificer. Consequently it has to be admitted that in this case the result spoken of accrues to the Adhvaryu (also).

Adhikarana (15): The 'Embellishments' of substances subserve the purposes of the Primary as well as the Subsidiary Sacrifices.

SŪTRA (30).

The Embellishment of a substance appertains to all sacrifices;
as there is no difference in the Context.

[The cases of conflict among Direct Assertion, Indicative Power and the rest having been dealt with, it is now going to be shown that the conclusions arrived at are applicable not only to Primary Sacrifices, but also to their Subsidiaries and Modifications.]

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Darsha-Pürnamäsa, there have been laid down many details relating to (preparatory of) the Grass, and others relating to the Altar.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these subserve the purposes of (are helpful to) the Primary as well as its subsidiaries? Or of the Primary only?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"by virtue of the Context, they should be helpful to the Primary only".

The Siddhānta is that it is not so; the Embellishment of substances subserves the purposes of the Primary as well as its subsidiaries, as has been already explained above (under Sū. 3. 7. 1 et seq.). [Though this has been already explained before, yet] it has been brought in here as leading up to what follows.

[According to the Tantravärtika, what is said here relates to the Primary and its Modifications; it remarks that what has been said before, under Sü. 3. 7. I et seq., is that the details appertain to the Primary as well as its subsidiaries; and the present Sütra has been introduced simply for the purpose of showing that the same conclusion holds good regarding the Modifications also.—From the last sentence of the Bhārya slao it is clear that the reiteration of the conclusion is meant to be introductory to what follows,—and what follows is the connection of the Details of the Primary with its Modifications—not subsidiaries; so that the present Abhikarana should really be taken in the way in which the Tantravärtika has taken it.—It is curious, that the wording of the Sütra is clearer than that of the Bhārya, as therein it is clearly stated that they are for 'all sacrifices', which includes the Primary. its subsidiaries as well as its Modifications.]

Adhikarana (16): The details peculiar to the Primary do not find place in its 'Modification'.

SŪTRA (31).

Inasmuch as they are laid down as relating specifically to the Primary Original, they should have no place in the 'Modification'.

Bhāsya.

In course of the Jyotiştoma there is the Agnīşomīya Animal [the animal defeated and sacrificed to Agnī-Soma], the sacrificing of which is laid down in the text—'Yo dūkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhatē' ['On being initiated, the man sacrifices the animal dedicated to Agnī-Soma'] (Taithi. Sath. 6. 1. 11. 6); in connection with the killing of this animal, we read 'Barhiṣū yūpāvaṭamavasṭrūāti, ājyēna yūpamanakti' ['He covers the pit of the Post with grass; he anoints the Post with clarified butter'].

In regard to this latter, there arises the question—Should the details, laid down in connection with the Grass and Clarifed Butter used at the Primary Original Sacrifice (Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa), be performed in connection with the Grass and Clarified Butter used for covering the pit and anointing the Post at the 'Modificatory Sacrifice' (Agrisomiya) ?—or not?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"They should be performed at the Modification.—Why?—The sentence that lays down the details in question (in connection with the Primary), lays them down for all grass and all clarified butter;—that sentence is applicable to the Modification also, by the general law (that 'the Modification is to be performed in the manner of the Primary Original');—nor are the Grass and Clarified Butter used at the Modification useless;—hence it follows that the said details are to be performed in connection with these latter also."

The Siddhanta, in answer to this, is as follows:-Inasmuch as they are laid down as relating specifically to the Primary Original, they should have no place in the Modification. As a matter of fact, the details in question have been laid down in relation to the Primary Original, at which they help in the fulfilment of what is done with the Grass and the Clarified Butter, at that Primary Sacrifice. Those details alone of the Primary Original are transferred to the 'Modification' which are of use in the latter [and not all the details of the Primary]. But what the general law (relating to Modifications) requires (for its operation) is the Primary Original itself (whose procedure the law transfers to the Modification), and not its details; because what is transferred by the general law (to the Modification) is the general outline of the Primary, and not the details. [For if all the details of the Primary were to come into the Modification, then the result would be that the Primary Sacrifice would come to be performed all over again--- says the Tantravārtika. 1

Further, a detail cannot be syntactically connected with one thing, even though it be in close proximity to it, when it is known to be appurtenant to something else,-at least so long as it is possible to connect it with that something else; for instance, in the case of the expression 'Bhāryā—rājñah—puruso—dēvadattasya' [where it being known that the 'bhāryā' 'wife', spoken of is that of Devadatta, we cannot connect that word with 'rājñah' 'of the king',-even though the two words are in juxtaposition]:-when such connection is not possible between two things in juxtaposition, how much less possible is it, my friend, in the case where the things are remote from one another ?-In the case in question the accessory character of the details is recognised only in relation to the Primary Original; and it is more transference that is done in connection with the Modification. If the details were all to come into the Modification, then it would be necessary also to establish their accessory character (in relation to the Modification); and all the required details in that case would be common to the Primary and the Modification, and there would be no occasion for any uha or alteration in the details (in consideration of the exigencies of the Modification); -further mantras would be adopted in accordance with the indicatives that might be found in each case; and there would be no room for any such specification of details as 'they offer the omentum at the Morning Extraction, the Cake at the Midday Extraction '.--or as 'The Father does not increase, nor the Mother, nor the Kin,-it is Prana alone'.-From all this it follows that the details should be performed at the Modification only through those things through which they have been performed at the Primary Original; -now, there is no 'covering of the pit of the Post' at the Original Sacrifice, nor the 'anointing of the Post' [through and to which the details regarding the Grass and the Butter could have been performed at the Original]; consequently it follows that those details of the Original Sacrifice cannot be performed at the Modification (Agnisomiya),—being related specifically, as they are, to that Primary Original.

Adhikarana (17): The 'Vidhrtis' and the 'Pavitras' are not to be made out of the Grass got for spreading over the Altar;—they may be made out of the 'Pavibhojanīya' Grass.

SŪTRA (32).

In view of a Vedic declaration, there would be an impossibility; hence the other cases must remain undefined.

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa, we read (a) 'Samān aprach-chhimāgrau darbhau prādeshamātrau pavitrē karoti'; and again (b) 'Aratni-mātrē vidhṛtē karoti' [(a) 'He makes two Pavitras of two pieces of Kusha-grass, ist inches in length, equal and with their tips uncut', (b) 'He makes two Vidhṛtis of two pieces of Kusha-grass, 18 inches long.']

In regard to this there arises the question—Are the Pavitras and the Vidhrtis made out of the grass that has been got for spreading over the Altar?—or out of some other grass?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"they should be made out of the grass got for spreading over the altar.—'Why so?'—Because it is that grass which has been spoken of in the Context, and the purificatory details also appertain equally to all kinds of grass;—hence the Pavitras and the Vidhytis should be made out of the same grass".

In answer to this, the Siddhānia is as follows:—They should be made out of other grass.—"Why?"—Because of impossibility.—"How is there an impossibility?"—There is a Vedic declaration to the effect that 'He spreads the grass over the altar thrice or five times'; if this spreading is done in this manner, how could any Vidhṛti or Pavitra be made out of the grass that is so spread out? It is, in fact, not possible that one and the same grass should be used for spreading and also for making the Vidhṛti and the Pavitra. Thus then there would be two mutually incompatible statements—(1) the direct declaration (regarding the spreading of the grass over the altar three or five times) and (2) the statement that several uses could be made out of that same grass.—From this it follows that the Vidhṛti and the Pavitra should not be made out of the grass got for spreading over the altar.

"If not out of that, then whence?"-

Well, as regards the uses of grass (other than the spreading over the Altar), it would always remain undefined as to which particular grass is to be used; or it may be done out of the grass named 'Paribhojaniya', which is there.

Adhikarana (18): The 'keeping' is to be done of that same Cake and other things which have been spoken of and used at the sacrifice.

SŪTRA (33).

THE 'KEEPING' IS TO BE OF A PORTION (OF WHAT HAS BEEN USED AT THE SACRIFICE); AS IN THAT CASE, THERE IS CONNECTION OF WHAT IS ALREADY THERE

Bhāsua.

In connection with the Jyotistoma we read—'Puroḍāshashakalam aindravāyavasya pātrē nidadhāti, dhānā āshvinapātrē, payasyām maitrā-varunapātrē' ['He keeps the cake-piece in the Aindravāyava vessel, the fried barley in the Āshvina vessel, and the Payasyā in the Maitrāvaruņa vessel'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are these to be kept out of the substances that have been used at the sacrifice? Or out of others?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"according to the principle of the foregoing Adhikaraṇa, they should be kept out of substances other than those used at the sacrifice".

In answer to this, the Siddhanta is that the keeping is to be of a portion of what has been used at the sacrifice ;-why ?-because in that case there is connection of what is already there. That is to say, the Cake, the Fried Barley and the Curds being already there, the most reasonable course is that what is to be done should be done in connection with those. not in connection with other substances.-Another reason for the same conclusion is that the 'embellishment' (brought about by the 'keeping') must appertain to the Cake and other substances, not of the Aindravaugva and other vessels,-"Why?"-Because we find the Accusative ending in the words denoting those substances.-Then again, the betterment (embellishment) that is perceived (in the Cake, etc.) is that brought about by the 'keeping of a portion', not by connection with the Aindraväyava and other vessels.-Lastly, it is only when the 'keeping' is done out of the substances used at the sacrifice that there is some good done to those substances.-For these reasons, the 'keeping' should be done in reference to the substances used at the sacrifice.-This should not be open to the objection that "this involves the enjoining (of the keeping) of what has been already enjoined (as to be offered into Fire), and also the anomaly of one and the same thing occupying the position of several kinds of subservience": -- because the piece offered into the Fire would be entirely different from the piece that is 'disposed of' (by being kept in the vessels).

Adhikarana (19): The 'silence' enjoined in connection with the 'Kāmya Istis' serves the purposes of the Principal Sacrifice only.

SŪTRA (34).

[PGRVAPAKSA]—"THE ACCESSORY DETAIL PERFORMED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'MODIFICATION' SHOULD SERVE THE PURPOSES OF ALL,—JUST LIKE THAT LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY."

Bhāsua.

We have the following text—'Yajñātharvanam vai kāmyā istayaḥ tā upāmshu kartavyāḥ' ['The Istis with a purpose pertain to the Sacrificial Atharvan,—they should be performed silently (inaudibly)'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this silence meant to be helpful in the Principal as well as the Subsidiary? or in the Principal only?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"the accessory detail performed in connection with the 'Modification' should serve the purposes of all,—i.e. of all Principals and all Subsidiaries; as there is no discrimination,—just like that laid down in connection with the Original Primary; that is, just as (under Sū. 3. 7. 1 et seq.) it has been decided that the details enjoined regarding the Altar and those regarding the Clarified Butter appertain to (and are helpful at) the Principal as well as the Subsidiaries,—so should it be in the present case also".

SŪTRA (35).

[Siddhanta]—In reality, it serves the purposes of the Principal Sacrifice only; as it has not been enjoined in connection with the Subsidiary at all.

Bhāṣya.

The particular detail in question (i.e. silence) observed at the subsidiaries, should be regarded as serving the purposes of the Principal Sacrifice.—If it were taken as being for all the sacrifices, it could be so taken only by setting aside the indication of the 'Context' (whereby it should be restricted to the Principal only), on the strength of 'Syntactical Connection' which connects the silence with the Principal as well as the subsidiaries. But we find that in the present case the 'Syntactical Connection' has been qualified by the qualifying adjunct 'Isis with a purpose'; and as a matter of fact it is the Principal Sacrifices that are 'with a purpose' (i.e. with a view to attaining certain rewards), and the subsidiaries only serve the

purpose of helping the Principals (in the fulfilment of the purpose of the latter) [and they do not serve any independent purposes of their own, not bringing any rewards apart from those brought about by the Principals],—and for this reason, what is laid down ('silence') cannot be regarded as enjoined in connection with the subsidiary at all; because what is meant to be related to the procedure of silence is only that sacrifice which has been enjoined as bringing about a desirable result [which alone can be called 'Kāmya Işti', 'Iṣti, or sacrifice, with a purpose'].—From this it follows that the 'silence' is meant to serve the purposes of the Principal Sacrifice only.

ADHIKARANA (20): The 'butter' is to be used as 'ājya' at the subsidiaries of the Shyēna sacrifice.

SŪTRA (36).

On account of the impossibility (of its being used at the Principal Sacrifice), it should be used at its subsidiaries; specially by reason of the peculiar connection.

Bhāsya.

In connection with the Shyēna sacrifice, we read—' Drtinavan̄tamājyam' ['The $\bar{A}jya$ to be used is the Butter stored in a leather bag'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this Butter to be used at the Principal (Shyēna) sacrifice itself? Or at its subsidiaries?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"it is to be used at the Principal Sacrifice; because the Context pertains to that; hence on the strength of the Injunction, it is the Principal Sacrifice that should be performed with Butter as the substance used".

In answer to this we have the following Siddhanta: -On account of the impossibility of its being used at the Principal sacrifice, it should be used at its subsidiaries, -i.e. at the subsidiaries of the Shyena sacrifice .- "Why should there be an 'impossibility' (of its being used at the Principal itself) ?"-Because the substance actually used at the Principal is the Soma-juice [the Shuēna being a 'modification' of the Jugistoma].—" But on account of the Injunction (under consideration), Butter would be the substance used at it".-The meaning of the Injunction is not that 'Butter is to be used at the Shyena', -but that "At the Shyena, the Ajya to be used is Butter'; so that what is enjoined is the peculiar relationship (of original and substitute) between 'Aiya' and 'Butter',—and the connection between the 'Ajya' and the Shyena sacrifice is only referred to. As a matter of fact, however, there is no direct connection between the Shyena and the ' $\bar{A}jya$ '; while there is a direct connection between the ' $\bar{A}jya$ ' and the subsidiaries of the Shyena. So that the use of the 'Butter' must be taken to be enjoined in reference to (i.e. in the place of) the ' $\bar{A}jya$ ', at that sacrifice with which the Aiya has had some connection; this is what is meant by the phrase (in the Sūtra), 'specially by reason of the peculiar proximity (connection)'

SŪTRA (37).

"THE SAME MAY BE THE CASE WITH FIRE-LAYING", —IF THIS BE URGED (THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING SÜTRA).

Bhāsya.

The following view may be taken—"If Fresh Butter is to be used at the subsidiaries of the Shyēna, then it would also be used at the Pavamāna

Istis performed in connection with Fire-laying; because these Istis also are helpful to the Shyēna, the Shyēna being performed in the Fire consecrated by means of those Istis [so that in this sense these Istis would be 'subsidiaries of the Shyēna'; consequently Butter should have to be used at these Istis also]".

SŪTRA (38).

That cannot be; because these (Iṣṭis) do not appear in the context of the Shyëra, and the fact of one act being subsidiary to the other depends upon that [i.e. its appearing in the Context of the latter].

Bhāsya,

As a matter of fact, neither the Pavamāna Istis, nor even Fire-laying are found mentioned in the Context of the Shyōna,—"What then !"—If it is so, then there is no direct connection between Fire-laying and Shyōna,—the 'Laying' being of the Fire, and the Fire being connected with the Shyōna; so that there could be no reason for Butter being used among the substances used at the Pavamāna Istis (which are performed at the Fire-laying).—The mere fact of the Laying being of use to the Fires does not make the Laying a subsidiary to the Shyōna; there would be a ground for regarding it as a subsidiary to it only if such were the indication of anyone of the six means of knowledge, 'Context' and the rest. [And since there is no such ground] therefore it follows that there is no connection between the Shyōna and the Laying (of Fire), [and there is no reason for Butter being used at the Laying of Fire),

Adhikarana (21): Butter is to be used as ' $\bar{A}jya$ ' at all subsidiaries of the Shyēna.

SŪTRA (39).

[PÜRVAPAKŞA]—["THE BUTTER SHOULD BE USED] ONLY AT THE TIME
[OF JUICE-EXTRACTION]; BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIONS
TO THAT REFECT.

$Bh\bar{a}sya.$

The question that arises now is—Is the Butter to be used at only those subsidiaries of the Shyēna which are performed at the time of Juice-Extraction? Or at all subsidiaries of the Shyēna?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"It should be used at only those subsidiaries that are performed at the time of the Juice-Extraction, because we find indications to that effect. For instance, we have the text—'Saha pashinālabhatē' ['He kills the animals together'], and then again, the declaration—'In place of the Agnisomiya animal, there should be the Agnisomiya Cake, and in place of the Anubandhyā animal, the Maitrāururuşa Cake;' these texts point to two vacant places (for which substitutes are provided). From this we understand that the declaration in regard to the use of Butter at the Shyēna sacrifice lays down a peculiarity in regard to the subsidiaries performed at the time of the Juice-Extraction. [If Butter were to be used, then there could not be any vacant places at all]".

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE USED AT ALL THE SUBSIDIARIES, AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

Butter should be used at all the subsidiaries of the Shyēna;—why?—because there is no distinction. Inasmuch as we find no grounds for making a distinction, Butter should be taken as to be used at all the subsidiaries of the Shyēna sacrifice.

SŪTRA (41).

As for 'indications', they can be accepted only when they are in accordance with Reason.

$Bh\bar{a}sya$.

The argument urged upon the basis of 'indications' has to be rebutted. There is no authority (or evidence) to show that what is asserted regarding

Butter to be used at the Shyēna applies to only those subsidiaries that are performed at the time of the Juice-extraction; all that is put forward in support of it is that "we perceive indications to that effect'.—But as a matter of fact, perception, not based upon evidence (valid means of knowledge), is wrong perception, as it is in the case of the mirage.—"How then is there to be the killing of animals in the middle of an action?"—Because of Reason.—"What is the reason?"—The reason lies in the fact that by so doing, we retain the order of sequence; i.e. by so doing the right order of sequence is followed, even in the absence of a direct injunction to that effect.—From all this it follows that the Butter is to be used at all the subsidiaries of the Shuēna.

[It is a well-known fact that such Indications can be regarded as authoritative only with regard to such subjects as are amenable to reasoning. The case in question however is one amenable to Verbal Authority only. The killing together of the animal is to be done at the time of the juice-extraction, not because it is an accessory enjoined with special reference to that time,—but because of a reason pointing to that conclusion, which however does not apply to the case of the Butter. This reasoning is as follows—There is an order of sequence which, in the absence of any injunction, appears in the form of proximity; and this order of sequence would be followed if the other details are connected with the time of piuce-extraction.—In this way, when the animals come to be killed at the time of the Savanīya, the time of no animals would be passed over.—Tantravērtika.]

ADHIKARANA (22): Only the 'Savanīya' Cakes should consist of flesh.

SŪTRA (42).

FLESH SHOULD BE USED IN PLACE OF THE 'SAVANIYA' CAKES ONLY, BECAUSE OF THE SPECIFIC INJUNCTION.

Bhāsya.

There is the sacrifice called 'Shākyānāmayana' (the sacrifice of the Shākyas), which continues for thirty-six years.—In connection with this we read—'At the close of each day, the Master of the House goes out hunting, the animals that he kills there, the flesh of those go to make up the Savanīya Cakes'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is flesh to take the place of the Savaniya as well as all the possible Cakes? Or of the Savaniya Cakes only?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"All the Cakes should consist of flesh; it is not possible for the same sentence to enjoin the fact of the Cakes consisting of flesh, and also to specify those Cakes by means of the word 'Savanīya'; as in so doing, there would be a syntactical split. Hence we conclude that all the Cakes are to consist of flesh".

In answer to this we have the following Siddhānta—Flesh should be used in place of the Savaniya Cakes only; because the words of the text— 'the flesh goes to make up the Savaniya-Cake; and the phrase 'the flesh becomes the Cakes' is a mere reference to the same.—"How is this so?" It is so because the term 'Savaniya' could not be taken as referring to all Cakes; while the term 'Cake' can very well be taken as referring to the Savaniya Cake; it is for this reason that the term 'Cake' is taken as containing a reference (not an Injunction).—From all this it follows that flesh is to be used in place of the Savaniya offerings, fried barley, etc.—because of the specific injunction.

SŪTRA (43).

"Recourse to indirect (figurative) signification cannot be eight, when there is no proximity".—If this is urged [Then the answer would be as given in the following Süyral.

$Bh\bar{a}$ şya.

If you argue as follows—"It has been said that the term 'Cake' would contain a reference to the Savanīya offerings;—but as a matter of fact the

term 'Cake' is never used in the sense of *Fried barley* and such things; and so long as a word can be taken in its direct (natural) sense it cannot be right to take it in an indirect (figurative) sense",—[then our answer is as follows].—

SŪTRA (44).

It is possible [to take the word in its indirect figurative sense, of indicating the 'Savaniya' offerings]; as it is so indicative in connection with the original primary sacrifice;—just as in the case


OF THE 'VAIRĀJA' Bhāsya.

In connection with the original Primary sacrifice, Juotistoma, we find the term 'Cake' used in its secondary sense and applied to the Fried Barley and similar things: on account of its being used in close proximity (to the names of these things); in the case in question also, it may be taken to be similarly used; because here also the 'Cakes' are in close proximity to the term 'Savaniya'. Then again, in connection with the Original Primary, the word is applicable by reason of the presence of indicatives; it is the same in connection with the 'Modification' also; just as we have such expression as 'Chhatrino gachchhanti', 'Dhvaiino gachchhanti' (where men holding the umbrella and the flag are called 'Chhatrin' and 'Dhvajin' because of the presence of the umbrella and the flag which are indicative marks], -Similarly in the expression 'Ukthyo vairūpasāmā čkavinshah sodashī vairājasāmā' ['In the Ukthya, the saman is the Vairupa with twenty-one stomus, and in the Sodashin, the saman is Vairāja'l, by reason of the original indicative in the shape of the word 'Sāman', the Vairāpa-nrstha and the Vairājaprestha are understood to be meant [by the words 'vairupa-sama' and 'vairāja-sāmā'; where the terms 'vairupa-sāma' and 'vairāja-sāmā' are taken as indirectly and figuratively indicating the Vairūpa-pṛṣṭha and Vairāja-pṛṣṭha]. In the same manner, in the case in question, the Savanīya offerings are understood to consist of flesh.

End of Pāda viii of Adhyāya III.

End of Adhyāya III.

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SHABARA-BHĀSYA

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